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11 FOREWORD 
Regional intergration continues to figure prominently in the debate on improving 
the economic outlook in Africa. There is a broad consensus that regional integration can 
contribute to  sustainable growth via increased competition and efficiency.  It also 
integration is a way to improve participation of  small economies in the world trading 
system.  Because of  these important positive effects,  regional integration is  a central 
element of  the Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000, between the A CP countries and 
the European Union. 
Despite its recognised potential,  the record of  regional integration in Africa has 
been to be below expectations. Clearly, regional integration is not a panacea; it needs to 
be complemented by sound macroeconomic policies and other requirements such as 
structural stability, good governance and prevalence of  the rule of  law.  A key success 
factor is ownership of  integration policies by the development actors, particularly the 
private sector. Actual implementation of  regional integration initiatives has often been 
delayed and sometimes been reversed. The Cross-Border Initiative to Facilitate Trade, 
Investment and Payments in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (CBI), 
right  from its inception in the early 1990s, has addressed the pre-conditions  for successful 
regional integration, particularly the consistency of  national and regional policies and 
the involvement of  the private sector. The initiative focused on the practical constraints 
that limit beneficial cross-border economic activities. It is a result of  broad collaboration 
between governments willing and ready to  subscribe to  policy reforms,  economic 
integration organisations in Eastern and  Southern Africa and  four co-operating  partners: 
the African Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund,  the World Bank and 
the European Commission. 
The CBI was neither a new institution, nor a new trading bloc, nor an alternative to 
structural adjustment. A number of  special  features of  the CBI deserve to be highlighted. 
Amongst these is the emphasis on outward orientation as a challenge and an opportunity 
to  regional integration initiatives undertaken in  Sub-Saharan Africa. In  addition,  the 
need  for consistency between national-level work, including structural adjustment, and 
the programmes of  the regional organisations, hfs been underlined. The CBI reforms 
were, in fact, conceived through a decentralised process by national Technical Working 
Group (TWGs),  comprising representatives from both the public and the private sector, 
111 in collaboration with the regional organisations, co-operating partners and  pan-African 
institutions.  Government ownership of  the programmes and private sector involvement 
were thus priorities right  from the start. In addition, the initiative is based on reciprocity 
and a  "variable speed" approach by which countries that are willing and able to 
implement measures can go ahead, encouraging others to follow when they are ready. In 
this way "peer pressure" plays a prominent role. 
Backed by these special features,  the  initiative advanced steadily.  From  the 
identification of  common constraints and the first recommendations of  the  TWGs  in 
1992,  the CBI moved to the ministerial endorsement in 1993 of  a Concept Paper.  This 
Concept Paper included a Common programme of  Action that was the basis of  country-
specific programmes (Letters of  CBI Policy). Subsequently, CBI  participants  formulated 
an approach for the harmonisation of  external tariffs. 
By the time of  the Fourth Ministerial Meeting in October 1999, virtually all of  the 
fourteen countries, which initially expressed interest in the initiative, had accomplished 
good progress in  the  implementation of the  CBI agenda.  While  recognising the 
considerable progress achieved in the implementation of  the initial trade and trade related 
agenda, the Ministerial Meeting adopted a "Road map for Investment Facilitation". It 
·was underlined that the essential conditions for attracting investment include peace and 
political stability, good political and corporate governance,  macroeconomic stability, 
continued trade liberalisation and investment deregulation.  Such policies would also 
create an  environment in  which capital could return to Africa.  The  countries further 
recognised that actions were needed in areas such as tax reform, judicial and institutional 
reform, privatisation and improved infrastructure. As  far as the management of  the CBI 
process is concerned,  the participating countries wished to mark their assimilation of 
the CBI agenda by changing the name from  CBI to  the Regional Integration F arum 
(RIFF).  This change in name also recognises a more marked leadership of  the process 
by the participating states. 
As the process moves forward and the number of  participant countries increases, 
the issues will undoubtedly become more complex and the commitment of  the participating 
countries ever more crucial.  The papers included in  this  Volume  demonstrate the 
continuing relevance of  the initiative for policy-makers and the growing capacity of  the 
TWGs to provide them with the necessary support to achieve the objectives of  the CBI/ 
RIFF and,  beyond that,  to contribute to the sustained development of  the region. 
iv 
f~ 
Koos Richelle 
Director-General for Development 
European Commission ADF 
AEC 
ARSO 
ASYCUDA 
BAD 
BEAC 
CE 
CCZEP 
CEPGL 
CMA 
COl 
CO  MESA 
CPA 
EAC 
EADB 
EC 
ECA 
GLOSSARYOFABBREVIATIONS 
African Development Bank 
African Economic Community 
African Regional Standards Organisation 
Automated System for Customs Data 
Banque Africaine de Developpement 
Banque des Etats d'  Afrique Centrale 
Commission Europeenne 
Chambers de Compensation de la ZEP 
Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs 
Common Monetary Area (Rand zone) 
Commission de I'Ocean Indien 
Commmon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Common Programme of  Action 
East African Cooperation 
East African Development Bank 
European Commission 
Economic Commission for Africa 
v ECCAS 
EU 
GCA 
HS 
ICSID 
IMF 
IOC 
ISO 
lTC 
LIC 
MIE 
MIGA 
NMA 
NTB 
OAU 
OECD 
OGEL 
OGIL 
PTA 
RCTD 
SACU 
SADC 
vi 
Economic Community of  Central African States 
European Union 
Global Coalition for Africa 
Harmonised System of  Tariff Classification 
International Centre for the Settlement of  Industrial Disputes 
International Monetary Fund 
Indian Ocean Commission 
International Standards Organisation 
International Trade Centre/UNCTAD/WTO 
Letter of  Credit 
Multinational Industrial Enterprises 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
Multilateral Monetary Area 
Non-tariff Barrier 
Organisation of  African Unity 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Open General Export Licence 
Open General Import Licence 
Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Road Customs Transit Declaration 
Southern African Customs Union 
Southern African Development Community SAP 
SITC 
SSA 
SYDONIA 
UAPTA 
UEMOA 
UNCITRAL 
UNDP 
UNECA 
US AID 
ZEP 
Structural Adjustment Programme 
Standard International Trade Classification 
Sub-Saharan African 
Systeme Automatise des Donnees Douanieres 
Unit of  Account of  the PTA 
Union Economique et Monetaire Quest Africaine 
United Nations Commission on International and Trade Law 
United Nations Development programme 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
United States Agency for International Development 
Zone d'Echanges Preferentiels pour les Etats de I'  Afrique de I'  Est 
et de 1' Afrique Australe 
vii THE CROSS-BORDER INITIATIVE: 
A SUMMARY UPDATE AND OVERVIEW 
By Richard Hess, Imani Development (International) Ltd 
l  THE INITIATIVE 
The Maastricht Conference on Africa (July 1990) came to a general consensus on 
the desirability of  more regional integration and cooperation in SSA, while at the same 
time noting that previous integration schemes had achieved limited progress in promoting 
cross-border trade and investment.  Moreover, there had been a growing recognition of 
the  importance of the regional dimension of adjustment and a realisation that the 
implementation of structural adjustment reforms over the past decade has created an 
improved basis for cross-border economic activity in SSA. 
Against this background, and following the Maastricht Conference, the Commission 
of the European Communities (EC), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the African Development Bank (ADB) (the co-sponsors) began to collaborate on 
developing a new practical approach to promoting economic integration that could be 
supported actively by the donor community.  The new approach reflected a shift away 
from regional industrial planning and selective tariff cuts on intra-regional trade with 
high protective barriers vis-a-vis the rest of the world, which were the foundations of 
most of the previous integration schemes in SSA.  Instead, the emphasis would be on 
measures that promote the mobility of factors,  goods and services across national 
boundaries in the region with relatively low tariff barriers against third parties.  These 
efforts led to the Cross-Border Initiative in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian 
Ocean region, where, as a result of  adjustment reforms, there had been progress towards 
flexible exchange rate policies, trade liberalisation and macro-economic stability as well 
as a particularly strong resolve to strengthen financial and economic linkages among the 
countries. 
p.  1 Based on past experience with regional integration schemes and the lessons of a 
decade of adjustment in SSA,  the co-sponsors observed the following guidelines in 
promoting the CBI: 
a)  The programme to implement the initiative had to be truly nationally conceived 
to ensure ownership.  This entailed a preparation process involving the public 
and private sector representatives of  the countries in identifying the constraints 
to cross-border activity and the measures to overcome them. 
b) The CBI  -supported programme of  action had to be consistent with the adjustment 
priorities of  the participating countries, be anchored in an outward-oriented policy 
framework, and have added value compared to the reforms supported under the 
ongoing variety of  adjustment programs, by accelerating the reform process. 
c)  The CBI should contribute to capacity building by relying primarily on local 
resources to design the programme. 
d)  The CBI should not lead to the creation of  a new regional institution to implement 
the programme and should continue to emphasise national action in the context 
of  each country's policy framework. 
e)  The CBI supported reforms should be consistent with the long-term vision of  an 
African economic community. This would be ensured through consultation with 
the relevant regional institutions. The CBI's focus was to be on helping to create 
the conditions for economic integration among those selected countries which 
volunteered to implement the proposed reform agenda.  Therefore, the initiative 
was seen as a "building block" in the long term process of creating an African 
economic community. 
f)  The CBI should support the efforts of  the relevant sub-regional organisations in 
so far as they are consistent with the objectives of  eliminating obstacles to cross-
border economic activity.  This would imply the involvement of and support to 
the PTA/COMESA, SADC, IOC and subsequently the EAC. 
The Cross-Border Initiative was therefore established to facilitate increased intra-
regional economic linkages, specifically concerning trade, investment and payments and 
thus to improve regional integration within Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian 
Ocean region. 
The CBI aimed at channelling the aspirations of  the participating countries for greater 
economic integration towards a new integration paradigm that is based on the promotion 
of  competition and efficiency in the domestic product and factor markets of  participating 
countries with low effective protection vis-a-vis third parties.  It would have several 
p.2 special features,  including: voluntary participation by a willing sub-set of countries; 
implementation of  reforms based on the principle ofreciprocity among the participating 
countries, thereby encouraging action which countries would likely hesitate to take if 
they were acting alone; harmonisation of  economic policy reforms across the countries 
so as to facilitate cross-border economic activity.  In addition, the CBI would have the 
potential for the kind of  peer pressure for reform that is not always present in the context 
of  adjustment dialogue between individual countries and the donors.  Moreover, the CBI 
would provide the participating countries with a visible vehicle for mobilising donor 
assistance and for attracting direct foreign investment. 
Countries which responded to the initiative and participated in the initial workshop, 
which was held in Mauritius in June 1992, were: 
t  Burundi 
t  Comoros 
t  Ethiopia 
t  Kenya 
t  Madagascar 
t  Malawi 
t  Mauritius 
t  Namibia 
t  Reunion 
t  Rwanda 
t  South Africa 
t  Swaziland 
t  Tanzania 
t  Uganda 
t  Zambia 
t  Zimbabwe 
p.3 At that workshop, discussions centred on the study undertaken by the lead consultants, 
Imani Development, to identify the main constraints to intra-regional trade, investment 
and payments. 
The next phase of  the initiative started immediately after the Mauritius workshop, 
when national Technical Working Groups (TWGs) were established. These groups 
included representatives from both the private and public sectors. TWGs were 
established in all the countries that participated in the workshop except for Ethiopia 
and South Africa, where private consultants were appointed to carry out independent 
research.  National research was undertaken between June and November 1992. 
Recommendations were developed in the form of  action plans, detailing measures that 
should be undertaken primarily at the national level, in order to overcome the identified 
constraints. 
Representatives from all the TWGs attended a second workshop that was held in 
Harare, Zimbabwe in December 1992. The private consultants who undertook the research 
in Ethiopia and South Africa also participated. The main objective of  this workshop was 
to discuss the findings from the national reports and to prepare a Common Programme 
of Action (CPA). The national TWGs had all identified the major constraints in their 
countries to intra-regional economic linkages. The CPA that was adopted comprised of 
measures that would be undertaken on a reciprocal basis between those countries 
committing themselves to the programme. It  was recognised that not all countries would 
be able to commit themselves to the proposed CPA, at least for the time being, so the 
initiative would move on the basis of  variable speeds. 
Following the Harare workshop, letters were sent by the co-sponsors to the relevant 
Ministers in each country which had established a TWG, sending copies of the CPA, 
inviting the country to express its interest in principle in implementing the measures. By 
the end of  May 1993, all thirteen countries had responded positively.  Further research 
and promotional work was undertaken in the participating countries during the year. The 
activities undertaken by the TWGs covered three main areas: promoting the initiative; 
building a consensus within the country on the initiative, and undertaking further research 
which would help governments in determining the implications and costs of  implementing 
the agreed measures. 
The co-sponsors prepared a Concept Paper (CP), which was based on the measures 
contained in the CPA. This paper became the discussion document at a meeting of  senior 
officials from participating countries, regional organisations and the co-sponsors which 
was held in Brussels on 24 June 1993. This meeting adopted the CP with some slight 
modifications. A Ministerial meeting was subsequently held on 27 August 1993  in 
Kampala at which the following countries were represented: 
p.4 • 
Burundi 
•  Comoros 
•  Kenya 
•  Madagascar 
•  Malawi 
•  Mauritius 
•  Namibia 
•  Rwanda 
•  Seychelles 
•  Tanzania 
•  Uganda 
•  Zambia 
• 
Zimbabwe 
Organisations represented at that meeting included the IOC, the PTA, the SADC, 
the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU), 
and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), as well as the four co-sponsors. This meeting 
gave its endorsement to the CP, whilst a number of  issues relating to the implementation 
of  the measures were raised, such as the impact on government budgets and balance of 
payments as well as the danger of de-industrialisation.  The question of compensation 
was raised by the governments, and the co-sponsors expressed their willingness to make 
funds available to help with revenue implications during the transitional phase. The co-
sponsors requested the participating countries to  establish Policy Implementation 
Committees (PICs) to approve policy changes. 
By the end of 1995, fourteen countries had requested to enter negotiations with the 
co-sponsors in the context of  the CBI. These were Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. Informal discussions with the new South Africa government revealed 
potential interest in their further participation in this initiative. 
Those countries tfmt  responded positively were requested by the co-sponsors to 
prepare Letters ofCBI Policy (LCBIP). These letters would spell out the country's current 
status on implementation of  the CP measures and give indicative plans for implementation 
of  the outstanding measures. They would also raise any problem areas that needed to be 
brought to the attention of  the co-sponsors. These letters would be prepared as drafts and 
p.5 would be submitted to the co-sponsors for comment. Exchanges would thereafter take 
place between the country and co-sponsors until such time that a letter acceptable to 
each party was finalised and signed.  On acceptance of the letter by the co-sponsors, 
financial assistance would be released for the country. 
As  the countries responded positively, the TWGs were offered further technical 
assistance through short-term consultancies under the Imani Development framework 
contract. One of the main areas of such assistance during this phase was to help draft 
amendments to the country's legal and regulatory framework to enable implementation 
of the  agreed measures.  This involved identifying the relevant legislation and 
administrative arrangements in the areas of  trade, investment, finance and payments and 
assessing those sections and provisions which would need to be changed in order to 
bring them into conformity with the CBI measures. Draft amendments to  legislation 
were thereafter prepared together with an action plan and timetable for implementation 
of  the reforms. Support was given to the country consultants by an experienced lawyer 
from the region who subsequently produced a synthesis report of  all the country papers. 
Technical assistance was also offered to  all  participating countries to help them 
assess the implications of implementing the CBI measures, to prepare for negotiations 
with the co-sponsors and to assist in the preparation of  Letters of  CBI Policy. This offer 
was taken up by most of  the countries and requests were submitted. Short-term technical 
assistance contracts were subsequently issued. 
Funding was also made available under the framework contract to re-appoint local 
consultants as secretariats to the TWGs in those countries which requested such assistance. 
Secretariats were therefore subsequently engaged under the framework contract in 
Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi, Seychelles and Tanzania. The World Bank had provided 
assistance for a limited period in Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, although secretariats had not actually been appointed in a number of 
these countries due to administrative problems. 
The  IOC  Secretariat held two meetings of its members (Comoros, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles) in 1994, specifically to discuss progress with the 
initiative, funded under the Imani framework contract. A meeting of the East African 
Co-operation countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) in Nairobi, Kenya, sponsored by 
the World Bank, was held in August 1994. Further EAC meetings were held in Jinja, 
Uganda in October 1994, and subsequently every year on a rotational basis, financed 
under the Imani framework contract. These meetings at the sub-regional level were useful 
in helping the countries move ahead with the initiative. They provided opportunities for 
neighbouring countries to discuss matters of common interest and for them to monitor 
progress in each other's countries. As such they provided a way of encouraging the 
slower countries to move more rapidly on implementation. 
p. 6 A  second Ministerial meeting was held in Mauritius on 23-24 March  1995. 
Government delegations from the following thirteen countries attended this meeting: 
• 
Burundi 
• 
Comoros 
• 
Kenya 
• 
Madagascar 
•  Malawi 
•  Mauritius 
• 
Namibia 
• 
Seychelles 
• 
Swaziland 
•  Tanzania 
• 
Uganda 
•  Zambia 
•  Zimbabwe 
Organisations represented at that meeting included secretariats of  the IOC, CO  MESA, 
SADC and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), as well as the four co-sponsors. The 
government of South Africa attended as an observer. 
This meeting discussed the experiences of the participating countries concerning 
implementation of  the CBI and planned the way ahead for further achievement. By this 
time, eight countries had either agreed their letters ofCBI policy with the co-sponsors or 
had prepared drafts that were at an advanced stage of discussion. The meeting agreed 
that the other countries would submit draft letters to the co-sponsors by September 1995 
at the latest with a view to acceptance by the co-sponsors by December 1995. The meeting 
further agreed that the principle of reciprocity would be maintained where necessary, 
which for many countries was particularly important in the realm of regional tariff 
preferences. In many other areas however, action would often be taken unilaterally because 
of its  intrinsic value. The EC agreed at this meeting to develop a project to provide 
p. 7 funding to give support to the TWGs and PICs. This project was tendered and a framework 
contract was subsequently issued to the winning firm, Imani Development, in November 
1995. 
A "road map" was discussed and approved for future action. This contained the 
following elements: 
t  elimination of  tariffs on intra-regional trade by October 1998; 
t  adoption of a harmonised external tariff by 1998  with two to  three non-zero 
rates:  15 per cent trade weighted average tariff and a maximum rate of  between 
20 and 25 per cent; 
t  harmonisation of the limited list of items subject to non-tariff barriers for non-
protective purposes. 
Agreement was  further reached on the need for  harmonisation of other policies 
including investment incentives, transit regulations, taxation, customs administration 
and company law. It was agreed to adopt the COMESA rules of origin. The regional 
organisations expressed their continued support for the initiative and agreed that they 
would have an important role in helping with the implementation, particularly with the 
co-ordination of policy harmonisation, both at the sub-regional level as well as at the 
regional level.  A meeting for representatives of the secretariats of the regional 
organisations and the co-sponsors was held immediately following the Ministerial meeting. 
This meeting was useful in clarifying the roles of  the regional organisations in the initiative 
and in planning their future involvement. The regional organisations agreed to initiate 
base-line studies in a number of areas requiring harmonisation and to follow these up 
with recommendations, discussion and subsequent agreement for implementation by 
their member States. 
The co-sponsors expressed their continued willingness to provide technical assistance 
to  those countries requesting help  in implementing the agreed measures.  Financial 
assistance would continue to be provided to  assist with the transitional costs of 
implementation in the context of  a coherent macroeconomic framework and to ensure 
consistency with the adjustment process. The measures foreseen would be included in 
Policy Framework Papers agreed by participating countries and the  Bretton Woods 
Institutions.  This assistance would be provided on a country-by-country basis after 
agreement on the letter of  CBI policy had been reached between the government and the 
co-sponsors. 
A regional meeting for representatives of  the national TWGs was held in Mauritius 
1-2 Aprill996. Delegations from the following thirteen countries attended this meeting: 
Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, 
p.8 Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Organisations represented at that 
meeting included the secretariats of  the IOC, CO  MESA, and the OAU as well as the four 
co-sponsors. The meeting reported on progress made in respect of CBI issues by each 
country, which showed that good progress had been made in some countries whilst others 
were moving at a slower pace. Extensive discussions revolved around the development 
of  a Harmonised External Tariff (HET) and agreement was reached on the structure and 
timing for implementation of  the HET. 
Discussions were also held on the need for the co-sponsors to provide projects that 
would give direct support to the private sector in the region. Such assistance was seen in 
the context ofthe development of  support programmes, such as a regional credit insurance 
mechanism, ESARIM (Eastern and Southern African Regional Insurance Mechanism) 
and an African Regional Exchange (AFREX), for which feasibility studies were 
undertaken. Direct assistance would also be provided through such avenues as  loan 
guarantees, export financing, enterprise development schemes and capacity building. 
An action plan was developed at this meeting, which included, inter alia, the following 
key elements: 
a)  The remaining draft letters ofCBI policy would be prepared and submitted to the 
co-sponsors before 30 June 1996, with the finalisation and approval by the co-
sponsors to be done by 30 September 1996. 
b) The TWGs would do further work on harmonisation of external tariffs in order 
to prepare for the next ministerial meeting. This would include: 
•  developing a "target" HET based on 6-digit HS tariff codes, to classify raw 
materials and capital goods, intermediate goods, and final consumer goods to 
low, intermediate and higher rates respectively; 
•  preparing a list of  existing NTBs and a schedule for their elimination except 
for agreed items; 
•  preparing a list of  customs duty exemptions and a schedule for their elimination 
consistent with international treaty obligations; 
•  preparing revenue impact estimates of  the various HET scenarios; 
•  preparing evaluations of the industrial and social impacts of customs duty 
reform. 
c)  All countries should introduce an 80 per cent tariff preference by October 1996. 
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HET work and to respond quickly to requests for technical assistance. Most CBI countries 
undertook studies to assess the implications of  harmonising their external tariffs. Some 
of these studies were handled at the sub-regional level, such as those in the four IOC 
countries and those in the three EAC countries. In both sub-regions the studies were co-
ordinated in conjunction with the secretariats ofthe sub-regional institutions. National 
studies were undertaken in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Whilst Namibia and Swaziland were 
both interested to have such studies undertaken, they decided it would be better to have 
the study undertaken at the SACU level, rather than for individual SACU members, and 
as such would need agreement from all the SACU members. However this study was 
never undertaken. Two studies were however subsequently undertaken ( 1996 and 1998) 
in the SACU region on the impact on the BLNS countries of the proposed Free Trade 
Agreement between South Africa and the EU. 
Several sub-regional meetings were held during 1997. The TWGs of  the East African 
Co-operation countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) met in Masaka, Uganda in October 
1997. The TWGs ofthe IOC countries (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles) 
met in Mauritius in May 1997. They were able to discuss the specific issues raised during 
the April1996 regional TWG meeting and develop a sub-regional approach, particularly 
in respect of  the HET. 
The SADC Secretariat convened a special meeting in Gaborone in February 1997. 
The aim was to encourage a greater dialogue between the SADC countries and the CBI 
participating countries and co-sponsors, as well as to give an opportunity for the non-
CBI participating countries to be updated on CBI developments. This was seen as 
particularly important in the context of the SADC Protocol on Trade that had been 
signed in August 1996 and the need to ensure consistency between that protocol, the 
COME  SA trade regime and the CBI arrangements. Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe attended this 
meeting.  As a result of this meeting there was a clearer appreciation of the way in 
which the CBI could facilitate the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. 
Two countries, Lesotho and Mozambique expressed their interest in participating in 
the CBI. 
An informal meeting of  Chairpersons from the TWGs, together with resource people 
and representatives of  the co-sponsors met in November 1997 for strategic reflection on 
the Initiative and to help prepare for the next Ministerial meeting. The main discussion 
document for this meeting was a draft of  a synthesis paper prepared by the co-sponsors, 
which raised a number of questions and attempted some answers. The issues raised 
included: 
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t  What has been the valued-added of  the CBI? 
t  How have CBI participating countries performed economically compared with 
other countries in sub-Sahara Africa? 
t  What have been the ingredients for a successful TWG? 
t  What are the elements of  the evolving agenda for CBI? 
t  Should the CBI continue after 1998? 
This informal meeting concluded on a positive note - that the CBI had indeed been 
very worthwhile. The Third CBI Ministerial meeting was subsequently held in February 
1998 in Harare, Zimbabwe.  Delegates from Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe attended this meeting. A representative of the government of  Mozambique 
also attended and expressed interest in participation in the initiative. Organisations 
represented at that meeting included COMESA, EAC,  IOC,  SADC, the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU), and the Global 
Coalition for Africa (GCA), as well as the four co-sponsors. 
Discussions during the two days affirmed the considerable progress in the 
implementation of the CBI Agenda, the contribution it had made in promoting sound 
economic management and the creation of a policy and institutional environment 
conducive to  the promotion of private investment and trade among the participating 
countries. The synthesis paper on the CBI was presented and discussed, which showed 
that there had been a distinct value added from the CBI in a number of  areas, including 
bringing the various parties (both public and private sector) together, helping to influence 
policy decisions, and assisting with the adjustment process. It  would appear that the CBI 
countries had performed better overall in macro-economic terms than other SSA countries, 
although a direct linkage between this  fact and the CBI could not empirically be 
determined. The Ministers gave a mandate that the CBI should continue beyond the end 
of 1998 and that investment facilitation should be a major thrust for future activities, as 
well as completing the existing agenda. 
An action plan was prepared and adopted, under which the ministers "resolved to 
continue and broaden the CBI and agreed that the future focus of  CBI should be on: 
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investment facilitation issues; 
~  facilitating the harmonisation of  national and regional policies towards a 
conducive environment for efficient investment and trade flows; 
~  welcoming new participants who have made adequate progress in macroeconomic 
reform and might thus benefit from the CBI  framework. " 
The Fourth Regional TWG meeting was held in November 1998 in Mauritius, 
attended by participants from Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Organisations represented at that meeting included COMESA, COMESA 
Clearing House, EAC, IOC, SADC FISCU, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
the Organisation of  African Unity (OAU), as well as the four co-sponsors. Mozambique 
was welcomed to their first regional TWG meeting. 
The meeting was held primarily to discuss progress_ in implementation of  the CHI-
supported reform agenda and to agree on the priority actions that could form the elements 
of a proposed Road Map for Investment Facilitation. Most countries reported good 
progress in connection with implementation measures, although some countries were 
still moving at a rather slow pace. The draft Road Map for Investment Facilitation, which 
had been prepared by the co-sponsors, was discussed extensively and comments given. 
This draft Road Map included proposed priority actions in four broad areas: investment 
promotion and improved information; select legal and judicial reform;  selective tax 
reforms;  and awards to spur private sector to  improve performance and information 
sharing. The TWGs agreed to identify the specific actions that each participating country 
would undertake to achieve the objectives of the proposed Road Map, whilst the co-
sponsors agreed to revise the draft document in the light of  the discussions at the meeting. 
A presentation was given on the proposed Africa Guarantee Facility, whilst a discussion 
also took place on establishing a CBI Web-site to improve communications. It  was agreed 
that an addendum to the Letters of  CBI Policy should be prepared by each country and 
that a Fourth Ministerial meeting should be held in 1999. 
The fourth CBI Ministerial meeting took place in October 1999 in Mauritius. 
Participants attended this meeting from Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, together 
with representatives from the African regional and sub-regional organisations and co-
sponsors.  The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing the initiative and 
adopted a Road Map for Investment Facilitation. The Road Map included a set of  actions 
to be taken collectively to raise the level of  domestic and foreign investment:-
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conditions for investment: peace, political and economic stability, good political and 
corporate governance, macro-economic reform and stability, trade liberalisation, market 
integration, exchange rate liberalisation, investment deregulation, and consistency in 
policy and application; 
(ii)  actions needed, in addition to the essential conditions, to attract increased 
investment including: tax reform, legal and judicial reforms, institutional reforms, capital 
market development, human capital development, credible privatisation, new/upgraded 
infrastructure, and investment promotion; and, given the time that these reforms may 
take to be formulated and bear fruit, there is a need for 
(iii)  immediate actions in the six areas identified in the Road Map: completion of 
the trade reform agenda, regional and national investment promotion consistent with 
each other, selective legal and judicial reforms, selective tax reforms, and participation 
in a cross-border awards scheme that will raise awareness of African businesses and 
provide incentives to spur private sector to improve performance and information sharing; 
(iv)  the  institutional arrangements for  implementation based on a growing 
partnership between government and the private sector; and 
(v)  use of the new CBI website (www.afdb.org./cbi) for dissemination of 
information and exchange of  views and experience. 
The participating countries agreed to  complete and to  circulate to  the other 
participants a draft addendum to their Letter of CBI Policy to facilitate their work in 
implementing the actions under the Road Map for Investment Facilitation.  Specifically, 
the addendum would (i) update the list of actions undertaken to  implement the CBI 
reform agenda; and (ii) describe the measures that each participating country would plan 
to implement the Road Map for Investment Facilitation. The participating countries agreed 
to complete the preparation of  their draft individual investment facilitation programmes 
and to circulate these to the other participants no later than 31 March 2000. 
The meeting also resolved to establish a ministerial-level working group-chaired 
by Mauritius and including Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and, if possible, 
one other country - to develop further the concept of a high level forum to promote 
regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa and to involve additional countries 
in the region. 
As a follow-up to the Fourth CBI Ministerial Meeting, a meeting of  the ministerial-
level working group was held in Mauritius on l4
1h  May 2000, coinciding with the 
CO  MESA Council of Ministers and Summit. At this meeting it was agreed that the 
CBI would formally come to  an end and would be replaced with a new Regional 
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with the CBI agenda, but on a somewhat different basis. The participating countries 
and regional integration institutions would henceforth take a stronger role in determining 
the direction of  the RIFF. The co-sponsors, which had greatly facilitated the CBI process, 
were thanked for the work they had done with the CBI and were asked to continue with 
their support, albeit from more of  a back seat position. All countries that had previously 
participated in the CBI would be invited to participate in the RIFF, together with any 
other countries in the region that expressed interest. It was agreed that the main focus 
of the RIFF should be the implementation of the Investment Facilitation Road Map. 
There would however still be a need to complete the Road Map on Tariff Harmonisation 
and Liberalisation. 
A Steering Committee was established with would comprise a bureau of RIFF 
countries, the secretariats of  CO MESA, EAC, IOC and SADC and representatives of  the 
ADB, EC, IMF and World Bank. The countries would be represented at the Ministerial 
level while the regional integration organisations would be represented at the level of  the 
Chief  Executive. Initially the Chair could be Mauritius but both the Chair and the countries 
represented on the Bureau could change on an annual basis. The Steering Committee 
would be tasked with managing the RIFF process. The SADC Secretariat offered to host 
a meeting of regional integration institutions to discuss their specific roles in the new 
RIFF. 
The COMESA Secretariat explained that they had recently started a new project 
with support from the EC, which had a component to continue assistance to the TWGs 
and to give support for the new RIFF. They would take over the function that had been 
provided by Imani Development as lead consultants. Through this project, financial 
support can be given for the TWGs to contract a local consultant to fulfil the role of 
part-time Secretariat and to undertake studies and other activities to further the RIFF 
objectives. The meeting expressed its appreciation to the EC and CO  MESA Secretariat 
for this support and accepted the new role to be played by the CO  MESA Secretariat as 
a facilitator of the RIFF.  It was however made clear that the RIFF was completely 
independent from the COME  SA Secretariat, the latter only being a facilitator of the 
process. TWGs would shortly be requested to submit nominations for the Secretariat 
positions and to submit annual work plans and cost estimates for the activities they 
would like to undertake. 
A discussion was also held on the proposed Africa Achievement Awards Scheme. 
The meeting endorsed this initiative and expressed its keen interest to see the Scheme 
established. 
The status of the initiative in each country as at 31st May 2000 is summarised in 
table 1. 
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Country  TWG  LCBIP  Harmonised  Addendum to 
draft  agreed  external tariffs  LCBIP drafted 
Burundi  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Comoros  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kenya  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Madagascar  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Malawi  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Mauritius  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Namibia  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Rwanda  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Seychelles  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Swaziland  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Tanzania  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Uganda  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Zambia  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Zimbabwe  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
2.  THE PROCESS 
2.1  Nationallevel 
One of  the main characteristics of  the CBI has been the emphasis throughout on the 
importance of the position and work done at the national level to  achieve regional 
integration. The original desk study carried out by Imani Development in 1991 identified 
lack of action and understanding at the national level as one of  the main causes of  the 
slow progress in regional integration. 
To achieve the objectives of  regional integration, the CBI called for an acceleration 
of the pace and a deepening of the scope of the  structural adjustment effort in the 
participating countries, as elaborated in the Concept Paper. This covered reform in the 
following areas: 
t  trade liberalisation, including immediate abolition ofnon-tariffbarriers, removal 
of tariffs on trade in goods and services among the reciprocating countries by 
1996, and, to minimise the risk of  trade diversion in the context of  the freeing of 
intra-regional trade, movement towards a common external tariffby end-1998, 
by lowering external tariffs vis-a-vis third countries to the level of  the member 
with the lowest tariffs; 
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current account transactions and the attainment of  current account convertibility 
by end-1996, relaxation of  restrictions on capital account transactions associated 
with the liberalisation of direct investment and investment in regional equity 
markets, and establishment of  unified, spot exchange markets by end-1996; 
t  deregulation of  investment, including adoption of  simple and liberal investment 
approval procedures, and recognition of  a special category of"regional enterprise," 
which would enable enterprises with cross-border capital investment to operate 
in any participating country on the same basis as national firms; 
t  strengthening of  financial intermediation in support of  cross-border trade and 
investment, and facilitating entry and increasing competition in the financial sector 
by, inter alia, promptly liberalising cross-border activities of  financial institutions 
and eliminating impediments to entry by regional and extra-regional financial 
institutions; 
t  facilitating the movement of goods and persons, including harmonisation of 
disparities in transit charges and documentation for goods in transit, facilitation 
of  movement of  labour by processing residence and employment permits within 
a short time period, and relaxation and eventual elimination of  visas among the 
participating countries. 
The work of the CBI has been handled at the national level by Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs).  These groups were established after the first CBI workshop in 1992. 
Each country was free to determine the exact composition of  their TWG but the overriding 
principle has been that they should have representatives from both the public and private 
sectors. In practice most TWGs have had representatives from Ministries of Finance, 
Trade,  Commerce, Industry, Economic Planning and Regional Co-operation with 
occasional participation from Transport and Agriculture, as well as  from relevant 
Departments and organisations such as  Customs and Excise, the Central Bank, the 
investment centre, and national trade development organisation. From the private sector, 
representatives have usually come from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Employers' Federation, Confederation of Industry,  and sometimes from Bankers' 
Association, Freight Forwarders' Association and other sectoral associations. Where 
secretariats for regional integration institutions are located in a particular country, they 
have also participated in the TWG. For example, the COMESA Secretariat has been a 
regular participant in the Zambian TWG. 
The TWG Chairperson has usually been appointed from the public sector, from the 
Ministry of Finance or from Commerce and Industry.  In some countries the Deputy 
Chairperson has come from the private sector. The TWGs would appoint a local consultant 
as Secretariat on a part-time basis. The Secretariat would perform the normal secretarial 
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would also provide the backbone and support to the TWG on technical issues and prepare 
regular reports on the activities of  the TWG and the position of  the CBI in their country. 
In that role they would regularly brief the TWG and the Chairperson on the technical 
issues and prepare briefing papers as required depending on the issues being discussed. 
They would often undertake specific studies and organise sensitisation activities such as 
workshops and seminars. When public relations activities were needed, it was their brief 
to  organise them.  They also had the role of liasing locally with the co-sponsors and 
facilitating any visits from the representatives of  the co-sponsors or consultants in related 
Issues. 
The TWGs were tasked with studying the CBI issues, corning up  with policy 
recommendations and informing the public and private sectors as well as the larger civil 
society. Some countries were far more active in this area than others. In some countries, 
the TWG would meet on a monthly basis, whilst in others they would only meet two or 
three times a year. The norm has probably been closer to meeting every two to three 
months.  Policy recommendations would be submitted through the public sector 
representatives (often the Chairperson) to the relevant government policy-making body. 
In some countries that would be the cabinet or a cabinet sub-committee. 
Most countries established Policy Implementation Committees in the context of  the 
CBI. These committees were normally comprised of  Ministers with economic portfolios, 
together with the Governor of  the Central Bank. It was their brief to approve the policy 
reforms formulated in the context of  the CBI. However the PICs would not often meet 
and their role became less defined. 
The brief  for the TWGs would be regularly debated and agreed at the regional level, 
normally at CBI Ministerial meetings or regional meetings of  representatives of  the TWGs. 
As  such there was an evolving agenda of specific issues,  although the issues would 
revolve around the core pillars of trade, payments and investment. The participating 
countries would determine the issues in discussion with the co-sponsors. 
The main outputs from the TWGs in the context of the CBI agenda included the 
following: 
t  Country reports on the state of cross-border trade, payments and investments 
(1992); 
t  Country reports on legal issues that need attention to facilitate regional integration 
(1994-96) 
t  Letters ofCBI Policy (1994-1998); 
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investments (1994); 
•  Studies on the harmonisation of  external tariffs (1997  -98); 
•  Updated country reports on the state of cross-border trade, payments and 
investments ( 1997); 
•  Addenda to the Letters ofCBI Policy (1999-2000); 
•  Regular country reports to the lead consultant; 
•  Regular updated matrices ofCBI agenda implementation measures (1995-2000). 
In addition to the core CBI issues, the TWGs have also handled a variety of  other 
issues. These include: 
•  WTO implementation and new round 
•  SADC Trade Protocol 
•  CO MESA Free Trade Area and Customs Union 
•  EAC Treaty and Customs Union 
•  IOC trade regime 
•  Informal cross-border trade 
•  Competitiveness of  domestic industry 
•  Competition policy 
•  Fiscal issues 
•  Investment promotion 
Studies would be commissioned to allow in-depth research on the various issues to 
be addressed. Whilst in some cases the TWG Secretariat would undertake the studies, 
there were often also instances where other local or regional consultants were used, 
depending on the nature of  the study. 
Alongside studies, most TWGs organised periodic sensitisation workshops and 
seminars. These were organised in the early days to inform the wider community about 
the CBI and to raise the awareness of  regional integration issues. Such seminars would 
often be on a national scale and could also involve officials from the secretariats of  the 
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also undertook a series of  regional seminars throughout the country. These were intended 
to get the same information across to centres outside the capitals and to get feedback 
from as wide a cross-section of  the business community as possible. 
Apart from the more general seminars, workshops were also held from time to time 
for specific issues, usually related to studies that had been commissioned by the TWG. 
As such this provided the opportunity for getting reactions to recommendations made in 
the study, as well as for disseminating study findings. The results from these workshops 
would be fed back to the TWG for further consideration in their policy recommendations. 
These workshops and seminars were usually organised and facilitated by the TWG 
Secretariats. 
The lead consultant would visit the various participating countries from time to 
time to meet with representatives of the TWGs and appraise them of the latest CBI 
developments as well as to discuss issues of  mutual interest and see what further support 
the TWGs may need. 
When looking back over the period 1992 to the present, it becomes very apparent 
that the results of the CBI from the work of the TWGs in the different participating 
countries have been very mixed. In some countries the initiative and the TWGs have 
played an extremely important role in influencing policy reform, whilst in other countries 
the TWGs have not been very active and have only played marginal roles. Great progress 
has been made in some countries along the reform agenda. Whilst the TWGs cannot take 
credit alone for this, they have often played an important and catalytic function. Regional 
integration now generally has a much higher level of awareness and understanding in 
most participating countries as a direct result of  the TWG activities. Another clear result 
has been the dialogue between the public and private sectors in matters relating to regional 
integration and policy reform. In the early 1990s this was not very common. Today some 
countries would not consider sending a delegation to a meeting of  a regional integration 
institutions without the inclusion of a private sector representative and without prior 
discussion with the private sector. To a large extent this is due to the work of  the TWGs. 
2.2  Regional level 
Whilst the backbone of  the CBI has been the TWG working at the national level, 
the TWGs and their representatives have also played an important role at the regional 
level. Meetings ofTWG representatives from all participating countries have been held 
on an as required basis throughout the period of  the initiative. Four meetings of  Ministers 
have been held, for which the TWGs would have to prepare and provide support. These 
regional meetings would help set the agenda for the CBI, discuss the issues and ensure a 
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the concept of  launching this initiative and agreeing the research agenda. As a result of 
this work a Common Programme of Action was developed which in turn led to the 
production of  the Concept Paper (CP) in 1993.  This CP was subsequently approved by 
the first CBI Ministerial Meeting held in August 1993.  The CP consisted of  core measures 
in the areas of: 
i)  Trade; 
ii)  Payments and Exchange Systems; 
iii)  Investment; and 
iv)  Institutional Development. 
Actions on all four areas were a general feature of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs), although the CBI would give a different emphasis to these issues, and the existing 
programmes ofPTNCOMESA, SADC and IOC. The CBI helped introduce the concept 
ofthe regional dimension of  SAPs. In the context of  the initiative, there would be a case 
for enhancement and/or acceleration of some of the measures agreed at the regional 
level.  These measures would be on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis.  Where this 
was not possible, for a transitional period the measures would be adopted on the basis of 
reciprocity with the participating countries. 
Subsequent TWG regional meetings and Ministerial meetings have addressed the 
following main topics: 
•  The Road Map for Tariff Harmonisation 
•  The Road Map for Investment Facilitation 
•  The future of  the CBI and transformation into a Forum. 
Occasional sector specific regional meetings have also been held under the auspices 
of the CBI. The first such meeting was held in 1993  specifically to discuss financial 
sector issues. 
At a sub-regional level, the TWGs have also been involved in meetings of  smaller 
groups of TWG representatives. The most active of these groups has been the annual 
meeting ofthe East African TWGs. These three TWGs have met every year, from 1994 
to 1999 to discuss issues of  mutual interest and specific issues related to the EAC, including 
the new EAC Treaty and barriers to trade between the countries. The Chairmanship of 
this group would rotate annually between the three country TWGs. A representative 
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the TWGs of  the IOC countries also have held a number of  sub-regional meetings. These 
tended to be more project specific and were mainly related to the development of the 
EU-funded PRIDE project for the IOC region and development of  the IOC trade regime. 
One regional meeting for SADC countries was held in 1997. This meeting was 
slightly different to the other sub-regional groups in that the meeting was open to 
representatives from all SADC countries (not just CBI participants). The main objective 
of  this meeting was to ensure no conflict between the CBI agenda and the new SADC 
Protocol on Trade and to give the opportunity for the non-participating CBI countries to 
become involved in the initiative should they be so interested. 
One of  the main results of  the CBI at the regional level has been the peer pressure 
brought upon the participating countries. This has been particularly effective at the sub-
regional level, but has been present throughout. Countries have seen what some of the 
faster moving countries have been doing in their reform programmes, which has then 
acted as a catalyst for the others. The regional meetings have also provided a forum 
whereby the countries can sit together in a non-institutional forum and have a more open 
debate.  They have provided forums  for open dialogue with the co-sponsors, in an 
environment where the co-sponsors sit together, rather than negotiating separately. The 
private sector has been given greater prominence in these meetings than is normally the 
case in regional inter-governmental meetings. 
2.3  Regional integration institutions 
In the early days of  the CBI, the institutions involved in the initiative were the IOC, 
PTA and SADCC. Gradually this situation changed as SADCC became SADC in 1992, 
the PTA was transformed into CO  MESA in 1994 and the Secretariat of  the Commission 
for East African Co-operation was established in 1996. In addition to these, the OAU 
and ECA have also been regular participants, as well as the GCA. 
The policy measures endorsed by the Ministers of the participating countries as 
summarised in the Concept Paper and in the letters ofCBI policy generally corresponded 
to those put forward by the regional organisations. Therefore, the CBI has directly 
supported the integration agenda of the regional organisations. Nevertheless, several 
practical problems have arisen, mainly from two sources:  not all the members of a 
particular organisation participate in the CBI and in some cases there has been a lack of 
harmonisation between different regional organisations. As regards the first point, CBI 
was open to all the members of the organisations (CO  MESA, SADC, EAC and IOC). 
However, examination of  the policy agenda would make it clear that only countries that 
had embarked on a road of  economic reforms were in a position to effectively implement 
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where a sub-group of members of an organisation carry out certain policies for which 
they are ready.  Other member states can implement these policies as  soon as  the 
circumstances make it possible and desirable. Variable geometry is a pragmatic approach 
that avoids progress towards regional integration to be determined by the slowest moving 
member state.  The aim is for faster moving members to encourage other member states 
to enter closer economic integration. 
The secretariats of each of these institutions have been invited to all the regional 
meetings referred to above as well as any relevant sub-regional meetings. They have 
therefore been able to  participate in shaping the evolving CBI agenda and ensuring 
consistency with their own programmes. The CBI agenda has always sought to build 
upon and facilitate implementation of  existing programmes, albeit at a faster pace, rather 
than to develop programmes which may conflict with other regional commitments. One 
specific meeting was organised for representatives of  the regional integration institutions 
themselves. This was held immediately after a full regional CBI meeting. The opportunity 
was taken to discuss the role of  the institutions in the CBI and to ensure consistency. 
The lead consultant would visit the secretariats of these institutions from time to 
time to appraise them of  the latest CBI developments, to discuss issues of  mutual interest 
and to identify areas for further assistance. 
Some direct project assistance under the Imani framework contract has also been 
given to the regional integration institutions to facilitate their work. 
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t  The COMESA secretariat was assisted in their endeavours to  develop a 
programme for involving the private sector associations in the region. This support 
enabled one of  their officers to visit a number of  these associations to help develop 
such a programme. 
t  Considerable assistance was given to the CO  MESA Clearing House in connection 
with its planned restructuring. This enabled technical work to be done to look at 
possible new areas of activity for the Clearing House, which was being 
transformed into a Regional Export Services Agency. Preparatory work on the 
African Guarantee Facility was also financed under this arrangement. 
t  A meeting under the auspices of SADC was facilitated through this project in 
1997 which enabled representatives from all SADC countries to meet together to 
discuss the CBI in the context of  the SADC Protocol on Trade. 
t  The SADC Industry and Trade Co-ordination Unit was assisted through funding 
being made available in 1998 for their workshop on development of a SADC 
regional industrial policy. t  The IOC secretariat organised a number of  meetings in the preparatory days of 
the PRIDE project with financial  assistance from this project, that enabled 
representatives from the member countries to come together to discuss the CBI 
and the PRIDE project. 
t  A study was funded on the impact of the proposed harmonisation of external 
tariffs for the IOC region. 
t  The EAC was also assisted through work in their region on the harmonisation of 
external tariffs. 
The results of the involvement by the institutions has been mixed. The COME  SA 
secretariat has been a great supporter of the CBI throughout.  They have very much 
appreciated the support given by the CBI to their own programmes, particularly in the 
field of  trade. In December 1994, the summit of  the PTA/CO  MESA endorsed the approach 
of the CBI. Two EC-financed support projects for the Secretariat of COMESA on the 
promotion of  regional integration and implementation of  CBI in the member states have 
also been prepared and introduced. 
The IOC Secretariat has been supportive of the CBI throughout and has been 
particularly appreciative of  the PRIDE project that was developed within the context of 
the CBI. In fact the policy conditions given for the countries participating in the PRIDE 
project were based on the CBI Concept Paper reforms. In the light of  the revitalisation of 
East African Cooperation, a meeting was organised by the World Bank for the Technical 
Working Groups of  Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and the co-sponsors in 1994 inN  airobi. 
The East African TWGs indicated their desire to link the work on CBI to the revitalisation 
of  East African Cooperation. The Communique of  the East African Cooperation summit 
in November 1994 explicitly recommended the adoption and implementation of the 
provisions of  the CBI. The EAC has therefore supported the initiative and has sought to 
develop their own trade regime within the framework of the CBI agenda. A project to 
strengthen the capacity of the EAC Secretariat to deal with regional integration was 
prepared by the EC. 
The  SADC Secretariat has regularly participated in the meetings and has been 
supportive of the CBI but has been rather less enthusiastic than the others. One of the 
main reasons for this in the early days was the absence of  any concrete programmes by 
SADC in the areas of  trade, payments and investment and as such they did not see such 
a great relevance. Subsequently, after the signing of  the SADC Protocol on Trade, there 
has been a very involved process of  working out the modalities for implementation of 
the Protocol. These modalities are at variance with the CBI agenda for liberalisation of 
intra-regional trade. A project to strengthen the capacity of  the SADC Secretariat to deal 
with regional integration, including the agenda of  the CBI was prepared by the EC. 
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specific issues of  some of  the regional integration institutions. The CBI has enabled the 
countries to undertake technical work related at times to the institutions' own programmes 
through the support of  the co-sponsors that would not have been otherwise available. In 
East Africa, for example, the TWGs held a series of seminars throughout each of the 
three countries. One ofthe main agenda items on these seminars was the draft Treaty for 
establishment of  the East Africa Community. Results from these seminars were in tum 
fed back to the EAC Secretariat, which was able to take the findings into account when 
modifying the draft treaty. Furthermore the financial support given by the co-sponsors 
has helped with the transitional costs of  adjustment. 
2. 4  Co-sponsors 
The co-sponsors (ADB, EC, IMF and World Bank) jointly assumed responsibility 
for ensuring effective implementation of the CBI, but with individual sponsoring 
institutions focusing more specifically on their respective areas of  competence.  During 
the preparation ofLetters ofCBI Policy a single lead agency took on the responsibility of 
co-ordinating CBI related work at the country level.  Where adjustment programs were 
in place or planned, the World Bank normally acted as the lead agency, while the CEC 
would normally assume leadership for the other countries.  A lead agency's primary 
responsibility was to co-ordinate the preparation/ negotiation process on behalf  of  and in 
cooperation with the other co-sponsors and to ensure that steps were taken by the country 
in preparing specific action programmes to implement the CHI-supported reforms. The 
CEC also, on behalf of  and in consultation with the other co-sponsors, co-ordinated with 
the sub-regional organisations. 
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The EU provided support to the participating countries in a number of  areas: 
t  Provision of  balance of  payments or budget  support: for those countries undergoing 
Bretton Woods institutions-supported reform programmes. Financial assistance was 
given to those countries to help with the transitional costs of  adjustment. 
t  Capacity building: human resource and institutional capacity building. Technical 
assistance has been provided to the TWGs and regional institutions to help with 
the whole CBI process. Most countries have engaged a local consultant for 
Secretariat services and engaged consultants (mainly local) as required to help 
study the various issues. 
t  Private sector development: specific assistance to help restructure the private 
sectors. In those countries not undergoing Bretton Woods institutions-supported 
reform programmes, assistance has been given through project support aimed at the private sector. This has included support with establishment ofthe Investment 
Promotion Agency in Swaziland and the PRIDE project in the IOC region which 
provides support for businesses in the areas of  product and market development 
on a cost sharing basis. A project for Namibia supported the EPZ regime as well 
as capacity building in the areas of  international trade and investment. A project 
in Mauritius supports technology diffusion to private enterprises. 
The co-sponsors participated in all the regional meetings and were able to  hold 
open dialogues with the participating countries. The CBI has also been of  help to them in 
co-ordinating their programmes and policy reform agendas between themselves. Whilst 
the different co-sponsors clearly had different perceptions on the nature of regional 
integration, they were able to work together to establish common objectives. There was 
also a learning process over the years and a noticeable change in thinking about regional 
integration. 
The two road maps-on tariff harmonisation and investment facilitation, were both 
drafted by the co-sponsors, based on country analyses and inputs from the TWGs and the 
lead consultant.  They were subsequently discussed in detail and finalised by the 
participating countries. The inputs from the co-sponsors were very helpful in formulating 
the various policy reform measures. 
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This synthesis paper is intended to provide an agenda for discussion at the 
forthcoming Third Ministerial Meeting of  the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI). The 
CBI, which originated in 1992, is a framework of  harmonized policies to facilitate a 
market-driven concept of  integration in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian 
Ocean countries. The initiative is based on the belief that a set of  actions, parallel to 
the ongoing economic reform programs of  participating countries, could accelerate the 
pace of  cross-border trade, investments and payments, and assist the cause of  regional 
integration. To date, fourteen countries participate in the CBI, which is co-sponsored 
by the African Development Bank, the European Union, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Bank. 
CBI's special features include: 
•  integration into the global economy 
•  private sector involvement in the design and implementation of  reforms 
•  peer pressure from fast reformers setting the pace of  integration 
•  avoidance of  creation of  new institutions, while strengthening existing capacity 
The CBI Agenda includes the following major planks: a road map for tariff 
reform and trade facilitation (including time-bound targets on tariff levels, number of 
tariff bands, elimination of  tariffs on intra-regional trade), liberalization of  exchange 
and payments system, and investment deregulation. 
There has been substantive but variable progress in implementation of  the 
CBIAgenda: 
•  Overall progress has been stronger in about half a dozen countries. 
•  Progress has been most marked in the areas of  exchange and  payments issues, 
and trade liberalization and  facilitation. 
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movement facilitation. 
t  A residual agenda thus remains which needs to be completed promptly. 
Trade Liberalization and Facilitation. The implementation record has been 
significant, but uneven: 
t  There has been generally good progress in lowering imports tariffs, with three 
countries having reached a maximum rate of  not more than 25 percent, and a 
trade-weighted average import tariff of  not  more than 15 percent. 
t  Five countries have already met the target of  reducing the number of  non-zero 
tariff  rate bands to three, and several countries have significantly reduced the 
number of  tariff rate bands. 
t  Less progress has been made in reducing "other duties and charges" (ODC's) 
and incorporating them into the tariff structure. 
t  Some progress has also been made toward increasing tariff preferences on 
intra-regional trade. 
t  Considerable progress appears to have been made in freeing export trade 
restrictions. 
t  Progress in reducing tariff exemptions has been limited; while most countries 
have reduced the scope ofnon-tariffbarriers (NIBs) on imports, these 
continue to be significant. 
t  Progress on trade facilitation has been relatively satisfactory with the broad 
adoption of  the COMESA Harmonized Road Transit Charges and COMESA 
customs document. However, less progress has been made on risk insurance 
and bond guarantee facilities. 
Exchange and Payments Systems: Considerable progress has been made in 
respect of  the liberalization of  the exchange and payments system: 
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t  Eleven countries have accepted the obligations under the Fund's Article VIII, 
which call for the elimination of  restrictions on external current account 
transactions, although a few of  them maintain exchange restrictions. 
t  There has also been considerable progress (nine countries) in moving towards 
market-based exchange rates in line with the target of  establishing unified 
interbank exchange markets. t  Competition in foreign exchange markets has also been enhanced with the 
licensing of  non-bank foreign !exchange bureaus in seven countries. 
t  Several other constraints on ctoss-border payments have also been eased. 
Thus,forward cover through ~uthorized dealers is available in nine countries, 
restrictions on foreign currenqy accounts have been lifted in eight countries, 
and considerable progress hasi been made in ten countries in easing foreign 
exchange surrender requirem~nts. 
t  Six countries have substantial~y or wholly liberalized capital account 
transactions, while several others have taken steps to ease such restrictions. 
Investment Deregulation and Facilitation of  Labor Movement 
t  There has been near full compliance in setting up of  a one-stop investment 
approval authority. 
t  The record with respect to the observance of  the Statute of  Limitations and the 
publishing of  the Investment Code is less robust. 
t  With regard to facilitation oflabor movement, most of  the non-island countries 
have taken action on short-term entry permits for border residents, five 
countries have taken full action (three others have partial action) to implement 
the CO  MESA visa protocol, while only three countries have fully complied 
with actions to improve the granting of  residence and work permits. 
Donor Support. The co-sponsors jointly assume responsibility for helping the 
countries to effectively implement CBI supported reforms, with each individual 
institution focusing on its area of  competence and providing support within the 
framework of  each co-sponsor's existing assistance policies and programs. To date, 
the co-sponsors as a group have provided the following support: 
t  Balance of  payments and budgetary support to help finance the net transitional 
costs of  implementing the CBI Agenda in several countries. 
t  Technical assistance for related capacity and institution building, including 
assistance to the Technical Working Groups (TWGs). 
t  Direct assistance to the private sector for restructuring and enterprise 
development to facilitate exploitation of  the global and regional market 
opportunities. 
p.33 Value Added of  the CBI. It is practically impossible to separate CBI  -related 
benefits from other elements of  overall economic reform programs. The effort to 
isolate CBI-related benefits must, therefore, be somewhat impressionistic. 
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t  While it is difficult to establish a clear and unambiguous link between policy 
initiatives under the CBI and macroeconomic performance, in the five-year 
period 1993-97, CBI participants have performed better than non-CBI 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries as a whole. Similarly, the CBI high 
performing countries have achieved growth rates in private investment and 
export that are in line with the experience of  non-CBI high performing 
countries. 
t  While the underlying principle of  the CBI is that of  self-selection of  the pace 
of  reform, some trail blazers have emerged, who have demonstrated to their 
less active partners the viability and benefits of  fast-paced reform. Moreover, 
among the CBI countries, performance is markedly superior among those 
which are more active in the implementation ofthe CBI agenda. 
t  The CBI has supported a shift away from past attempts at regional integration 
based on import substitution with high protection to one with relatively low 
effective rates of  protection. Its success has increased the credibility of  open 
regional integration schemes among donors. 
t  The institutional components of  the CBI process have fostered a forum with 
active participation of  the private sector for the formation of  a national 
consensus on development issues. 
t  The CBI also provides a useful framework for governments and donors to 
coordinate their reform objectives and its phasing. The outcome is likely to be 
more harmonized tariff regimes. 
Lessons Learnt 
t  Institutionalizing the role and views of  the private sector in the formulation 
and execution of  the economic policy framework contributes to ownership and 
effective implementation of  reforms. 
t  TWGs have emerged as the linch pin of  the CBI process. Timely assistance for 
institution-building and active participation of  the private sector have helped 
the TWGs become an important player in the policy reform process. 
t  The outcome of  tariff reform to date is a compelling case of  how high 
performers could create a neighborhood effect and demonstrate that tariff reform can be undertaken within overall taxation reform, especially reduction 
of  exemptions, with manageable fiscal impact. 
•  As a flexible, yet fairly regular forum, CBI provides a good example of  a 
partnership through which the donors could coordinate their approaches to 
better serve the needs of  the countries. 
Evolving Agenda 
Despite good overall progress, especially in the implementation of  CBI's major 
planks, there is a need to stay the course and complete the actions envisaged. 
Moreover, the evolution of  global economic relations points to additional measures to 
keep pace with the rest of  the world. The participating countries are encouraged to 
consider the following actions which could help to improve their competitiveness in 
the global economy. 
•  In regard to the Trade Liberalization Agenda, it is recommended that the pace 
of  external tariff  reform be accelerated, taking into account the specific 
country circumstances. Continuing efforts, beyond the targets specified in the 
road map, should also be made to further reduce the stipulated maximum rate, 
narrow the number of  tariff bands, and lower the trade-weighted average tariff. 
•  All remaining non-tariff barriers (both imports and exports) should be 
eliminated, except those justified for health, security and environmental 
reasons. 
•  In order to avoid further complications in managing a variety of  arrangements 
regarding the granting of  preferences on intra-regional trade, it is 
recommended that the CBI countries implement the schedule of  preferences 
under the COMESA Treaty. 
•  The concern that tariff reform will lead to fiscal erosion and, therefore, of 
macroeconomic instability is unlikely to materialize if  the recommended tariff 
reform is firmly anchored in a reform of  overall taxation. The elimination of 
the considerable exemptions (except those under reciprocal diplomatic 
obligations) prevalent in CBI countries would improve the revenue response 
and the transparency of  the tariff regime. 
•  It is also recommended that CBI countries complete the Investment 
Deregulation Agenda by October 1998 -- the target date for the trade 
liberalization agenda. 
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The maturation of  CBI invites a question about its future. There are three options. 
•  Option 1-- Continue as is.  The unfinished agenda is too substantive not to 
merit further attention of  the CBI participants as a group. 
•  Option 2. A more inclusive CBI. This is not mutually exclusive to Option 1, 
but seeks to broaden the process among potential new participants such as 
Mozambique. 
•  Option 3. Closure. The CBI was conceived as a forum to promote a consensus 
on policy reforms; it was never intended to be an institution with a life of  its 
own. A closure could, therefore, be called, and the unfinished agenda could be 
pursued in the context of  the on-going economic reform programs. 
The above options were discussed at a meeting with representatives of 
participating countries, resource persons from regional organizations and co-sponsors 
in Harare, November 20-21, 1997. There was a consensus to recommend to the 
Ministerial meeting a combination of  options 1 and 2, i.e., to continue and broaden the 
CBI. 
p.36 CROSS-BORDER INITIATIVE: 
IMPLEMENTATION  AND THE EVOLVING 
AGENDA 
Synthesis Paper for consideration at the Third CBI Ministerial Meeting
1 
(Harare, February 19-20, 1998) 
Part I. Introduction 
1.  The 1990 Maastricht Conference on Africa offered a validation of  the need 
for more regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), while noting at the same 
time that previous integration attempts have achieved little of  enduring value. Such 
views were also echoed in the deliberations of  the Special Program of  Assistance for 
Africa (SPA). The advent of  North American Free Trade Area ( NAFTA) and Mercado 
del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR), regarded as examples of  what is collectively described 
as New Regionalism offered a paradigm for a different approach to regional 
integration in SSA that is consistent with multilateral trade liberalization.2  Against this 
background, the African Development Bank, the European Union, International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank (i.e., the co-sponsors) began a dialogue with the 
interested countries and regional institutions on issues related to regional integration 
in SSA. This dialogue culminated in the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) covering the 
Eastern and Southern African and Indian Ocean countries. The underlying pre~ise 
was that given the on-going economic reform programs in most of  these countries, a 
parallel set of  policy and institutional reforms could accelerate the pace of  economic 
1This synthesis paper has been prepared by the co-sponsors on the basis of  implementation updates by the Technical Working Groups and other 
information available to the co-sponsors. Its audience is the participants in the forthcoming CBI ministerial meeting. The paper seeks to set out 
an agenda for the meeting"s deliberations. The focus is on i) progress in implementation of the CBI and an updated agenda of actions to be 
undertaken;  ii) value added of CBI and the lessons learnt; and iii) options for the future of CBI.  An earlier version of the paper was also 
discussed at a meeting with representatives of  participating countries, resource persons from regional organizations and co-sponsors in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, November 20-21,  1997.  That meeting endorsed the general thrust of the  synthesis paper and contributed additional ideas and 
suggestions which have been incorporated in the present version of  the paper. 
2There is more recent validation. The Denver Summit of  the Eight (including Russia) made specific reference in its communique to attempts at 
regional integration. The Communique called upon them "to support reforming Sub-Saharan African countries .... towards openness, regional 
integration, and deeper participation in the world economy". 
p.37 growth through regional integration, particularly by fostering efficient cross-border 
investment and trade flows. 
2.  This ensuing dialogue led to a consensus that the CBI should avoid the 
failings of  previous regional initiatives in SSA by emphasizing: i) outward-orientation, 
particularly openness to the rest of  the world to ensure that regionalism is 
accompanied by greater integration of  the sub-region into the world economy; ii) 
avoidance of  the creation of  new institutions; iii) direct involvement of  the private 
sector in the formulation and implementation of  a conducive policy/institutional 
environment; and iv) the need for the initiative to be driven by the potential 
participants to ensure ownership as a key to effective implementation. 
3.  A vigorous process of  consultation among interested parties, including 
regional and sub-regional institutions (viz., COMESA, EAC, ECA, OAU, SADC, and 
IOC),  led to a consensus on the scope and time-frame for implementation of  the 
package of  policy/institutional reforms which became known as the CBI  Agenda (see 
Annex 1 for details). A critical element in this consultative process was the formation 
of Technical Working Groups (TWOs) with private and public sector participation in 
each of  the interested countries. 
3  The TWOs serve as vehicles to conduct debate and 
achieve consensus on common policy issues within each country and among the 
participating countries.
4  The consultative process culminated in the CBI Concept 
Paper (June 1993), which set out the CBI Agenda. The CBI Concept Paper was 
formally adopted at the First CBI Ministerial Meeting (August 1993) in Kampala by 
representatives of  fourteen countries (Burundi,  Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania,  Uganda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe) that constitute the "CBI participants". 
4.  To date, ten countries have finalized Letters of  CBI Policy (LCBIPY which 
describe the program of  action of  each participating country to implement the CBJ-
supported reform agenda. Of  the remaining four, Madagascar and Seychelles have 
recently submitted revised LCB!Ps to the co-sponsors. No action has been taken with 
regard to Burundi's draft LCBIP, submitted in July 1996, because of  the uncertain 
prospects for implementation of  reform due to political uncertainties. CBI activities in 
Rwanda have been halted since 1994 for a similar reason, although the authorities 
have recently indicated renewed interest. The status of  LCB!Ps and other institutional 
arrangements are summarized in Annex IL Table 1. 
3The first meeting of the TWGs took place in Mauritius in June 1992 and agreed on the terms of reference for the background studies to be 
conducted by the TWGs.  These studies were reviewed and synthesized into a common program of  action during the second TWG workshop in 
Harare in December 1992. 
4lt  was decided later in the consultative process to facilitate the coordination and implementation of  the CBI Agenda through the creation of  a 
Policy Implementation Committee (PIC),  at the ministerial level, typically headed by the Minister of Finance and including other concerned 
ministers and involving input from private sector representatives through the TWGs.  In many cases, a similar body already existed such as 
those created for the implementation of  adjustment programs. The PIC, however, is distinguished by explicit private sector input. 
5LCBIP is a statement of intent by the concerned government to undertake action within a reasonable time-frame on each element of  the CBJ 
Agenda. The LCBIP is reviewed and agreed by the co-sponsors and constitutes a basis for assistance from the co-sponsors within the framework 
of  each co-sponsor's existing assistance policies and programs. 
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Ministerial Meeting in Mauritius (March 1995) which set forth, among others, a Road 
Map for the implementation of  the tariff reform program, a crucial element of  the CBI 
Agenda. This was followed up by the Third Meeting of  the TWGs,  also in Mauritius 
(Aprill996), to further review progress in implementation, identify steps needed to 
accelerate action on tariff reform, and to explore the feasibility of  an export credit 
insurance scheme. 
6.  Since its formal adoption in August 1993 by the participating countries, there 
has been substantive but variable progress in the implementation of  the CBI  Agenda (see 
below, Part II). Its implementation history cannot, of  course, be independent of  the uneven 
pace of  progress in the economic reform programs of  the participating countries. 
Nevertheless, a generally good record of  progress under the CBI is clearly discernible. 
First, overall progress has been stronger in about half-a dozen countries. Secondly, 
progress has been most marked in the areas of  exchange and  payments issues, and trade 
liberalization and  facilitation which represent the major planks of  the CBI  Agenda. Thirdly, 
there has been some progress in the area of  investment deregulation, but less so on labor 
market reform measures (i.e., residence and work permits). There is thus a residual set of 
actions which needs to be completed promptly. In the meanwhile, new issues have 
emerged in the context of  the rapidly changing structure of  the global economy. To 
improve their competitive position in the global economy, the CBI countries need to 
continuously adapt to an evolving reform agenda. 
7.  Implementation of  the CBI  Agenda by most of  the participating countries 
has also been accompanied by sound macroeconomic policies and related structural 
reform programs. It is, of  course, difficult to establish a clear and unambiguous link 
between policy initiatives under the CBI and macroeconomic developments. 
Moreover, it could hardly be over-emphasized that CBI is a process, not a set of 
immediate outcomes. Consequently, the impact on GDP growth and other significant 
economic variables could only be envisaged over the medium to long term because of 
the lagged impact on output flows. 
8.  It may be useful, nevertheless, to look at the broad macroeconomic trends 
among the CBI countries. Real GDP growth in CBI countries has increased from an 
average of2.9 percent in 1993 to 4.0 percent by 1997, due largely to the growth 
performance of  Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Real Per 
Capita GDP growth which was significantly negative at the beginning of  the period 
increased to 1.2 percent by 1997. A further development was the steady and 
continuous decline in inflation from 26 percent in 1993 to 12 percent in 1997, 
reflecting sound macroeconomic policies as well supply conditions in the participating 
countries. Relative to GDP, Government revenue (including grants) and broad money 
have remained virtually unchanged ( at around 23 percent and 32 percent respectively) 
during the period under consideration. On the other hand, broad money growth (like 
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regard to external transactions, while exports has remained unchanged the external 
current account as well as the overall balance have shown considerable improvement 
since 1993. Total investment and domestic savings have remained virtually unchanged 
at around 20 percent and 12 percent ofGDP respectively (see Annex IL  Table 2). 
9.  In the five-year period, 1993-97, the CBI countries have also performed 
better than the non-CBI countries in SSA in almost all the categories surveyed (Annex 
IL  Table 2). Thus Real GDP increased by 3.8 percent per annum compared to 3.1 
percent annum in non- CBI countries. Per capita GDP growth and investment 
performance were also better in CBI countries and inflation less than half that of  non-
CE! countries. The performance of  the external sector was equally impressive among 
the CBI countries: exports grew much faster and overall balance of  payments deficit 
was lower than the rest of  SSA. 
10.  A more cogent comparison could be between the CBI high performers and the 
non-CBI high performing countries which have been implementing a generally similar 
reform agenda either individually or in the context of  other sub-regional integration 
initiatives (e.g., UEMOA in Western Africa). The top 15 countries in SSA in terms of 
structural reforms6  have been used to select the country samples in the two high 
performing comparator groups (see Annex IL  Table 14 for relevant details) . The 
appropriate time-frame for this comparison is 1995-97 since most of  the LCB!Ps were 
formulated in 1994 and onwards, and since in some of  the non-CBI countries there was a 
major shift of  policy after 1994 when the CFAFranc was devalued. The comparison 
between these two high performing groups is most relevant along two variables (i.e., 
private investment growth rate and export growth rate) upon which the impact of  the CBI 
Agenda could be felt more immediately. As seen from the said Annex table, CBI countries' 
performance is in line with the experience of  other high performers in SSA. Two important 
general inferences could be drawn from this comparison: i) sound policies lead to good 
results; and ii) most of  the high performers in both groups (  11 out of 15 countries in the 
said Annex table) are pursuing economic policies in the context of  CBI or UEMOA. 
Part II. Policy Implementation and Donor Support 
A. Implementation 
11.  Trade Liberalization. This is a major plank of  the CBI  Agenda which 
aims to reduce the anti-export bias in the trade regime of  the participating countries 
and create an incentive structure that would promote efficient investment and trade 
flows. To this end, a Road Map for trade reform was proposed by the co-sponsors and 
'Using "':orld Bank methodology for performance ranking of  developing countries. 
p.40 endorsed by the country representatives at the Second CBI Ministerial Meeting (March 
1995). The Road Map,  which was elaborated further at the Third TWG Meeting (April 
1996), 
7  envisaged that, by October 1998, the following would be achieved: 
t  a tariff structure of  no more than three (non-zero) rates with a maximum rate 
of  20-25 percent covering all import-specific taxes and charges; 
t  lowering trade-weighted average of  tariffs vis-a-vis third parties to no more 
than 15 percent; 
t  acceleration of  CO  MESA's schedule of  preferential tariffs on intra-regional 
trade with a view to complete elimination of  all tariffs on intra-regional trade 
by 1998, i.e., ahead of  CO  MESA's objective (by year 2000); 
t  application of  the lowest customs duty rate to raw materials and capital goods, 
a middle rate for intermediate goods, and a higher rate for finished goods 
(based on a 6-digit harmonized system tariff code); 
t  elimination of  the remaining non-tariff barriers except those justified for 
health, security and environmental reasons; and 
t  reduction in customs duty exemptions to a minimum consistent with 
international treaty obligations. 
12.  The record of  implementation of  the actions envisaged under the Road 
Map has been substantive but uneven. Among the countries that have progressed most 
rapidly. maximum import tarifft have been reduced from the range of 50-60 percent in 
1992 to 20-25 percent in 1997(see Annex II,  Table 3). Kenya, Uganda and Zambia 
have reduced the maximum rate to 20-25 percent, Madagascar and Tanzania have 
lowered the rate to 30 percent, Malawi to 35 percent, and Comoros to 40 percent. 
However, maximum rates continue to be significantly higher in Seychelles (200 
percent), Burundi (100 percent), and in the 60-85 percent range in Mauritius, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
13.  There has been slow progress in reducing other duties and charges 
(ODCs) and in incorporating them into the tariff structures. The level of  ODCs in the 
majority of CBI participants are in the range of  20 percent or less (Burundi,  Comoros, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe),8  the sole exception being Mauritius (400 percent). Nevertheless, the 
existence of  ODCs reduces the efficiency and transparency of  trade regimes and a 
renewed effort is needed to incorporate them into the import tariff regime and the 
number of  rate bands (see Annex II,  Table 3). 
'Cross-Border Initiative: Proposal for a Harmonized External Tariff, Apri/1996. prepared by the co-sponsors. 
'For Seychelles and Tanzania,  ODCs are incorporated into the tariff structure. 
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Kenva. Madagascar.  Uganda. and Zambia) have met the target of  reducing the 
number of  non-zero tariff rate bands to no more than three, while another five 
countries (Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) have four or five rate 
bands. Mauritius and Seychelles have 8 and 9 rate bands respectively, while SACU 
countries (Namibia and Swaziland) have multiple bands in their tariff schedule.
9 At 
least three countries (Kenya.  Uganda and Zambia) have reduced the trade-weighted 
average taritf(excluding ODCs) to substantially less than 15 percent ( see Annex IL 
Table 4). 
15.  Progress has been made by the CBI participating countries towards 
eliminating tariffs on intra-regional trade (see Annex IL Table 4). At the Second 
Ministerial Meeting it was agreed that: i) CBI countries should begin taking unilateral 
action to accelerate granting of  preferences beyond the schedule stipulated under the 
CO  MESA Treaty and in accordance with the Road Map timetable (i.e., 90 percent 
preference by October 1997 and 100 percent by October 1998); and ii) if, within one 
year of  such action, the other CBI countries have not reciprocated, then the countries 
in(i) above could withdraw the additional preferences over and above those stipulated 
under the COMESA Treaty. While none have reached the 90 percent preference margin 
envisaged under the CBI by December 1997, four countries (Kenya, Madagascar,  10 
Uganda, 11  and Zimbabwe) have achieved the target under the COMESA Treaty while 
five others (Comoros, Malawi, Mauritius, Tanzania,  12  and Zambia) provide a 60 -70 
percent preference margin. Moreover, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have indicated a 
desire to accelerate tariff reductions between them, in the context of  the East African 
Cooperation (EAC) agreement. On the other hand, as members of  SACU, the 
preference margins given by Namibia and Swaziland are determined together with 
other SACU countries. Those CBI countries which have made most progress in tariff 
reform have expressed concern at the lack of  reciprocal treatment. These countries 
claim that their nominal tariffs are already much lower than their regional partners so 
that imports could be facing very low tariff rates compared to their exports to these 
countries. 
16.  Progress towards reducing taritfexemptions has been limited. An attempt 
has been made to disaggregate the sources of such exemptions (see Annex II, Table 5). 
Overall, about half  the CBI countries have a significant degree of  exemptions (applied 
to more than 40 percent of  imports). Nevertheless, some countries (notably, Kenya, 
Malawi, Namibia,  Tanzania, and Uganda) have made progress in recent years in 
reducing exemptions. Government imports are subject to tax in only five countries, 
'Both these countries are tied to the pace of  South Africa's implementation of  its own tariff  reform program under the SACU Treaty obligations. 
10In the case of  Madagascar, a decision, in principle, has been made but not yet implemented, except in relation to its trade with Mauritius. 
''Uganda has introduced a I 0 percentage point surcharge on the preference rate for selected goods commencing July 1996, thereby effectively 
lowering the preference margin to 70 percent for such goods. 
p.42 (Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Uganda). The parastatal sector continues 
to benefit from partial or full exemption from duty liabilities in Burundi, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Tanzania,  and Zambia. Exemptions given under Investment Code or 
General Conventions are pervasive with the exception of  Malawi, Swaziland and 
Uganda. The extent of  tariff exemptions for NGOs, for foreign-financed projects and 
other categories of  projects is also comprehensive. While such exemptions could 
reduce the anti-export bias of  a tariff regime, these are also i) inherently discretionary 
and thus have the potential to distort the incentive structure; ii) could cause a 
substantial revenue loss; and iii) are neither neutral nor transparent. A substantial 
unfinished agenda, therefore, remains in the area of  tariff  exemptions. 
17.  Progress towards elimination of  Non-Tarif]Barriers {NTBs) except for a 
small negative list for reasons of  health. environment and security has been mixed.
13 
Annex IL Table 6 assesses the significance of  NTBs by disaggregating them into 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) such as bans and quotas, state trading monopolies, and 
discriminatory excise/VAT rates on imports. Currently, bans and quotas exist in only 
three CBI countries (Uganda, 
14  Seychelles15 ,  and Zambia
16 
); however, Uganda has 
announced a phased withdrawal of  all bans by July 1999. Import licensing
17  is 
confined to Namibia, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. State trading monopolies also exist 
in: Comoros (petroleum), Mauritius (cement and petroleum), Namibia (food crops), 
Seychelles (a wide variety of  goods), Swaziland (maize), Tanzania (petroleum) and 
Zambia (petroleum). Discriminatory rates of  excise duty and/or sales tax are prevalent 
in Kenya (petroleum), Mauritius (tobacco and alcohol), Tanzania (beer), Uganda 
(selected imports) and Zambia (beer). Burundi also requires that 5 percent of  the value 
of  imports be deposited with a commercial bank. Overall, a subjective evaluation of 
the pervasiveness of  the NTBs indicates that while most countries have reduced the 
scope of  NTBs in their trade regimes over the past five years, NTBs on imports 
continue to be significant in almost all of  the CBI countries . 
18.  Considerable progress has been made in freeing export trade regimes of 
restrictions (Annex IL  Table  7}.
18  Only Zambia (sawn wood and logs), and Zimbabwe 
(maize) have QRs on their exports. Licensing of  exports are confined to Kenya 
(foodstuffs and agricultural products), and Zimbabwe (textile machinery). Export 
duties are prevalent in Burundi, Comoros, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe); they are, however, more pervasive in Malawi (covering 7  5 percent of  its 
exports) and in Tanzania (a 2 percent export duty is applied on traditional exports, 
including minerals). 
13NTBs include quantitative restrictions, state trading, monopolies, restrictive foreign  exchange practices affecting the trade regime (e.g., 
surrender requirements at an overvalued exchange rate), quality control and customs procedures that act as trade restrictions. Pre-shipment 
inspection is not considered a NTB, unless implemented in a restrictive manner. 
140n soft drinks, cigarettes, automotive batteries, and beer. 
15Value specific quota of 1995 imports. 
16Zambia maintains an import ban on petroleum products and wheat flour. 
170nly for restrictive purposes. 
18The March 1995 ministerial meeting called for removal of  QRs on exports to all countries. 
p.43 19.  Trade Facilitation. Progress in the area of trade facilitation. another 
major plank of  the CBI  Agenda. has been relatively satisfactory (see Annex IL Table 
8). Adoption of COMESA Harmonized Road Transit Charges and the introduction of 
the Road Customs Transit Document (RTCDJl
9  have been achieved in more than half 
the CBI countries (Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe  ).20  Namibia and Swaziland have indicated that the enactment of  th~se 
measures will depend on the outcome of  the on-going re-negotiation of  the SACU 
agreement. With r~gard to the introduction of  the Yellow Card (i.e., single goods 
declaration document), there is compliance by Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, while action is in process in Burundi, Malawi, Swaziland and Uganda.
21 
Regarding introduction of  a bond guarantee scheme (i.e., aimed at facilitating transit 
trade while avoiding loss of  customs revenue), there has been very little progress on 
the COMESA scheme. 
20.  Financial Sector Issues. An important issue in this regard is the absence 
of  Risk Insurance facilities, on which there has been little progress and the matter 
deserves active consideration. The lack of  such coverage is a restraint, particularly on 
intra-regional trade. While commercial risks are, to some extent, covered by the 
financial system, no such facilities exist with respect to political risks. The perception 
of  high political risk in Africa results in scarce and high cost cover for many African 
countries, even for many short term transactions, and an absence of  cover for medium 
term transactions. A proposal in this regard, the Eastern and Southern Africa Regional 
Insurance Mechanism (ESARIM) was discussed at the Third TWG Meeting (Mauritius, 
April 1996). At a subsequent meeting with experts (Brussels, July 1996), the viability 
of  the project was questioned, and action was postponed pending further study. 
21.  Another initiative in this regard (now in a broad consultative phase) is 
the establishment of  an Africa Guarantee Facility (AGF) 22  by the World Bank with 
the use ofiDA credits and donor/country funds. The proposed guarantee scheme 
would be available to cover political risk in relation to eligible transactions in 
participating countries. The eligible transactions would include exports by 
participating countries to both participating and non-participating countries and 
imports of  capital goods by participating countries. The political risks associated 
with financing eligible activities proposed to be covered by the scheme are 
principally those that are normal and usual in the market. These include non-
convertibility of  currency, expropriation or moratorium on payments, Government 
interference causing debtors to default in performance of  its obligations to a 
guarantee holder, war and civil disturbance. 
"Replaced by the COMESA Customs Document. 
20As these are intended to facilitate laud-based transportation, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, aud Seychelles, are not required to enact 
these measures. 
21The measure is not applicable to the islaud economies (i.e., Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius,  and Seychelles). 
22The proposal follows a concept operating successfully in Bosnia aud Herzegovina aud under preparation in Ukraine aud Albania. 
p.44 22.  Exchange and Payments System. Liberalization of  exchange systems is 
another major plank of  the CBI framework. It involves, inter alia, lifting of  restrictions 
on current international transactions, development of  inter-bank foreign exchange 
markets, elimination of  surrender requirements, and liberalization of  foreign currency 
accounts. It also calls for a relaxation, as circumstances permit, of  those restrictions on 
capital flows that are important for cross-border investment, including the 
development of  equity markets in the region. 
23.  With regard to the elimination of  restrictions on current account 
transactions, as of end-December 1997. 11  of  the 14 CBI countries have accepted the 
obligations under IMF's Article VIII although a few of  them maintain restrictions on 
such transactions (see Annex II,  Table 9). Of  the remaining three countries, although 
Burundi and Rwanda continue to avail themselves of  the transitional arrangements 
under IMF's Article XIV, they maintain no restrictions on current account payments 
and transfers; while in the case of  Zambia, the only restriction is in respect of  private 
debt service payments contracted before 1991, i.e., prior to the liberalization of  the 
exchange regime. Moreover, all three countries have expressed the intention of 
accepting Article VIII obligations in the near future. 
24 ..  There has been substantial progress in moving towards a market-based 
exchange rate in the last two years, in line with the CBI target of  establishing unified 
inter-bank arrangements and markets by 1996. Annex II (Tables 10 and 11) summarize 
the characteristics of  foreign exchange markets of  the CBI countries. Nine countries 
have unified inter-bank exchange markets.23  Banks are now able to buy/sell foreign 
exchange from one another, thus consolidating the mechanism for market-determined 
exchange rates. A  significant constraint to trade and foreign investment has thus been 
removed and there will be less likelihood of  illegal transfers abroad. Competition in 
foreign exchange markets has also been enhanced in Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Tanzania,  Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe with the licensing of  non-bank 
foreign exchange bureaus. In addition, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (EAC countries) 
have agreed that their respective currencies be fully accepted within EAC and that the 
currencies be quoted by banks and foreign exchange bureaus. 
25.  Several other constraints on cross-border payments have also been eased. 
Forward cover through commercial banks and other authorized dealers is available in 
Comoros, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania,  Uganda and 
Zimbabwe. Restrictions on foreign currency accounts for residents and foreign entities 
have been lifted in all countries with the exception of  Burundi, Comoros, Namibia, 
Seychelles and Swaziland.
24  Finally, with the exception of  Burundi, Comoros, Rwanda 
23 Although Namibia and Swaziland peg their respective currencies to the South African Rand, an inter-bank market exists for the determination 
of  forward rates. 
24Corporate foreign currency accounts in Zimbabwe were liquidated by the monetary authorities in November 1977 as a stop-gap measure to 
contain an imminent balance of  payments crisis; the intention is to reconstitute these accounts once the foreign exchange situation improves. 
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foreign exchange surrender requirements (Annex IL  Table 12). 
26.  Six countries (Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Uganda and 
Zambia), have substantially or wholly liberalized capital account transactions. 
Comoros and Madagascar have also taken steps to ease restrictions. However, some 
countries still require prior authorization which is usually granted if  the inflow is 
deemed to benefit a priority sector, an approved enterprise or, as in most cases, an 
investment approved under the Investment Code or similar regulations. A number of 
countries have also moved to ease restrictions on the repatriation of  direct investments 
(Comoros, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe) and portfolio outflows. 
27.  A recent facilitating development is the World Bank-financed effort at 
coordination/rationalization/improvement of  the payment systems, financial 
legislation, regulatory/supervisory and accounting practices among the SADC member 
states.25  Since eight out of  the fourteen SADC member states are also CBI participants 
(i.e., Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) this initiative would facilitate integration of  the financial systems and thus 
remove a major systemic hurdle in improving cross-border financial transactions 
among more than half of CBI countries. 
28.  Investment Deregulation. The CBI  framework envisages the following 
reforms: 
t  One-Stop Investment Approval Authority to consolidate bureaucratic 
requirements and vesting it with the responsibility of  securing investment-
related residence/work permits. 
t  Statute of  Limitations (  45-60 days maximum) on investment applications, 
following which such applications are to be deemed approved unless 
determined otherwise. 
t  Adoption of  an Investment Code to provide transparency with regard to 
investment incentives and the regulatory environment. 
t  Ratification of  CO  MESA's MIE Charter legislating similar provisions to treat 
investments, irrespective of source, in a non-discriminatory manner. 
t  Dual taxation Agreements. 
t  Cross-listing of  Stocks. 
25The World Bank has provided funds for this purpose in the form of  an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant (May 1997) to the Finance 
and Investment Coordinating Unit (FJSCU)  for a study on the harmonization of payments systems among SADC member states. 
p.46 29.  Overall. progress in the area of  investment deregulation has been mixed. 
There has been almost full compliance with regard to establishing one-stop investment 
approval authority which is a major plank of  the CBI  Agenda. For those indicated as 
partial (see Annex IL  Table 13), there is actually substantive progress. For example, in 
the case of  Swaziland, action is imminent. The record with respect to two other major 
planks of  the CBI Agenda is less robust regarding the observance of  the Statute of 
Limitations (only Kenya, Namibia, and Seychelles have fully complied) and is only 
slightly better with regard to the adoption of  the Investment Code (half the CBI 
countries have fully complied). The ratification of  CO  MESA's MIE Charter has been 
overtaken by recent economic reforms in participating countries such as improvements 
in investment-related legislation which has generally removed discriminations against 
FDI. Accordingly, no further consideration should be given to the MIE Charter. There 
is slow progress with regard to dual taxation agreements and cross listing of  stocks ( 
see Annex IL  Table 13). 
30.  The absence of  more rapid progress with regard to some of  the CBI 
provisions under Investment Deregulation is a cause for concern. Except for dual 
taxation agreements and cross listing of  stocks, action by individual countries is 
possible. More importantly, investment deregulation would raise the volume and 
productivity of  investments. 
31.  Facilitation of  Labor Movement. CBI-supported reform agenda 
envisaged the following actions in the liberalization of  labor markets: 
t  Improve the processing of  Residence and Work Permits 
t  Implement the COMESA Visa Protocol 
t  Issue short term Entry Permits for border residents 
32.  Overall. progress has been mixed in implementing the above actions. 
While most of  the non-island economies have taken action on short term entry permits 
for border residents, there is relatively less progress in implementing the COMESA 
Visa Protocol. Five countries have taken full action and three countries have taken 
partial action; Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda no longer require visas by citizens of 
EA C countries for travel between these countries. The processing of  residence and 
work permits, however, remains intractable. Except for Malawi, Namibia and Uganda 
and to some extent, Kenya and Zambia, related actions by the CBI participants are at a 
very preliminary stage. 
p.47 B. Donor Support 
33.  The co-sponsors jointly assume responsibility for helping the countries to 
effectively implement CBJ-supported reforms, with each individual institution 
focusing on its area of  competence. In countries that are under adjustment, the general 
policy provisions related to the CBI Agenda are incorporated, as appropriate, in the 
Policy Framework Paper (PFP) as the regional dimension of  adjustment. 
34.  To date, external support provided to the CBI participants can be divided 
into the following three categories: 
•  Balance of  payments and budgetary support to help finance the net 
transitional costs of  implementing the CBI Agenda. The modalities for this 
type of  assistance vary among the co-sponsors. For example, in 1994 EU 
allocated ECU 60 million (some unused funds are no longer available) in the 
form of  supplements to on-going operations in support of  the participating 
countries' reform programs. Under the new EDF Financial Protocol of  EU, 
possibility exists to provide an additional tranche ofbalance of  payments or 
budgetary support to countries incurring transitional costs resulting from 
implementation of  the CBI  Agenda. The Bretton Woods institutions have 
contributed to meeting the overall financing requirements of  these countries in 
the context of  regular adjustment operations, where applicable. 
26  Similarly, the 
African Development Bank has also contributed to meeting the overall 
financial requirements of  selected CBI countries; for example, ADF 7 
resources have been made available to Tanzania ( US$ 30 million) and 
Uganda (US$ 27.7 million). 
•  Technical assistance for related capacity and institution building, on the basis 
of  requests formulated by the TWGs. This type of  assistance has taken the form 
of  framework assistance by the European Union,27  technical assistance on 
specific issues by the IMF, and Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grants 
by the World Bank.28  ADB is also prepared to support institutional capacity 
building activities of TWGs' through its Technical Assistance Fund. 
•  Assistance to the private sector for restructuring and enterprise development to 
facilitate exploitation of  the global and regional market opportunities. Again, 
"For countries undertaking economic reform programs with the support of  the Bretton Woods institutions, actions included in the LCB!Ps are 
reflected in the objectives of  such programs. For example, the World Bank provided balance of  payments financing to Zambia in the context of 
the Economic Recovery and Investment Program  (US$  140 million credit) and to Malawi in the context of the Fiscal Restructuring and 
Deregulation Program (US$ 110 million credit). These resources were complemented by EU  grants for balance of  payments support under the 
CBI (ECU !!million for Zambia and ECU I 0 million for Malawi). 
"This covers mainly general assistance for the functioning of TWGs (e.g., support for the secretariat through local consultants), provision of 
legal expertise on the revision of  legislation involving CBI reforms, special studies as requested by the TWGs and organization of  meetings at 
regional and sub-regional levels. Approximately, ECU 3 million has been provided for this purpose since 1992. 
28To date, ten IDF grants amounting to about US$ I million have been provided to support priority capacity building activities of the TWGs. 
This includes a regional IDF grant in support of  coordination of  payments among SADC member states (see para. 27) 
p.48 the modalities vary among the co-sponsors. The World Bank has supported 
targeted investment operations with IDA credits
29
;  the European Unions 
PRIDE project (ECU 9.3 million), is a facility to assist the private sector in the 
member states ofthe JOCwith restructuring to benefit from the more open 
regional and world markets. EU is also supporting private sector projects in 
Mauritius (ECU 2.9 million, proposed), Namibia (ECU 5.4 million) and 
Swaziland (ECU 1.5 million). 
Part III. Value Added of CBI 
35.  Most of  the CBI countries have been implementing broad-based economic 
reform programs over the last decade, and it is plausible to argue that such programs 
have acquired a certain momentum and would have continued independently of CBI. 
What then is the value added of CBi? Admittedly, CBI rests on a proposition that, ex 
ante, it would accelerate the on-going reform agenda and that its benefits are 
incremental to such economic reform programs. However, for many of  the CBI 
countries, the trade policy agenda of  the economic reform programs essentially reflects 
the substantive elements of  the CBI  Agenda. Moreover, these substantive elements 
now constitute a major element of  the policy dialogue with the multilateral 
institutions. In terms of  a quantitative demonstration of  the pay-off from CBJ-
supported reforms, however, it is practically impossible to separate the CBI-related 
benefits from the aggregate economic indicators which reflect the impact of  other 
elements of  reform. The effort to isolate and identify CBJ-related benefits must, 
therefore, be somewhat impressionistic. 
36.  Comparative growth performance. As noted in para. 8 and 9 above, 
selected growth indicators (i.e., GDP growth rate, exports and investment as GDP 
ratios ) for 1993-97 are significantly above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Moreover, among the CBI countries themselves, a stronger performance is discernible 
among those which are more active in the implementation ofthe CBI Agenda (e.g., 
Kenya, Uganda, Zambia). It is, of  course, difficult to attribute this outcome exclusively 
to the CBI since these countries are also engaged in adjustment programs. It should, 
however, be noted that the CBI-content of such adjustment programs is quite 
pronounced, which arguably would not have been present to the same extent but for 
the focus and attention generated by the CBI process itself. Arguably also, the impact 
of  CBI would accelerate over time because of  the implied time lag between 
implementation of  reforms and associated beneficial effect on investment and trade. 
3  7.  Much like the debate over the benefits of  the economic reform programs in 
general, the CBI is sometimes unfavorably assessed for its failure to obtain quick and 
29For example, US$ 45 million credit for the Enterprise Development Project in Zambia and US$ 70 million credit for the Enterprise Development 
Project in Zimbabwe. 
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hardly be overemphasized that the CBJ's potential role in this respect is supportive and 
incremental and that it cannot assume the entire burden of  addressing the underlying 
causes of  under-development, which properly belong to the willingness and ability to 
implement broad and sustained economic and social reform programs. Its effect is also 
medium term in nature in the sense that it addresses the investment incentives structure 
(e.g., tariffs, exchange rates) and a host of  other factors which are essentially facilitating for 
the process of  growth and development (e.g., trade facilitation measures, labor market 
reforms). All of  these take time to impact on investor expectations. These take a medium 
and long term view of  investment decisions, which in turn impact on supply responses. 
The pursuit of  the CBI-supported reform programs should, therefore, be sustained over the 
medium to long term. An early pay-off  is not a realistic expectation. Nevertheless, medium 
term prospects are encouraging. CBI high peiformers have experienced sustained high and 
positive growth rates in private investment and exports (see para. 1  0). It is not a 
coincidence that several of  the CBI  participating countries have been recently included in 
what is known as the emerging African markets (e.g., Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe). The growing volume ofFDI to these countries as well as improving 
Institutional Investor International (III) risk-ratings are all causes for optimism and a 
validation of  the fundamental principles which underlie the CBI  Agenda. 30 
38.  Growth in Intra-Regional Trade. Data are not available on intra-CBI 
country trade. Nevertheless, since CBI countries represent nearly half  the COMESA 
member states and SADC, one could look at the latter two groupings as proxies. In 1991, 
the volume of  intra-COMESA trade was about 4 percent of  aggregate CO  MESA trade. 
By 1996, this figure had risen to about 6 percent. It will be difficult to suggest that the 
change is essentially trade-diversionary in Pature emanating from the preference 
obligations on intra-regional trade under the COMESA. It is to be noted that in the case 
of  CBI countries, the on-going implementation of  the CO  MESA preferences has 
occurred simultaneously with sustained liberalization with respect to trade with third 
parties (see para 15 above) so that although there could have been some trade diversion, 
for the major part, the effect has been trade creation in nature. Similarly, intra-regional 
trade among SADC member states has doubled in the period 1993-97. Intra-SADC trade 
increased from about US$ 5 billion in 1993 to about US$ 10 billion in 1997. Of  the 
latter, about two-thirds (US$ 6.5 billion) is intra-SACU trade. However, a large part of 
the SA CU trade in 1997 is on account of  trade with South Africa following resumption 
of  normal trade relations between the latter and the former front-line states. 
39.  New Paradigm of  Regional Integration. CBI offers a different framework 
for pursuing regional integration, an avowed aim of  the countries concerned. It has 
supported a shift away from past attempts at regional integration based on import 
substitution with high protection to one based on efficiency in domestic production with 
relatively low effective rates of  protection. Its success so far has increased the credibility/ 
30For example, in the case of Uganda, FDI increased from$ 2 million in 1992 to$ 160 million in 1996; similarly, III risk-rating for Uganda 
improved from 5 in 1993 to 18 by March 1997. 
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example, the CBJhas helped strengthen the support for regional integration schemes 
among some of  the international organizations such as the IMF and the World BankY 
Similarly, in the context of  the Special Program of  Assistance for Africa (SPA),  several 
development partners have cited the CBI as a good example of  the approach to regional 
integration in SSA. CBI has also had an impact on existing integration arrangements 
(e.g., CBI now constitutes an agenda item in CO  MESA deliberations and is now 
recognized as a fast-track program for COMESA). Finally, since the CBI is based on the 
concept ofthe fastest reformers setting the pace of  integration, it does not constitute a 
constraint on those countries wishing to liberalize faster and deeper than envisaged in 
the CBI framework (e.g., Uganda with respect to the tariff reform). 
40.  Peer Pressure/Neighborhood Effect. An underlying principle of  CBI is 
that of  self-selection, i.e., each country will pursue the CBI  Agenda at its own pace. As 
it happened, some trail blazers have emerged (e.g., Uganda, Zambia) who have, in the 
various CBI discussions, taken up the task of  exhorting their less active CBI partners, 
and in demonstrating the benefits of  fast-paced policy reform. Moreover, the CBI 
forum (with its peer pressure and example effect) has helped in locking in the reforms 
and preventing major backsliding. A case in point is the issue of  tariff reform, which 
has long been mired in the perception that it will erode the fiscal base at least in the 
short run. The experiences of  Kenya,  Uganda and Zambia in implementing the Road 
Map (see para. 12) has demonstrated that a significant lowering of  the tariff rates in 
the context of overall taxation reform could absorb potential fiscal loss, and in some 
cases, could even lead to improvement in revenues. Such examples have played a 
critical part in persuading other regional partners to accelerate their tariff reforms in 
line with the Road Map. As an extension of  the neighborhood effect, of  late, the 
implementation of  the Road Map by the CBI countries has began to influence the tariff 
reform agenda of  the other regional groupings in SSA (e.g.,  UEMOA). 
41.  Capacity Building/Ownership. The proposition that the institutional 
components of  the CBI process have fostered a forum with active participation of  the 
private sector for the formation of  national consensus on major development issues 
(e.g., trade policy, investment incentives, etc.) is significant especially when the 
private sector is recognized as the engine of  growth. Formation of  the TWGs and P  !Cs 
and the close interaction between the government and private sector has facilitated 
deliberations on such issues and advanced the cause of  improved macroeconomic 
management and active private sector participation. The TWGs have created a multi-
sectoral forum for cross-fertilization of  ideas and have had impact beyond their 
individual members. For example, some private sector members of  the TWGs also 
represent chambers of  commerce and other business associations. Most of  the studies 
carried out by the TWGs have relied on local expertise thus helping to build up 
31 As noted in Paragraph I, there is now broader support for regional integration attempts in Africa. The recent Denver Summit of  the Eight has 
explicitly called for support to these from its members and international financial institutions. 
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members of  the TWGs have brought their TWG experience to bear upon broader policy 
formulation through their advisory role to the decision makers (e.g., Tanzania and 
Uganda; see also box on TWGs' impact on policy formulation). 
Impact of  the TWGs in the Policy-Making Process 
This summation is derived from the views expressed by the representatives of  the 
CBI participating countries at the meeting with them in Harare (November 20-21, 
1997). Clearly, TWG as a concept has taken roots. It is now increasingly functional for 
consensus formation on investment and trade policy and related macroeconomic 
issues. Its role is multi-faceted: analytical, policy advisory, and disseminatory. There 
was an unanimity of  views at the meeting that TWG provides an expression of 
national ownership of  the CBI and its role is vital for the articulation of  national CBI 
programs. It brings together the public and private sectors in a novel partnership. The 
practice of  private sector participation varies between the TWGs (i.e., the degree of 
private sector representation, chairpersonship of  the TWGs, etc.) but it is always 
important and vital to the process. There was also a view that TWGs have been 
institutionalized and are likely to survive in the event a closure is called for the CBI 
process. The evolution of  the TWGs and their impact on policy formulation have 
clearly surpassed the hopes in this regard at the beginning of  the CBI process. Specific 
examples in support of  this conclusion abound, the following constitute a sampler: 
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t  EAC (i.e., Kenya,  Tanzania,  and Uganda): Consultation on country budgets 
takes place through the TWGs. CBI Agenda is fully endorsed by the EAC. Local 
dissemination is emphasized: in Uganda, the TWG had organized six public 
awareness seminars outside Kampala on CBI and regional integration issues. 
t  Mauritius: TWG has equal representation from the public and the private 
sectors. It advises the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC),  an inter-
ministerial body, on issues related to all regional cooperation groupings. 
t  Swaziland: TWG is chaired by the private sector. It was instrumental in 
obtaining reconsideration of  a proposed tax reform bill and is now engaged in 
its redraft. 
t  Zambia: TWG redrafted the Export Processing Zone bill, following a study 
involving TWG members and national consultants. The TWG is regularly 
invited to meetings of  the Chamber of  Commerce. 
t  Zimbabwe: TWG has led the analysis of  the implications of WTO membership 
and is currently following up on various issues with the government such as 
notifications to WTO. It is also advising the Government in assessing the 
implications of  adopting the Harmonized External Tariff  under CBI. 42.  The CBI Agenda for each country program has been essentially a product 
of  such internal debate. The co-sponsors have played only a supportive role in this 
process, through funding and technical assistance ( see section on donor support 
above). As a result, there now exists in each CBI country, a core capacity, albeit of 
varying proportions, to deal with industry and trade-related issues in the broader 
context of  regional integration (e.g., TWGs also advise on issues related to other 
regional institutions such as CO  MESA and SADC. This is likely to be an enduring 
benefit of  the CBI process. 
43.  Harmonization of Policies. The CBI provides a useful framework for 
enabling governments and donors to coordinate their respective positions on reform 
objectives and the phasing thereof. The peer  pressure effect referred to above is only 
one aspect of  it. Another important aspect of  the CBI is that the Road Map provides a 
framework within which specific country paths to tariff reform, including regional 
preferences, could be envisaged. This has helped the co-sponsors as well in ensuring 
that their bilateral dialogue with the participating countries is anchored in a common 
framework that has been endorsed at the regional level by both the country authorities 
and the co-sponsors. The outcome is likely to be more harmonized tariff regimes than 
had been possible to establish in the past. 
44.  Cooperation with Sub-Regional Institutions. An important outcome of 
the CBI process is the on-going dialogue with sub-regional institutions, especially 
CO  MESA, SADC and IOC. Convergence of  institutional views has been steady. The 
proposition that tariff reform and removal ofnon-tariffbarriers promotes mutually 
beneficial and efficient investment and trade flows, is no longer contentious, 
although the pace of implementation and whether it should be reciprocal or 
unilateral, are still subject to debate within some of  the sub-regional organizations. 
Moreover, both the COMESA Treaty and the more recent SADC Trade Protocol are 
far removed from the autarchic visions of  the 1970s. The CBI framework and the 
deliberations it has facilitated have played an important role in facilitating a 
consensus among the member countries which, in tum, could form a critical mass in 
steering the debates under CO  MESA and SADC towards a common agenda, 
particularly in the areas of  trade and payment systems. There have been periodic 
consultations between these sub-regional institutions and the CBI co-sponsors. 
Apart from these dialogues with CO  MESA and SADC, the co-sponsors have also 
helped organize consultations with other sub-regional groupings (e.g., IOC, EAC). 
The co-sponsors, as a group, have maintained a steady stream of  technical assistance 
to these institutions in the implementation of  their respective agenda. It could thus 
be concluded that the CBI process has helped in advancing the agenda of  the 
regional institutions in the CBJ-related fields. 
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A. Lessons Learnt 
45.  Role ofthe Private Sector. From the beginning, the CBI process underlined 
the crucial role of  the private sector in the formulation of  the CBI  Agenda. As a result, 
the latter is essentially a synthesis of  the issues and recommendations put forth by the 
TWGs in which the private sector has played a leading role. This outcome has been 
instructive not only for the concerned governments but also for the multilateral 
institutions. There is a clear recognition not only that the private sector is the prime 
source of  growth, but whose views are of  crucial importance as to what constitutes a 
supportive policy/institutional framework. The ensuing experience suggests that perhaps 
a beginning has been made in institutionalizing the viewpoint of  the private sector in 
delineating economic policy framework. The process, however, has to be sustained. The 
necessary institutional evolution such as the formation of  a Policy Implementation 
Committee (PIC), in which private sector input has been promoted under the CBI 
framework needs to be strengthened and clarified in some of  the participating countries. 
46.  Role of the Technical Working Groups. The TWG has emerged as the 
linch pin of  the CBI process. Country experiences have varied in terms of  leadership, 
organization and process of  analysis and formulation of  policy advice. The following 
lessons could be drawn in terms of  what accounts for a successful TWG: i) government 
commitment to the process; ii) dynamic chair person and visibility and authority for the 
TWG; iii) proactive stance and continuity in membership; iv) adequate secretariat; v) 
substantive participation by the private sector through chambers of  commerce and other 
business associations; and vi) effective dissemination strategy to increase public 
awareness among civil society and business community. 
47.  Asymmetric Performance and Peer Pressure. The outcome of  the tariff 
reform is a compelling case ofhow high performers (e.g., Uganda and Zambia) could 
create a healthy measure of  neighborhood effect to accelerate the implementation of  the 
CBI-supported reform agenda in other countries. Given the extent of  the Evolving 
Agenda (see paragraphs below), it may be time for the high performers as a group to take 
a more active role in exerting the necessary peer  pressure to address the task. It could be 
plausibly argued that since CBihas achieved a certain maturity, the leadership role 
should be more firmly grasped by the high performers (e.g., more frequent discussion 
among the TWGs focusing on i) lessons learnt and sharing of  good practices; and ii) 
exchange of  expertise acquired in implementation of  the CBI process. 
48.  Donor Coordination. As a flexible, yet fairly regular forum, CBI provides 
a medium through which the donors can coordinate their approaches. This can help 
ensure that the respective bilateral dialogues become more efficient and lead to policy 
outcomes that are owned by the country authorities and which are more harmonized 
across countries. 
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49.  As noted in Part II, despite good overall progress under CBI,  especially in 
the implementation of  its major planks, there is an important residual agenda. There is 
a need to stay the course and to complete the actions envisaged in each of  the CBI-
supported reform categories. Thus in the case of  exchange and  payments system the 
removal of  all remaining restrictions in line with the obligations under IMF Article 
VIII should form an important part of  the residual agenda. Moreover, the evolution of 
global economic relations since the start of  the CBI process points to the need for 
additional reforms to keep pace with the rest of  the world. Together these actions 
represent the evolving agenda under the CBI. The following paragraphs delineate 
where further actions are necessary. 
50.  Harmonization of  external tariffs and related measures. As indicated in 
para.11, the Road Map for trade reform was endorsed at the Second Ministerial Meeting 
(1995). The subsequent TWG Meeting (1996) laid out an approach to its implementation 
(HETpaper, 1996) progress on which has been uneven (para. 12). The Road Maps 
target date for tariff harmonization, October 1998, leaves a tight time span to undertake 
the necessary action in some countries within the 1998 budget cycle or shortly thereafter. 
It is recommended that the pace of  tariff reform be accelerated. taking into account 
specific country circumstances. The approach underlying the HET paper is 
demonstrative and not a rigid framework. Transitional arrangements on critical country 
issues could, therefore. be envisaged under this framework. The co-sponsors are 
prepared to continue to provide technical assistance and other financial support in this 
regard. It should also be remembered that the Road Maps target date for tariff 
harmonization is not to be deemed as the culmination of  the tariff reform process. The 
HET  paper also suggested that continuing efforts beyond the target date (1998) should 
be made to further reduce the stipulated maximum tariff (i.e., 25 percent), narrow the 
number of  tariff bands further, and lower the average trade-weighted tariff. Such efforts 
will be key in helping the CBI countries to remain competitive in the global economy. 
51.  Two related issues are the continued existence of  other duties and charges 
(ODCs and non-tariff  barriers, see para. 13 and 17 above). As envisaged in the Road 
Map,  the suggested tariff structure was a maximum of  three non-zero rates with a 
maximum of  20-25 percent covering all import-specific taxes and charges. The 
underlying argument for the latter stipulation is that unless such charges are 
incorporated in the tariff structure as recommended the structure of  effective 
protection could be very high. As noted above (para. 13), the ODCs can be as high as 
20 percent and in some cases, significantly higher. It is. therefore. recommended that 
in undertaking tariff reform following an approach similar to that delineated in the 
HETpaper. the ODCs must be regarded as an integral part ofthe tariff structure to 
create a relatively low-incidence and transparent pattern of  effective protection. In 
regard to non-tariff  barriers, although much progress has been made in reducing them 
p.55 in the 1990s, much remains to be done. A renewed effort should be undertaken to 
substantially reduce them (particularly. import licensing. state trading monopolies. and 
discriminatory rates of  excise duty/sales tax) in the period immediately ahead.
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52.  Another related issue is the difficulty of  managing a variety of 
arrangements regarding the granting of  preferences on intra-regional trade. For 
example, under the CO  MESA Treaty,  80 percent preferences are to be provided by the 
member states to each other by 199833  and 100 percent by 2000. Under CBI, it was 
proposed to accelerate the COMESA schedule, with a view to achieving complete 
elimination of  tariffs on intra-regional trade by October 1998. Similar intra-regional 
preferences are also envisaged under the SADC Trade Protocol over a period of  eight 
years. There are also bilateral preferences further complicating the trading 
arrangements among the intra-regional trading partners and between CBI countries 
and other regional trading partners. To avoid further complications, and in view of  the 
fact that reciprocal preferences under CBI's proposed accelerated schedule have not 
materialized (see para. 15 above), it is recommended that the CBI countries strive to 
implement the schedule of  preferences under the CO  MESA Treaty (i.e. eliminate all 
tariffs on intra-regional trade by year 2000). 
53.  In deepening tariff reform, the CBI participating countries may also 
consider introducing WTO tariff  bindings at rates not much higher than the levels 
envisaged in the Road Map, with the stipulation that the ODCs should be included 
within the limits posed by the tariffbindings.34  Such a step will greatly enhance the 
participating countries' credibility in creating an appropriate incentive structure for 
promoting efficient investment and trade flows. The tariff  bindings in the 
recommended manner will, however, still permit flexibility in case of  need as well as 
discretionary action to liberalize tariff levels further. 
54.  Fiscal Implications of  Trade Liberalization. Much of  the hesitation by 
some CBI participating countries in implementing a tariff reform program along the 
guidelines provided in the HET  paper arises from the possibility that it would lead 
to fiscal erosion in the short term and thus compound the problem of  maintaining 
macroeconomic stability.35  The simulations provided in the HET  paper as well as 
the experience of  countries that have implemented the reforms (e.g., Zambia) would 
suggest that such a consequence is unlikely, if  the recommended tariff reform is 
anchored in a reform of  overall taxation, especially exemptions. 36  Nevertheless, in 
32 An additional important element is  the planned reduction in,  and standardization and simplification of trade documentation and border 
procedures for non-island economies. For the private sector, such improvements reduce costs significantly. 
33Generally achieved, with some exceptions, (see para.  14). 
34To date, most CBI countries have not bound many products and those that have been bound are at rates much higher than the rates applied. 
"Thus in the case of  Namibia and Swaziland (as members of  SACU) prospective tariff cuts as well as revisions to the revenue-sharing formula 
could have implications for the net transitional costs of  implementing a tariff reform program. 
"Fiscal erosion should not be a long term concern since the main purpose of tariff reform is to promote efficient investments and therefore 
growth, and consequently, expansion of  the revenue base in the long run. 
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continuing fiscal constraint, CBI countries will need to accelerate efforts to: (i) 
strengthen customs administration: and (ii) explore other (non-trade) sources of 
revenue such as VAT. The cosponsors stand ready to discuss with the country 
authorities what further technical assistance and balance of  payments support would 
be required in this regard. 
55.  As indicated in para. 16, about half  the CBI countries have a considerable 
degree of  exemptions (more than 40 percent of  imports). It is recommended that the 
exemptions be limited to those under General Convention (i.e .. those provided under 
reciprocal diplomatic obligations) and effectively monitored. Elimination of  the 
exemptions on government and parastatal imports would promote fiscal discipline 
since expenditures on imports could prove to be less competitive and will have to be 
justified. Similarly, elimination of  exemptions on NGO imports would close an 
increasingly significant loophole. If  some NGO activities are deemed worthy of 
support then it would be more appropriate to provide these through budgetary 
subventions. This would allow better scrutiny of  their purpose and mode of  delivery of 
their services. 
56.  Financial Sector Reform. In the light of  the on-going successful reform 
process among the SADC countries (see para. 27) for the coordination and 
rationalization of  improvements to the financial systems, financial legislation, and 
regulatory/supervisory practices, it is recommended that a similar coordinating 
initiative be undertaken among the non-SADC CBI countries (Burundi. Comoros. 
Kenva. Madagascar. Rwanda. and Uganda). Such an initiative holds the prospect of 
removing a systemic hurdle in improving cross-border financial transactions. The co-
sponsors are ready to provide the needed support for such an initiative. 
57.  Investment Deregulation. As indicated in para. 29, there is almost full 
compliance with regard to setting up One-Stop Investment Approval Agencies. The 
same, however, is not true with regard to Statute of  Limitations on the time taken to 
assess investment applications and the publishing of  an Investment Code. Except for 
dual taxation agreements and cross listing of  stocks, unilateral action is possible for 
this category. It is recommended that CBI participants resolve to complete the 
Investment Deregulation Agenda by October 1998 with due attention to concluding 
dual taxation agreements and cross listing o(stocks. No further action will be 
necessary with regard to the ratification of  the MIE Charter. 
58.  Residence and Work Permits. As noted in para. 32, the record of  progress 
remains a cause for concern, since lack of  progress in this area of  reform could 
contribute to reducing the CBI countries' chances of  mobilizing FDI and cross-border 
investments. Resolute action is thus necessary. To alleviate possible concerns among 
the country authorities, it should be emphasized that action proposed is investment-
p.57 related, and not a general relaxation of  immigration laws. The proposed action should 
be simultaneous with the completion of  the Investment Deregulation Agenda (see 
para. 57 above). 
Part V. Future of CBI: Options 
59.  The maturation of  the CBI process, about five years since its inception, 
also invites a question about its future. During this period, the views of  the main 
stakeholders in the debate over approaches to regional integration have evolved 
significantly. From a relatively dirigistic approach (i.e., import substitution), there has 
been an evolution towards a more pragmatic, market-based approach. This involves a 
more realistic policy and institutional agenda which recognizes the following: 
consistency between macroeconomic management and regional integration, the vital 
role of  private sector in the process, and the principle of  variable speed/geometry in 
the implementation of  the agenda. 
60.  Contrary to the occasional misperception, CBI was also never intended to 
become an institution. It only supports actions by those countries who wish to advance 
their regional agenda on a fast-track basis through financial and technical assistance 
with regard to such matters as transitory budgetary problems, private sector 
restructuring, etc. 
61.  At its inception, CBI was also not envisaged as an infinite process. Indeed, 
at the Second CBI Ministerial Meeting (March 1995), a three-year time horizon was 
agreed for implementation of  the policy agenda, although it was fully realized at the 
time that the objectives and timing were ambitious. With less than one year left in that 
time-frame for progress to be made, there is a legitimate query about how to proceed 
from now on, and what should be the future of CBJ. 
62.  There are essentially three options (i.e., Continue As Is,  a More Inclusive 
CBL  and Closure) upon which the present meeting will have to adjudicate. These 
options are discussed below: 
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•  Option 1 -Continue as is.  There is a viewpoint that the Unfinished Agenda is 
too substantive not to merit further attention of  the CBI participants as a group. 
There is, therefore, a clear need for accelerating the resolution of  trade policy 
issues as well as investment promotion measures. In addition, in the rapidly 
evolving context of  the global economy, CBI countries need to continuously 
adapt their policies to improve international competitiveness. Moreover, 
resolution of  issues of  major importance such as the implementation of  the 
SADC Trade Protocol would also be facilitated if  CBI remains active and continues to provide a forum to debate elements of  a conducive policy/ 
institutional environment for efficient investment and trade flows.37 
•  Option 2 -A more Inclusive CBI. This is not mutually exclusive to Option I 
but seeks to broaden the process among potential participants. One of  the 
principles underlying the CBI  process is that of  self-selection. Contrary to the 
situation in 1993, there are more countries which have made considerable 
progress in economic reform and which may benefit from participation in the 
CBI process. Mozambique is the most plausible example in this regard. 38 
•  Option 3 - Closure. CBI was conceived as a forum to stimulate debate and 
promote a consensus on policy reforms. It was never intended to be an 
institution with a life of  its own. A closure could. therefore. be called on CBI 
activities on the presumption that its achievements have taken roots and will 
be pursued by the participating countries in cooperation with the regional 
institutions. The CBI Agenda is now firmly rooted in the participating 
countries' internal dialogue on economic reform as well as with the regional 
and multilateral institutions promoting regional integration. Arguably, 
therefore, the evolving agenda as described above could be pursued in the 
context of  the on-going economic reform programs. 
63.  The above options were discussed at a meeting with representatives of 
participating countries, regional organizations and co-sponsors, which took place in 
Harare, Zimbabwe, on November 20-21, 1997. There was consensus to recommend to 
the Third Ministerial Meeting a combination of Options I and 2 above, which is to 
continue and broaden the CBI. The future focus of  CBI could be on: 
t  accelerating the implementation of  the evolving agenda as described in 
paragraphs 49-58 above, with more emphasis on investment facilitation issues; 
for this purpose, a road map for investment facilitation needs to be elaborated 
for consideration at a subsequent ministerial meeting; 
t  facilitating the harmonization of  national and regional policies towards a 
conducive environment for efficient investment and trade flows; and 
t  welcoming new participants who have made adequate progress in macro-
economic reform and might thus benefit from the CBI framework. 
37Eight out of the fourteen CBI countries are also SADC member states. 
38The non-participation of South AJYica poses special issues. Because of its importance as  a trading partner and as  a source of cross-border 
investment flows, South Africa's absence from the CBI  process is a major impediment to the latter's prospects. The present ministerial meeting 
will need to reflect over how to seek South Africa's inclusion in the CBI process and under what modalities. 
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CBI Framework and Special Features 
Quartet of  policy/institutional reforms:
39 
t  Trade liberalization and Trade Facilitation. Envisaged under Trade 
Liberalization are such measures as: i) tariff reform to obtain a low and 
relatively uniform nominal tariff structure; ii) elimination of  intra-regional 
tariffs on a reciprocal basis; iii) removal of  non-tariff barriers such import 
licensing and quantitative restrictions on imports; iv) removal of  export 
restrictions; and v) parallel measures to liberalize trade in services (e.g., 
financial services, insurance, transport, consultancy, tourism, etc.). Under the 
category of Trade Facilitation, the measures envisaged were harmonized 
transit charges, a common road customs transit document, single customs 
declaration form, and a bond guarantee scheme. 
t  Exchange and Payments Systems. Envisaged Reforms in this area are: i) 
domestic payments and settlement systems; and ii) exchange systems. 
t  Investment Deregulation. This category envisaged the following: i) adoption of 
a single and simple investment code exhibiting all incentives and regulatory 
requirements; ii) setting up of  one-stop investment approval authorities; iii) 
establishment of statute of  limitations on the period required to consider 
investment applications; and iv) adoption of  the PTA's MIE Charter or similar 
non-discriminatory provisions. 
t  Removal of  Labor Market Restrictions. Measures envisaged are: i) 
arrangement by the one-stop investment centers to obtain investment-related 
residence/work permits simultaneously with the approval of  investment 
application; ii) ratification of  the PTA protocol on visas; and iii) provision of 
short term entry permits to facilitate movement in border areas. 
Special Features of  CBI: 
t  Private sector orientation through the Technical Working Groups 
t  Peer pressure from fast reformers setting the pace of  policy reform 
t  Variable geometry 
t  Client Ownership 
t  Local Capacity Building 
39Envisaged in the Concept Paper. 
p.60 Table 1. Cross Border Initiative: Status of Institutional Arrangements 
(As at end-December, 1997) 
Letter of  CBI Policy  Policy  Technical  Assistance  Status with  Membership 
(LCBIP) 
Draft 
Country 10/  Prepared  Agreed 
I.  Burundi  Yes  No 
2.  Comoros 2/  Yes  Yes 3/ 
3.  Kenya 5/  Yes  Yes 
4.  Madagascar 2/  Yes  No 9/ 
5.  Malawi 11/  Yes  Yes 
6.  Mauritius 2/ 111  Yes  Yes 
7.  Namibia 2/ 11/  Yes  Yes 
8.  Rwanda  No  No 
9.  Seychelles 2/ 111  Yes  No 9/ 
10. Swaziland 11/  Yes  Yes 
11. Tanzania 5/ 11/  Yes  Yes 
12. Uganda 5/  Yes  Yes 
13. Zambia 11/  Yes  Yes 
14. Zimbabwe 11/  Yes  Yes 3/ 
Source: Data provided by the co-sponsors 
11  Whether formally constituted. 
21  Indian Ocean Commissioni(IOC) countries. 
31  Subject to acceptable macroeconomic framework. 
41  Through end-July 1997. 
51  East African Cooperation (EAC) countries. 
61  But not formally constituted. 
7  I  But not functioning. 
81  Emergency Post-ConflictAssistance 
Implementation  Working 
Committee  Group· 
(PIC) 11  (TWG) 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 6/ 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 7/ 
Yes  Yes 
No  No 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes 
91  Revised drafts received in August, 1997, and are being reviewed by co-sponsors. 
101  All countries with the exception of  Seychelles are COMESA countries. 
111  SADC countries. 
121  Lapsed on July 31, 1997. 
131  World Trade Organization 
141  Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
151  In process of  accession. 
toTWG  the Fund 
Secretariat  (program)  In  In 
WTO 13/  MIGA 
14/ 
Pending  Article IV  Yes  No 15/ 
Pending  Staff- No  No 
Monitored 
Program 4/ 
Yes  ESAF 12/  Yes  Yes 
No  ESAF  Yes  Yes 
Yes  ESAF  Yes  Yes 
No  Article IV  Yes  Yes 
Yes  Article IV  Yes  Yes 
No  EPCA 8/  Yes  No 15/ 
Yes  Article IV  No 15/  Yes 
Yes  Article IV  Yes  Yes 
Yes  ESAF  Yes  Yes 
Yes  ESAF  Yes  Yes 
Yes  ESAF  Yes  Yes 
Yes  On-going  Yes  Yes 
programme 
discussions 
p.61 Table 2. CBI and Non-CBI Countries 1/: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 1993-97 
(Weighted Average) (in percent) 
Estimated  Annual 
1993  1994  1995 
CBI  Non-CBI  CBI  Non-CBI  CBI  Non-CBI 
Real GDP growth  2.9  1.5  1.5  2.4  4.5  3.8 
Real GDP per capita growth  -1.5  -2.5  -2.0  -0.7  1.0  1.4 
Inflation  26.1  40.4  25.4  53.2  16.6  47.7 
Government revenue  23.6  21.9  24.2  21.5  23.8  21.9 
(including grants) 2/ 
Broad money growth  34.9  26.3  33.7  45.0  23.3  27.6 
Broad money 2/  30.0  40.0  33.2  41.0  32.7  38.5 
Exports 2/  31.8  25.5  35.6  25.4  33.7  24.6 
External current account  -3.4  -2.9  -3.4  -3.3  -4.8  -3.9 
(including grants) 2/ 
Overall balance (including grants) 2/  -6.0  -7.5  -5.7  -6.8  -4.1  -5.1 
Total investment 2/  19.7  15.9  20.5  17.1  20.3  17.9 
Domestic savings 2/  11.6  16.6  12.7  17.2  10.7  17.7 
Source: IMF African Department data base, December 1997, and World Economic Outlook July 1997 
11  Countries in sub-Saharan Africa excluding CBI Countries, and Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 
2/  In percent of  GDP. 
1996  1997  Average  1993-97 
CBI  Non-CBI  CBI  Non-CBI  CBI  Non-CBI 
6.0  4.2  4.0  3.5  3.8  3.1 
2.2  1.2  1.2  0.6  0.2  0.0 
15.3  36.5  12.3  18.6  19.1  39.3 
22.9  22.6  22.8  21.8  23.5  21.9 
21.6  30.1  15.7  15.5  25.8  28.9 
32.3  36.3  31.3  36.5  31.9  38.5 
32.4  25.9  31.4  25.8  33.0  25.4 
-2.8  -2.5  -2.0  -2.4  -3.3  -3.0 
-3.9  -4.0  -2.0  -3.7  -4.5  -5.4 
19.6  17.4  19.5  17.1  19.9  17.1 
12.7  18.1  13.0  17.7  12.1  17.5 Table 3. Cross Border Initiative Characteristics of  Import Duty Structure 
Maximum Tariff 
(Ilercent) 
Country  1992  1995  1996 
I. Burundi 
Import tariff  100  100  100 
ODC2/ 
Fiscal duties  15  15  15 
Statistical tax  4  4  4 
2. Comoros 
Import Tariff  10  10  40 3/ 
ODC 
Consumption tax  0-300  5-60  0 
Turnover tax  15  10  7 
Consumption surtax  43-65  0  0 
Presumptive tax  I  I  3 
Statistical tax  0  0  1-3 
Administrative tax  0  3.5  0 
3. Kenya 
Import Tariff  60  40  25 3/ 
ODC 
Import surcharge  20  16 4/ 
Statistical tax  2  2.75 
4. Madagascar 
Import Tariff  50  30  30 51 
ODC 
Customs duty  40  20  20 
Luxury surtax  30  0  20 
5. Malawi 
Import Tariff  60  45  35 6/ 
ODC 
Surtax (including  ...  20  20 
imports) 
6.  Mauritius 
Import Tariff  17  80  80 7/ 
ODC 
Customs duty  60  0  0 
Fiscal duty  110  0  0 
Import excise duty  0  0 
Source: Data provided by the co-sponsors 
11  Excluding zero rate. 
21  Other duties and charges 
3/  1997. 
Number of  bands 11 
1992  1995  1996 
5  5  5 
3  I  3 
5  4 
1  1 
5  0 
1  0 
0  I 
9  5  3 
...  5  3 
11  6  4 
...  ... 
90  8  8 
400 
41  As of September 1,  1997 and excludes suspended duties. 
51  The sum of the import tariff and customs duty does not exceed 30 percent. 
61  Malawi and Namibia have free-trade agreements with Zimbabwe. 
Revenue from 
imports as a % of 
Average  total value of 
tariff 15/  imports 16/ 
1996  1996 
35.4  14.8 
30.0  15.9 
14.1  14/  13.0 
21.0  17.6 
22.0  11.9 
30.6  14.2 
7  I  Excludes a surcharge of 20 percent on the two highest rates for nonpreferential countries. 
Import taxes as 
a% of  total 
revenue 16/ 
1996 
13.0 
30.4 
15.3 
31.5 
17.5 
42.6 
p.63 Table 3. Cross Border Initiative Characteristics of  Import Duty Structure 
(Concluded) 
Revenue from 
imports as a % of  Import taxes as 
Maximum Tariff  Average  total value of  a% of  total 
(percent)  Number of  bands 11  tariff 15/  imports 16/  revenue 16/ 
Country  1992  1995  1996  1992  1995  1996  1996  1996  1996 
7. Namibia 
Import Tariff  ...  90  61  6/  multiple  multiple  multiple  n.a  .  22.0 91  30.1  9/ 
ODC 
Additional sales duties  ...  15  15  ...  ...  ... 
Import surcharge  40  ...  .  .. 
8. Rwanda 
Import Tariff  100  60  60  8  4  4  32.5  13.2  24.6 
ODC 
Handling fee  4  4  4 
9. Seychelles 
Import Tariff  ...  600 8/  200 8/  ...  18  9  50.2  n.a  .  n.a. 
10. Swaziland 
Import Tariff  ...  90  83  multiple  multiple  multiple  18.0  12.7 9/  29.1  9/ 
ODC 
Sales tax  ...  10  12 
Import surcharge  40  ...  .  .. 
11. Tanzania 
Import Tariff  60  40  30 10/  8  5  4  16.3  14.1  27.0 
12. Uganda 
Import Tariff  50  30  20 111  6  4  3  8.8  5.5  9.8 
ODC 
Excise Surcharge  10/18 
Processing fee  ...  ...  1 
13. Zambia 
Import Tariff  40  40  25  ...  4  3  11.2  9.6 19/  16.4 19/ 
ODC 
Import fee  ...  5  5  ... 
14. Zimbabwe 
Import Tariff  100  85  85  12/  ...  5  20.4 14/  16.6 17/  16.8 17/ 
ODC 
Import surcharge  20  10  10 13/ 
8/  In the form of  a trades tax applied to imported goods, goods manufactured or produced locally for sale, and specified 
services - import revenue is not disaggregated. 
9/  SACU receipts. 
I 0/  Reduction of maximum tariff to 30 percent in 1997/98 budget (June 1997) (includes shipment inspection fee of 
1.2 percent). 
ll/  Reduction of maximum tariff to 20 percent in 1997/98 budget (June 1997), except for manufactured tobacco (including 
cigarettes) at 30 percent. 
12/  Effective March 1,  1997. Does not include a surcharge of 10 percent on finished goods. 
13/  On finished goods. 
14/  Trade weighted. 
15/  Average tariff is the simple average i.e. tbe sum of the rates (including zero rate where applicable) divided by the number of 
rates and exclude "other duties and changes." 
16/  Excluding other duties and charges. 
17/  Includes  10 percent surcharge. 
18/  On selected goods. In July 1997 discriminatory excises on selected goods were harmonized and reduced to  10 percent and it 
was announced that tbey would be eliminated in July 1998. 
19/  Include ODC's. 
p.64 Table 4. CBI: Summary of  Tariff System in Place Compared 
to Road Map Objectives (As at end-December 1997) 
Road Map  Minimum/  Hannonize External  Incorporate  Eliminate Tariffs on 
Objective/  Maximum Rate  Tariffs by Having  Other Duties  Intra- CBI Trade 11 
Country  (to be between  Not More Than  and Charges  (preference margin -
20-25 percent) 11  Three Non-Zero  into Tariff  1/  percent) 11/ 
(Import tariff)  Rates 1/ 
1.  Burundi  10/100  5  No  10 2/ 
2.  Comoros  0/40  .1  No  70 
3.  Kenya  0/25  .1  No  80 
4.  Madagascar  10/30  .1  No  80 3/ 
5.  Malawi  10/35  4  No  70 
6.  Mauritius  0/80  8  No  70 
7.  Namibia  0/61  multiple  No  None 
8.  Rwanda  10/60  4  No  SNone 
9.  Seychelles  0/200 61  9 6/  Yes  None 4/ 
10.  Swaziland  0/83  multiple  No  None 
11.  Tanzania  0/30  4  Yes  70 51 
12. Uganda  0/20  .1  No  80 7/ 
13. Zambia  0/25  .1  No  60 
14. Zimbabwe  0/85  5  No  80 8/ 
Source: Data prepared by the Cosponsors 
* Shaded figures indicate objectives of  Road Map have been met. 
1/  By October 1998. 
2/  Only to CO MESA countries. 
3/  Decision made in principle, but not yet implemented (except imports from Mauritius). 
4/  Other than a 5 percent preference from IOC member states. 
51  Published but not implemented. 
6/  In the form of  trades tax 
Lower Trade-
Weighted Average of 
Tariff to No More 
Than 15 Percent 11  12/ 
35.4 
30.0 
12.3 9/ 
20.0 
22.0 
21.5 9/ 
n.a. 
32.0 
50.2 
n.a. 
16.3 
10.7 9/ 
11.4 9/ 
20.4 9/ 
7/  Uganda has had a 10 percentage point surcharge on the preferential rate, effectively lowering the preferential margin to 70 
percent for selected goods. 
8/  Except for a duty-free market access for trade between Mauritius and Zimbabwe. 
91  The trade-weighted average (for Kenya in respect of 1997 and for Zimbabwe in respect of 1996). 
I 0/  Malawi has a surtax applied uniformly on both imports and domestic production. Manufacturers are entitled to a rebate on 
taxes paid on production inputs. 
II/  The preference margin was to be at 90 percent by October 1997. 
12/  Unweighted, except where specified, and excludes "other duties and charges". 
p.65 Country 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Table 5. CBI Countries: Status of Tariff Exemptions 
(As at end-December 1997) 
Category of  Exemptions 
Investment Code or 
General  Recognized  Goods for Foreign-
Government  Parastatals  Convention  NGOs  Financed Projects 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No  No  No  Yes  No 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No  No  No  No  No 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: World Bank!IMF Staff  Reports; and data provided by the authorities 
1/  Includes discretionary exemptions and waivers granted. 
p.66 
Other 1/ 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No Table 6. CBI Countries: Summary of Import Non-Tariff Barriers 
(As of  end-December 1997) 
Quantiative  Restrictive Import 
Restrictions  Licensing Reguirements  Discriminatory  Rates of 
(Imports)  For all  For some  State Trading  Excise DutyNAT (etc.) on  Restrictions by 
Bans  Quotas  products  products  Monopolies  Certain Imports  Quality Standards 
Burundi  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Comoros  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Kenya  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Madagascar  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Malawi  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Mauritius  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Namibia  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Rwanda  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Seychelles  No  Yes  Yes  - Yes  Yes  No 
Swaziland  No  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Tanzania  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Uganda  Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
Zambia  Yes 3/  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Zimbabwe  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
Source: World Banld!MF Staff  Reports; and data provided by the authorities 
11  Includes national heritage. 
21  Includes countervailing duties, dumping, etc. 
3/  An import ban on wheat flour was introduced in September 1997. 
Restrictions for 
Health, Security, and 
Environment, etc.  11  Other 2/ 
Yes  Yes 
No  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No 
Yes  No Table 7. CBI Countries: Status of Export Trade Regimes 
(As at end-December 1997) 
Quantitative Restrictions 
Country  Bans  Quotas 
1.  Burundi  No  No 
2.  Comoros  No  No 
3.  Kenya  No  No 
4.  Madagascar  No  No 
5.  Malawi  No  No 
6.  Mauritius  No  No 
7.  Namibia  No  No2/ 
8.  Rwanda  No  No 
9.  Seychelles  No  No 
10.  Swaziland  No  No 
11.  Tanzania  No  No 
12.  Uganda  No  No 
13.  Zambia  Yes  No 
14.  Zimbabwe  No  Yes 
Sources: World Bank/IMF Staff  Reports and data provided by the authorities 
11  Only for restrictive (and not for statistical) purposes. 
2/  Excludes export quotas on diamonds. 
p.68 
Licensing 11  Duties 
No  Yes 
No  Yes 
Yes  No 
No  No 
No  Yes 
No  No 
No  No 
No  Yes 
No  No 
No  Yes 
No  Yes 
No  No 
No  No 
Yes  Yes 
Marketing 
Monopolies 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes Table 8. CBI Countries: Status of Trade Facilitation Measures 
(As at end-December 1997) 
Implement PTA 
Country  harmonized transit  Introduce RCTD 11  Introduce single goods  Introduce bond 
changes  declaration document  guarantee scheme 
Burundi  Done  Done  ...  ... 
Comoros  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Kenya  Done  Done  Done  Under consideration 
Madagascar  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Malawi  Done  Done  ...  ... 
Mauritius  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Namibia  Not done  Not done  Done  Not done 
Rwanda  Done  Done  ...  ... 
Seychelles  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Swaziland  Not done  Not done  Not done  Under consideration 
Tanzania  Done  Done  Done  Not done 
Uganda  Done  Done  Not done  Not done 
Zambia  Done  Done  Done  ... 
Zimbabwe  Done  Done  Done  Not done 
Source: Data provided by the authorities 
11 Road Customs Transit Document. 
n.a. =  not applicable. 
p.69 Table 9. CBI Countries: Status of  Exchange Restrictions on Payments and 
Transfers on Current International Transactions 
(As of  end-December 1997) 
Country  Article  Date of  Article  Article VIII  External  Article XIV  Intention to 
VIII/XIV Status  VIII  Restrictions  Arrears  Restrictions  Move to 
Acceptance  Article 
VIII 
1.  Burundi  XIV ll  n.a.  n.a.  yes  none 1/  yes; in due 
course 
2.  Comoros 2/  VIII  June I, I996  none  yes 4/  n.a.  n.a. 
3.  Kenya 3/  VIII  June 30,  I994  yes 5/  yes  n.a.  n.a. 
4.  Madagascar 2/  VIII  Sept.  I8, I996  none  yes  n.a.  n.a. 
5.  Malawi  VIII  Dec. 7,  1995  none  none  n.a.  n.a. 
6.  Mauritius 2/  VIII  Sept. 29,  I993  none  none  n.a.  n.a. 
7.  Namibia  VIII  Sept. 20, 1996  none 6/  none  n.a.  n.a. 
8.  Rwanda  XIV ll  n.a.  n.a.  yes  none I/  yes; in due 
course 
9.  Seychelles 2/  VIII  Jan. 3, I978  yes 7/  yes  n.a.  n.a. 
IO.  Swaziland  VIII  Dec. 11,  I989  none 6/  none  n.a.  n.a. 
II. Tanzania 3/  VIII  July 15, 1996  none  yes 10/  n.a.  n.a. 
12. Uganda 3/  VIII  April 5,  1994  none  yes Ill  n.a.  n.a. 
13. Zambia  XIV  n.a.  none  yes  yes 8/  yes; in due 
course 
I4. Zimbabwe  VIII  Feb. 5,  1995  yes 9/  none  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: IMF Staff  Reports; and data provided by the authorities 
ll  Burundi and Rwanda continue to avail themselves of the transitional arrangements under Article XIV Sec. 2, 
but maintain no restrictions on the making of  paym1:nts and transfers for current international transactions. 
However, there are arrears in respect of  external payments. 
2/  Member Indian Ocean Commission. 
3/  Member East African Cooperation. 
4/  Expected to be cleared by end-December I997. 
51  A multiple currency practice arising from outstanding operations under the Exchange Risk Assumption Fund. 
61  Namibia and Swaziland are part of  the Common Monetary Area (CMA) comprising Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Swaziland which is a single exchange control area. 
7  I  On current payments (pipeline) including restrictions on transfers of  dividends and management fees. 
8/  On private debt service payments (principal) held before January I991, before the exchange regime was 
liberalized in 1994. 
9/  Arising from blocked corporate dividend and interest payments schemes (to be removed by mid-I998) and 
multiple currency practice arising from contracts under a discontinued forward exchange cover scheme (to be 
cleared by end-2000). 
10/  With non-Paris Club members. 
Ill On reschedulable payments with non-Paris Club bilateral creditors. 
p. 70 Table 10. CBI Countries: Summary Features of Exchange and Bilateral Payment 
Arrangements, and Cost Related Import Restrictions 
(As of  end-December 1997) 
Exchange Arrangements 
Pegged  Floating 
Country  Composite of 
currencies 
1.  Burundi  yes 
2.  Comoros 
3.  Kenya 
4.  Madagascar 
5.  Malawi 
6.  Mauritius 
7.  Namibia 
8.  Rwanda 
9.  Seychelles  yes 
10.  Swaziland 
11.  Tanzania 
12.  Uganda 
13.  Zambia 
14.  Zimbabwe 
Source: Data provided by the cosponsors 
11  French Franc 
21  South African rand 
3/  Import surcharges 
Single 
Currency  Independent  Managed 
yes 1/ 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 2/ 
yes 
yes 2/ 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Bilateral  Cost Related 
Payment  Import 
Arrangements  Restrictions 3/ 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 4/ 
yes 
yes 6/ 
yes 5/ 
4/  A wide range of  imports from countries outside the SACU are subject to a general sales tax of 11  percent (as 
are locally produced goods), and to surcharges ranging from 7.5 to 40 percent. 
51  only on final consumption finished goods. 
6/  Inoperative. 
p. 71 Table 11. CBI Countries: Characteristics of Foreign Exchange Markets 
(As of  end-December 1997) 
Forward 
Cover  Foreign  Prudential 
Unified  against  Currency  Restrictions 
Interbank  Exchange  Accounts  Authorized  (exposure  Restrictions on 
Country  Market  Risk  (Restrictions)  Dealers 1/  limits)  Capital flows 
l.  Burundi  no  no  limited  c.b.  yes  yes 
2.  Comoros  no  yes  French franc  c.b.  no  yes 2/ 
(limited) 
3.  Kenya  yes (1993)  yes  liberal  c.b. and b.u.  yes  liberalized 3/ 
4.  Madagascar  yes (1994)  no  liberal  c.b.  yes  yes 
5.  Malawi  yes (1994)  yes  liberal  c.b. and b.u.  yes  liberalized 7  I 
6.  Mauritius  yes (1994)  yes  liberal  c. b.  yes  liberalized 
7.  Namibia  no  yes  limited  c.b. and b.u.  no  yes 4/ 
(CMA member) 
8.  Rwanda  yes (1995)  no  liberal  c.b. and b.u.  yes  yes 
9.  Seychelles  no  no  limited  c.b.  no  yes 8/ 
10. Swaziland  no  yes  limited  c.b.  no  yes 4/ 
(CMA member) 
11. Tanzania  yes(1994)  yes  liberal  c.b. and b.u.  yes  yes 
12. Uganda  yes (1993)  yes 9/  none  c.b. and b.u.  yes  none 5/ 
13. Zambia  yes (1996)  no  liberal  c.b. and b.u.  yes  liberalized 
14. Zimbabwe  yes (1995)  yes  liberal  c.b. and b.u.  yes  yes 6/ 
Source: IMF Staff  Reports; and data provided by the authorities 
1/  Commercial banks (c. b.) and /or bureaus (b.u.). 
2/  Only outside French franc (Operations Account) area. 
3/  Except for purchase of shares and securities by non residents (up to 40 percent) and individuals (up to 5  percent). 
4/  Only outside CMA area. However, in respect of  Namibia, there is a restriction even within the CMA-pension funds and 
life insurance companies have to invest 35 percent of  their assets domestically. 
51  Effective July I, 1997. 
6/  In 1996, the maximum foreign ownership of  companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock was raised to 40 percent. 
7  I  Malawi has removed restrictions related to the inflow and profit repatriation of  FDI and has adopted a liberal attitude 
regarding portfolio investment by non-residents. 
8/  Restrictions confined to transfers of proceeds of  asset sales. 
91  Although there is no official currency futures market, authorized banks may deal in the forward exchange market, if  there is 
an underlying approved import or export contract. 
p. 72 Table 12. CBI Countries: Foreign Exchange Repatriation and 
Surrender Requirements 
Country  1992  1995  1997 
(end-December) 
I.  Burundi  Full repatriation; full surrender  EPZ enterprises exempt from  Unchanged. 
excluding 30 percent of  non- surrender; otherwise unchanged. 
traditional exports. 
2.  Comoros  Full repatriation and surrender to  Unchanged.  Unchanged. 
authorized banks. 
3.  Kenya  Full repatriation and surrender  Repatriation without surrender  Unrestricted. 
excluding 50 percent of  non- requirement. 
traditional exports. 
4.  Madagascar  Full repatriation; 60 percent  Repatriation and sale of  I 00 percent repatriation within 
surrender; 40 percent surrender  merchandise export proceeds  3 months. 
to authorized banks.  within 90 days of date of 
shipment; and surrender within 
30 days of service receipts. 
5.  Malawi  Full repatriation and surrender.  Full repatriation and 60 percent  Unchanged. 
surrender. 
6.  Mauritius  Repatriation; surrender to  Unrestricted since July 1994.  II  Unrestricted. 2/ 
authorized dealer of  unused 
proceeds within 6 months. 
7.  Namibia  Full repatriation and surrender.  Full repatriation within 6 months  Unchanged. 
of shipment; and surrender 
within 7 days of repatriation. 
8.  Rwanda  Full repatriation and surrender to  Repatriation; surrender of  Repatriation and surrender of 
authorized banks.  90 percent of coffee and tea  50 percent of coffee and tea 
receipts.  receipts within 7 days 
(December 1996). 
9.  Seychelles  Completely unrestricted.  Surrender requirement of  Repatriation and surrender 
19 percent of commercial banks'  requirement of all foreign 
foreign exchange inflows to  exchange earnings through 
central bank. 3/  domestic commercial banks. 5/ 
10.  Swaziland  Rep 1triation and surrender.  Repatriation and surrender.  Unchanged. 
11.  Tanzania  Full repatriation: surrender of  Repatriation within 180 days.  Repatriation within 60 days. 
I 0 percent of traditional exports  No surrender requirement. 
and 50 percent of other 
merchandise. Surrender of 
invisible proceeds. 
12.  Uganda  Repatriation:  I 00 percent of  Repatriation to authorized banks.  Unchanged.4/ 
coffee proceeds; otherwise 
surrender to authorized dealer. 
13.  Zambia  100 percent surrender of ZCCM  ZCCM surrender reduced to  Unrestricted. 
metal exports; I 0 percent  45 percent; otherwise completely 
surrender otherwise.  unrestricted. 
14.  Zimbabwe  Repatriation and surrender.  Repatriation.  Unchanged. 
Source: Staff  Reports; and data provided by the authorities 
1175 percent of  exports proceeds of  sugar by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate must be surrendered to the Bank of  Mauritius. 
2/  Surrender requirement by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate removed effective July l, 1997. 
3/  No regulations governing repatriation of  export proceeds. 
4/  Unrestricted as of  July l, 1997, with liberalization of  the capital account. 
51  Effective January l, 1997. 
p. 73 Table 13. CBI Countries: Implementation of Investment Deregulation, and Labor Market Measures 
(As of  end-December 1997) 
Country  Investment 
Approval  Improve 
Liberalize  Publish  45-60 days' Statute  Labor Market Issues  Processing of 
Approval  Investment  of Limitation on  Ratify/Implement  Dual Taxation  Cross Listing  Implement PTA Visa  Residence/Work 
Procedures  Code  Inv. Applications  MIE Charter  Agreements  of Stocks  Protocol  Permits 
I.  Burundi  Full  Full  Partial  Pending  Pending  Pending  Partial  Partial 
2.  Comoros  Pending  Full  Full  Full  - - Full  Full 
3.  Kenya  Full  Pending  Full  Pending  Partial  Partial  Partial  Partial 
4.  Madagascar  Full  Full  Partial  Pending  Partial  Pending  Pending  Partial 
5.  Malawi  Full  Full  Partial  Pending  Pending  Partial  Full  Partial 
6.  Mauritius  Full  Partial  Pending  Pending  Partial  Full  Pending  Pending 
7.  Namibia  Full  Full  - Full  n.a.  Partial  Partial  Pending  Full 
8.  Rwanda  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
9.  Seychelles  Full  Full  Full  Pending  Partial  Pending  Full  Pending 
10.  Swaziland  Partial  Pending  Pending  Pending  Partial  Pending  Pending  Pending 
11.  Tanzania  Partial  Partial  Partial  Partial  Partial  Pending  Partial  Partial 
12.  Uganda  Full  Full  Partial  Partial  Partial  Pending  Full  Full 
13.  Zambia  Partial  Full  Pending  Partial  Partial  Partial  Full  Pending 
14.  Zimbabwe  Full  Partial  Partial  Pending  Partial  Partial  Partial  Partial 
Source:  Implementation updates provided by Tecnhical Working Groups 
Note: The category, Pending runs a wide range, from administrative/legislative arrangements in preparation to not yet identified. 
Short Term 
Entry Permits 
for Border 
Residents 
Pending 
Full 
Full 
n.a. 
Full 
n.a. 
Full 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Full 
Partial 
Full 
Pending 
Pending Table 14: Comparative Performance: CBI and Non-CBI High Performers,  1 
Av. 1995-97 (weighted average) (in percent) 
Private  Export 
Investment  Growth Rate 
Growth Rate 
CBI Countries 
Kenya  15.4  11.1 
Malawi  206.0  5.8 
Mauritius  23.0  6.5 
Namibia  3.0  4.8 
Uganda  19.4  23.8 
Zambia  3.6  0.1 
Zimbabwe  4.0  3.6 
Weighted Average  12.1
2  9.4 
Non-CBI Countries 
Benin  n.a.  14.9 
Botswana  n.a.  8.3 
Cape Verde  17.6  16.7 
Cote d' I  voire  24.7  8.3 
Ghana  55.4  5.9 
Mali  9.6  15.8 
Mauritania  16.3  5.3 
South Africa  7.2  7.7 
Weighted Average  10.33  8.3 
Source: World Bank, Africa Region Live Data Base 
1 Using the World Bank methodology for performances ranking of developing countries. This methodology has also been use by external 
experts to develop country rankings/classifications. 
2 Exclude Malawi which shows very high private investment growth rate given low base. If Malawi were included, it would distort the 
weighted average to 20.4 percent. 
3 Excludes Benin and Botswana for which data on private investment is not readily available 
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p. 77 1.  BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF STUDIES 
The Second CBI Ministerial Meeting, held in 1995 endorsed an overall road map 
for tariff reform, which covered a number of  issues and measures for adoption by the 
participating countries. The CBI countries would converge to a tariff structure of  no 
more than 2-3 non-zero tariff rates with an average trade-weighted tariff of  no more 
than 15 percent and a maximum rate of  20-25 percent.  Other duties and import 
charges would be incorporated in the tariff structure to simplify the trade regime and 
improve transparency. Achieving this target would imply an average preference 
margin of  no more than 15 percent between imports from CBI countries and non-CBI 
countries, on the assumption that CBI countries would eliminate tariffs on trade 
among themselves.  The CBI approach was to work towards a Harmonised External 
Tariff (HET) whereby minor differences in tariffs between countries could still be 
accommodated, rather than adopting a Common External Tariff (CET) under which 
there would be no variation. 
Given the variable geometry principle that underpins the CBI approach, it was 
agreed that a smaller sub-group of  countries could move faster along the above path 
and harmonise their tariff regimes sooner and at a lower average tariff than proposed 
above.  For example, under the East Africa Community (EAC), Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda had discussed the possibility of  accelerating the convergence of  their external 
tariff regimes. Moreover, the country specific path to reaching the overall objectives 
would have to be flexible and determined in the context of  each country's overall 
adjustment programme, including coherent fiscal frameworks that take into account 
alternative sources of  revenue. 
The CBI countries also committed themselves to the following with respect to 
third-party trade: (i) not to impose new NTBs; and (ii) to eliminate existing NTBs 
(except for health and security reasons). 
To achieve harmonisation of  trade regimes within a common economic space, the 
need was agreed to not only move towards a similar rate structure, but also to 
harmonise: (i) the definition of  goods bearing similar tariffs; (ii) the limited list of 
permitted NTBs; and (iii) the rules for exemption from customs duties. 
The countries also committed themselves to using rules of  origin that were 
simple, transparent and consistent with the revised COMESA rules. It was noted that 
under the Uruguay Round commitments, the use of  rules of  origin would be regulated 
by the WTO. It would be important for the CBI countries to follow the transformation 
(change in tariffheading) and value added rules and to set the eligibility rate under the 
value-added rule for preferential tariffs at a reasonable level (between 25-50 percent of 
value added). 
p. 78 At the Third Meeting of  the CBI TWGs in 1996, further details on the road map 
were discussed.  Agreement was reached that the TWGs would initiate work in the 
following areas: 
~  develop a target HET based on 6-digit HS tariff codes to classify raw materials 
and capital goods, intermediate goods, and final consumer goods (to low, 
intermediate and higher rates respectively); 
~  prepare a list of  existing NTBs and a schedule for their elimination, except 
where justified for the given reasons; 
~  prepare a list of  customs duty exemptions and a schedule for their elimination; 
~  prepare revenue impact estimates of  various HET scenarios and make 
recommendations for measures to alleviate any negative impacts; 
~  prepare evaluation of  industrial and social impacts of  customs duty reform. 
The co-sponsors agreed to assist in this process and to provide technical 
assistance in implementing this work. 
Subsequent to this meeting, requests were submitted to the co-sponsors by some 
of  the CBI participating countries, both individually and sometimes as sub-regions for 
assistance with this work. The result was that two studies were done as sub-regional 
groupmgs: 
~  The EAC members (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) undertook separate, but co-
ordinated studies with the assistance of  the World Bank. 
~  The IOC participating members (Comores, Madagascar, Mauritius and 
Seychelles) undertook a combined study with assistance of  the EC. 
In addition to these, Zambia and Zimbabwe undertook individual studies, with 
assistance from the EC. Namibia and Swaziland, which had considered undertaking 
the studies, decided to postpone such a study until such time that agreement could be 
reached with their partners in SACU to undertake a SACU-wide study. Malawi had 
expressed interest in undertaking the study, but did not commission any such work. 
Burundi and Rwanda, the remaining two CBI participating countries have similarly 
not undertaken this work. 
This paper summarises the key findings of  the reports that were undertaken and 
gives the current status regarding implementation of  tariff reform. Where we know of 
changes in the various regimes that have taken place since the HET reports were 
p. 79 prepared, we have made editorial notes to that effect. There are some gaps in this 
report that prevent direct comparison between the various reports. This is regretted but 
could not be avoided since each study had slightly different terms of  reference and 
emphases. As such direct comparison has not always been possible  . 
.  2.  METHODOLOGIES 
The studies by the EAC countries only covered the trade relations between 
themselves and did not consider the impact of  trade with the broader CBI region. 
Whilst intra-CBI trade between the EAC countries is clearly heavily dominated by 
intra-EAC trade, each of  the countries also trades with other CBI countries to greater 
or lesser extents. 
The other studies all worked on the basis of  removal of  tariffs on all intra-CBI 
trade. 
Each of  the studies employed a similar methodology. This covered the following 
elements: 
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t  Desk study of  relevant literature and collection of  data on tariff structures and 
classification codes used to distinguish raw materials and capital goods, 
intermediate goods and final goods. 
t  Proposing changes to conform to the objectives of  the HET; 
t  Analysis of  tax revenue structures, including revenue from customs duties; 
t  Investigation of  constraints faced by the production sectors relating to the 
current structure of  tariffs, classification system and distortions caused by 
import tariffs; 
t  Analysis of  the budgetary effects of  eliminating tariffs on intra-regional trade 
and the reduction of  external tariffs on the basis of  the proposed HET 
structure, using different scenarios; 
t  Analysis of  non-tariff barriers; 
t  Recommendations for tariff reform. 3.  TARIFF REGIMES 
There are broad similarities in tariff regimes between the countries. All of  the 
countries are committed to a more open trade policy and are currently undergoing a 
process of  trade liberalisation. Whilst in the past most of  these countries maintained 
very protective policies in order to develop industries for the domestic market, the 
approach has been radically altered in recent years. There is recognition of  the need to 
open the economies to the pressures of  competition to create more competitive 
economies in both the regional and global contexts. 
All the countries have been engaged in significant reform of  their tariff structures 
in recent years, except for Seychelles, where the need for reform is understood but 
where little has yet been implemented. These reforms have generally resulted in the 
lowering of  MFN rates and the adoption of  a cascading structure in tariffs, whereby 
the lowest rates are applied to capital goods and raw materials, middle rates are 
applied to intermediate goods and the highest rates are applied to finished products. 
Those countries with the highest tariff peaks are Mauritius, Seychelles and 
Zimbabwe. There are still considerable variations between the countries in the rates 
for the different chapters. In the agricultural chapters (1-24), low rates generally 
dominate (with some exceptions) in Mauritius, whilst rates are on the higher side 
(with some exceptions) for the other countries. Those agricultural products which tend 
to attract high rates in most countries include chapters 8 and 9 (fruits, nuts, coffee, 
tea), chapters 19, 20, 21  and 22 (cereal and flour preparations; vegetable and other 
edible preparations; and beverages and spirits). Concerning industrial products, those 
which tend to attract high rates in all countries include chapters 42 (articles of  leather), 
57 (carpets and floor covering), and 61  and 62 (clothing). 
East Africa 
Kenya's reforms in the year 1997/98 reduced the maximum tariff to 25 per cent 
with four tariffbands, the main ones being 5% (raw materials and capital goods), 15% 
(intermediate goods) and 25% (finished goods). A small number of  items are zero-
rated. The import-weighted average tariff is 13 per cent. A number of  items also 
attract specific duties as well as ad valorem duties. As of  October 2000, Kenya offers a 
100 percent reduction on tariffs on qualifying imports from COME  SA countries. A 
number of  items face suspended duties, imposed for protective purposes. Imports also 
face excise duties on a number of  items but these are on the whole non-discriminatory, 
being applied equally on locally produced and imported goods. The only 
discriminatory excise duties are those on motor vehicles, cosmetics, petroleum 
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CBI HET requirements. 
In Tanzania, during the 1996/97 financial year, customs duties had widely 
dispersed rates from zero to 40 percent (5, 10, 20, 25, 30, 40). In 1997/98, reforms 
were introduced to reduce the dispersed rates to four, (5, 10, 20, 30), thus, reducing the 
maximum rate from 40% to 30%.  The maximum tariff rate has subsequently been set 
at 25%.  Elements of  the excise duty and sales tax, which also are sometimes 
discriminatory to imports, provide additional protection to domestic industry. This 
structure is therefore already broadly in line with the CBI HET requirements. Tanzania 
withdrew from CO  MESA in September 2000 and suspended all regional tariff 
preferences. It is however currently considering re-introducing  tariff  preferences of  80 
per cent for imports from its fellow EAC members of  Kenya and Uganda. 
In 1997/98 Uganda reduced its maximum tariff rate to 15 percent, with three 
rates, namely 0 (plant, machinery, drugs and medicines), 1 per cent (intermediate 
goods) and5 1B~  percent (finished goods). Tobacco faces a tariff of30 percent. A 
number of  imported items also attract an excise duty of 10 percent. An import levy of 
2 percent is charged for the Uganda National Bureau of  Standards and a Pre-shipment 
Inspection (PSI) charge of 1 percent on imports worth more than US$10,000. Excise 
duty on tobacco is 122 percent. This structure is therefore already broadly in line with 
the CBI HET requirements. Uganda offers a 90 percent reduction on tariffs on 
qualifying imports from COMESA countries. It has signalled its intention to adopt the 
100 percent reduction in due course. 
Indian Ocean 
Since 1993 in Co  mores all imported goods (except rice and petroleum products 
which are subject to specific taxes) are subject to a 10% customs duty, a 3.5% 
"administrative fee" (redevance administrative) and a consumer tax ranging between 
5% to 60%. In 1996 Comoros went further in the move towards simplification of  the 
tariff structure. The outcome was a simplified structure comprising two types of  taxes, 
namely the "single duty" (Taxe Unique d'Importation- TUI) and the "Unique specific 
duty" (Taxe Unique Specifique -TUS). Thus previous taxes were consolidated into two 
taxes. The TUI bears three rates - 20% (basic commodities), 30% (general consumer 
goods) and 40% (luxury goods). The TUS is applied on a variety of  products based on 
volume or weight, or per unit. The main products that are concerned by this tariff are 
flour, meat, cement and soft drinks. With the introduction of  this new formula, 
government revenue registered an increase on the previous year. In the 1997 Finance 
Act customs tariffs were slightly modified, especially as regards the TUI. The number 
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speciale a  vocation fiscale (TSVF) was introduced, applicable on 3 products, namely 
alcoholic drinks and tobacco (150%) and whisky (180%). A General Sales Tax (TGV) 
of  7 percent is applied on all imported commercial goods, except basic commodities. 
Another tax, an "advance payment for various taxes" (Acompte sur Divers Imp6ts -
ASDJ) is applied on imported commercial goods. This "advance payment" is 
immediately deductible from domestic taxes and is applied at the rate of  3% on the 
CIF value. No COMESA tariff reductions are yet given, although a reduction in intra-
regional tariffs with a preference of  80% was approved in the 1999 budget speech for 
imports from the other IOC countries.  This structure therefore needs a certain amount 
of  modification to come in line with the CBI HET requirements, especially in terms of 
unifying the different taxes, reducing the rates and implementation of  regional 
preferences. 
Customs tariffs in Madagascar are defined as the sum of  the Customs Duty (CD) 
and the Import Tax (IT)). In 1994, these combined rates were reduced to a maximum 
of  30%, with a view to reducing to 25% in coming years.  Madagascar entered the 
COME  SA Free Trade Area in October 2000 and plans to offer a reduction of 100% on 
goods from countries of  COME  SA on condition of  reciprocity. At the moment, 
preferences are only offered to goods from Mauritius. This structure therefore needs a 
little modification to come in line with the CBI HET requirements, especially in terms 
of  reducing the rates. 
The tariff structure in Mauritius, which used to be comprised of 60 different 
tariffs, now contains eight non-zero tariff rates only. Charges of  equivalent effect are 
combined into a single tariff. The rates are: 0%, 5%, 15%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 55%, and 
80%. The customs duties are however not classified according to large groups of 
products. Thus, some raw materials or inputs are subject to customs duties that are 
higher than those that apply to finished products which use these inputs. Mauritius 
also has excise duties on certain products which are applicable to imports as well as to 
products manufactured locally. In some cases, these are discriminatory against 
imports. The main products which are subject to excise duties are cigarettes, motor 
vehicles, alcoholic beverages, and furniture. Mauritius entered the COMESA Free 
Trade Area in October 2000 and offers a reduction of 100% on qualifying goods. This 
structure therefore needs a certain amount of  modification to come in line with the 
CBI HET requirements, especially in terms of  classification of  goods and reducing the 
rates. 
The current tariff structure in Seychelles constitutes a trades tax which is levied 
mostly on an ad valorem basis on the CIF value of  imported goods, although in the 
case of  alcoholic beverages and tobacco the trades tax also has a specific component. 
The trades tax also applies to certain selected locally produced goods and services, but 
at different rates. There are no other indirect taxes, duties, levies or fees applicable to 
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licences which are paid annually and which do not exceed US$ 1,000 p.a  .. Seychelles 
has recently embarked on an exercise of  tariff reform with plans to remove the trades 
tax and introduce a conventional customs tariff and excise duty regime, as well as a 
VAT system.  No tariff preferences are given for COMESA imports, although a 5 
preference of 5 percentage points is given for imports from other IOC countries. 
Average tariffs are now 25 percent with an eventual target of 15%.  This structure 
therefore needs a considerable amount of  modification to come in line with the CBI 
HET requirements, especially in terms of  introducing customs and excise duties, 
reducing the rates, classification of  goods and implementation of  regional preferences. 
Southern Africa 
In Zambia, there has been considerable progress in rationalisation of  customs 
tariffs. In the 1996 budget, the Zambian government adopted an integrated package of 
customs duty reductions and removal of  most exemptions.  The main feature of  the 
reforms was to lower customs tariff rates on most goods by 15 percentage points. This 
resulted in a cascading tariff structure ranging from 0 to 5% for most capital goods and 
basic materials, 15% for intermediate goods and 25% for final products. The simple 
average MFN tariff is 13.6 percent. The aim of  these reforms was to strengthen export 
competitiveness by providing access to inputs at near world market prices.  These 
policy reforms were subsequently maintained and consolidated in the 1997 budget. All 
other duties and charges on imports have been integrated in the customs tariff structure 
in line with the principles endorsed under the CBI. Zambia entered the COMESA Free 
Trade Area in October 2000 and offers a reduction of 100% on qualifying goods. This 
structure is therefore already broadly in line with the CBI HET requirements. 
Zimbabwe introduced major changes in the tariff structure in March 1997 with 
rate bands being reduced to 6 and the tariff spread being reduced from 0 to 100% to 0-
40% with few exceptions where protection considerations resulted in high rates of 
duty (up to 85 percent).  The structure is broadly a cascading one. The legislated tariff 
rates became the effective tariffs, thus, providing a measure of  transparency that 
hitherto had been lacking.  Zimbabwe entered the COMESA Free Trade Area in 
October 2000 and offers a reduction of 100% on qualifying goods. Excise duties are 
applied similarly on imports and domestic products. This structure therefore needs a 
certain amount of  modification to come in line with the CBI HET requirements, 
especially in terms of  reducing the rates. 
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EastA(rica 
Duty exemptions in Kenya are considerable. Most Ministerial discretionary 
exemptions were abolished in 1995, although some remain. Statutory exemptions 
remain.  In the year 1995/96, exemptions given to importers amounted to 21  per cent 
of  total potential revenue from import duties. However 74 percent of  this amount was 
accounted for by export promotion programmes and obligations under international 
treaty. Total revenue loss, defined as the difference between potential revenue and 
actual collections for that year amounted to approximately 30 percent of  potential 
revenue. "Unofficial" exemptions or revenue leakages therefore amounted to 9 percent 
of  potential revenue or Ksh 1.9 bn. 
Customs duty exemptions in Tanzania are also considerable. Discretionary 
exemptions are much larger than statutory ones. In 1996 total customs duty collections 
amounted to only 50 percent of  potential revenue. Official exemptions amounted to 47 
percent of  potential. "Unofficial" exemptions or leakages therefore amounted to 3 
percent or Tshs 4.1  bn. The most significant product accounting for official 
exemptions was motor vehicles, especially four-wheel drive vehicles. It would be hard 
to find legitimate reasons for justifying this. 
In Uganda, duty exempted imports were valued at US$ 99.3 mn in 1996/97. At an 
average weighted tariff of 15.8%, this would work out at a revenue loss ofUS$15.7 
mn or 17.9 percent out of  total potential revenue ofUS$87.9 mn on declared imports. 
Of  these, 69 percent were for diplomats or other obligations under international 
agreements. Discretionary exemptions accounted for 29 per cent, with the balance 
being for approved investors, but these are being phased out. Total revenue loss on 
declared imports amounted to 24.5 percent of  potential revenue. It was further 
estimated that an additional US$51.5 mn might have been lost that year on unofficial 
imports, for which no duty was paid. This was equivalent to 76 percent of  actual duty 
collections. Unofficial imports are imports that are smuggled, under-valued or not 
recorded by Customs. 
Indian Ocean 
Very few duty exemptions are given in Comores, the main exemptions being 
given on imports for religious purposes, and goods imported under international 
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duty. 
Information on duty exemptions in Madagascar is not given. 
In Mauritius there are various types of  unclassified duty exemptions (no duty is 
levied) and concessions (levied duty is lower than duty that should normally be 
applied). Thus, under various investment schemes for enterprises producing for 
exports, as well as for those producing for the local market, inputs for manufacturing 
companies are liable to exemptions or concessions. Other products liable to duty 
exemptions or concessions include inputs to be used in the EPZ, tourism, pioneer 
status enterprises, as well as certain specific industries. Other duty exemptions 
concern, among others, religious bodies, humanitarian organisations, office equipment 
and furniture to be used by offshore banks and companies, the Mauritius Offshore 
Business Activities Authority (MOBAA), and the Mauritius Freeport Authority, 
equipment for airline companies, and vehicles for employees of  the Civil Service and 
parastatal organisations. Moreover, rice and flour imported on behalf of  the 
Government of  Mauritius (State Trading Corporation) enter Mauritius free of  charge. 
Concessions are available for a number of  other purposes. 
Information on duty exemptions in Seychelles is not given. 
Southern Africa 
No specific information or analysis was given in the report on exemptions in 
Zambia, although it is known that Zambia has extensively reduced the range of 
exemptions which previously existed. From an analysis of  total imports and import 
duty collections for 1996, actual collections amounted to 8.9 percent of  the value of 
imports. Given the fact that the simple average duty rate was 13.6 percent, an 
assumption could be made that there was some under-collection of  potential revenue, 
which would be due either to exemptions or leakages. 
Exemptions are a widespread feature of  the tariff system in Zimbabwe. The process 
of  application for exemptions is not transparent and is open to political lobbying thereby 
restricting access to the exemptions to a limited number of  traders. In 1996 the value of 
actual duty collections (Z$3.8 bn) was 64 percent of  estimated potential revenue (Z$5.9 
bn). The difference would have been due to exemptions and leakages. The official 
exemptions accounting for the largest proportions of  duty loss were those on capital 
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incentives, followed by governmental imports. In 1997, potential revenue from customs 
duty was estimated to be 24 percent of  import value.  Actual collections were 14.2 
percent, implying a revenue loss of  40.8 percent of  potential revenue, applying an 
average duty rate. In the first nine months of 1997, the value of  official customs duty 
exemptions was Z$1 ,3 bn, although the available data indicated a revenue shortfall of 
Z$800 mn. There are therefore some anomalies in the data. 
Table 1: Customs duty revenue losses and exemptions 
Country  Year  Potential  Actual  Revenue  Official  Revenue 
Revenue  revenue  loss  exemptions  loss as% of 
(US$mn)  (US$mn)  (US$mn)  (US$mn) 
Kenya  1995/96  389.3  275.0  114.3  80.3  29.5 
Tanzania  1996  289.7  146.1  143.6  136.5  49.6 
Uganda  1996/97  87.9  66.4  21.5  15.7  24.5 
Zambia  1996  258.1  169.7  88.3  N/a  34.2 
Zimbabwe  1996  590.0  380.0  210.0  N/a  35.6 
* = estimated on simple average. 
5.  SCENARIOS FOR TARIFF HARMONISATION 
The data used in analysing the effect of  harmonisation of  external tariffs were 
based on the HS classification at the 8-digit level. For all studies, import items were 
aggregated into three main groups: raw materials and capital goods, intermediate 
goods and final goods, except for Zimbabwe, where the study made a distinction in 
tariff rates between raw materials and capital goods. 
For East Africa and the Indian Ocean countries, the procedure for estimating the 
revenue effects of  tariff harmonisation involved first computing the potential statutory 
tariff revenue based on the prevailing statutory tariff rates. A change was then 
estimated in the value of  imports due to the introduction of  the proposed HET tariffs. 
These were derived from the total value of  imports from countries outside East Africa 
multiplied by the elasticity of  the item and the percentage change in the tariff from the 
statutory rate to the new harmonised rates. The new import values were calculated 
with the initial import values plus the estimated change in import values. 
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HET requirements as explained above (see section 1.) 
EastA(rica 
In Kenya, statutory tariffs were obtained from the 1996 Finance Bill. The 
computations were done with the data ofthe 1995/96 fiscal year. To estimate the 
revenue impact of  tariffs changes, four scenarios of  tariff structure were assumed as 
follows: 
Table 2: Proposed scenarios for East Africa countries 
Primary products  Intermediate goods  Final goods 
Scenario I  0%  10%  20% 
Scenario II  0%  0%  15% 
Scenario III  0%  15%  15% 
Scenario IV  Uniform harrnonised tariff of 10% 
Simulations of  the results were made using the demand elasticities obtained from 
Stem, Francis and Schumacher (1997). The sensitivity of  revenue changes was 
examined by taking three variations on the elasticities: a lower case (half of  the import 
demand elasticity provided); a middle case (actual import demand elasticity provided) 
and an upper case (twice the import demand elasticity provided). 
Mineral fuels were excluded from the simulations because they only face excise 
taxes in Uganda. 
The Tanzanian case made a distinction in its models between a political situation, 
where sensitive products have a 30 percent duty rate, and an apolitical situation, which 
keeps to the original scenarios. 
Indian Ocean 
For extra-CBI trade, the adoption of  the HET was calculated with two scenarios. 
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Primary products  Intermediate goods  Final goods 
Scenario I  5%  15%  25% 
Scenario II  0%  10%  20% 
For Indian Ocean, elasticities were approximated by the world demand elasticities 
as presented by Stem, Francis and Schumacher (1997) for these goods and the 
consultants used a partial equilibrium model. 
In the Seychelles scenarios, all petroleum products are classified as a finished 
good. 
Southern Africa 
There was no need to apply scenarios for the Zambian case as the country had 
already broadly implemented the proposed CBI rates. 
For Zimbabwe, four tariff rate options were used to generate revenue forecasts 
from the forecast import figures for 1998 and 1999. The four options were applied 
with two scenarios. Import forecasts were based on two cases: a base case where 
imports would rise by 1 percent in 1998 and 4 percent in 1999; and a lower case where 
imports would decrease by 5 percent in 1998 and rise by 1 percent in 1999. 
Table 4: Proposed scenarios for Zimbabwe 
Raw materials  Capital goods  Intermediate  Final goods 
Scenario I  5%  0%  10%  20% 
Scenario II  5%  5%  15%  25% 
Scenario III  0%  0%  15%  25% 
Scenario IV  5%  0%  15%  25% 
p. 89 6.  REVENUE IMPACTS 
6.1  Intra-CBI trade 
East Africa 
The East African studies did not separately calculate the effect of  removal of 
duties on intra-CBI trade. Tanzania however analysed intra-EAC trade, which 
accounts for the vast majority of  intra-CBI trade. This showed that losses associated 
with the adoption of  duty free trade for intra-East Africa trade would account for 
losses of  between 5 and 7 percent of  all customs duties and approximately 2 percent of 
all government tax revenue collected. 
Indian Ocean 
For the Indian Ocean countries, the revenue loss coming from the shift in tariff 
from the old preferential tariff to a zero tariff would be relatively small. 
t  Mauritius' loss of  revenue would be $3.9 million representing 0.6 percent of 
the total government recurrent revenue in 1996. 
t  For Madagascar, the revenue loss would be $1.7 million or 0.54 percent of  the 
total government fiscal revenue collected in 1997. 
t  Seychelles would lose $0.13 million accounting for 0.54 percent of  the total 
government fiscal revenue collected in 1997. 
t  For Comoros, the revenue loss would be ofthe order of$107,905, which 
amounts to 0.6 percent of  total government revenue. 
Southern Africa 
Although a detailed analysis of  the impact of  tariff changes on Zambia's 
government budget was not undertaken, general indications of  the impact of  the HET 
show that Zambia will only face a modest impact. The impact would only be in terms 
of  removal of  duties on imports from CBI countries, since there would be no external 
p.90 tariff adjustment. The impact on actual revenues collected from imports would be 
minimal due to its current tariff structure that gives a 60 percent preference on imports 
from CO  MESA member states. However, Zambia would lose immediate tax revenue 
ofK4.4 billion corresponding to the amount of  customs duty earned from its 
COMESA imports. This revenue loss would be compensated by the increase in 
collection of  import VAT, which will arise because of  trade creation and greater 
compliance from business. 
For Zimbabwe, the removal of  duties on intra-CBI imports would lead to a loss of 
1.5 percent of  total customs revenue. 
6.2  Extra-CBI trade 
The simulation exercises have shown in most countries that the loss in revenue is 
lowest when the imports are applied with 20% duty of  final goods, 10% intermediate 
goods and 0% primary goods. From the various simulations, it is noted that adopting a 
common external tariff will have a positive impact on imports while it will impact 
negatively on revenue. 
EastA(rica 
New tariff revenues were calculated by using the new value of  imports and the 
proposed harmonised tariff scenarios. The revenue change due to the proposed 
harmonised tariff is then the difference between the initial statutory tariff revenue and 
the new potential tariff revenue. 
Welfare effects oftariffharmonisation were estimated by applying the average 
tariffs (averages of  statutory and proposed harmonised tariffs) to the change in the value 
of  imports arising from the shift from statutory to harmonised tariffs. The average tariff 
is derived as the mean of  the sum of  statutory tariffs and harmonised tariffs. 
The revenue impact is significantly different between the EAC members but 
revenue losses are the lowest when applying a zero tariff on primary goods, 10 percent 
on intermediate and 20 percent on final goods. 
With the tariffs proposed above, revenue losses for Kenya are about 22.3 percent 
of  the total potential tariff revenue in 1995/96. A zero tariff for primary goods and 15 
percent duty for intermediate and final goods would lead to the second lowest revenue 
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would lead to the largest revenue loss with 55 percent of  tariff revenue while the 10 
percent uniform tariff scenario leads to a revenue loss of  35.3 percent and is likely to 
create the highest anti-export bias. The greater welfare effect is reached with the 10 
percent harmonised tariff, followed by a zero rate on primary and intermediate goods 
and 15 percent on final goods. 
Table 5: Revenue impact for Kenya of the introduction of the HET (1995-96) 
Revenue changes for 199SI9(i, billion Ksbs 
Revenue loss as %  Welfare effect 
Scenarios  Lower case  Base case  Upper case  of customs revenue  (in million Kshs) 
0, 10,20  -4.29  - 4.723  - 5.907  22.3  + 950 
0, 0,  15  - 11.670  - 11.728  - 11.843  55.4  2,453 
0,  15,  15  -4.904  -4.876  - 4.819  23.0  1,735 
10,  10,  10  - 7.628  - 7.474  - 6.291  35.3  2,862 
The same scenario leads to the lowest revenue loss for Uganda, but also with a 
loss of  welfare. A zero tariff on primary product and 15 percent duty on both 
intermediate and final goods would lead to the second lowest revenue loss and with a 
welfare gain. 
Table 6: Revenue impact for Uganda of the introduction of the HET 
Revenue cha~ges  for 1996/97, billioQ. Usbs 
Revenue loss as %  Welfare effect 
Scenarios  Lower case  Base ease  Upper case  of customs revenue  (in billion Ushs) 
0,10,20  +0.72  -4.63  - 15.35  6.56  -2.38 
0, 0,  15  - 35.69  - 36.81  - 39.04  52.36  + 5.32 
0,  15,  15  -4.11  -6.82  - 12.24  9.7  + 1.87 
10,  10,  10  - 16.14  - 15.13  + 13.10  21.52  + 7.96 
For Tanzania, the same scenario goes to achieve the lowest loss of  revenue of 
Tshs49. 7 billion representing 61  percent of  duty collected in 1996. However, in this 
case, import change is also the lowest as well as welfare increase. The simulation 
surprisingly showed that applying a 30 percent duty on sensitive products does not 
necessarily imply a gain in revenue. 
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Revenue loss as %  Welfare effect 
Scenarios  of customs revenue  (in million Tshs) 
0,  10,20  - 50.052  -49.709  -49.022  29.84  + 12,776 
0, 0,  15  - 88.118  - 85.539  - 80.382  51.35  + 22,048 
0,  15,  15  - 62.344  - 58.209  -49.938  34.94  + 19,601 
10, 10,  10  - 76.949  - 70.999  -42.777  42.62  + 25,946 
Indian Ocean 
The revenue impact analysis for Indian Ocean countries was made comparing the 
real revenue collected (present actual revenue), the revenue that could have been 
collected if  the system was more efficient (present potential revenue), the revenue that 
should be collected under the harmonised tariff (new potential value) and the revenue 
that could reasonably be collected under the HET (new realistic revenue). 
In comparing the realistic estimate of  the ability of  customs authorities to collect 
the new revenue and the present collections for 1996, the revenue impact is rather 
small for the Indian Ocean countries. A 5 percent duty on primary products, 15 percent 
on intermediate and 25 percent on final goods would lead to the lowest revenue loss 
and even revenue gains if  revenue collection can be improved. 
Table 8: Revenue impact for Indian Ocean countries of the 
introduction of the HET 
Proposed tariffs: 5%, 15%, 25%  Proposed tariffs: 0, 10, 20 
Country  A  B  c 
Mauritius  -16.0  +17.0  -1.0 
Madagascar  -8.0  +2.69  -5.75 
Seychelles  -14.8  -4.6  -6.8 
Comoros  +3.2  +0.8  n/a 
Notes:  A- new potential minus present potential revenue 
B - new potential minus present actual revenue 
C - new realistic minus present actual revenue 
A  B  c 
-35.0  -0.7  -11.7 
-16.5  -4.4  -10.3 
-15.4  -5.0  -7.2 
+1.6  -2.2  -3.9 
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Zambia has no revenue losses since their external tariff is not being significantly 
adjusted. 
Revenue losses for Zimbabwe ranged from less than 1 percent up to 31.8 percent 
of  customs revenue according to the four scenarios. The lowest loss occurs with 5. 
percent duty on primary products and on capital goods, 15 percent on intermediate 
goods and 25 percent on final goods. The greatest loss is with a 5 percent duty on 
primary products, zero tariff on capital goods, 10 percent on intermediate and 20 
percent on final goods. 
Scenarios 
5,0, 10,20 
5, 5, 15, 25 
0, 0, 15, 25 
5, 0,  15, 25 
Table 9: Revenue impact for Zimbabwe of the introduction of 
the proposed tariffs 
Revenue loss as% (CBI/effective duty rate) 
-2,209  -2,348  31.8 
- 3  - 3  0.04 
- 1,172  - 1,246  16.9 
-948  - 1,008  13.6 
7.  OTHER IMPACTS 
Revenue losses alone should not be the main determinant in the equation when 
deciding how to harmonise external tariffs. It  has been shown above that the lower the 
duty rates were, the greater the welfare growth was (except for Kenya) and in some 
cases, it was also leading to an increase in imports over the years (Tanzania). This 
conflict between efforts to minimise revenue loss with maximisation of  welfare is 
always overlooked since revenue loss is directly observable and therefore attracts 
greater attention of  the authorities. 
Moreover, by applying lower tariff levels, dynamic effects can be generated such 
as expansion of  the economic activity with increased disposable income for 
consumption and investment. The increase in aggregate demand would therefore lead 
to increased output and employment and hence, more revenue collection. 
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shown in the Indian Ocean study with sensitive sectors being highly protected (e.g. 
some of  the light manufactured products in this region have a duty rate up to 80 
percent). The removal oftariffbarriers might lead to a more competitive economy, but 
in the immediate future, it would lower protection of  local industry and therefore, 
could create a situation where local production might not be competitive enough to 
avoid social effects such as unemployment. 
8.  NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 
Some non-tariff barriers are still remaining after the significant efforts of  the 
governments to abolish them as a mean of  protectionism, but the more traditional legal 
NTBs have mostly disappeared. 
Kenya abolished its quantitative restriction on trade in 1993 and there is now just 
a negative list concerning 16 import products and 2 export items that are restricted for 
health, security and environment reasons. 
Tanzania has diminished tremendously the list of  goods that were previously 
prohibited or restricted. 
The ban on imports to Uganda for products such as beer, sodas, car batteries and 
second hand tyres was lifted on 1st April 1998. However, some restrictions have 
subsequently been imposed on imports that have not complied with Uganda's Quality 
Standards, appearing to be a mean of  protectionism. 
There are very few legislated non-tariff barriers in the Indian Ocean countries, 
except for controlled lists of  products pertaining to environmental, phytosanitary and 
national security concerns still exists. Foreign exchange shortages in Seychelles also 
are giving rise to NTBs in this area. 
Some NTBs still exist which particularly affect intra-regional trade, such as 
barriers between Zambia and Zimbabwe, including quantitative restrictions or 
voluntary restraints that reinforce tariff protection, and payment barriers that are 
protective in nature such as minimum and maximum limits to the amount of local 
currency that can be remitted outside the country. These barriers may not be 
transparent although their effect is quite acute. Other barriers include product 
standards, transport costs labour and capital movement restrictions. 
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East Africa 
Comparing the revenue loss between the different scenarios, it was recommended 
that the best scenario would be the one with a zero duty on primary products, 10 
percent on intermediate and 20 percent on final goods. Although this scenario leads to 
the lowest revenue loss for the three countries, it also leads to lower welfare gains. 
In Kenya, this scenario is presented as the most feasible alternative providing a 
moderate protection regime. The tariff to be introduced should be one that is not 
complicated, encourages importers, exporters and domestic manufacturers and the 
rates should be set in a manner that discourages constant lobbying. 
The study on Tanzania also showed an interest in trying to find other internal 
taxes in order to avoid a high dependency on trade taxes. 
For the whole region, a significant part of  revenue losses could be balanced by an 
improvement of  tariff administration and duty collection, together with a deeper 
regional co-operation in customs administrations. 
Indian Ocean 
The studies showed several similarities among the Indian Ocean countries. A 5 
percent duty rate on primary good, 15 percent on intermediate and 25 percent on final 
goods is presented as the best scenario. The reports recommended for all countries to 
levy excise duties on imports at the same rate as for domestic production in order to 
balance part of  the revenue loss due to the implementation of  harmonised tariffs and to 
increase excise duties on those products currently with very high import tariffs. 
Efficiency should also be improved in fiscal and customs administrations in order to 
face this loss of  revenue, particularly for Madagascar. 
p.96 Southern A(rica 
Zambia has achieved much in stabilising the macro-economy, in pursuing 
privatisation and in liberalising markets. With the implementation of  the HET, Zambia 
is in a good position to play a significant role in the region and the key factor will be 
the extent to which the other CBI countries will implement economic reforms. 
For Zimbabwe, a 5 percent duty rate on primary goods, zero tariff on capital 
goods, 10 percent on intermediate and 20 percent on final goods is recommended as 
the best scenario. The suggestion is given to apply a 15 percent rate on intermediate 
and 25 percent on final goods at a first stage before fully implementing the 
recommended scenario. The following road map was proposed: 
t  introduction of  a new classification system of  specific products under the CBI 
categories; 
t  gradual reduction of  rates, taking into account sensitive products which would 
be reduced by 20 percent in 1999 and by 40 percent in 2000. Highly sensitive 
products would remain at the same rate before commencing a duty reduction 
programme from 1999; 
t  revision of  the exemption list regarding the impact of  the introduction of  a 
HET; 
t  establishment of  a Revenue Authority to be pursued with more vigour to 
enhance revenue collections; 
t  to bridge the revenue gap, other alternative sources of  revenues were 
recommended such as: improvement in revenue collection, in particular taxes 
on income, profits, goods and services; the upward review of  the penalties, 
stamp duties, fines and fees; the introduction ofVAT to replace sales tax; the 
reduction in the number of  exemptions or the introduction of  informal sector 
taxation. 
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p.  101 Summary and Overview 
1.  At the Third Ministerial Meeting of  the Cross-Border Initiative (  CBI) held 
in Harare in February 1998, the participating countries resolved to continue and 
broaden the CBI and agreed to focus its future activities on investment facilitation. 
The meeting requested the CBI co-sponsors (AfDB, EU, IMF, and World Bank) to 
prepare a Road Map for this purpose. The first draft was discussed by the Technical 
Working Groups (TWGs) in Mauritius in November 1998 and, in the light of  those 
discussions, the present document was finalized for presentation to the Fourth 
Ministerial Meeting. This Road Map provides a framework which the countries can 
use, individually and jointly, to encourage and facilitate investment from within and 
from outside the CBI countries. 
2.  While this Road Map has been conceptualized within the CBI forum, it 
has broad applicability beyond the present participating countries. It could therefore be 
disseminated through the Global Coalition for Africa and other African regional and 
sub-regional organizations who can benefit from and contribute to its implementation. 
Recent Investment and Savings Performance in CBI 
3.  A snapshot of  growth and investment performance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and the CBI participating countries reveals the following key trends: 
t  while there has been an upturn in the average real GDP growth in SSA in 
recent years, the signs are that: (i) the East Asia crisis and the intensification of 
armed conflicts have ushered in a new and unpredicted phase of  uncertainty; 
and (ii) growth in SSA and in CBI countries in the next few years is unlikely to 
be robust and diversified enough to ensure a significant improvement in living 
standards; 
t  gross investment in the CBI countries as a group has been below the minimum 
of  25 percent of  GDP suggested by the Global Coalition for Africa; 
p.  102 •  foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries increased during 
1990-96 but most of  these flows were concentrated in a few countries, none in 
SSA; while during 1993-97 FDI in the CBI participating countries increased, it 
reached a level of  only 1.2 percent of  their GDP; and 
•  during 1994-1998, there was no increase in savings as a share of  GDP in the 
CBI countries. 
4.  The main lessons of  experience are that: 
•  investor confidence is linked not only to the perception of  the robustness of 
reforms but also to their consistent implementation over time; 
•  even in some of  the reforming countries under the CBI, the reform efforts 
(which usually take a long time) have not been consistent and sustained 
enough to regain investor confidence; 
•  from an investor's viewpoint, the conditions for doing business in Africa are 
unsatisfactory; 
•  while risk rankings of  most CBI countries has improved since the inception of 
the CBI, none of  the CBI countries has yet achieved a sustained low risk 
rating; and 
•  a concerted effort is, therefore, needed over an extended period to firmly 
establish improved general conditions for attracting investment and to build a 
better image. 
Essential Conditions for Attracting Investment 
5.  Many steps have already been taken within the CBI framework towards 
investment facilitation; but a lot more needs to be done, particularly in the following 
essential areas: 
•  Political stability. An important step towards building investor confidence in 
the region would be for the CBI countries to explicitly recognize internal and 
neighborhood stability as necessary overarching objectives. 
•  Good governance. Investors generally prefer countries which display 
democratic open government, transparency and a willingness to combat 
corruption throughout society. In addition to reforms in the public sector 
through privatization, governments need also to: 
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•  reorganize and reorientate public institutions so that they provide services 
which facilitate rather than control investors' activities; and 
t  Macroeconomic reform and stability. Through their adjustment programmes, 
CBI countries have achieved a measure of  success in achieving steady and 
broad-based per capita economic growth, stronger external positions, declining 
and low rates of  inflation, controlled growth in money variables and improved 
fiscal operations. Nevertheless, there is a continued need for: 
•  greater vigilance in macro-economic policy to help survive the economic 
maelstroms that presently beset the global economy and threaten to erase 
the hard won gains of  the region; 
•  further fiscal reforms, both in revenue and expenditure, which are vital to 
underpin the investment facilitation measures contemplated in this paper; 
and 
•  governments to restructure expenditure and reduce the burden of  debt 
service so as to reallocate scarce resources towards health and education 
and physical infrastructure. 
t  Trade liberalization. The CBI Road Map for Trade Reform envisaged tariff 
simplification, rationalization and reduction. Progress to date has been 
significant but uneven, and there is a need to accelerate the pace of  trade 
reform implementation in order to reduce further the anti-export bias, acquire 
foreign technology, and exploit comparative advantage. 
t  Market integration. Despite progress in achieving economic growth in the 
past few years, Africa is losing its already small share of  global markets. In 
addition to continued efforts at integration into the global economy, greater 
integration of  regional markets would help create more opportunities for 
investors, and for financial markets to develop a critical mass, particularly 
given the current sizes of  the CBI economies. The efforts of some West and 
Central African countries provides a good example to emulate. 
t  Exchange system liberalization. The considerable progress achieved in the 
liberalization of  exchange systems needs to be buttressed by: (i) removing the 
remaining restrictions on current account transactions, including elimination of 
arrears; and (ii) further liberalizing capital account transactions and foreign 
exchange repatriation and surrender requirements. 
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liberalizing approval procedures but progress has been slow or mixed in 
concluding double taxation agreements, authorizing the cross-listing of  stocks, 
and dealing with labor market issues. 
t  Consistency in policy and application. Investor confidence has to be built 
over time by consistently applying the necessary conditions over a prolonged 
period. 
Principal Actions Needed to Increase Investment over the Medium-Term 
6.  While all investors are not homogenous and attach different priorities to 
different factors, there are, in addition to maintaining macroeconomic stability and 
completing the CBI agenda on trade reform, several areas where action is most likely 
to attract and facilitate investment: 
t  Tax reform. Reforms could include: lowering income tax rates, eliminating tax 
holidays, improving assessment and collection procedures; and finalizing 
double taxation treaties among CBI countries and with traditional and 
expected trading partners. 
t  Legal and  judicial reforms. Changes are needed to protect payment and 
property rights and to regain confidence in the judicial system by assuring 
timely processing of  claims in accordance with consistent application of  the 
relevant laws. The principal reforms that are most commonly needed are in: 
corporate law, contract law, bankruptcy, labor law, and property rights. The 
redrafting of  legislation will not, of  itself, introduce the requisite changes; 
judicial reforms are also necessary to ensure that laws are applied properly. 
Given the inherent pressures of  globalization, CBI participants must in the 
long term adopt common commercial and labor laws. 
t  Institutional reforms. While most CBI countries have established one-stop 
investment agencies, regulatory and administrative systems reforms are needed 
to reduce the cost of  doing business by enabling procedures to be applied 
consistently and efficiently. Further steps should also be taken to assist the 
development of  the accounting, banking and legal professions. 
t  Capital market development. Greater attention must be given to providing 
more instruments for increasing domestic savings and more medium- and 
long-term capital. At the same time, businesses require an improved range of 
financial services to be able to operate more efficiently. Rapid development is 
therefore needed to improve: 
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response, action is required to foster the growth of  private institutions that 
provide equity and long-term credit; 
•  financial intermediation: more effort is required to educate savers about 
long-term investment in equities and other financial instruments, and to 
expand markets to provide more investment opportunities; but regional 
capital market development, including more cross-listings, can only be 
achieved ifthere are free cross-border flows of  capital and dividends; and 
this will require acceptance of  common standards and procedures; and 
•  over-the-counter services: there is need to harness the latest technology to 
improve and extend the range of  over-the-counter services. 
t  Human capital development. Investors place a premium on locations which 
offer an educated, mobile, efficient and low-cost workforce. Possible avenues 
for cooperation and harmonization among participants include adopting 
common technical education standards, and common international standards 
for professional bodies. Similarly, there is a need to improve health to raise 
efficiency. However, HIV  I  AIDS is so prevalent in East and Southern Africa 
that its effects now cut across all sectors and every aspect of  development, 
including investment. CBI countries must therefore work together to deal with 
this disease. 
t  Credible privatization. Privatization is a catalyst for significant FDI, helps to 
introduce and expand competition, and provides a launch pad for developing 
the private sector. Perceptions are that African governments have accepted 
privatization reluctantly; and there are concerns about insufficient public 
information and transparency. Thus the way in which the process is managed 
strongly influences, and often reflects on, the general investment climate of 
each country. 
t  New/upgraded infrastructure Facilities in many CBI countries are inadequate 
to attract investment. While efforts are under way to expand and upgrade 
infrastructure, there will be added pressure to use existing capacity to 
maximum efficiency. In response to the public sector's difficulties in financing 
and managing new major infrastructure projects, there is need to build on the 
increasing trend of  private participation in infrastructure by strong 
commitments to credible regulatory provisions and by packaging infrastructure 
projects in a regional context to use soft loans from multinational financial 
institutions to provide guarantees for investors. 
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build a better image-one that portrays the successes and the group's 
resources and opportunities. 
Proposed Programme of Immediate Actions 
7.  It would not be feasible to tackle all aspects of  investment facilitation at 
one and same time, so the Road Map includes immediate actions in selected priority 
areas. The programme described here is only a framework: each country will have to 
design its own specific path along the Road Map. Hence, actions in addition to those 
set out here could be included. The focus here is principally (though not exclusively) 
on regional initiatives which would be implemented collectively and/or in unison by 
the CBI countries. The following actions are recommended: 
t  Accelerate implementation of  the CBI trade reform agenda: 
•  complete expeditiously the import tariffs reforms set out in the existing CBI 
Road Map for Trade Reform. This would further help to harmonize and 
reduce the anti-export bias of  the tariff regimes of  CBI participating 
countries; 
•  lock in tariff  reforms by adopting WTO tariff bindings at rates not much 
higher than the levels envisaged in the Road Map for Trade Reform. Such a 
step will greatly enhance the CBI countries credibility in creating an 
appropriate incentive structure for efficient investment and trade flows; and 
•  go beyond the targets specified in the Road Map for Trade Reform by 
further reducing the stipulated maximum rate, narrowing the number of 
tariff bands, and lowering the trade-weighted average tariff (as in the case 
ofUganda). Such efforts will be key in helping the CBI countries to 
integrate into the global economy and remain competitive. 
t  Investment promotion: 
•  at the regional (CBI) level. Countries should cooperate on promotion by: (i) 
mounting a public relations campaign to improve the image of  doing 
business in the region; (ii) sharing information by establishing a CBI 
website, and (iii) examining the feasibility of  establishing cross-border 
investment funds; and 
•  at the national level. There is need to design and implement a package of 
changes that will provide more information and better services and make 
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significant part at both the regional and national level. 
t  Selective legal and  judicial reforms: 
•  recognize the "regional enterprise". A firm would be considered a regional 
enterprise if  it were incorporated in one of  the CBI participating countries 
regardless of  the nationality of  ownership; 
•  adopt common company and branch registration procedures. Adoption of 
common registration procedures would be a first important step towards 
harmonization of  contract, bankruptcy and property laws; and 
•  establish separate commercial courts. A fast track system is needed which 
will give lenders confidence to recover debt in the event of  default. 
t  Selective tax reforms: 
•  taxes on goods and services. The domestic tax base should be broadened by 
adopting a single-rate domestic non-cascading tax; 
•  taxes on income and profits. Steps should be taken to simplify taxes on 
income and profits and to reduce rates to levels which will diminish 
evaswn; 
•  steps to improve and harmonize tax and customs administration; and 
•  conclude double taxation agreements among CBI members, traditional 
trading partners and with new countries with a potential to attract 
investment. 
t  Awards to raise awareness and private incentives. The Road Map also 
includes a proposal to introduce a scheme of  annual Africa Achievement 
Awards in order to spur the private sector to deliver improvements in services 
and performance, and to improve information sharing. 
It  must be emphasized that, for the above actions to bear fruit, the essential 
conditions for attracting investment, summarized in paragraph 5, must be established 
and sustained. 
Institutional and Other Requirements for Implementation 
8.  To commence implementation of  the Road Map it will be essential for the 
CBI participating countries to consider and agree upon appropriate institutional 
p.  108 arrangements, which should preferably give emphasis to private sector participation. 
To help this process, the Road Map includes suggestions for institutional arrangements 
and preparatory steps for implementing the proposed immediate actions. 
A. Introduction 
1.  At the Third Ministerial Meeting on the CBI held in February 1998 in 
Harare, the participating countries decided to continue and broaden the CBI. It was 
also agreed to accelerate the evolving CBI agenda, with more emphasis on investment 
facilitation issues, including harmonization of  national and regional policies towards a 
conducive environment for efficient investment. The third ministerial meeting also 
requested the co-sponsors (African Development Bank, European Commission, 
International Monetary Fund, and World Bank) to prepare a proposal that would 
provide a framework for the design and implementation of a program of  action that 
CBI participating countries could take to encourage and facilitate investment from 
within and from outside those countries. A paper, in the form of a draft "road map" for 
investment facilitation, was prepared in response to that request. The paper was 
discussed by the Technical Working Groups (TWGs) at the fourth TWG meeting in 
Mauritius in November 1998 and this version reflects the comments made at that 
meeting. This paper is intended to provide an agenda for discussion at the Fourth 
Ministerial Meeting to be held in Mauritius in 1999. The Ministerial Meeting will also 
examine and agree on actions that CBI participating countries will take to harmonize 
their approach in a mutually beneficial way. 
2.  The paper is organized as follows. Section B summarizes recent 
investment and savings performance in CBI countries. Section C outlines the essential 
conditions that need to be fulfilled to attract investment. It also summarizes progress 
to date within the CBI policy framework on exchange, trade reforms, and investment 
deregulation which are necessary for investment facilitation. Section D discusses the 
actions required to attract more investment in the medium-term and highlights those 
actions which would be of  mutual benefit to CBI countries. Section E outlines 
proposals for immediate actions to facilitate investment - to be implemented 
collectively and/or in unison- on which measurable progress could be made in a 
relatively short period, while Section F considers the institutional and other 
requirements for implementing those actions. 
3.  While this Road Map has been conceptualized within the CBI forum, it 
has broad applicability beyond the present participating countries. It could therefore be 
disseminated through the Global Coalition for Africa and other African regional and 
sub-regional organizations who can benefit from and contribute to its implementation. 
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4.  Although, in recent years, there has been a welcome upturn in real GDP 
growth in Africa, at an average of  about 5% in 1996 (5.9% for CBI countries- see 
Annex I), it is still well below what is needed to achieve a major reduction in poverty. 
While the trend during the period 1995-1997 was encouraging, the signs are that many 
African economies suffered a setback in 1998 resulting primarily from the East Asian 
financial crisis and from armed conflicts. The overall 1998 GDP growth rate in sub-
Saharan Africa is estimated to have dropped by more than 2 percentage points from 
the 1997 level to around 1.4%. In the CBI countries, however, the GDP growth rate 
averaged 3.4% and thus these countries, as a group, were able to maintain growth rates 
at the previous year's level. 
5.  Despite progress in achieving significant economic growth over the past 
few years, Africa's small share of  world trade is declining. Countries are having to 
look not only at penetrating the world market but also at the potential for expanding 
and diversifying regional markets. At the present time, though higher at the sub-
regional level, regional trade within sub-Saharan Africa is only about 7 percent of  total 
trade. 1  Trends in investment are also below the desired levels. A recent report 
prepared by the Global Coalition for Africa2  states that "Africa's investment 
performance has to be raised from its current rates of 16-18% of  GDP to an annual 
investment rate of  25% or better, for the region to be on the path to adequate and 
sustained growth and poverty reduction." Not only must the levels of  investment be 
raised, so too must the quality of  that investment. 
3 
6.  Data on the levels of gross domestic investment for the CBI countries as 
a group compared with the rest of  Africa (Annex II) show that: (i) gross investment 
for the CBI countries as a group has been consistently below the 25% of  GDP 
suggested as the minimum by the Global Coalition for Africa, and below that of  the 
total of all other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (whether or not South Africa and 
Nigeria are excluded); and (ii) only a few of  the CBI countries have achieved the 
25% level and, of  those, only three - Seychelles, Swaziland, and Mauritius - have 
done so consistently over the past five years. Given the constraints on public 
resources, public sector investment is unlikely to grow significantly. Therefore, there 
1  The low level of regional trade within sub-Saharan Africa is attributed principally to the structure of production and exports which depends 
mainly on commodity exports to industrial countries.  However, it should be noted that trade levels are higher at the sub-regional level (for 
example: about l 0% within UEMOA and 17% within SADC); moreover, there is a significant unrecorded cross-border trade in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Very recently, it was announced that the trade volume within CO  MESA countries has been growing steadily at 20 percent each year 
since 1995 and that between 1994 and 1998 the volume of intra-COMESA trade had trebled. 
'"Enhancing the Investment Environment in Africa", Document GCA/EC/n°2/03/1998 prepared for the Economic Committee Meeting held in 
Gaborone in March 1998.  Section B draws heavily on that report. 
'To underline the need to improve the quality of investment, a recent paper ("Is Investment in Africa Too High or Too Low" by Devarajan, 
Easterly, and Pack, May 1999) presents data to show the low productivity of  investment in Africa and concludes that "Unless some or all of  the 
underlying factors that made investment unproductive in the past are addressed, the results may be disappointing". 
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levels quoted above (which are the sum of  private and public sector investment).4  In 
this context it is worth noting the efforts not only of  the CBI c~untries but also of 
some West and Central African countries to explore and develop mechanisms to 
expand trade flows and improve their national and regional business environment.  5 
7.  The picture on gross private investment is perhaps a little more 
encouraging. Over the past six years, some two-thirds of  investment has consistently 
come from the private sector (Annex III). However, the level of  private investment 
remained fairly steady at about 13% of  GDP. Hence, most countries have a long way 
to go if  the suggested 25% minimum level of investment as percentage of  GDP is to 
be achieved by mobilizing the additional resources from the private sector. 
8.  Globalization of  international economic and financial systems has led to a 
spectacular growth of  foreign private investment since the late 1980s. In recent years, 
the total of  foreign private investment flows has exceeded official development 
assistance in developing countries. While foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to 
developing countries continued to increase during 1990-96, most of  these flows have 
been concentrated in a dozen countries, none of  them in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, 
the share of  those flows to countries in sub-Saharan Africa was stagnant or declining. 
Although net FDI to the CBI countries and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole showed a 
steady increase up to 1997 (Annex IVa), these net flows only represented about one 
percent of  GDP (Annex IVb  ). 
9.  It is also useful to refer to the available data on savings in the CBI 
participating countries. Data on the levels of  gross domestic savings6  as a share of 
GDP over the five year period 1993-1997 show that within the CBI countries as a 
whole there was no increase (see Annex V). Although the available data is limited, the 
same appears to be true of  gross national savings7  (Annex VI), with the levels 
marginally higher. To complete the savings picture, Annex VII shows the external 
savings8  of  each country, virtually all of  which are negative. 
4lt should be noted that the  suggested investment target of 25% of GDP assumes reasonable efficiency in the use of existing and future 
investment.  Growth can be achieved by more efficient use of investment; conversely, more investment will not necessarily guarantee more 
growth. 
'The Organisation pour I 'Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique (OHADA) is an initiative to harmonize business law within Central 
and West Africa through the  adoption of common rules (actes uniformes ),  the establishment of appropriate judicial procedures, and the 
promotion of  arbitration.  For a useful summary see "New Business Law in Africa : OHADA" published by Price Waterhouse, Fidafrica. 
'Defined as the difference between gross domestic product and total consumption. 
7Defined as  the  sum of gross domestic savings, net factor  income from  abroad (income derived from direct investment abroad including 
dividends, property rents,  and professional fees),  and net private transfers from  abroad (inflows such as workers remittances, transfers by 
migrants, gifts, dowries, inheritances, and alimony). 
'Defined as the net financial position of  a country vis-a-vis the rest of the world as represented by the current account balance (of the balance 
of  payments) excluding capital grants.  The current account balance is the difference between exports of  goods and all services plus inflows of 
unrequited current transfers and imports of goods and services plus outflows of  unrequited transfers to the rest of the world. 
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10.  The statistics in section B show clearly that most CBI countries, as well as 
Africa generally, are failing to attract sufficient savings and investment. The main 
reason is the absence of  one or more of  the essential conditions for attracting 
investment: political stability, good governance, macroeconomic reform and stability, 
free trade and open foreign exchange systems, investment deregulation, and (for larger 
investors) sufficient market size. These conditions are outlined below. However, in 
addition, there is the problem of  perception. 
Perception 
11.  In terms of  places to invest, most African countries have a poor image. 
And that is true not only of  foreign investors, but also of  domestic investors, as 
evidenced by the extent of  capital flight which has occurred. When asked about their 
views on business opportunities in Africa, most potential investors tend to refer to the 
image of  political instability, the higher risks and cost of  doing business in most 
African countries than elsewhere. Annex VIII, which sets out the Institutional 
Investor's country credit ratings for the CBI countries at selected dates since the 
inception of  the CBI, brings out this point: only one of  the CBI participants, Mauritius, 
has reached a 50 percent credit rating, with Seychelles and Zimbabwe next best with 
an average of  around 30 percent. Overall, the CBI average of  credit ratings has 
improved from around 20 percent in 1993 to around 28 percent. 
12.  The main lesson of experience is that investor confidence is linked not 
only to the perception of  the robustness of  reforms but also to their consistent 
implementation over time. From an investor's viewpoint, Africa's performance 
regarding the latter seems unsatisfactory. This means that a determined effort is 
needed over an extended period to firmly establish improved general conditions for 
attracting investment and to build a better image. 
Political Stability 
13.  Peace and stability both between and within partner countries are pre-
conditions for normal business operations. Although there will always be speculators 
active where profit margins from risky operations are high, investors - especially long-
term investors- generally shun countries and sub-regions which are, or are considered 
to be, unstable and conflict-prone. The CBI countries could take a first step towards 
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neighbourhood stability as a necessary overarching objective. The CBI countries 
would then need to plan and work within the framework of  regional groupings and 
institutions to find ways to establish and maintain stable and peaceful neighbourhoods. 
Good Governance 
14.  Genuine investors- in for the long haul, not for a quick profit-want to do 
business straightforwardly. They generally prefer countries where transaction costs are 
lower and where there is governance which displays democratic, open government, 
transparency and a willingness to deal with corruption throughout society. There is 
also empirical evidence that corruption hinders economic development by reducing 
domestic investment and discouraging foreign direct investment.9 
15.  Moreover, corruption is a subject which is attracting a lot more attention 
worldwide, and international investors are increasingly influenced by the press reports 
on this topic and by the published perceptions indices. Annex IX sets out a 
comparison of  the index ratings for 1998 extracted from Transparency International's 
1998 list of  85 countries. It can be seen that, with the exception of  Namibia and 
Mauritius, CBI countries are either not ranked or are ranked fairly low in these indices. 
CBI countries must be prepared to tackle - and be seen to tackle - the issue of 
corruption. 
16.  An important visible step towards tackling corruption and achieving good 
governance would be to accelerate the improvement of  the civil service, instal and 
enforce good financial rules and regulations, and improve the quality of  the accounting 
and legal professions in order to raise, as well as harmonize, standards. This would 
help raise the perceptions of  investors if  they see efficient public services as well as 
well run professional firms and private businesses, and commercial courts. 
Macroeconomic Reform and Stability 
17.  The achievement of  the objectives of  the CBI -liberalization of  trade in 
goods and services, trade facilitation, liberalization of  the exchange system, 
strengthening of  financial intermediation, deregulation of  investment, and facilitating 
'See, for example, Shang-Jin Wei "Corruption in Economic Development: Beneficial Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?", February 
1999, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2048 (posted on the web at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/ 
wps2000series/wps2048/wps2048-abstract.html) 
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economic stability. While the issues of  political stability and good governance have 
been referred to earlier, economic stability could be evaluated against steady and 
broad-based real per capita economic growth, low rates of  inflation, improvements in 
external sector operations (particularly exchange market stability and a sustainable 
external debt position), and improved fiscal operations. In all these matters, the CBI 
participants, often in the framework of  adjustment programmes supported by the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the other co-sponsors, have achieved a measure of  success. 
Thus real per capita GDP growth, which was significantly negative in 1993, increased 
to over 1 percent by 1997; further positive developments were the decline (a reduction 
of  more than 50 percent) in inflation, and the considerable improvement in the 
external current account.
10 
18.  These developments, though encouraging, should not, however, lull 
participants into complacency. Macroeconomic stability is vital to underpin the 
investment facilitation measures contemplated in this paper. An appropriate monetary 
framework is crucial for lowering inflation rates and, ultimately, nominal interest 
rates; while further fiscal reforms - both in revenue and expenditure - are critical in 
facilitating lower real interest rates and thus helping to boost private domestic 
investment. Moreover, broadening and restructuring of  the revenue base is essential if 
the CBI agenda of  trade and exchange reform is to be successfully completed. A 
reorientation of  government expenditure towards human (health and education) and 
physical infrastructure is important to establish the conditions for future growth. To 
maintain fiscal- and therefore macroeconomic stability- reductions in non-essential 
expenditures are apposite. The co-sponsors are also fully aware of  the need to ease the 
debt burden of  the CBI countries in an eqvitable manner. Indeed, initiatives in these 
areas are being vigorously pursued in other- and perhaps more influential and 
appropriate - fora. The most notable of  these is the debt initiative for the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) (Annex X). These initiatives need to be supported by 
clear signs of  improved debt management. 
Trade Liberalization 
19.  A major plank of  the CBI agenda is the reduction of  the anti-export bias of 
the trade regime and the creation of  an incentive structure that will promote efficient 
investment and trade flows. Towards this end, the CBI Road Map for Trade Reform 
envisaged a simplification, rationalization, and reduction of  tariffs.  11  Implementation 
of  these actions has been substantive but uneven, with half a dozen countries having 
10See page 3 of  the Synthesis Paper prepared for consideration at the Third CBI Ministerial Meeting held in Harare, 19-20 February 1998. 
11 Synthesis Paper, paragraph II. 
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Thus, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia reached the trade weighted average tariff of  not 
more than 15 percent, while Rwanda and Tanzania are very close to the target; 
Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia have met the target of 
reducing the number of  non-zero tariffbands to not more than three; Kenya, Uganda 
and Zambia have achieved the target of  a maximum rate of  no more than 25 percent, 
while Madagascar, Malawi and Tanzania are at 30 percent. In 1994 Mauritius reduced 
the number oftariffbands to 8; further reform took place in 1999 with customs duties 
removed on industrial machinery and equipment, and reduced on other items leading 
to a weighted average tariff of  26 per cent. (Annex XI). 
20.  While import tariff rates have been generally reduced, there has been slow 
progress in reducing other duties and charges, and incorporating them in the tariff 
structures. Some progress has also been made in eliminating tariffs on intra-regional 
trade (five countries now give an 80 percent preference margin), although progress 
towards reducing tariff exemptions, thereby increasing the revenue yield and the 
transparency of  the trade tax system, has been limited (Annex XII). Progress towards 
eliminating import non-tariff barriers (except for a small negative list) has been mixed 
(Annex XIII), but progress in freeing exports of  restrictions has been considerable 
(Annex XIV). Overall, the CBI countries have made good progress on harmonizing 
external tariffs but no single country has yet achieved the full package of  changes 
outlined in the Road Map for Trade Reform; so work on the agreed changes needs to 
be completed expeditiously. 
Market Integration 
21.  In addition to continued efforts at integration into the global economy, 
greater regional integration of  markets could create more opportunities for investors; 
and for financial markets to develop a critical mass among the CBI participating 
countries. The average size of  an African economy is about $8 billion, compared with 
$50 billion in other developing regions; and the total GDP of  all the CBI countries is 
$55 billion. The whole of  sub-Saharan Africa's economy today, excluding South 
Africa, is about as large as Thailand's (even with South Africa, it is still not as large as 
that ofMexico). Hence, few countries can expect to make further substantial and 
sustained progress unless they expand their access to regional and global markets. 
22.  Greater regional market integration could also help CBI countries to avoid 
concurrent replication of  efforts to raise investment in the same sectors; and thus avoid 
too many firms in the same industries with low levels of  capacity and technology. It 
can be argued that this would logically lead to a concentration of  investment and 
development in only a few locations; but, if  this were to be the outcome in the short 
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capital, combined with availability of  infrastructure for business, would soon entice 
investors to other places. 
Exchange System Liberalization 
23.  Over the past few years the CBI participating countries have made good 
progress in liberalizing exchange systems, reflected in the widespread elimination of 
restrictions on external account transactions, and the shift to market-based exchange 
rates (Annexes XV and XVI). The reduction in the reliance on direct controls has 
correspondingly increased the role of  macroeconomic policies and the need to 
strengthen the financial systems. Nevertheless, there is need to strengthen the 
efficiency of  inter-bank spot exchange markets. To strengthen investor confidence and 
the export environment, there is also a need to remove the remaining restrictions on 
current account transactions (including arrears), and to further liberalize capital 
account transactions, and foreign exchange repatriation and surrender requirements. 
Annex XVII sets out the position of  the CBI participating countries on foreign 
exchange repatriation and surrender requirements as at end-December 1998. 
Investment Deregulation 
24.  Reform of  the regulatory environment and the progressive harmonization 
of  investment incentives (both domestic and foreign) are major objectives of  the 
CBI. 12  In this regard, participating countries have agreed to simplify and codify all 
regulatory provisions into a single published document that would be widely available, 
and to establish one-stop investment centres that will process all applications within 
45-60 days, and grant automatic approval in the absence of  objections at the end of 
that period. Other specific measures call for participating countries to conclude double 
taxation agreements on a bilateral basis, to authorize the cross-listing of  stocks from 
other exchanges in the region, to expedite the processing of  residence and work 
permits, and to relax visa requirements for investors. 
25.  Overall progress in the area of  investment deregulation has been mixed 
(Annex XVIII). By end-December 1998, there had been almost full compliance with 
regard to liberalizing approval procedures (in particular establishing a one-stop 
investment approval authority); and a majority of  countries have completed the 
publication of  Investment Codes. However, the record with regard to the observance 
12Synthesis Paper, paragraph 28. 
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Multilateral Industrial Enterprise Charter has been overtaken by recent economic 
reforms in participating countries, such as improvements in investment related 
legislation which generally removed discrimination against FDI. In addition, 
participants were encouraged to become members of  the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and, where necessary, bilateral investment guarantee 
agencies such as OPIC. All CBI participating countries are now members ofMIGA. 
26.  Progress on concluding double taxation agreements is partial and much 
more needs to be done in this area. Annex XIX sets out the reported position as at 
mid-1998 but more agreements may be in existence.  13 
27.  Progress in dealing with labour market issues (visa protocol, residence and 
work permits, and short-term entry permits) has also been mixed. While some non-
island economies have taken action on short-term entry permits for border residents, 
there has been relatively little progress in implementing the CO MESA visa protocol. 
14 
There has also been little progress in expediting the processing of  residence and work 
permits. 
Consistency in Policy and Application 
28.  At the TWG meeting in November 1998, most CBI countries expressed 
the view that they had made progress in establishing the necessary conditions 
described above. Their concern was that, despite this progress, the expected supply 
response has not materialized. The continued reluctance on the part of  investors 
underlines the need for consistency in applying the necessary conditions for 
investment, especially macroeconomic stability and structural reforms, over a 
prolonged period, such that the risk of  any reversal is perceived as negligible. 
D. Principal Actions Needed to Increase Investment over the Medium-Term 
29.  Many factors influence investors' attitudes and decisions, and it is evident 
that economic malaise or conflicts in one country usually have spill-over effects in 
neighbouring countries. Also, investors are not homogenous: they attach different 
13The individual CBI participants have not reported on a consistent basis: (i) some have reported on agreements that had been concluded (i.e. 
new treaties); (ii) others have listed the countries (presumably all) with which they have agreements; and (iii) there are cases where one CBI 
country has reported having concluded an agreement but the other country has not (e.g. Comoros and Mauritius). 
14lt  should be noted that Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda no longer require visas for citizens of  EAC countries for travel between these countries. 
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macroeconomic, structural reform, debt, or trade issues that affect investment, which 
were outlined in section C, since these are dealt with in detail in other, more 
appropriate fora. 15  Instead, it outlines practical actions which CBI countries can -
within a regional framework- undertake in the medium-term to attract and facilitate 
investment. These actions fall into eight areas: tax reform, legal and judicial reform, 
insti.tutional reforms, capital market development, human capital development, 
credible privatization, expanded and upgraded infrastructure, and investment 
promotion. 
Tax Reform 
30.  Potential investors want to know and understand the tax regime, and how 
taxes are assessed and paid. They pay particular attention to the level of  taxation, 
simplicity of  calculation, and the reputation for speedy processing without demands 
for kick-backs or suggestions for unofficial discounts; and they compare tax 
arrangements with countries with which they are familiar. Hence, tax reform which 
aims to achieve fairness, consistency, efficiency, transparency, and harmonization will 
encourage investment. If  agreement on this Road Map for Investment Facilitation is 
reached, steps to rationalize and harmonize taxes (e.g. on income and profits) will 
assume greater importance. It should be noted that tax reform should not be at the 
expense of  essential expenditure. However, it should be appreciated that lower tax 
rates - consonant with an adequate revenue base - which would mean higher net 
returns to investors, would be more attractive and would also reduce the incentives for 
evasion and corruption. Annex XX summarizes the standard personal income and 
corporate profit tax rates in the CBI participating countries. 
31.  Reforms of  taxes on income and profits could include: (i) the finalisation 
of  double taxation treaties among all CBI countries and with all traditional and 
expected trading partners; (ii) lower tax rates; (iii) elimination of  tax holidays so as to 
ensure non-discrimination between types of  investors; (iv) recognition ofthe need for 
tax allowances for certain types of  expenditure (e.g. research and development, and 
staff training); and (v) improvements in tax assessment and collection procedures (see 
Institutional Reforms). It should be noted that the tax reform measures referred to here 
would comprise only those which would specifically impinge on investors' attitudes; 
other aspects of  tax reform would be a matter for individual governments to address. 
15For example: political issues within the context of  OAU; debt issue within the context ofHPIC; macroeconomic and structural reform issues 
within the context of adjustment programs supported by the Bretton Woods institutions and other partners; and trade issues within the context 
of  the earlier CBI Road Map for Trade Reform. 
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32.  The problems of  exercising payment and property rights have long been 
recognized and action to address them is long overdue. Changes are needed not only 
because of  outdated laws and the rationale for harmonization but also because courts 
are not functioning properly. In a number of  CBI countries, banks, especially state-
owned banks that undertook directed credit policies, have had to be financially 
restructured, not because of  insufficient spreads or high overheads (although the latter 
have played their part) but because of  non-payment or the banks' inability to realize 
collateral on overdue debts. Too often, the excessive time needed to process recovery 
action through the courts and the unpredictable outcome of  what should be a 
straightforward legal process to recover debt have led to a lack of  confidence in the 
judicial system. This affects the ability ofbusinesses, especially locally owned firms, 
to raise loan capital (which, in tum, affects savings mobilization). 
33.  In the context of investment facilitation, the CBI participating countries 
should complete the work already begun by the TWGs to determine the 
requirements for legal reforms which will remove anomalies and constraints to 
investment. The principal areas where reforms are most commonly needed are: 
corporate law, contract law, bankruptcy, labor law, and property rights. Reforms in 
these areas, which should also remove discrimination against certain types of 
investors, would contribute greatly to creating a level playing field for investment 
and doing business. However, there is widespread recognition that redrafting of 
legislation will not of itself introduce the requisite changes. Judicial reforms are 
essential to ensure that laws are applied properly. Only then will investors begin to 
acquire greater confidence that there is legal support for claims for payment and for 
property rights. 
34.  Given the inherent pressure being applied by globalization, the CBI 
countries must, in the medium-term, work to harmonize commercial and labor laws. 
Harmonization of  corporate, contract, and bankruptcy laws will be complex and 
sensitive. However, the fact that this aim has already been accepted in the UEMOA 
countries shows this to be development which is considered necessary and feasible. 
16 
In addition there is a proposal for a project to harmonize the commercial laws of 
Southern Africa.
17 
16The latest text of the draft Common Investment Code for UEMOA countries ("Avant-Projet de Reglement Portant Code Communautaire 
d'Investissement des Pays Membres de l'UEMOA") was issued by the UEMOA Commission in July 1998. 
17Professor Winston P.  Nagan, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, and Professor Dean Visser, Dean and Professor of Law at the 
University of Cape Town, have prepared a project document setting out their proposals for harmonization of  the commercial laws of  Southern 
Africa (SADC countries). 
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35.  Improvements in governance and other institutional reforms in the public 
sector are being addressed primarily through civil service reform, strengthening of 
financial rules and regulations, and privatization. However, in the context of 
investment facilitation, there is still a need for parallel improvements in those public 
institutions which deal with businesses (e.g. tax authorities, customs & excise, 
procurement, trade, licencing, labour, and sector ministries). Personnel in all these 
types of  institutions should understand the importance of  being responsive to inquiries 
and their role in encouraging investment and stimulating growth of  commercial 
activity; i.e. the public services are there as facilitators not controllers. The aim should 
be to achieve a situation where investors respect these institutions, where inquiries are 
dealt with minimum fuss, paperwork and delay, and without favour or a hint of  under-
the-counter payments (or their equivalent). 
36.  Legal and judicial reforms need to be supported by appropriate 
institutional reforms; indeed, all are inextricably linked. Heavy government regulation 
and weak public institutions have deterred foreign investors because of  the high 
transaction costs which result. Reforms of  regulatory and administrative systems are, 
therefore, essential to reduce the cost of  doing business and demonstrate that the 
procedures in use are applied consistently and efficiently. Take the composite example 
described in Annex XXI. 
3  7.  The example in Annex XXI gives a flavour of  what doing business in 
some countriesin Africa can entail. While the overall case is fictitious, its elements 
are based on real investors' experiences; and it aptly illustrates several points. First, it 
is very unlikely that a so-called "one-stop shop" can deal with all the necessary 
approvals for investment. Indeed, given the complex nature of  the business in the 
example, it is hardly surprising. Also, without extensive legal resources, an investment 
agency cannot possibly be aware of  all the laws and regulations applicable to each and 
every sector. At the same time, some Ministries will not agree to delegate the approval 
procedure to such an agency, so it is inevitable that investors will, at times, have to 
deal with several ministries, government departments, or licencing authorities for 
certain approvals. Second, those public institutions which are part of  the chain of 
doing business, may, because of  past behaviour, be suspicious of  the private sector. 
There needs to be a change in the culture of  such institutions from that of suspicion 
and control to that of  partnership and facilitation. In many instances they are not 
geared up to respond quickly and positively to inquiries and to work with the private 
sector in partnership to move processes forward expeditiously. A typical problem is: 
who should give permission and sign on the dotted line; and, regrettably, just as 
typical, the need for approval opens up the opportunity to extract a rent for the 
"service". Finally, the example demonstrates that many services (accounting, 
architectural, engineering, financial, legal, etc.) are required to support investment; 
p.  120 and the larger the investment and more complex the business, the broader the range of 
services that are needed. 
38.  Therefore, while most CBI countries have a one-stop investment agency, 
reforms are still needed throughout the public sector so that regulatory and 
administrative institutions will respond to and work with the private sector, process 
documentation fairly and quickly, and do so without expectation of  rewards in addition 
to salaries. This calls for an education program to show how the private investors 
operate and respond, as well as changes in the structure and procedures of  the these 
institutions. In addition, further steps should be taken to assist the development of  the 
accounting, banking, and legal professions. 
39.  Many of  the required actions are to be undertaken at the national level. 
However, regional credibility is important; and there is a clear case for common 
standards and practices to be adopted by professional bodies across the CBI countries. 
So, as more countries take steps to streamline administrative procedures and facilitate 
investment, the more all the CBI countries will benefit, both from experience and a 
broader base of  investor confidence. 
Capital Market Development 
40.  Capital market development plays a vital role in investment facilitation by 
providing the vehicles for increasing domestic savings which, in turn, makes more 
capital available. Domestic financial markets need to be strengthened to the point 
where they can supply some of  the much needed long-term capital (debt, quasi-equity, 
and co-financing) which is currently not available to new local entrepreneurs, except 
from a relatively few, low-level venture capital providers. Also, investors and 
businesses require a range of sophisticated financial services, not generally available 
throughout the CBI countries, to be able to operate efficiently in the global 
marketplace. 
41.  Capital market development is presently inhibited by the small size of  the 
economies and low trading levels, and this argues strongly for regional integration of 
financial markets in order to provide investors with greater choice and flexibility, which 
are particularly important for bond and equity markets. However, in many countries, the 
first priority is to develop a sound financial sector and an efficient payments system for 
goods, services and capital transactions which are essential for increasing cross-border 
flows and market access. These developments call for the liberalization of  domestic 
financial markets and improvements in their competitiveness by encouraging the free 
entry of  private financial institutions together with appropriately strengthened systems of 
prudential management and bank supervision. 
p. 121 42.  To ensure the soundness of financial institutions in the context of 
ongoing financial liberalization, the CBI framework calls for intensified efforts to 
improve prudential and supervisory capacity of  central banks so as to encourage 
development of  the commercial banking sector and other financial institutions, and 
to. strengthen the domestic payments system. 
18  Additional measures include 
developing foreign trade instruments and establishing correspondent banking 
relationships within the region. 
43.  Despite a variety of  continuing problems faced by participating countries, 
there has been good progress in improving the efficiency of  the banking systems. 
Direct monetary instruments in the form of  bank-by-bank credit ceilings and selective 
credit controls have been phased out in almost all countries; most countries now use 
indirect monetary instruments such as open-market operations, liquidity requirements 
and discount facilities. At the same time, administered interest rates have been phased 
out and replaced with market based mechanisms in most countries (Annex XXII). 
44.  Attention has also been devoted to strengthening prudential regulations 
and the central banks power to enforce these regulations. To this end, legislation has 
been enacted or is being revised in several countries (Annex XXIII). The increasing 
focus on regulatory issues has coincided with an expansion of financial markets; the 
number of  commercial banks have increased, and so have the foreign banks operating 
in these countries. Several participating countries have also taken measures to 
privatize state-owned financial institutions or to reduce government ownership of 
equity in privately controlled banks. Development of  foreign trade instruments and the 
removal of  impediments to entry indicate that significant progress has been achieved 
in many countries. 
45.  Despite recent progress in several areas, the degree of  competition in 
financial markets in a number of  countries remains limited to a few operators, and a 
thin supply of  instruments. Limited institutional capacity and human resources have 
also been cited as important barriers in implementing on-site and off-site supervision 
and inspections for the effective and timely enforcement of  prudential regulations. 
While the additions of  new financial institutions and instruments should lead to 
greater efficiencies in financial sector operations, they demand supporting measures 
for training to strengthen prudential standards, reporting requirements and regulatory 
capacity. 
46.  Once progress in the above areas is well under way, attention can then 
focus on other improvements. From an investor's point of  view, there are three areas 
where rapid development of  the financial sector is needed: medium and long-term 
financing, financial intermediation, and over-the-counter services. 
"See Concept Paper endorsed at the first Ministerial Meeting, Kampala, August 1993. 
p.  122 Medium and Long-Term Credit 
4  7.  The demand for credit is well known and documented, and, in view of  the 
somewhat slow supply response, action is required to foster the growth of  private 
institutions which provide equity financing and medium- and long-term credit. The 
CBI sponsors will have an important role in helping and advising countries on ways to 
bridge the gap between investment requirements and funds that can be mobilized from 
local savings and FDI. 
48.  In this context it is worth noting that efforts are under way to address the 
need for political risk guarantee. In many African countries, the principal reason why 
interested investors cannot obtain commercial credit is because financial institutions 
are reluctant to lend without a guarantee against the perceived political risks. To help 
address this issue, the World Bank- in conjunction with the CO  MESA Clearing 
House-has developed proposals for establishing an Africa Guarantee Facility (AGF) 
-to be renamed the Regional Trade Facilitation Project (RTFP). The AGF/RTFP was 
discussed briefly at the TWG meeting in November 1998 and a World Bank technical 
team visited a number of  CBI participating countries, which expressed interest in the 
concept, to discuss the practical details of  the proposed facility. An update on the AGF 
will be given at the forthcoming ministerial meeting. Annex XXIV provides a brief 
description of  the proposed project. 
Financial Intermediation 
49.  The mobilization of  domestic savings is itself an important indicator of 
confidence both in the banking system and in a country's perceived prospects. It also 
acts as a signal to foreign investors. The extension of  financial services to small 
savers, particularly in rural areas, would broaden and deepen financial intermediation. 
Thus, more effort is required to develop savings instruments, to educate savers about 
longer-term investments, and to build confidence in the ability to readily trade their 
investment instruments. In this regard, there is need to take steps to encourage the 
expansion of  existing stock markets in Harare, Lusaka, and Nairobi. More cross-
listings could be one such step. 
50.  Some economies are too small to support a stock market; and those on the 
margin are finding it difficult to attract more listings while trading levels are low. An 
obvious way to permit companies and investors in small economies to derive benefit 
from an active stock exchange is to develop regional stock exchanges, but these can 
only be effective if  there are free cross-border flows of  capital and dividends. At the 
same time, the larger economies would gain from the reputation attached to added 
p.  123 market capitalization and the demand for attendant financial intermediation services.
19 
But regional capital market development would require acceptance of  common 
standards and procedures; for example, listed companies in the various countries 
would have to adopt uniform accounting and reporting practices and standards.
20 
Over-the-Counter Services 
51.  In most African countries there is need to harness the latest technology to 
improve and extend the range of  over-the-counter services. For example: (i) transfer of 
capital should be swift and the cost minimal; (ii) a person should be able to cash 
travellers cheques immediately on presentation ofhis/her identity card (or equivalent) 
and not have to sign several different forms and set aside over an hour for the process; 
and (iii) an investor who has bought shares should be able to lodge the share 
certificates with a bank for safekeeping and be confident that he/she can withdraw 
those certificates on demand. 
Human Capital Development 
52.  The need for human capital development was raised several times during 
the TWG meeting in November 1998. There is no doubt that this is a critical issue and 
that greater effort and resources are required for investment in primary and technical 
education; but these forms of education will need to be sustained over a long period in 
order to be reflected in changes in business activity. The co-sponsors have been 
actively supporting capacity building efforts throughout the CBI countries but there is 
an increasing focus on regional initiatives; and these sources of support should be 
exploited to the full. 
21 
53  Since capacity building requires a long time horizon whilst that of  the CBI 
itself is short, no specific proposals in this area are as yet included in this Road Map. 
However, a road map extending into the medium term (at least five years ahead) 
19 A study was carried out with EU funding on the feasibility of establishing an African regional exchange (AFREX). The study proposed 
AFREX as an independent cross-market, electronic and regulated regional securities exchange which would mainly deal with equity instruments, 
debt instruments, and money market instruments issued by private corporations and commercial banks. The key objective would be to mobilise 
funds from capital surplus regions and channel them towards African economies, especially in the Eastern and Southern African region, more 
effectively than is being done at present or which could be achieved through simply a network of  national exchanges. AFREX would specifically 
serve the needs of  smaller economies. 
20The newly established regional stock exchange in Abidjan provides an example of the steps to be taken and what can be achieved. 
21For example: (i) the EU has supported capacity building at a regional level under its regional cooperation programmes; and (ii) the Executive 
Directors of the World Bank recently approved a new instrument whereby the Institutional Development Fund can give grants to  regional 
entities for capacity building activities. 
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vocational training. Nevertheless, CBI countries should endeavour to share capacity 
building programs. Possible avenues for cooperating in and harmonizing human 
capital development include: (i) adopting common technical education and training 
syllabuses and materials;
22  (ii) adopting common (international) standards for 
professional bodies; and (iii) merging professional bodies in order to form regional 
instead of  national institutions, which would have greater influence and be better 
equipped to provide training and development. 
54.  Unfortunately, progress in capacity building is now seriously threatened by 
HIV/AIDS. Nowhere in the world is HIV/AIDS more prevalent than in East and 
Southern Africa. Annex XXV shows the adult prevalence rates as at end 1997 for the 
CBI participating countries. At that time more than half of  the CBI countries had adult 
prevalence rates over 10 percent and four countries had rates close to or in excess of 
20 percent. These statistics represent a stark picture of  human tragedy. Worse still, the 
prevalence rate in most countries is expected to increase. This reality has profound 
implications for development, including investment. 
55.  As the incidence ofHIV/AIDS becomes more widely known and 
understood (and it must be in order to deal effectively with this disease) it will, in the 
absence of  counter-measures, become an increasing deterrent to investment. 
Companies in the most affected countries are facing the prospect of  significant 
increases in staff costs arising from staff absenteeism (due to illness and family 
bereavements), higher labour turnover (due to incapacity and deaths), increasing 
recruitment, training, and staff  welfare costs (medical insurance, medical expenses, 
and assistance to affected employees). Absenteeism, high labour turnover, and under-
trained staff are also likely to impact on production efficiency and quality, all of  which 
pose additional burdens on managers (who themselves represent one of  the categories 
most affected by the HIV/AIDS disease). This means that the comparative advantage 
of  a plentiful supply of  labour is rapidly being eroded and the countries concerned will 
become increasingly non-competitive.  23  Without immediate and visible action to 
counter the HIV/AIDS threat, foreign investors will shy away from setting up and/or 
developing businesses which are labour intensive. Otherwise, they will need 
incentives which will limit staff costs to internationally competitive levels. Dealing 
with HIV  I  AIDS is therefore no longer simply a medical problem. Its effects now cut 
across all sectors and every aspect of  development, including investment. Hence, CBI 
participating countries must be seen to recognize and address this critical issue by 
taking concerted joint action to deal with its growing impact. 
22The AERC, with support from a group of  donors, is implementing a collaborative MA programme in economics. This programme involves 20 
universities in 15 African countries that collaborate to offer a high quality Masters Degree in Economics. 
23The U.S. Census Bureau's recent report "World Population Profile: 1998" estimates that, by the year 2010, sub-Saharan Africa will have 71 
million fewer people than it would have without the effect of  AIDS. The report states that the average Zimbabwean can now expect to live 39 
years, down from 65  prior to  the AIDS epidemic sweeping the country and estimates that Zimbabwe already has  1.6 million fewer people 
directly or indirectly due to AIDS. 
p.  125 Credible Privatization 
56.  Privatization is playing an important role in attracting investment. Not only 
is it the catalyst for significant FDI, it is also helping to introduce and expand 
competition and it is providing a launch pad for developing the private sector in many 
African countries. But the process must be credible if  it is to continue, avoid reversals, 
and yield its full potential benefits, including the attraction of  the right types of  investors. 
57.  While privatization has taken off  in most CBI countries, experiences vary 
and few programmes are rated as successes. Perceptions are that African governments 
have only adopted privatization reluctantly and that programmes have generally not been 
well managed. In particular, there are concerns about insufficient public information and 
transparency.24  The recent trend for major utilities to enter the privatization process have 
only highlighted these issues, with reports from several countries of  behind the scenes 
manamvering (involving bribes to give preferential treatment to particular investors) in 
an attempt to bypass the official procedures which were designed to ensure a level 
playing field. Recently in Uganda, a well publicized example of  this led Parliament to 
suspend the privatization programme there. Despite concern about what this meant to 
current privatization transactions, the action by Parliament may well prove to be 
beneficial to Uganda's investment climate because it demonstrated a commitment to root 
out unacceptable practices. It is becoming increasingly clear that the way in which 
privatization programmes are managed, including the extent of  stakeholder participation 
and public information, reflects on good governance and, for the immediate future, the 
general climate for investment in each country. 
58.  Equally important is the need for divestiture transactions to be negotiated 
and concluded in a professional, business-like manner. There have been several 
instances in Africa where the way in which an important privatization deal has been 
handled has undermined a country's efforts to attract investment (e.g. where there is a 
delay in negotiating a deal with a first-ranked bidder, or where an additional entrant is 
introduced after the closure of  a competitive bidding process). Governments and their 
implementing agencies should remain alert to the fact that all investment facilitation 
efforts can be negated if  investors in the market get the wrong signals. Hence, fairness 
and transparency must be applied consistently. 
Investment in New/Upgraded Infrastructure 
59.  Infrastructure- including power and water supplies, roads, transport and 
related services, and telecommunication - is essential to business operations. From an 
investor's point of  view, these facilities and services in many CBI countries are 
inadequate (either because of  quality or unreliability) or are too costly. Efforts to 
24See "Privatization in Africa" by Oliver Campbell White and Anita Bhatia, World Bank, April 1998. 
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privatization, encouraging private sector entrants, and private participation in new 
major infrastructure projects. However, in some cases, these efforts may take time to 
realize significant improvements and, in the meantime, there will be added pressure to 
use existing capacities to maximum efficiency. 
60.  Privatization is yielding benefits, but more can be done to use the process 
to accelerate the much needed upgrading of  infrastructure. CBI countries should look 
closely at this, particularly in the context of  shared infrastructure (e.g. border roads). 
61.  In view of  the difficulties in quickly accessing reliable utility and other 
services in many CBI countries, more attention should be given to establishing 
industrial estates with good infrastructure.  25  At the same time, investors will respond 
if  utility services were provided at world market prices. Already several CBI countries 
have moved to establish export processing zones (EPZs) including Mauritius, 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. The record of  performance ofEPZs has been 
mixed. There is need to harmonize the regulatory framework of  export processing 
zones and to conform with WTO provisions. However, some observers argue that, 
because EPZs could attract instances of  fiscal fraud, there is a case for their 
elimination; as an alternative they propose a rebate on the import duty component of 
applicable exports. 
62.  Worldwide, in response to the public sectors' difficulties in financing and 
managing new, major infrastructure projects, there is an increasing trend of  private 
participation in infrastructure (PPI). Whilst there are a few examples in sub-Saharan 
Africa, PPI has not taken off as in other parts of  the world. In the absence of strong 
commitments on service tariffs and credible regulatory provisions, private companies 
have been unwilling to take investment risk in the region. In some cases they have 
taken on a degree of  commercial risk under lease contracts; in other cases private 
participation has been limited to management contracts. However, the projects in the 
CBI countries for which PPI would be suitable call for large sums of  money; but 
investors are wary due to the long-term payback period and perceived high risks. 
Instruments for mitigating risks are available through, among others, MIGA, IBRD 
and IDA partial risk guarantees, and international investment protection treaties.
26  But 
CBI participating countries could collectively do more to package their efforts so as to 
be able to use soft loans from multinational financial institutions and equivalent loans 
and grants from bilateral sources to provide guarantees which would cover medium 
and long-term credit for both foreign and domestic investors. 
25Experience of  industrial estates and export processing zones worldwide suggests that they are more likely to be successful if  they are privately 
owned and/or managed. 
26Note that: (a) the World Bank can now provide IDA guarantees for IDA-only countries; this new facility ($300 million for the pilot phase) can 
be used to promote private sector-sponsored cross-border projects; and (b) if  the proposed Africa Guarantee Facility is adopted, this will add an 
important new instrument. 
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63.  There is no argument about Africa's image outside the continent. 
Perceptions are largely influenced by the bad news that has emanated from Africa, 
which has usually described events and situations arising from famine, poverty, 
sickness, drought, tribalism and racism, civil war, and corruption. Today, a few 
countries are free of  most or all ofthese elements; while many others have recently 
taken steps to deal with them. Even so, efforts by individual countries to promote a 
better image are not enough to correct the common perception of  Africa. Hence 
there is mutual interest among Africa's countries- and the CBI countries in 
particular - to build a better image, one that portrays the successes as well as the 
strengths of  the continent's resources and opportunities, and one that shows that 
determined efforts are under way to counter and overcome corruption, HIV  I  AIDS, 
instability, and poverty. 
E. Proposed Programme of Immediate Actions 
64.  It would not be feasible to tackle all aspects of  investment facilitation at 
one and same time; hence it is important to discuss and agree priority areas and 
actions. Firstly though, it must be emphasized that the necessary conditions outlined in 
section C are of  paramount importance, especially with regard to macroeconomic 
stability. In terms of  what CBI participating countries can do additionally to encourage 
and facilitate investment, this section proposes immediate actions in five priority 
areas: 
(i)  accelerate implementation of  the CBI trade reform agenda; 
(ii)  more intensified investment promotion efforts; 
(iii)  selective legal and judicial reforms; 
(iv)  selective tax reforms; and 
(v)  establishment of an Africa Achievements Awards scheme which would 
promote improvements in the quality of services which influence investment. 
65.  More could be done but, whatever steps are agreed, there will be a need to 
focus attention on speedy, effective and coordinated implementation to yield early 
positive results. The programme described here is only a framework: each country will 
have to design its own specific path along this Road Map. In the light of  the guidance 
of  the Inter-Ministerial Meeting, each TWG will, in conjunction with its national 
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agreed actions, including additional country specific actions which reflect sector 
priorities. In addition, a comprehensive programme will have to be drawn up for 
implementing the collective CBI actions and for coordinating those efforts which are 
to be undertaken simultaneously at the national level. 
66.  Whilst the actions at the national and regional levels are complementary, 
they require different implementation approaches. For example, national promotion 
efforts - both those suggested in this paper and others more generally - can only be 
the responsibility of local private and/or public institutions. These can- and should-
be implemented regardless of  the CBI context. However, each participating country 
has to implement the actions agreed under the CBI in unison so that they are consistent 
both in nature and timing with other countries and thereby contribute towards building 
a better regional image and reputation. The regional initiatives, on the other hand, are 
actions which have to be implemented collectively, by coordinating efforts and 
contributions using the institutions and vehicles to be agreed upon. 
67.  Clearly the national level investment promotion efforts, referred to below, 
will be organized and managed in each country; but action will also be needed at the 
national level to support most of  the other proposed actions. A key issue will therefore 
be how to ensure concerted efforts which are in unison among the participating 
countries. This can perhaps be answered if  satisfactory institutional arrangements 
(Section F) can be agreed for those actions which clearly require an appropriate 
regional vehicle. 
Trade Reform 
68.  There is an urgent need for a substantive push towards the completion of 
the liberalization of  trade regimes, thereby reducing the anti-export bias (essential for 
investment in small developing economies), improving the use of  foreign technology, 
and increasing the comparative advantage that CBI participating countries could 
exploit to improve their income distribution. The first step would be to complete 
expeditiously the import tariffs reforms set out in the existing CBI Road Map for 
Trade Reform by lowering the trade weighted average of  import tariffs to no more than 
15 percent, having an import tariff structure of  no more than three non-zero rates and a 
maximum rate of  20-25 percent, and eliminating customs duty exemptions consistent 
with international treaty obligations. Furthermore, as indicated in the Road Map for 
Trade Reform, tariff rates on capital goods and raw materials should not exceed five 
percent.
27 
"Synthesis Paper, paragraph 11. 
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CBI participants have not bound many products, and those that have been bound are at 
rates much higher than the rates applied. Accordingly, in deepening tariff reform and 
providing additional credibility to the irreversible nature of  the reform process, CBI 
participating countries should initiate the introduction of  WTO tariff bindings at rates 
not much higher than the levels envisaged in the CBI Road Map for Trade Reform and 
increase the number of  tariff lines that are bound. Such a step will greatly enhance the 
participating countries' credibility in creating an appropriate incentive structure for 
promoting efficient investment and trade flows. Moreover, it will permit flexibility in 
case of  need as well as discretionary action to reduce tariff levels further. 
70.  Finally, as already recorded in the Synthesis Paper discussed at the Third 
CBI Ministerial Meeting, continuing efforts beyond the targets specified in the Road 
Map for Trade Reform should be made to further reduce the stipulated maximum 
tariffs, narrow the number of  tariff bands further, and lower the average trade-
weighted tariff. Uganda is showing the way by already going beyond the targets of  that 
Road Map with two non-zero rates, a maximum rate of 15%, and a trade-weighted 
average tariff of  around 10%. Such efforts will be key in helping the CBI participating 
countries to integrate into the global economy and remain competitive. 
Investment Promotion 
Regional (CBI) Level Investment Promotion Efforts 
71.  To promote investment successfully, African countries need to go forward 
with conviction and self-confidence and be able to demonstrate that worthwhile 
investment opportunities exist and that barriers to doing business have been removed. 
Once the barriers are removed, substantial flows of  investment can only be achieved 
through a sustained promotion program with consistent messages and a stable business 
environment. The CBI participating countries have a common need to take concrete 
actions to promote a better image of  Africa and, therefore, to encourage investment at 
two levels: regional and national. At the regional (CBI) level, the following actions 
could be taken: 
a)  building on progress to date, simplify and liberalize further the approval 
procedures and consolidate investment codes and other regulatory provisions 
into a single published document for each country to facilitate access to 
regional and world markets by potential investors (by end-2000); 
b) cooperate on promotion by adopting common policies and by pooling 
advertising, promotion events and investment missions.28  However, without 
"Efforts could be coordinated with MIGA's !PAnel and the World Bank Group's PrivatizationLink. 
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providing adequate resources, a unified approach to investment promotion will 
not be easy (Annex XXVI). Nevertheless, a joint approach has already been 
adopted by the investment agencies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The 
proposal here would build on and extend that approach.29  The centrepiece for 
promotion should be a public relations campaign to improve the image of 
doing business in the CBI countries. Whilst specialists would be recruited to 
advise and coordinate the work, much of  the preparation would have to be 
undertaken by the TWGs. For example, the TWGs would be responsible for 
identifying and collecting information on success stories and other features 
that would convey the right messages for attracting investment. The TWGs 
should consider targeting specific industries and sectors (for example: roads 
and other infrastructure) and investors. There are three broad categories of 
investors to be targeted. First are the multinational publicly quoted companies. 
These are the most important because of  their ability to mobilize investment, 
introduce new technology, expand market access, and to act as a catalyst for 
new local businesses. These are the types of  companies whose presence would 
send a clear message of  confidence to the market place. Next are CBI country 
nationals who have savings outside the region; and, third, are selected non-
traditional investors. 
30 
c)  improve and share information by establishing a CBI website which would 
present data of  interest to investors, including, for example, macroeconomic 
data, progress in harmonization of  tariff regimes and liberalization of  exchange 
systems, recent and current share prices and trading levels, and availability of 
support services. Links should be established to the World Bank Group's 
IPAnet and PrivatizationLink services and Africa Privatization Database, and 
other relevant sites (by end-1999); and 
d)  examine the feasibility of  establishing cross-border investment funds 
(see Box 1). 
National Level Investment Promotion Efforts 
72.  At the national level, a four-pronged initiative is suggested. First, a 
package of  changes should be designed and implemented which would make each CBI 
country a more attractive place to visit and which would provide more information 
and better services to potential foreign investors.
31  These would include improved 
"Similar actions are foreseen under the integrated regional programme for developing trade (PRIDE) initiated by the Indian Ocean Commission. 
30These should be carefully selected on the basis of their recognized special technical niche and financial soundness. 
311! should be noted that actions and sequencing will vary from one country to another. Each TWG will need to prepare its own country-specific 
road map for investment facilitation. The co-sponsors can help in this process (e.g., FIAS has helped several countries, including Uganda and 
Swaziland, to prepare enterprise level investment road maps). 
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printed guides on hotels and business support services (such as firms of  accountants, 
business consultants, lawyers, surveyors, and secretarial services), and provision of 
quality taxi services without crowd nuisance. 
73.  Second, greater attention should be paid to the issue of security. Not only 
do investors, whether they be local or foreign, prefer to do business in an 
environment in which they feel personally safe, but the level of  security is read by 
many as an indicator of longer term stability. Hence, steps should be taken, in 
conjunction with the authorities responsible for security measures, to develop and 
carry out programs to educate people on the need to improve security, not simply in 
terms of  enforcement measures but also in terms of  the benefits to society generally 
if everyone feels safe. 
Box 1 : Facilitating Savings and Investment through Cross-Border Funds 
Broadening ownership is one of  the recurring issues in privatization in most African 
countries. In most countries, opportunities for broadening ownership are 
constrained not only by low savings but also by the scarcity of sound investment 
opportunities and the infancy of  the capital market. Opportunities are scarce 
because most parastatals undergoing privatization require substantial capital 
investment, technological upgrading, and greater access to markets, in addition to 
improved corporate governance; and these requirements necessitate the 
introduction of  core investors or, for smaller companies, outright sale to interested 
investors. Public offerings of shares in companies with a credible track record are 
few and far between; and as yet unavailable in some countries. At the same, the size 
of  many economies raises doubt as to whether there would, in the foreseeable 
future, be a sufficient critical mass of  equity instruments and trading activity to 
support a stock exchange. The idea of  establishing regional stock exchanges has 
already been floated; and the first regional stock exchange in Africa has recently 
been established in Abidjan. But for the CBI countries, the development of  one or 
more regional stock exchanges may be some years into the future. In the meantime, 
privatization agencies need vehicles for divesting minority stakes in profitable 
companies in ways which will broaden ownership, while new equity instruments 
are needed to attract small savers to invest. 
A possible instrument for this could be cross-border investment funds. Some 
privatization agencies (for example in Tanzania and Zambia) are already working 
on establishing investment funds. CBI members should consider extending this 
concept to enable funds to hold a portfolio of equities in several countries. There 
would be a number of  details to work out, but cross-border investment funds or unit 
trusts could: 
p.  132 t  facilitate the setting up of funds with a substantive core of attractive equities; 
t  provide a vehicle for faster divestiture of  residual state shareholdings, 
especially in smaller companies; and 
t  help broaden ownership and stimulate savings by offering small savers in 
several countries the possibility of  investing in funds where risks are spread 
across a broader range of  equities. 
74.  Third, in several CBI countries the private sector was for some years under 
a command economy. As a result, many potential entrepreneurs have very limited 
knowledge and experience of  preparing business plans, raising capital, marketing, 
quality control, and business administration. Where this situation is applicable, 
investment promotion efforts should therefore be aimed to provide information and 
training to meet the need of  emerging businesses. 
75.  Fourth, efforts to attract foreign investors should be matched by promoting 
a good interaction with local investors. This suggests that investment promotion 
agencies should play an active part (including, for example, by maintaining databases 
of  foreign and local investors) in facilitating appropriate introductions. 
Selective Legal and Judicial Reforms 
76.  As a recent World Bank document explains, the strengthening of legal, 
regulatory and judicial underpinnings are essential to private sector development in 
Africa.  32  In the context of  efforts to attract both foreign and local investment and to 
harmonize procedures in order to facilitate investment, CBI members could: (a) create 
a new category of"regional enterprises"; (b) adopt common company and branch 
registration procedures; and (c) establish separate commercial courts to deal with 
contract enforcement. 
77.  However, the first and most important step , which would send a clear 
message to investors, is for the CBI countries to resolve land issues. Investors need to 
know that appropriate land is available and that they can purchase it or lease it on a 
long-term basis. Without this reform, the promotion efforts described earlier will be 
unconvincing and fruitless. 
32"Africa Can Compete! A Framework for World Bank Group Support for Private Sector Development in Sub-Saharan Africa" published by 
the Private Sector Finance Group, Africa Region, World Bank in August 1998. 
p.  133 Regional Enterprises 
78.  Investors would find the cost of  doing business significantly lower if  a 
company registered in one CBI country was recognized as a regional enterprise and could 
commence activity in other CBI countries without the need to incorporate new legal 
entities. A firm would be considered a regional enterprise if  it was incorporated in one of 
the member countries regardless of  the nationality of  ownership. Thus, any firm 
incorporated in the region, including foreign multi-nationals, would be considered resident. 
Improved Company Registration Procedures 
79.  Adoption of  common registration procedures is closely linked to the 
previous action. However, it could be more easily and quickly adopted. Whilst there 
might, at least in the short-term, remain differences in the legal forms of  companies 
and regulations governing their ownership and stewardship, there is no reason why 
agencies responsible for company registrations should not adopt common - and more 
modem and simplified-registration procedures (see Box 2). 
80.  This step would evidence the intent and commitment to reducing 
transaction costs and to gradually harmonizing laws governing businesses and 
commercial activity. Depending on their colonial history, the corporate laws of 
member CBI countries are based on one of  either: English Common Law and 
Company Law, Dutch Roman Law, or the Code Civil. Adoption of  common 
registration procedures would be a first important steps towards harmonizing the laws 
(including contract, corporate, bankruptcy, labour, and property laws33 )  which form an 
integral part of  an investment regime.34 
81.  Overhaul and harmonization of  company registration procedures would 
yield a number of  benefits: 
t  investors would find it easier to register companies; 
t  registrars would have the ability to share cross-border corporate information; 
t  automatic links to other registration requirements (such as tax and licencing); 
t  enormous information retrieval potential (of benefit to government planners 
and policy makers, economic analysts, investors, and existing or potential 
creditors); and 
t  improved billing and collection of  penalties. 
33lncluding intellectual property rights. 
34The  laws  underpinning regulation would also  be included.  Indeed,  a road map extending into  the medium term could well include the 
harmonization and/or integration of regulatory frameworks. 
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Incorporation of  a business - more oftenj but not exclusively, in the form of  a 
limited liability company - normally requires registration at a central bureau. In the 
case of  Anglophone countries, the bureau is usually referred to as the Company 
Registry and the official who signs the certificate of  incorporation is known as the 
Registrar of  Companies. Incorporation can or should also trigger tax registration 
and other business registration requirements, such as trading licences and 
registration of  business names. Within a specified time and annually thereafter, 
registered companies are required to complete and submit an "Annual Return" to 
which should be appended a copy of  the company's audited financial statements. 
Similar procedures apply in non-Anglophone countries. 
In some countries, because of  ill-equipped offices and under-investment in 
staff and technology, there are significant backlogs of  work, procedures are not 
applied consistently, and linkages to other registration requirements have lapsed. 
Companies consistently fail to file their returns on time and administrative 
inefficiencies mean that steps are not always taken to enforce reporting 
requirements and to collect fees and penalties. A relatively small investment in 
designing and installing a standard computerized company registration system in 
the CBI countries could make registration easier for investors and would 
dramatically improve knowledge of  how companies and sectors are performing. 
Investment would be facilitated because: (i) investors would know that 
registration requirements and procedures would be identical in each CBI member 
country; (ii) with network connections between company registries, it could be 
feasible for a company registered in one CBI country to automatically open a 
branch in another country; and (iii) by directly linking incorporation with tax, 
business names, and trading licencing systems, it would be possible to streamline 
most, if not all, registration formalities. 
Standardized registration systems and procedures would also facilitate trade as 
buyers and sellers will be able to access publicly disclosed information on potential 
corporate suppliers and customers across borders. 
A company registry is essentially a database to which shareholders, creditors, 
and other interested parties have legal right of  access (on payment of  a fee). 
Upgrading the computerized database would yield enormous potential for improved 
monitoring of  economic changes. Properly administered, it could instantly provide 
data on business growth, changes in business patterns (entries and exits), and the 
financial performance of  enterprises by type of  owner, by sector, by size, by 
location, etc. However, to yield its full potential benefit, company reporting 
requirements should also be reviewed and a unified reporting system introduced 
which would combine the requirements of  the tax authorities as well as the registrar 
of  companies. This would require legislation to be updated in order to extend the 
scope of  disclosure of ownership and financial and other information in the annual 
report and audited financial statements of incorporated companies. 
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82.  A fast track system is needed which will give lenders confidence in their 
ability to recover debt in the event of  default. CBI countries could, therefore, establish 
separate commercial courts to deal with corporate disputes and debt recovery and 
bankruptcy actions. Uganda has already embarked on this course and would serve as a 
useful model. Uganda's TWG could be requested to disseminate its experience and lessons 
in this area to the other TWGs. More recently, CO  MESA (which is now referred to as an 
investment area) has established a commercial court; the Court of  Justice comprises seven 
judges who meet on an ad hoc basis with a permanent Court Registrar who is in Lusaka. 
35 
Selective Tax Reforms 
83.  The proposals are grouped into four distinct areas- taxes on goods and 
services, taxes on income and profits, tax administration, and double taxation 
agreements - with an explicit frontloaded annualized timetable over the next three 
years. Annex XXVII summarizes good practice in tax and tariff systems. However, as 
noted earlier, tax reforms should not be at the expense of  cutting essential expenditure. 
Taxes on Goods and Services 
84.  An important step would be to make detailed preparations for introducing 
a broad-based consumption tax (a VAT), preferably with a single rate, minimal 
exemptions, and a threshold. 
Taxes on Income and Profits 
85.  Steps should be taken to simplify taxes on income and profits and to 
reduce rates to levels which will diminish the attractiveness of  evasion. For 
companies, the CBI countries could adopt: (i) a common policy on tax holidays and 
specific exemptions (preferably their elimination); (ii) lower company profits/income 
tax to one moderate rate and a lower withholding tax.  36  Concomitant with these 
measures, depreciation allowances on all capital equipment should be uniform among 
sectors, with a provision for accelerated depreciation, and expenditure on research and 
development and worker training should be fully deductible. 
35The Court will, inter alia, adjudicate on unfair trade practices and interpretation of  the treaty, and ensure that members comply with agreed 
decisions. 
36Withholding tax should be credited at the time of  filing individual returns. The status of  non-residents should be re-examined in order to take 
account of  the effect of double taxation treaties (or absence thereof). 
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personal exemptions and deductions, and aim at a few brackets and a moderate top 
marginal rate. 
Tax Administration 
87.  Among the various aspects of  tax administration which could be 
improved, probably the most important for investment is customs computerization 
using the least cumbersome means possible. In this regard, there are a number of 
systems available but customs computerization based upon the Automated System 
for Customs Data and Management (ASYCUDA) is recommended as that system 
has been adopted by CO  MESA.  37  The CBI countries should take steps to ensure 
policy coordination between the Inland Revenue and Customs Departments and the 
policy-making ministries (Finance and Planning) with a close liaison with the PIC of 
the CBI. 
Double Taxation Agreements 
88.  As reported earlier, some progress has been made towards concluding 
double taxation agreements but there is a long way to go to extend coverage to all the 
countries from which potential investors may emerge. It is suggested that the CBI 
countries approach this in three steps: (i) conclude mutual double taxation agreements 
among all CBI members, preferably in a standard form; (ii) conclude agreements with 
all traditional trading partners (where they do not currently exist or have lapsed); and 
(iii) seek to conclude agreements with new countries from which there is potential to 
attract investment. 
Awards to Raise Awareness and Provide Incentives 
89.  As already explained in Section D, there are certain support services 
whose availability and quality influence investment. The most important of  these are: 
(i) improving information for investors; (ii) raising professional standards and 
practices; and (iii) improving financial and non-financial services. The questions then 
arise: how can CBI countries raise the awareness of  the need to make these 
improvements and what incentives can be put in place to stimulate an early response 
from the private sector? Box 3 outlines a proposal to establish an awards scheme 
which would help raise awareness and would provide incentives. 
37Several CBI participating countries have already implemented ASYCUDA. often as part of an EU supported CO MESA project. 
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Awards 
Today there is wide acceptance that the private sector must be the engine for 
economic growth. But the recurring question is: what can be done to spur the 
private sector to deliver the improvements in services and performance which are 
urgently required? And can ways be found to deliver early measurable 
improvements without government intervention? By providing financial and 
publicity incentives to private sector firms in key sectors, the introduction of  a 
scheme of annual Africa Achievement Awards (AAA) would be one possible 
vehicle for accomplishing this. 
For example, the range of  financial services needs to be extended and 
technology harnessed in order to make over-the-counter transactions more efficient 
and customer friendly. One of  the awards could be a prize for the commercial bank 
which had demonstrably made most progress in introducing more products and in 
improving the quality of  customer services. 
Another award could be for more export growth resulting from promotional 
and quality enhancement efforts. Such an award would be open to companies of all 
sizes since growth could be measured in relative, not absolute, terms. Yet other 
awards could be for increased production (whether for domestic or export sales) 
and for diversification. 
If  this concept gains CBI acceptance and is adopted, and private and public 
sponsors commit the required financial support, commercial enterprises in CBI 
countries could compete for annual awards including, for example, awards for 
achievements in: 
Best financial services 
Company reporting 
Efficiency improvement 
Environment protection 
Export growth 
Information technology 
Innovation 
New business 
Increased production and diversification 
Professional training 
The AAA scheme could, with financial support from the CBI sponsors and 
private sponsorship, offer financial rewards (annual prizes of  grants from, say, 
$50,000 to $250,000). Firms would gain significant marketable value in terms of 
the publicity and kudos from winning an award. At the same time, the scheme 
would also contribute to information sharing among the participating countries for 
further dissemination and awareness building. 
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90.  To implement the proposed actions under this investment facilitation road 
map, the participating countries' authorities will have to decide on the: (i) scope and 
sequencing of  actions; (ii) preparatory steps; and (iii) the internal and regional 
institutions who will be responsible. These actions will also Tequire ongoing efforts 
and support to sustain them beyond the time when the policy decisions to proceed 
have been taken. This will call for sound planning and effective institutional 
arrangements based on the following principles: 
t  consistency in applying the general conditions for investment; 
t  recognition of  the larger market concept ( the need to build a regional market 
as well as further integration into the global economy) and thus the need for 
CBI participating countries to work together and pool resources so as to 
maximize investment generation; 
t  participation of  the private sector to the maximum extent feasible; 
t  broad recognition of, and responsiveness to, the need to sustain credibility in 
the market place; 
t  ability to readily communicate and coordinate among CBI participating 
countries; 
t  ability to generate and sustain donor support and private sector sponsorship; 
and 
t  leadership and a private sector approach to implementation (non-bureaucratic, 
decisive, speedy). 
91.  To help the PICs and TWGs to design effective institutional arrangements, 
Table A on the next page lists each of  the proposed actions under the Road Map 
(Section E), the key institutions who might be involved, and the principal options for 
implementation. Annex XXVIII provides additional details to help policy makers and 
the TWGs in this process. 
92.  There are four major factors which will influence how soon 
implementation can commence: 
a)  the presence of  a champion who can help drive the programme forward and 
maintain momentum through continuous contact with the TWG's and others 
involved in the various activities; 
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c)  the authority and capacity of  the TWGs. The TWGs must be firmly entrenched 
in both the policy making framework and in the public-private dialogue; and 
they must be sustainable to help see through and maintain reforms. In some 
countries, this may require institutionalising the role of  the TWGs (e.g. by 
placing them within private or semi-private policy institutions or in relevant 
government ministries). The TWGs will almost certainly require their capacity 
to be reinforced in order to implement and sustain the changes; and 
d)  support of  the co-sponsors and other donors to ensure adequate and timely 
resources for (b) and (c). 
93.  This Road Map represents a challenge which must be met if  the CBI 
participating countries are to demonstrate seriousness in their intent to mobilize 
investment. While the TWGs will have an important role in monitoring and reporting 
on progress, the main responsibilities for implementation are likely to fall to the 
investment promotion agencies. It is, therefore, vital that these agencies be briefed as 
soon as possible so that they begin the task of  contacting and mustering the 
institutions who should contribute to the individual actions. Many institutions, 
especially from the private sector, will be involved (in fact more than simply those 
referred to in the notes in Annex XXVIII) and coordination may not be simple. The 
use of  virtual meetings would greatly facilitate this coordination. This illustrates the 
need for the agencies to review their resources to ensure that they will have the 
capacity to deliver. 
94.  Finally, attention should be drawn to the continuing efforts that will be 
required under the Road Map for Investment Facilitation: it will involve not only 
detailed preparatory work but also ongoing efforts, including detailed policy reviews 
and support over a period of  years. Indeed, it may be several years before these actions 
will yield a discemable response from investors, a fact which underlines the need for 
consistent application. Hence, Governments and their implementing agencies, the 
regional institutions involved, and the sponsors will need to be prepared to provide 
ongoing commitment in order to derive success from this Road Map. 
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Proposed Action  Key Institutions Involved at Country Level*  Key Institutions Involved at  Principal Options for Implementation 
Regional Level (plus TWGs) 
Trade Reform 
(a)  complete reforms under CBI Road Map for Trade  As now  COMESA, EAC, !OC, SADC  As now 
Reform 
(b)  lock in trade reforms  As for (a)  CO  MESA, EAC, TOC, SADC  As for (a) 
(c)  go beyond targets in CBI Road Map for Trade  As for (a)  CO  MESA, EAC, !OC, SADC  As for (a) 
Reform 
Regional Promotion Efforts: 
(a)  simplify investment codes and approval  IPA, Government legal office  CO  MESA, EAC, !OC, SADC  !PAs take lead responsibility with detailed work 
procedures and regulatory provisions  contracted out 
(b)  joint promotion  IPA, business associations, Government ministries  CO  MESA, EAC, ECA, IOC, SADC  Africa Business Roundtable, Enterprise Networks, and 
other private sector cross-border institutions, but 
detailed work to be contracted out 
(c)  information website  IPA, business associations, Central Bank, Government  AfDB,ECA  AfDB and institution responsible for joint promotion 
ministries 
(d)  examine feasibility of  cross-border investment  Privatization agency, privatization trust, stock exchange,  CO  MESA, EAC, ECA, IOC, SADC  A co-sponsor or a privatization agency or trust with 
funds  financial institutions, Ministry of  Finance  study contracted out 
National Promotion Efforts: 
(a)  improve information and travel environment  IPA, business associations, airports/ports authorities,  !PAs or Chambers of  Commerce 
immigration and customs authorities. 
(b)  improve security  Business associations, police, Ministry of  Home Affairs,  Ministry responsible for internal security 
Ministry of  Trade/Industry 
(c)  assistance to local entrepreneurs  IPA, business associations, banks  Specific projects 
(d)  promote interaction oflocal and foreign investors  IPA, Business associations, Ministry ofTrade/Industry  IPA or, if  very active, Chamber of  Commerce 
Selective Legal and Judicial Reforms: 
(a)  create regional enterprise legal form  Government legal office, accounting and legal  COMESA, EAC, IOC, SADC  COMES  A and Government legal offices 
professions, business associations 
(b)  adopt common registration procedures  Company registrar, Government legal office, tax  CO  MESA, EAC, !OC, SADC  Registrars under guidance of  COMES  A commercial 
authorities, accounting and legal profession, IPA  court 
(c)  establish separate commercial courts  Justice Ministry, legal profession, judiciary  COMES  A  Justice Ministries under guidance of  CO  MESA 
commercial court 
Selective Tax Reforms: 
(a)  Lower import tariffs in line with CBI Road Map  As now  As now  As now 
(b)  simplify income tax structure and lower rates  Ministry ofFinance, tax authorities, accounting  CO  MESA, EAC, ECA, IOC, SADC  Ministries ofFinance 
profession, business associations, IPA 
(c)  improve tax administration  Ministry ofFinance, tax authorities, accounting  CO  MESA, SADC  Ministries ofFinance 
profession 
(d)  conclude double taxation agreements  Ministry ofFinance, tax authorities, accounting  CO  MESA, EAC, ECA, IOC, SADC  Ministries of  Finance 
profession 
Africa Achievement Awards  Business associations, professional institutes,  Enterprise Networks, Africa Business Roundtable, 
Government ministries  Private firms 
Note: The co-sponsors will also contribute to and support these actions, subject to each institution's own policies and assistance programs. Annex/ 
GDP Growth Rates in CBI countries(%) (negative rates in italics) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  -5.7 
Comoros  3.0 
Kenya  0.4 
Madagascar  2.1 
Malawi  9.7 
Mauritius  5.4 
Namibia  -2.0 
Rwanda  -8.1 
Seychelles  6.2 
Swaziland  3.3 
Tanzania  12.2 
Uganda  8.3 
Zambia  6.8 
Zimbabwe  1.3 
All CBI countries:  3.3 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  -23.8 
Botswana  -0.1 
Lesotho  4.0 
Mozambique  8.6 
Nigeria  2.2 
South Africa  1.3 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  0.9 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  0.5 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Figures calculated in 1987 constant terms. 
Source:  World Bank Africa Rsegion Live Database (12 May  1999) 
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1994 
-3.1 
-5.3 
2.6 
0.0 
-10.2 
4.1 
6.7 
-19.3 
-0.8 
3.5 
1.4 
6.4 
-3.4 
6.8 
0.9 
1.4 
4.1 
12.9 
7.5 
-0.6 
2.7 
2.0 
2.1 
1995  1996  1997  1998* 
-7.0  -8.6  0.4  4.5 
-3.9  -0.4  0.0  1.0 
4.4  4.1  2.1  1.5 
1.7  2.1  3.6  3.6 
14.7  10.7  5.1  4.0 
4.7  5.4  5.0  5.3 
3.4  2.9  1.8  1.5 
36.6  12.0  10.9  10.0 
-0.6  4.7  4.3  4.1 
2.7  3.9  3.7  2.0 
2.6  4.1  4.0  3.4 
11.4  9.3  5.4  5.7 
-2.3  6.5  3.4  -2.0 
-0.7  7.3  3.2  2.4 
4.8  5.9  3.8  3.4 
11.2  11.6  7.6  -1.1 
3.1  7.0  6.9  6.0 
9.1  12.7  8.0  1.5 
4.3  7.1  12.4  9.1 
2.6  6.4  3.9  -3.2 
3.4  3.2  1.7  -0.5 
5.9  4.9  3.6  1.4 
8.1  5.6  4.5  3.7 Annex II 
Gross Domestic Investment in CBI countries as a share of GDP (%) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  15.7 
Comoros  20.6 
Kenya  17.6 
Madagascar  11.4 
Malawi  15.2 
Mauritius  30.7 
Namibia  16.1 
Rwanda  15.2 
Seychelles  28.7 
Swaziland  26.6 
Tanzania  26.1 
Uganda  15.2 
Zambia  15.0 
Zimbabwe  22.8 
All CBI countries:  19.6 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  26.4 
Botswana  27.9 
Lesotho  75.0 
Mozambique  26.5 
Nigeria  23.3 
South Africa  14.5 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  17.5 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  19.0 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Ratios calculated from current local currency series. 
Source:  World Bank  Africa Region Live Database (12 May1999) 
1994 
8.6 
21.0 
19.3 
10.9 
29.3 
32.3 
23.1 
4.3 
26.2 
32.1 
24.9 
14.6 
13.5 
23.5 
20.7 
23.2 
25.5 
80.3 
31.3 
19.6 
17.0 
19.3 
21.2 
1995  1996  1997  1998* 
7.2  9.9  6.8  6.7 
19.9  18.9  21.3  19.8 
21.8  20.4  19.1  18.4 
10.9  11.6  11.8  13.3 
16.6  12.4  12.3  18.2 
25.7  25.1  27.6  26.1 
20.7  22.5  19.8  19.0 
8.6  10.3  10.0  9.8 
30.3  50.9  36.0  30.6 
34.1  30.1  33.9  33.4 
21.9  18.0  16.3  16.0 
16.2  16.0  15.3  15.4 
13.9  14.9  14.5  16.2 
19.4  23.2  18.7  23.6 
19.2  19.3  17.8  18.3 
25.0  22.7  24.7  20.1 
28.2  25.8  25.9  26.0 
83.2  89.2  85.5  80.0 
I 
36.1  30.1  29.5  35.2 
16.1  12.8  15.3  21.4 
18.9  17.4  15.9  17.0 
19.9  19.1  18.4  20.2 
21.2  22.0  21.3  22.0 
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Gross Private Investment in CBI countries as a share of GDP (%) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  2.9 
Comoros  9.8 
Kenya  9.6 
Madagascar  3.7 
Malawi  2.6 
Mauritius  20.6 
Namibia  13.6 
Rwanda  7.6 
Seychelles  14.9 
Swaziland  15.5 
Tanzania  21.6 
Uganda  8.5 
Zambia  7.0 
Zimbabwe  19.9 
All CBI countries:  12.8 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  19.8 
Botswana  .. 
Lesotho  28.1 
Mozambique  15.1 
Nigeria  12.5 
South Africa  10.8 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  11.7 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  11.1 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Ratios calculated from current local currency series. 
Source:  World Bank Africa Region Live Database (12 May  1999) 
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1994 
1.4 
9.5 
9.9 
4.7 
11.6 
21.7 
12.9 
1.6 
14.6 
21.9 
20.9 
9.1 
5.6 
18.6 
13.1 
28.4 
.. 
26.0 
18.4 
10.7 
11.7 
12.6 
12.8 
1995  1996  1997  1998* 
1.1  1.4  1.7  2.1 
11.5  12.5  14.6  13.8 
13.5  12.3  11.3  13.4 
5.2  5.0  5.5  6.1 
5.0  5.8  5.2  4.3 
16.3  16.8  20.0  22.9 
14.7  13.5  11.5  12.0 
0.7  1.1  1.8  3.4 
15.2  40.6  25.8  23.2 
27.0  24.4  21.1  27.8 
18.5  14.3  13.5  12.1 
10.0  10.1  10.4  9.9 
4.5  8.8  9.5  8.8 
21.3  22.4  21.5  21.3 
13.6  13.0  12.1  13.0 
14.1  4.7  20.5  17.0 
..  .  .  ..  .  . 
..  ..  70.0  64.4 
25.1  20.8  19.5  26.0 
9.1  6.1  6.7  15.4 
12.6  12.6  12.7  14.6 
12.8  12.5  12.7  15.8 
12.9  13.7  14.2  14.9 Annex Illb 
Gross Private Investment in CBI countries 
as a share of Gross Domestic investment (%) 
CBI Countries:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  18.4  18.3  19.1  18.0  32.9  31.8 
Comoros  47.6  45.1  57.7  66.2  63.8  69.4 
Kenya  54.7  51.1  61.9  60.3  58.9  72.8 
Madagascar  32.2  43.2  45.2  42.7  46.5  45.6 
Malawi  30.3  40.0  29.7  26.1  22.3  23.4 
Mauritius  67.1  67.3  63.4  66.7  72.5  87.7 
Namibia  83.3  54.9  67.8  68.9  65.2  63.2 
Rwanda  50.0  ..  8.1  10.7  18.0  34.7 
Seychelles  54.5  68.5  77.7  79.7  71.8  76.0 
Swaziland  58.1  68.4  79.1  78.4  83.0  83.2 
Tanzania  83.0  84.2  84.5  79.0  83.0  76.0 
Uganda  55.7  62.6  62.0  64.4  64.6  64.5 
Zambia  46.5  46.8  47.5  58.0  54.0  54.4 
Zimbabwe  87.6  76.8  110.4  86.4  88.5  90.2 
All CBI countries:  65.2  63.2  70.5  67.5  67.8  71.2 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  74.7  122.6  56.3  20.7  82.7  84.6 
Botswana  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Lesotho  37.5  32.4  ..  ..  81.8  80.5 
Mozambique  56.7  58.8  69.6  69.0  66.1  74.0 
Nigeria  53.7  54.8  56.2  47.6  43.9  71.9 
South Africa  74.4  69.0  66.6  72.6  79.8  85.9 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  67.3  65.4  64.5  65.5  68.8  74.6 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  64.5  63.7  63.4  62.7  66.2  67.9 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Where the ratio is over 100%, this is because gross domestic investment was lower than the private 
component as a result of  a negative change in assets in the public sector. 
Ratios calculated from current local currency series. 
Source: World Bank Africa Region Live Database (I  2 Mayl999) 
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Net Foreign Direct Investment in CBI countries 
(current US$m) (net outflows in italics) 
CBI Countries:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  0.3  -0.1  1.4  ..  .. 
Comoros  0.2  0.4  0.9  0.9  0.2  .. 
Kenya  1.5  4.0  12.9  36.0  37.1  19.0 
Madagascar  15.4  5.7  9.7  10.2  13.8  .. 
Malawi  0.0  0.0  0.0  30.0  25.0  39.6 
Mauritius  -18.4  10.2  26.6  18.2  30.3  25.0 
Namibia  49.0  60.0  118.3  151.0  125.0  .. 
Rwanda  5.8  0.0  2.0  2.2  2.6  .. 
Seychelles  6.4  16.6  26.6  16.7  44.5  28.0 
Swaziland  44.1  -1.4  10.4  23.0  34.1  32.0 
Tanzania  61.7  63.0  104.1  134.1  150.0  165.0 
Uganda  4.0  5.0  2.0  110.0  160.0  190.0 
Zambia  0.0  40.0  97.0  117.0  125.4  163.5 
Zimbabwe  7.6.7  80.0  162.0  32.0  146.0  108.3 
All CBI countries:  196.7  283.4  573.9  681.3  894.0  .. 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  302.0  171.0  472.4  181.0  184.6  .. 
Botswana  -296.4  -23.8  29.5  90.6  0.0  .. 
Lesotho  15.0  18.7  31.8  26.0  18.0  .. 
Mozambique  32.0  35.0  45.0  72.5  64.4  .. 
Nigeria  581.0  588.0  677.0  761.0  1,141.0  1,151.0 
South Africa  -312.0  184.0  -225.0  144.0  684.0  400.0 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  662.8  1,519.2  2,114.5  2,656.3  3894.8  .. 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  393.8  747.2  1,662.5  1,751.3  2069.8  .. 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Source: World Bank Aji-ica Region Live Database (12 May 1999) 
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Net Foreign Direct Investment in CBI countries 
as a share of GDP (%)(net outflows in italics) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  0.0 
Comoros  0.1 
Kenya  0.0 
Madagascar  0.5 
Malawi  0.0 
Mauritius  -0.6 
Namibia  1.7 
Rwanda  0.3 
Seychelles  7.0 
Swaziland  4.1 
Tanzania  1.4 
Uganda  0.1 
Zambia  0.0 
Zimbabwe  0.4 
All CBI countries:  0.6 
Some non-CBJ countries: 
Angola  5.7 
Botswana  -7.2 
Lesotho  2.1 
Mozambique  1.9 
Nigeria  1.8 
South Africa  -0.3 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  0.1 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  0.1 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Ratios calculated from current US$ series. 
Source: World Bank Africa Region Live Database (12 May  1999) 
1994  1995  1996 
0.0  0.0  0.1 
0.2  0.4  0.4 
0.1  0.1  0.4 
0.2  0.3  0.3 
0.0  0.0  1.3 
0.3  0.7  0.4 
3.0  3.5  4.7 
0.0  0.2  0.2 
6.6  4.6  4.3 
-0.6  -1.9  2.6 
1.5  2.2  2.3 
0.1  0.0  1.8 
1.3  2.8  3.5 
1.2  2.2  0.4 
0.8  1.2  1.4 
4.2  9.3  2.4 
-0.6  0.6  .. 
2.5  3.7  3.0 
1.9  2.3  3.1 
1.8  2.1  1.6, 
0.2  -0.2  0.1 
0.4  0.6  0.8 
0.4  1.0  1.1 
1997  1998* 
0.0  .. 
0.5  .. 
0.1  0.18 
0.4 
1.0  2.20 
0.7  0.59 
3.8  .. 
0.2  .. 
4.7  5.12 
3.2  2.76 
..  2.21 
2.4  2.86 
5.1  4.93 
1.6  1.92 
1.2  .. 
2.4  .. 
..  .  . 
..  .. 
2.3  .. 
2.2  2.26 
0.5  0.36 
1.1  .. 
1.1  .. 
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Gross Domestic Savings in CBI countries as a share of GDP (%) 
(negative savings in italics) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  -4.5 
Comoros  2.9 
Kenya  22.4 
Madagascar  2.5 
Malawi  -0.9 
Mauritius  24.5 
Namibia  9.6 
Rwanda  -0.1 
Seychelles  18.4 
Swaziland  26.3 
Tanzania  -2.4 
Uganda  1.1 
Zambia  9.0 
Zimbabwe  21.0 
All CBI countries:  10.9 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  25.2 
Botswana  32.9 
Lesotho  -33.2 
Mozambique  -11.4 
Nigeria  20.2 
South Africa  18.5 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  9.3 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  1.6 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Ratios calculated from current local currency series. 
Source: World Bank Africa Region Live Database (12 May1999) 
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1994  1995 
-9.6  -7.2 
-5.9  -6.9 
22.4  15.9 
3.4  3.6 
8.3  8.1 
23.4  23.2 
16.9  12.8 
-54.5  -13.7 
22.1  23.5 
26.0  29.0 
-1.0  2.0 
4.3  7.1 
9.3  8.1 
21.6  16.7 
12.4  11.2 
32.7  15.7 
38.7  39.1 
-14.6  -16.9 
-4.8  10.6 
20.6  18.2 
18.8  19.1 
11.7  10.7 
6.6  4.4 
1996  1997  1998* 
0.2  2.6  -2.0 
-6.1  -2.6  -5.0 
16.3  11.4  13.4 
5.8  4.7  5.8 
0.8  2.1  5.3 
23.9  24.1  24.2 
13.5  14.2  .. 
-9.7  -7.8  -7.7 
39.6  22.3  20.3 
18.8  19.5  18.0 
3.6  5.4  6.0 
4.7  7.5  5.8 
8.7  9.3  6.5 
23.4  11.9  19.4 
12.4  9.8  9.8 
20.2  27.3  20.3 
41.9  44.7  41.9 
-1.8  -9.8  -16.8 
9.4  13.6  16.0 
33.5  21.9  16.3 
18.7  17.0  18.0 
13.1  11.3  .. 
6.1  6.8  .. Annex VI 
Gross National Savings in CBI countries as a share of GDP (%) 
(negative savings in italics) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  7.6 
Comoros  24.2 
Kenya  17.7 
Madagascar  3.6 
Malawi  n.a. 
Mauritius  27.7 
Namibia  20.7 
Rwanda  8.7 
Seychelles  n.a. 
Swaziland  47.0 
Tanzania  5.4 
Uganda  3.6 
Zambia  n.a. 
Zimbabwe  n.a. 
All CBI countries (see note):  12.4 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  -11.9 
Botswana  42.7 
Lesotho  21.1 
Mozambique  n.a. 
Nigeria  11.2 
South Africa  16.1 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  6.2 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  -1.6 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Ratios calculated from current local currency series. 
Source: World Bank  Africa Region Live Database (1 2 May  1999) 
1994 
4.6 
9.3 
19.0 
1.4 
n.a 
25.6 
26.2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
39.2 
6.8 
9.5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
14.3 
-17.1 
35.1 
55.4 
n.a. 
11.6 
16.7 
8.6 
3.5 
1995  1996  1997 
4.3  3.3  6.5 
8.8  9.6  9.1 
16.4  18.2  14.2 
1.2  5.4  6.2 
n.a  -0.5  1.1 
25.5  25.7  26.1 
25.3  25.6  25.6 
5.4  5.6  2.3 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
46.3  39.1  41.1 
-0.6  1.5  3.7 
12.1  11.1  12.3 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
12.5  14.0  11.4 
-35.7  -22.6  -14.4 
37.7  41.8  n.a. 
59.8  72.9  47.2 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
11.1  27.8  17.3 
16.9  16.0  14.4 
7.4  9.7  8.3 
0.5  2.1  3.1 
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External Savings in CBI countries as share of GDP (%) 
(negative savings in italics) 
CBI Countries:  1993 
Burundi  -8.1 
Comoros  -2.5 
Kenya  1.2 
Madagascar  -7.8 
Malawi  -16.5 
Mauritius  -3.2 
Namibia  4.8 
Rwanda  -6.4 
Seychelles  -9.0 
Swaziland  -6.4 
Tanzania  -24.5 
Uganda  -11.8 
Zambia  -14.4 
Zimbabwe  -4.7 
All CBI countries:  -7.9 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  -16.0 
Botswana  12.3 
Lesotho  -53.0 
Mozambique  -48.4 
Nigeria  -10.1 
South Africa  1.6 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  -4.8 
All SSA excluding South Africa & Nigeria  -9.5 
* 1998 figures are estimates and are subject to revision. 
Ratios calculated from current local currency series. 
Source: World Bank Africa Region Live Database (12 May  1999) 
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1994  1995 
-4.0  -2.9 
-11.7  -11.1 
-0.2  -5.4 
-9.4  -9.7 
-23.1  -12.1 
-6.5  -0.4 
4.3  4.6 
-6.2  -1.1 
-4.4  -8.7 
3.2  2.4 
-25.5  -21.1 
-6.6  -7.7 
-11.9  -13.3 
-4.6  -5.2 
-7.1  -7.0 
-13.9  -19.6 
5.5  7.4 
-27.9  -33.3 
-47.1  -34.9 
-6.8  -3.2 
-0.3  -2.1 
-4.3  -4.9 
-7.9  -8.0 
1996  1997  1998* 
-6.6  -0.3  -4.6 
-9.2  -12.1  -13.0 
-2.4  -3.7  -3.1 
-6.2  -5.6  -6.7 
-12.0  -12.6  -16.6 
0.9  -1.1  -1.4 
3.1  5.9  .. 
-5.1  -7.9  -8.7 
-10.8  -12.7  -11.5 
-2.5  -3.7  -5.1 
-16.1  -11.9  -15.0 
-8.2  -7.9  -10.4 
-12.9  -11.3  -16.0 
-2.1  -9.3  -8.6 
-5.7  -6.6  -8.5 
-4.5  -9.2  -13.2 
12.3  11.4  3.9 
-32.1  -38.3  -50.0 
-27.9  -22.4  -26.1 
11.2  4.7  -6.8 
-1.6  -1.5  -1.4 
-3.0  -3.6  -5.5 
-7.5  -7.5  -8.2 Annex VIII 
Comparison of Institutional Investor's Country Credit Ratings 
for CBI countries 1993-98* 
CBI Countries:  1993  1995  1997  1998 
Burundi  ...  .  ..  .  ..  .  .. 
Comoros  ...  .  ..  .  ..  .  .. 
Kenya  24.7  24.9  28.6  25.9 
Madagascar  ...  .  ..  ...  .  .. 
Malawi  16.2  18.8  21.0  19.8 
Mauritius  38.4  45.4  51.9  53.0 
Namibia  ...  .  ..  .  ..  .  .. 
Rwanda  ...  ...  ...  .  .. 
Seychelles  20.7  23.7  29.5  28.9 
Swaziland  22.2  28.5  33.3  32.0 
Tanzania  12.9  15.5  18.7  19.9 
Uganda  7.3  12.8  20.1  19.9 
Zambia  11.7  14.6  16.0  17.2 
Zimbabwe  27.7  30.7  33.8  29.8 
All CBI countries:  20.2  23.9  28.1  27.4 
Some non-CBI countries: 
Angola  13.7  10.9  13.6  12.3 
Botswana  41.1  48.5  51.2  51.9 
Mozambique  8.4  12.6  14.6  17.9 
Nigeria  20.3  17.5  15.3  16.4 
South Africa  39.6  42.5  46.4  46.6 
Selected Non-CBI countries:  24.6  26.4  28.2  29.0 
All sub-Saharan Africa:  18.7  19.9  21.9  23.3 
Source:  "The Tnstitutionallnvestor'', 1993-November 1998 
*  Based on information provided by leading international banks who were asked to grade each of  the 
countries on a scale of  zero to 100, with 100 representing those with the least chance of  default. 
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Comparison of Transparency International 1998 Corruption Index 
Rankings of CBI countries 
(Lower ranking and lower Corruption Perception Index score means more corruption) 
CBI Countries: 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Some non-CBI  countries: 
Angola 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Source: Transparency International 
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Ranking* 
(1 = highest rank and 
least corruption) 
* From list of  85 countries 
n.r.  =  not rated 
n.r. 
n.r. 
74 
n.r. 
45 
33 
29 
n.r. 
n.r. 
n.r. 
81 
73 
52 
43 
n.r 
23 
n.r. 
n.r. 
n.r 
32 
CPI Score 
(1 = most corrupt) 
n.r. 
n.r. 
2.5 
n.r 
4.1 
5.0 
5.3 
n.r. 
n.r. 
n.r. 
1.9 
2.6 
3.5 
4.2 
n.r 
6.1 
n.r. 
n.r. 
n.r. 
5.2 Annex X 
The HIPC Initiative 
The debt initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) was 
designed for those countries that have achieved satisfactory policy performance in 
order to bring their individual debt burden to a sustainable level. The principal 
objective of  the HPIC Debt Initiative is to ensure that adjustment and reform efforts 
are not put at risk by continued high debt and debt service burdens. By requiring the 
participation of  all relevant creditors, the initi'!tive was designed to facilitate a 
comprehensive resolution to the debt problem. This Initiative, which was endorsed by 
the Development Committee in September 1996 for an initial period of  two years (i.e. 
to September 1998), has been extended to end-2000, and is now being implemented. 
In addition, potential new approaches in the debt relief area are under discussion, 
notably emerging proposals in the context ofG7, which would enhance the HPIC Debt 
Initiative. 
Key Features 
t  Eligibility. To qualify, countries have to be IDA-only and face an unsustainable 
debt situation after the full application of  current debt relief mechanisms, and 
have to demonstrate an appropriate track record of  adjustment and reform. 
t  Debt Sustainability Targets are defined on a case-by-case basis in the range of 
200-250 percent net present value (NPV) debt-exports ratio and 20-25 percent 
of  the debt service-exports ratio with debt determined in the light of  country 
specific vulnerability factors such as the concentration and variability of 
exports and taking into account fiscal indicators of  the burden of  debt service. 
For very open economies (where the exclusive reliance on external indicators 
may not adequately reflect the fiscal burden of  external debt), an NPV 
debt-to-export target below 200 percent of  the completion point can be 
recommended provided that the country concerned meets two criteria at the 
p.  153 decision point: an export-GDP ratio of  at least 40 percent and a minimum 
threshold of  fiscal revenue-GDP ratio of  20 percent. 
t  Track Record. At the end of the initial three years of good performance under 
IMF and Bank Supported programs, the international community would grant 
debt relief, if needed, to  achieve debt sustainability over the next three years, 
provided good performance is sustained. The required six-year performance period 
would be implemented flexibly on a case-by-case basis, with countries receiving 
credit towards the decision point stage for programs that are already underway; 
exceptionally, the second stage of  three years might be shortened for countries 
with sustained records of strong performance. 
t  Action at Completion Point.  Assistance as  promised at the decision point is 
provided if  the committed debt relief  were to bring the actual debt-export or debt 
service-export ratios at the completion point to the established sustainability target 
ratios. If  the actual ratios fall outside the target, creditors will be asked to adjust 
their assistance so as to achieve sustainability. 
Progress to end-February 1999 
The eligibility for 12 HIPCs have been reviewed of  which 10 qualify for debt 
relief packages which could amount to about $4.3 billion in net present value (NPV) 
terms and an estimated nominal debt service relief amount of  about $8.5 billion over 
time. 
Debt relief has been agreed for Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guyana, 
Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda, totalling about $3 .1 billion in NPV terms or about 
$6.1 billion in debt service relief over time. 
Preliminary reviews of  eligibility have been completed for Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, and Mauritania. HIPC debt relief for these countries could total $1.2 billion in 
NPV terms at their completion dates equivalent to about $2.5 billion in nominal debt 
service relief. While Mauritania could reach its decision point in the second quarter of 
1999, finalization of  debt relief packages for Ethiopia and Guinea-Bissau has been put 
on hold due to armed conflicts. 
For Benin and Senegal, debt sustainability is provided through traditional 
mechanisms and do not require HIPC debt relief. 
Two countries, Bolivia and Uganda, have reached the completion point for 
delivery of  HIPC debt relief totalling nearly $800 million in NPV terms and more than 
$1.4 billion in debt service relief. For Bolivia, which reached its completion point in 
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debt service relief and brings the actual NPV debt-to-export ratio to 218% compared 
with about 350% in the early-1990s. With supplemental ODAreliefgranted by Japan 
of  the order of $300 million, the NPV debt-to-export ratio will be further lowered to 
about 202%. Completion points for Guyana and Mozambique are expected in 1999. 
Active preparation ofHIPC documents for Guinea, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Niger is underway. 
Financing 
The World Bank has transferred $850 million to the HIPC Trust Fund to date. At 
the 1998 Annual Meetings, the Bank's Board ofGovemers approved another transfer 
of  $100 million out of  IBRD 's 1998/99 financial year net income. The Bank remains 
committed to meet its full share of  the cost. 
The IMF has provided for $520 million to its ESAF/HIPC Trust to finance special 
ESAF operations under the Initiative. 
The African Development Bank has indicated commitment to provide about $206 
million from its own resources towards HIPCs during the period 1998-2000. 
The HIPC Trust Fund has obtained about $450 million in bilateral contributions 
and pledges from 19 countries to help meet the cost of  AfDB and other MDBs other 
than the World Bank. 
Source: AJDB, IMF, and World Bank 
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Summary of  Tariff Systems in Place in CBI countries compared with Trade 
Reform Road Map Objectives as at end-December 1998 
Import Tariff  Harmonize  Incorporate  Eliminate 
Minimum/  External Tariffs  Other Duties  Tariffs on Intra-
Road Map  Maximum Rate  by Having Not  and Charges  CBI Trade (a) 
Objective:  (to be between  More Than Three  into Tariff (a)  (preference 
20-25 percent)  Non-Zero  margin-
(a)  Rates (a)  percent) OJ 
Burundi  10/100  5  No  60 
Comoros  No  70 
Kenya  No  80 
Madagascar  No  80 (b) 
Malawi (i)  10/30  No  70 
Mauritius  0/80  8  No  80 (n) 
Namibia  0/75  Multiple  No  None 
Rwanda  10/40  3  None 
Seychelles  0/200 (e)  9 (e)  None (c) 
Swaziland  0/75  None 
Tanzania  80 (d) 
Uganda  80 (j) 
Zambia  60 
Zimbabwe  80 (g) 
Source: Data prepared by the Co-sponsors 
* Bold  figures on shaded area indicates that objectives of  Road Map have been met or exceeded 
(a)  By October 1998. 
(b)  Decision made in principle, but not yet implemented (except imports from Mauritius). 
(c)  Other than a 5 percent preference from IOC member states. 
(d)  Implemented as ofJuly 1998. 
(e)  In the form of  trades tax. Tariff bands were recently increased to more than nine. 
(j)  Uganda has had a 10 percent surcharge on selected imports. 
(g)  Except for a duty-free market access for trade between Mauritius and Zimbabwe. 
(h)  The trade-weighted average (for 1997 in respect of  Kenya and Zimbabwe). 
Lower Trade-
Weighted 
Average of 
Tariff to No 
More Than 
15 Percent (a)  k) 
35.4 
30.0 
22.0 
n.a 
17.5 
n.a 
16.3 
(i)  Malawi has a surtax applied uniformly on both imports and domestic production. Manufacturers are entitled to 
a rebate on taxes paid on production inputs. 
OJ  The preference margin was to be at 90 percent by October 1997, and eliminated by October 1998. 
(k)  Unweighted, except where specified, and excludes "other duties and charges". 
(/)  Number of  rate bands; the number of  rates are 30. 
(m) In 1997. 
(n)  Increased to 90 per cent in June 1999. 
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Status of Tariff Exemptions in CBI countries as at end-December 1998 
Category of  Exemptions 
Investment  Goods for 
Country  Government  Parastatals  Code or  Recognized  Foreign- Other (a) 
General  NGOs  Financed 
Convention  Projects 
Burundi  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Comoros  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Kenya  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Madagascar  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Malawi  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mauritius  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Namibia  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Rwanda  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Seychelles  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Swaziland  No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Tanzania  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Uganda  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Zambia  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Zimbabwe  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: World Bank/IMF staff  reports; and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  Includes discretionary exemptions and waivers granted. 
p. 157 Annex XIII 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Summary of  Import Non-Tariff Barriers in CBI countries 
as at end-December 1998 
Quantitative  Restrictive Import 
Restrictions  Licensing  Discriminatory 
On Im12orts  Reguirements  State  Rates of 
Trading  Excise 
Monopolies  Duty  NAT 
Bans  Quotas  For all  For  (etc.) on 
products  some  Certain 
products  Imports 
No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
No  No  No  No  No  No 
No  No  No  No  No  No 
No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
No  No  No  No  No  No 
No  Yes  Yes  - Yes  Yes 
No  No  No  No  Yes  No 
No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Yes  No  No  No  No  Yes 
No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
No  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Source:  World Bank/IMF staff  reports and data provided by the authorities 
Other (a) 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Note:  In all CBI countries, there are no restrictions by quality standards but every country applies 
restrictions for health, security, environment, and national heritage reasons. 
(a)  Includes countervailing duties, dumping, etc. 
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Status of Export Trade Regimes in CBI countries as at end-September 1998 
Quantitative Restrictions  Licensing (a) 
Country  Bans  Quotas 
Burundi  No  No 
Comoros  No  No 
Kenya  No  No 
Madagascar  No  No 
Malawi  No  No 
Mauritius  No  No 
Namibia  No  No (b) 
Rwanda  No  No 
Seychelles  No  No 
Swaziland  No  No 
Tanzania  No  No 
Uganda  VIII  No 
Zambia  Yes  No 
Zimbabwe  No  Yes 
Source: World Bank and IMF staff  reports, and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  Only for restrictive (and not for statistical) purposes. 
(b)  Excludes export quotas on diamonds. 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes (c) 
No 
No 
No 
No 
None 
No 
Yes 
Duties  Marketing 
Monopolies 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  No 
No  No 
No  No 
No  No 
No  No 
No  Yes 
Yes  No 
No  No 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  No 
No  No 
No  No 
Yes  Yes 
(c)  All exports, except to SACU member countries, require a licence. Within SACU, textiles, meat 
products and second hand goods require a licence. 
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Status of  Exchange Restrictions on Payments and Transfers on Current 
International Transactions in CBI countries as at end-September 1998 
Country  Article  Date of  Article VIII  External  Article XIV  Intention to 
VIII/XIV  Article VIII  Restrictions  Arrears  Restrictions  Move to 
Status  Acceptance  Article VIII 
Burundi  XIV (a)  n.a.  n.a.  Yes  Yes (a)  Yes, in due 
course 
Comoros (b)  VIII  1 VI 1996  None  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Kenya (c)  VIII  30 VI 1994  Yes (d)  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Madagascar (b)  VIII  18 VIII 1996  None  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Malawi  VIII  7 XII 1995  None  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Mauritius (b)  VIII  29 VIII 1993  None  None  n.a.  n.a. 
Namibia  VIII  20 VIII 1996  None (e)  None  n.a.  n.a. 
Rwanda  XIV (a)  n.a.  n.a.  Yes  None (a)  Yes, in next 
ten months 
Seychelles (b)  VIII  3 I 1978  Yes (f)  Yes  n.a.  n.a. 
Swaziland  VIII  ll XII 1989  None (e)  None  n.a.  n.a. 
Tanzania (c)  VIII  15 VII 1996  None  Yes (i)  n.a.  n.a. 
Uganda (c)  VIII  5 VI 1994  None  Yes())  n.a.  n.a. 
Zambia  XIV  n.a.  None  Yes  Yes (g)  Yes, in due 
course 
Zimbabwe  VIII  5 II  1995  Yes (h)  None  n.a.  n.a. 
Source: IMF Staff  Reports; and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  Burundi and Rwanda continue to avail themselves of  the transitional arrangements under Article XIV Sec. 2. 
Rwanda maintains no restrictions on the making of  payments and transfers for current international 
transactions. In November 1997, Burundi reintroduced restrictions in current transactions which had been 
eliminated at the end of 1995. However, there are arrears in respect of  external payments. 
(b)  Member Indian Ocean Commission. 
(c)  Member East African Cooperation. 
(d)  A multiple currency practice arising from outstanding operations under the Exchange Risk Assumption Fund. 
(e)  Namibia and Swaziland are part of  the Common Monetary Area (CMA) comprising Lesotho, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Swaziland which is a single exchange control area. 
(f)  On current payments (pipeline) including restrictions on transfers of  dividends and management fees. 
(g)  On private debt service payments (principal) held before January 1991, before the exchange regime was 
liberalized in 1994. 
(h)  Arising from blocked corporate dividend and interest payments schemes (to be removed by mid-1999) and 
multiple currency practice arising from contracts under a discontinued forward exchange cover scheme (to be 
cleared by end-2000). 
(i)  With non-Paris Club members. 
())  On reschedulable payments with non-Paris Club bilateral creditors. 
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Characteristics of  Foreign Exchange Markets in CBI countries 
as at end-December 1998 
Forward 
Unified  Cover  Foreign  Authorized 
Country  Interbank  Against  Currency  Dealers (a) 
Market  Exchange  Accounts 
Risk  (Restrictions) 
Burundi  No  No  Limited  c.b. 
Comoros  No  Yes  French franc  c.b. 
(Limited) 
Kenya  Yes (1993)  Yes  Liberal  c. b. and e. b  .. 
Madagascar  Yes (1994)  No  Liberal  c.b. 
Malawi  Yes (1994)  Yes  Liberal  c.b. and e.b. 
Mauritius  Yes (1994)  Yes  Liberal  c.b.and e.b. 
Namibia  No  Yes  Limited (i)  c. b. and e. b. 
(CMA member) 
Rwanda  Yes (1995)  No  Liberal  c.b. and e.b. 
Seychelles  No  No  Limited  c.b. 
Swaziland  No  Yes  Limited  c.b. 
(CMA member) 
Tanzania  Yes (1994)  Yes  Liberal  c.b. and e.b. 
Uganda  Yes (1993)  Yes (h)  none  c.b. and e.b. 
Zambia  Yes (1996)  Yes  Liberal  c. b.  and e. b. 
Zimbabwe  Yes (1995)  No  Limited  c. b. and e. b. 
Source: IMF staff  reports and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  Commercial banks (c.b.) and /or foreign exchange bureaux (e.b.). 
(b)  Only outside French franc (Operations Account) area. 
Prudential  Restrictions 
Restrictions  on 
(Exposure  Capital 
Limits)  Flows 
Yes  Yes 
No  Yes (b) 
Yes  Liberalized (c) 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  Liberalized (g) 
Yes  Liberalized 
No  Yes (d) 
Yes  Yes 
No  Yes 
No  Yes (d) 
Yes  Yes 
Yes  None (e) 
Yes  Liberalized 
Yes  Yes (f) 
(c)  Except for purchase of  shares and securities by non residents (up to 40 percent) and individuals (up to 
5  percent). 
(d)  Only outside CMA area. However, in respect of  Namibia, there is a restriction even within the CMA 
pension funds and life insurance companies have to invest 35 percent of  their assets domestically. 
(e)  Effective July 1, 1997. 
(f)  In 1996, the maximum foreign ownership of  companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange was 
raised to 40 percent. 
(g)  Malawi has removed restrictions related to the inflow and profit repatriation of  FDI and has adopted a 
liberal attitude regarding portfolio investment by non-residents. 
(h)  Although there is no official currency futures market, authorized banks may deal in the forward 
exchange market if  there is an underlying approved import or export contract. 
(i)  Can be operated by EPZ companies and by individuals up to N$350,000. 
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Foreign Exchange Repatriation and Surrender Requirements in CBI 
countries as at end-December 1998 
Country  1992  1995  1997  1998 
(end-December)  (end-December)  (end-December)  (end-Dec) 
Burundi  Full repatriation; full surrender  EPZ enterprises exempt from  Unchanged  Unchanged 
excluding 30 percent of non- surrender; otherwise 
traditional exports.  unchanged.  Unchanged 
Comoros  Full repatriation and surrender  Unchanged.  Unchanged 
to  authorized banks. 
Kenya  Full repatriation and surrender  Repatriation without surrender  Unrestricted  Unrestricted 
excluding 50 percent of non- requirement. 
traditional exports. 
Madagascar  Full repatriatiOn; 60 percent  Repatnatwn and sale ot  I  UU percent repatnatwn w1thm  Unchanged 
surrender; 40 percent surrender  merchandise export proceeds  4 months. 
to authorized banks.  within 90 days of  date of 
shipment; and surrender within 
30 days of service receipts. 
Malawi  Full repatriation and surrender.  Full repatriation and 60 percent  Unchanged  Unchanged 
surrender. 
Mauritius  Repatriation; surrender to  Unrestricted since July 1994.  Unrestricted (b)  Unchanged 
authorized dealer of unused  (a) 
proceeds within 6 months. 
Namibia  Full repatriation and surrender.  Full repatriation within 6  Unchanged  Unchanged 
months of shipment; and 
surrender within 30 days of 
repatriation. 
Rwanda  Full repatriation and surrender  Repatriation; surrender of  Repatriation of  all foreign  Unchanged 
to authorized banks.  90 percent of  coffee and tea  exchange receipts through 
receipts.  commercial banks. (f) 
Seychelles  Completely unrestricted.  Surrender requirement of  Repatriation and surrender  Unchanged 
19 percent of commercial  requirement of all foreign 
banks' foreign exchange  exchange earnings through 
inflows to central bank. (c)  domestic banks(  e) 
Swaziland  Repatriation and surrender.  Repatriation and surrender.  Unchanged  Unchanged 
Tanzania  Full repatriation: surrender of  Repatriation within 180 days.  Repatriation within 60 days.  Unchanged 
10 percent of traditional exports  No surrender requirement. 
and 50 percent of other 
merchandise. Surrender of 
invisible proceeds. 
Uganda  Repatriation:  100 percent of  Repatriation to authorized  Unrestricted (d)  Unrestricted 
coffee proceeds; otherwise  banks. 
surrender to authorized dealer. 
Zambia  100 percent surrender of ZCCM  ZCCM surrender reduced to  Unrestricted  Unrestricted 
metal exports; 10 percent  45 percent; otherwise 
surrender otherwise.  completely unrestricted. 
Zimbabwe  Repatriation and surrender.  Repatriation.  Unchanged  Unchanged 
Source: IMF Staff  Reports and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  75 percent of  exports proceeds of  sugar by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate must be surrendered to the Bank of Mauritius. 
(b)  Surrender requirement by the Mauritius Sugar Syndicate removed effective July 1,  1997. 
(c)  No regulations governing repatriation of export proceeds. 
(d)  Unrestricted as of 1 July 1997, with liberalization of  the capital account. 
(e)  Effective 1 January 1997. 
(f)  After a reduction to 50 percent in December 1996, the surrender requirement for tea and coffee receipts were eliminated in 
December 1997. 
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Implementation of Investment Deregulation, and Labor Market Measures in CBI countries as at end-December 1998 
Country  Investment Deregulation 
Liberalize  45-60 days'  Ratify/ 
Approval  Publish  Statute of  Implement  Dual Taxation  Cross Listing 
Procedures  Investment  Limitation on  MIE Charter  Agreements  of Stocks 
(a)  Code  Investment 
Applications 
Burundi  Full  Full  Partial  Pending  Pending  Pending 
Comoros  Pending (b)  Full  Full  Full  Pending  -
Kenya  Full  Pending  Full  Pending  Partial  Partial 
Madagascar  Full  Full (c)  Partial  Pending  Partial  -
Malawi  Full  Full  Partial  Pending  Partial  Partial 
Mauritius  Full  Full (d)  Pending  Pending  Partial  Pending 
Namibia  Full  Full  Full  n.a.  Partial  Partial 
Rwanda  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Seychelles  Full  Full  Full  Pending  Partial  Pending 
Swaziland  Full  Full  Full  Pending  Partial  Partial 
Tanzania  Full  Full  Full  Partial  Partial  Pending 
Uganda  Full  Full  Full  Partial  Partial  Pending 
Zambia  Partial  Full  Pending  Partial  Partial  Partial 
Zimbabwe  Full  Partial  Partial  Pending  Partial  Partial 
Source:  Implementation updates provided by Technical Working Groups 
Note: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
The category "Pending" runs a wide range, from administrative/legislative arrangements in preparation to not yet identified. 
Includes creation of a one-stop approval authority. 
Passed by parliament but not come into force. 
Integrated into general tax law. 
Industrial Expansion Act of 1993 
Labor Market Issues 
Improve  Short Term 
Implement  Processing of  Entry Permits 
COMESA Visa  Residence/  for Border 
Protocol  Work Permits  Residents 
Partial  Partial  Pending 
Pending  Pending  Full 
Partial  Partial  Full 
Pending  Partial  n.a. 
Full  Pending  Full 
Pending  Pending  n.a. 
Partial  Full  Full 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Full  Partial  n.a. 
Pending  Pending  Full 
Full  Full  Full 
Full  Full  Full 
Full  Pending  Full 
Partial  Partial  Partial Annex XIX 
Double Taxation Agreements in CBI countries (a) 
Progress as at mid-1998 
Degree of  Reported to have DTAs with: 
Implementation 
Burundi  not reported 
Comoros  partial  Mauritius 
Kenya  partial  Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
Madagascar  partial  Mauritius 
Malawi  partial  Kenya, South Africa 
Mauritius  partial  Botswana, Namibia, Madagascar, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Namibia  partial  Mauritius, South Africa 
Rwanda  not reported 
Seychelles  partial  South Africa 
Swaziland  partial  Botswana, South Africa, United Kingdom 
Tanzania  partial  Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia 
Uganda  partial  South Africa, Zambia 
Zambia  partial  Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda 
Zimbabwe  partial  Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa 
Source: Imani Development International 1998 Mid-Year Report : Status of  the CBI Initiative 
(a)  with countries that are members ofCOMESA or SADC. 
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Standard Personal Income and Corporate Profit Tax Rates in 
CBI countries as at end-December 1998 
Country  On Individual Incomes (a)  On Corporate Income (percent) 
(percent)  Resident 
Burundi  60 (b); 20 (c)  40 
Comoros  30 (d);  15 (e)  40 
Kenya  30 (f)  30 (g) 
Madagascar  35 (h); 25 (i);  15 0)  35 
Malawi  35 (/)  38 
Mauritius  30 (n)  35 (m) 
Namibia  N$22,500 + 40% (p),  10 (q)  40 
Rwanda  40 (r)  40 
Seychelles  40 (s)  40 
Swaziland  39 (u),  (v)  37,5 (t) 
Tanzania  35 (w)  30 
Uganda  Ush 546,000 and 30 (x)  35 
Zambia  30 (y)  35  (z) 
Zimbabwe  40 (bb)  37.5 
Source: Data provided by the co-sponsors 
Maximum rate.  (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
On wage incomes over BF 4.0 million, and rental income over BF 1.5 million. 
Capital income (dividends, interest, etc). Distributed income of foreign companies set at 48 percent. 
Income over CF 3.5 million. 
On capital income, distributed dividends, and interest paid. 
On incomes over Ksh 0.45 million. 
Non-resident 
40 
40 
40 (g) 
35 
43 (k) 
35 (m) 
40 (o) 
40 
37.5 (t) 
30 
35 
35  (z) 
46.0 (aa) 
(g)  EPZ enterprises 25 rercent after I 0 years; Dividends from resident corporations 5 percent, and non-resident corporations 
15 percent (both final tax). 
(h)  Wage income over FMG 1.0 m and non-wage income over 45 percent. 
(i)  Capital income. 
OJ  Transfers abroad to non-resident persons or companies. 
(k)  Waived in cases where tax rate of foreign countries is less than 40 percent. 
(I)  In excess of  MK 42,000 (excludes drought levy of  3 percent). 
(m)  EPZ rate 15 percent; stock exchange listed companies 25 percent; unit trusts 15 percent; and offshore companies 0-35 
percent. 
(n)  In excess ofMR 55,000. 
(o)  Non-mining. Diamond companies are taxed at 55 percent. 
(p)  Of  wage income in excess ofN$100,000. 
(q)  On non-resident shareholders. 
(r)  On income over RF 1.0 million. 
(s)  On income over SR 96,000. 
(t)  Mining companies are taxed at 27 percent on income up to E20,000. 
(u)  On income over E40,000. Dividend income over E20,000 is taxed at 10 percent on companies listed on the Swaziland 
Stock Exchange; 20 percent for others. 
(v)  In addition, non-residents' interest income is taxed at 10 percent, dividends at 15 percent (12  112 percent if  incorporated in 
Botswana, Lesotho or South Africa). 
(w)  On income over Tsh 700,000. 
(x)  On income over Ush 4.8 million. There is a withholding tax of 15 percent on non-residents' capital income (e.g. interest, 
dividends). 
(y)  Incomes over K 1.8 million. There is a withholding tax of 15 percent on capital income (interest, dividends, capital gains, etc). 
(z)  Companies listed are in the Lusaka Stock Exchange are taxed at 30 percent. 
(aa)  Includes 8.5 percent on taxable income earned by local branches of foreign companies derived from domestic sources. 
(bb)  On incomes over Z$ 60,000. Non-resident: shareholders tax 15 percent (on listed companies); interest 10 percent; 
remittances and royalties 20 percent. Resident: shareholders 15 percent interest 30 percent. 
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An example of what an investor might typically 
encounter in an African country 
An experienced foreign investor (international conglomerate) in the chemicals 
sector, with capital to invest and access to long-term credit, learns that there are 
increasing business opportunities in Africa. A team visits several African countries 
where the group has not invested previously. In country X, the team identifies an 
unfulfilled demand for pharmaceutical products and available human and physical 
resources as well as possible local partners; this combination suggests a good business 
opportunity. 
The investor goes to the one-stop investment promotion agency where 
information on the investment code is available. Included in the package of 
information are details about registering a company, business name, and patents, 
obtaining a trading licence, the labor code, corporate and employment tax rates and 
procedures. With the tax and other incentives which are available, the idea begins to 
look even more attractive. A suitable site is chosen and plans for constructing a factory 
are drawn up; and the time has now come to set up a corporate legal presence in the 
country. 
Despite the information and help from the investment promotion agency, the 
investor is well aware that new businesses in general, and the pharmaceutical sector in 
particular, will require additional licences and permits. Now the administrative hassles 
begin. 
First, there is the question of land title and use for the site, which is unused but is 
known to be owned by a major parastatal. Current legislation does not permit a foreign 
investor to hold freehold title. Can a locally registered company hold freehold title, 
especially when some of  the shareholders would be nationals? The investment 
agency's advice-to let the local investors acquire the freehold and for the new 
company to lease the property- is not fully convincing. This means going to a lawyer 
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legal entity should take - a registered company or a branch; and (ii) land use requires 
approval at three levels: district (which takes account of  the objection procedure); 
regional (which considers regional implications and where clearance is required before 
submission to the Ministry; and national (i.e. the Ministry). The lawyer undertakes to 
look into these matters and to carry out a search on the land title of  the selected real 
estate property. The lawyer discovers that a title document does not exist at the Lands 
Registry. No-one appears to know what to do in this case of  no title, even though there 
is a general belief  that the property is owned by enterprise Y; and, of  course, a lease 
title cannot be drawn up without evidence of  the principal land title. Even more 
complicated is the fact that it is known that the property was sequestered by a previous 
government some years ago, and that if  today the government (through the current 
parastatal owner) attempts to sell the property, a claim from the original owner is very 
likely. The investor asks the officials in the Lands Registry and the investment agency, 
as well as the lawyer, to look into the whole question and to come up with a definitive 
set of  recommendations to resolve the issues. 
Meanwhile, the lawyer has also advised the investor that although the investment 
agency can help facilitate the company registration and issuance of  a trading licence, 
other licences and permits are also required. First, with regard to the factory, it will be 
necessary to obtain clearance from the Ministry of  Natural Resources and the 
Environment. This Ministry will be concerned about the possible levels of  air and 
effluent pollution; so negotiations on acceptable levels and how these will be recorded 
and monitored will have to be held. Second, a building permit is required; so the 
factory plans will have to be submitted to the Ministry of  Housing and Construction 
for approval. Third, since the factory will produce medicines, individual licences for 
each product will have to be obtained from the Ministry of  Health. This is likely to 
take some time, because the Ministry has no experience of  the manufacture of  some of 
the proposed products and has no research facilities for testing. 
Whilst these matters are being attended to, the foreign investor's representatives 
go to a local bank to draw cash to replenish what they have spent since arriving in the 
country. There is a problem: although cash had been transferred two weeks previously, 
a bank account has not been opened; indeed an account cannot be opened unless and 
until a company or a branch of  a company has been registered or the individual is a 
resident. The hassles have only just begun. 
Will the investor have the time and patience to deal with these hassles over the 
next several years to get the business up and running and be prepared to meet the 
extremely high transaction costs; and will the capital now available for investment still 
be accessible in three years time? 
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Monetary Operations and Financial Market Developments in 
CBI countries as at end-December 1998 
Monetary Instruments 
Direct  Indirect (a)  Interest Rate 
(d)  Determination 
Burundi  n.a  omo/rr/lr/sf  n.a 
Comoros  No  None  Controlled 
Kenya  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  No controls 
Madagascar  Yes  omo/rr/sf.  No controls 
Malawi  No  omo/rr/sf/rf  No controls 
Mauritius  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  No controls 
Namibia (g)  No  omo/rr/sf  Market 
determined (f) 
Rwanda  No  rr/sf/rf  No controls 
Seychelles  No  rr/lr  Controlled (h) 
Swaziland (g)  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  Market 
determined (f) 
Tanzania  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  No controls 
Uganda  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  No controls 
Zambia  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  No controls 
Zimbabwe  No  omo/rr/lr/sf  No controls 
Source: IMF Staff  Reports and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  omo =  Open market operations 
rr  = Reserve requirements 
lr  = Liquidity requirement 
sf  =  Standing discount facilities 
rf  =  Refinancing facilities 
(b)  Not well developed 
(c)  Limited 
(d)  Credit ceilings and selective credit controls 
(e)  Exists but not active 
(f)  Strongly influenced by South Africa 
(g)  Member ofCMA 
(h)  Maximum and minimum interest rates 
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Financial Market Developments 
Primary  Secondary  Interbank  Stock 
Exchange 
n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
No  No  No  No 
Active  Active (b)  Yes©  Active 
Active  Active (b)  Yes (e)  No 
Active  Active  Yes  Yes 
Active  Active (b)  Yes  Yes 
Active  No  Yes  Active 
No  No  Yes (c)  No 
Yes  No  No  No 
Active  Active (b)  Yes (c)  Yes 
Active  No  Yes (c)  No 
Active  Active (c)  Yes (c)  Yes (c) 
Active  Active  Yes  Active 
Active  Active  Yes  Yes AnnexXX/11 
Structure of Banking Systems in CBI countries as at end-December 1998 
__  Supervisory Framework _  Infrastructure (b)  Prudential Regulations 
Number  Banking  Revisions  Central  Complete  Develop  Payment  Capital  Borrowing  Reserve  Minimum 
of  Law  Planned  Bank  Financial  Foreign  System  Adequacy (e)  Limits (d)  Requirement  Liquid 
Banks (a)  Year  Autonomy  Sector  Trade  Efficiency  Assets 
Reform  Instruments  Requirement 
Program 
Burundi  n/a  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Comoros  1 (-)  Yes(-)  No  Partial  4  2  Average  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Kenya  67 (8) (g)  Yes 1991)  Yes  Partial  1  1 (c)  Average  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Madagascar  5 (3)  Yes (1995)  No  Full  2  2  Average  Yes  Yes  n/a  Yes 
Malawi  4 (-)  Yes (1989)  No  Partial  1  2  Average  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mauritius  10 (5)  Yes (1988)  Yes  Full  1  1  Good  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Namibia  5 (4)  Yes (1998)  No  Full  3  4  Good  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Rwanda  5 (1)  Pending  Yes  Full  n/a  n/a  Low  Yes  Yes  Yes  n/a 
Seychelles  5 (4)  Yes (1997)  No  Full  1  1  n/a  n/a  n/a  Yes  Yes 
Swaziland  5 (4)  Pending  Yes  Full  3  1  Good  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Tanzania  18 (10)  Yes (1991)  No  Partial  2  2  Low  Yes  Yes  Yes  n/a 
Uganda  20 (11)  Yes (1993)  Yes  Full  2  1  Average  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Zambia  21  (6)  Yes (1994)  Yes  Partial  1  2  Average  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Zimbabwe  7 (3)  Yes (1965)  Yes  Full (f)  2  2  Average  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: IMF Staff  Reports and data provided by the authorities 
(a)  Branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in parentheses. 
(b)  1 =Fully implemented;  2. =Partially/ or substantially implemented;  3. =Arrangements for implementation being made;  4 =Arrangements for implementation not in place. 
(c)  Proposed Kenya Export Development Fund. 
(d)  As single or connected borrower. 
(e)  Basle-based. 
(j)  However, the Ministry of  Finance retains the power to license banks. 
(g)  This includes 53 commercial banks and 14 non-bank financial institutions. 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Exposure 
Limits 
n/a 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
n/a 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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The Proposed Regional Trade Facilitation Project 
Rationale 
Whilst there are commercial banks, specialized insurance firms, and national export 
credit agencies who are prepared to assume the political risk in cross border transactions 
involving some African countries, there are significant gaps in the market which hinder 
investment and growth of  productive activity in Africa. Political risk cover from 
commercial sources or export credit agencies is not available at all for some African 
countries, and where it is available, it is usually very costly or on unfavourable terms. In 
particular, available cover is either very thin or non-existent for transactions over the 
medium term, thereby restricting the import of  essential capital goods. 
A major problem arising out of  the perception of  political risk in African 
countries is that commercial banks, export credit agencies, and commercial credit risk 
insurers alike operate within strict country political risk limits. These limits are 
necessary to observe a prudential spread of  risk policies and to comply with the 
requirements of  regulatory authorities. However, from time to time these internally 
imposed limits have the effect of  restricting the availability of  finance for projects for 
reasons that have nothing to do with the viability of  the projects or the risk per se of 
doing business in countries where the limits would be exceeded. 
Lack of  political risk cover for exports from African countries is a significant 
impediment to the availability of  finance for exports from the region and within the 
region, in particular, the development of  export credit insurance. 
A project, originally referred to as the Africa Guarantee Facility but now to be 
renamed the Regional Trade Facilitation Project (RTFP) has been designed to address 
these problems and to help fill in the gaps. 
Outline 
It is envisaged that the RTFPwould use International Development Association 
(IDA) credits and other donor funds as security for a guarantee or for an insurance 
agency (the Regional Export Services Agency or RESA) to allow it to provide 
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associated with productive activity in those countries. 
The principal elements of  the proposed RTFP are: 
a)  Each country agreeing to participate in the RTFP would enter into a credit 
agreement with the IDA whereby IDA would lend funds, on usual IDA 
repayment terms, for the purpose of  the RTFP; 
b) The IDA credit funds and any contributions from other donors would represent 
a country's contribution in the RTFP; 
c)  Under the RTFP, insurance policies would be provided by a guarantee or 
RESA on behalf of  participating countries; 
d)  The IDA credit would give credibility to the operations ofRESA and provide a 
means for RESA to settle valid claims; 
e)  The insurance policies issued by RESA would cover losses to parties engaged 
in or supporting productive activity, arising from political risks occurring 
either in a participating country or produced in a participating country; 
f)  Political risks would include events such as war or civil commotion, or certain 
actions taken by a government known as "government performance" risks such 
as expropriation or imposition of  exchange controls; 
g)  Although the guarantee or insurance policies would be issued by one guarantee 
agency on behalf of  all participating countries, each country would initially 
have its own separate scheme and would not be liable for obligations assumed 
by RESA on behalf of  other countries; and 
h)  Obligations ofRESA under issued insurance policies would be 100 percent 
backed by the IDA credit funds and other donor funds held by RESA in escrow 
accounts. 
The greatest benefit from the RTFP will flow to all participants when it becomes 
a truly regional scheme with a significant number of  countries from the region 
participating in it. Only then can it be fully effective in dealing with the perception of 
high levels of  risk in doing business in Africa as a region. 
Source: Africa Guarantee Facility: Discussion Paper for Technical Working Groups, 14 October 1998 
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HIV  I  AIDS Prevalence Rates among Adults 
in CBI countries as at end 1997 
Adult (15-49 years) 
HIV/AIDS Rate(%) 
Burundi  8.30 
Comoros  0.14 
Kenya  11.64 
Madagascar  0.12 
Malawi  14.92 
Mauritius  0.08 
Mozambique  14.17 
Namibia  19.94 
Rwanda  12.75 
Seychelles  unknown 
Swaziland  18.50 
Tanzania  9.42 
Uganda  9.51 
Zambia  19.07 
Zimbabwe  25.84 
All Sub-Saharan Africa  8.00 
World Average  1.10 
Source: UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, June 1998 
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An Example of the Difficulty of a Unified Approach 
SADC IPAs blame insufficient government support for failure to market 
region successfully 
In June 1998 the first meeting of  the SADC Subcommittee on Investment took 
place in Pretoria, South Africa at which the findings of  an EU funded study of  the 
investment climate in the SADC region was discussed. Some criticism was meted out 
against the study, mainly on its statement that the investment promotion agencies 
(IPAs) in SADC were failing to market the region successfully. Most IPAs felt 
prejudiced by the lack of  full support from their respective governments. Competition 
between IPAs in the region was also felt to be a problem, leading to "beggar-thy-
neighbour" policies. It was felt that the solution to this did not lie in outright 
competition but, because they serve a common market, IPAs should instead develop 
working relationships. 
At the same meeting it was agreed that all IPAs in the region will be required to 
provide inputs into the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol. As a step towards this 
end, a six  -country working group was formed. 
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Summary of Good Practices in Tax and Tariff Systems 
t  Theoretical and practical considerations have yielded a set of  best practices in 
tax and tariff systems in developing countries. Good tax systems are those that 
cause a minimum of  distortion in resource allocation, and are equitable and 
easy to administer. 
t  Taxes on international trade should play a minimal role. Import tariffs should 
have a low average rate and limited dispersion of  rates to reduce arbitrary and 
excessive rates of  protection. Exporters should have duties rebated on inputs 
used for producing exports. Export duties should be avoided. 
t  The introduction or strengthening of  a broad-based consumption tax (covering 
manufacturing, import, and distribution sectors), notably a VAT, preferably 
with a single rate and minimal exemptions, and a threshold to exclude small 
enterprises. Excises should be restricted to a limited set of  products. VAT and 
excises should be applied equally to imports and domestic products. 
t  The corporate income tax should be levied at one moderate rate. Depreciation 
allowances should be uniform across sectors. There should be little use of  tax 
incentives. The personal income tax should be characterized by only a few 
brackets and a moderate top marghal rate; limited personal exemptions and 
deductions; a standard exemption that excludes persons with low incomes; and 
extensive use of final withholding. 
t  The reforms above may be usefully complemented by the introduction of  a 
simplified tax regime for small businesses and the informal sector. 
t  Tax and customs administration reforms should modernize systems and 
procedures. Simplification of  the tax and tariff systems is a prerequisite for 
administrative reforms. Typically reforms stress the reorganization of  tax and 
customs administrations along functional lines; the adoption of  effective 
procedures for a national system of  unique taxpayer identification numbers; 
strengthening of  audit; and improvement of  taxpayer services. 
Computerization is generally a central component of  reforms along with 
upgrading of  skills of  tax and customs officers, and providing them with 
administrative autonomy and pay incentives. 
Source: IMF Reports SM/981254 Supplement I of  November 17,  1998 
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Notes on Institutional and Other Requirements for Implementation 
1.  These notes supplement the options for institutional arrangements set out 
in Table A (Section F) and indicate some of  the main preparatory steps required to 
implement the actions under the Road Map for Investment Facilitation. The topic 
headings are set out in the same order as the actions are described in Section E and as 
listed in Table A. 
Trade Reform 
2.  The institutional arrangements for implementing the proposed actions 
should be the same as those which have applied for the trade reforms carried out under 
the Road Map for Trade Reform. The one possible qualification is that, in keeping 
with the aim to build an improved image, it may, where feasible, be desirable to seek 
greater private sector participation in the process. 
Regional Promotion Efforts 
Simplifying Investment Codes and Approval Procedures and Regulatory 
Provisions 
3.  Ultimately, the simplification of  investment codes and regulatory 
provisions (which have already begun at the national level and is well advanced in 
some countries) will result in the adoption of  a common code and regulatory regime. 
Although decisions and actual implementation will take place at the national level, 
preparatory work will need to be undertaken at the regional level to compare current 
codes and practices in the various CBI participating countries and to suggest the 
common codes and provisions that the countries should adopt over an agreed 
timeframe. 
4.  In each country, the key institutions to carry out this work will be the 
investment promotion agency and the government legal office. The first step would be 
for the PICs and TWGs to brief  these institutions on the CBI and to agree a plan of 
action, allocation of  responsibilities, and arrangements for reporting on progress. The 
TWGs could assume the temporary role of  monitoring progress and facilitate the 
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have published a single document which sets out its investment code, approval 
procedures, and regulations. By that time, long term arrangements for coordinating 
national and regional level work should be established. Although responsibilities for 
implementation will rest with public agencies, the private sector should be closely 
involved and relevant business and professional associations consulted on possible 
changes. To both speed up the process and to ensure broad private sector participation, 
as much of  the detailed work as possible should be contracted out to professional firms. 
5.  Work at the regional level is required both to monitor and coordinate 
changes occurring in the countries and to propose policies and procedures for adoption 
by the CBI participating countries. This work could be undertaken by a coordinating 
committee established for this specific purpose or by one (or more) of  the regional 
economic institutions. A coordinating committee might have insufficient status and be 
difficult to organize and manage; and it would be tantamount to establishing another 
institution. Use of  one of  the existing regional institutions to head up this work would 
appear to be more practical, and would be consistent with their roles. The participating 
countries will have to decide which institution they wish to approach to assume this 
responsibility. 
Joint Promotion 
6.  The key to success in joint promotion will be a focused campaign, 
professionally designed and executed, and supported by consistent application of  the 
general conditions for attracting investment. To achieve this, the bulk of  the effort and 
representation must come from the private sector; and a public relations firm, with 
experience and skills of  international promotion activities and image building, should 
be appointed to advise and assist. A regional private sector institution will have to be 
selected or formed which will organize this work. One possibility might be to form 
one or more regional chambers of  commerce, but institutions such as the East African 
Enterprise Network, the Southern African Enterprise Network, the Africa Business 
Round Table, and ESABO should also be considered; and they should certainly be 
involved. In addition, the TWGs will have to identify appropriate private sector 
institutions in their individual countries and consider how best to involve them, and 
through which institutions. 
7.  Joint promotion can-and, indeed, should-be undertaken between 
several as well as all participating countries. What is important is consistency in the 
messages sent to the market(s). Certain institutions at the national level, who have a 
key stake in the success of  promotional activities, will need to contribute information 
and resources to the effort. The key stakeholders will most likely be the investment 
promotion agency, business associations (including, for example, chambers of 
commerce, manufacturers' associations, and professional bodies) and government 
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overall coordination arrangements have been agreed by the CBI participating 
countries, the first step would be for each TWG to identify and brief  the stakeholders 
on the CBI and the investment facilitation road map, and to agree on mechanisms to 
ensure their participation in promotion efforts. 
8.  Promotional activities will not centre on the CBI participating countries as 
a defined group but rather on investment in countries in East and Southern Africa and 
the Indian Ocean and in Africa as a whole. The success of  these efforts will be of 
interest to the regional institutions referred to above (COMESA, EAC, IOC, and 
SADC) and also to the Africa-wide bodies, such as EAC and OAU. 
Setting Up and Maintaining the CBI Information Website 
9.  It was agreed at the meeting of  the TWGs in Mauritius in November 1998 
to establish a CBI website to facilitate the exchange of  information and lessons of 
experience among the participating countries. This website, which will be hosted and 
maintained by the African Development Bank, could also be used to support 
investment promotion. As with any website, its use and relevance will be determined 
by the coverage and quality of  the information posted. To help ensure quality, the 
Steering Committee of  the Co-sponsors will oversee development and maintenance of 
the website. Whilst the institution selected to head up joint promotion efforts will use 
the CBI website as one of several vehicles for announcements and advertising, the 
main data sources will be TWGs, investment promotion agencies, business 
associations, central banks, and government ministries. One question to be resolved is 
which, if  any,  ins-~itution should be responsible for vetting country data before it is 
passed to the AfDB for posting on the website. In the meantime, the TWGs should 
help get the website up and running as soon as possible by contributing whatever data 
they can. Improvements in content and design can follow. 
Examining the Feasibility of Cross-Border Investment Funds 
10.  This is a proposal of  particular interest to privatization agencies and those 
working in the capital market, including merchant banks and the stock exchanges; and, 
since they are crucial to this initiative and have a vested interest in the outcome of  the 
study, they should be closely involved. Regional agencies too would be interested in this 
study but, because of  the capital market nature, the research and preparatory work would 
be best undertaken by persons with considerable fund management experience. At this 
stage, given their involvement in supporting capital market development in many African 
countries and their frequent contacts and experience of  relevant professional firms, it 
would probably be most practical to invite one of  the co-sponsors to take responsibility for 
the study, which would include a review of  the options for implementation. 
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Improving the Information and Travel Environment 
11.  This action will involve institutions who have a stake from a business 
perspective (such as business associations) and those who, in addition to their business 
interest, would have an important role to play in implementation (such as the 
investment promotion agency, airports and port authorities, and immigration, customs, 
and tax authorities). While all these institutions have something to gain from this, 
there is much to do to redirect the attitudes and perspectives of  their staff towards 
attracting investors and establishing a working rapport between the public and private 
sectors. 
Improving Security 
12.  The need to improve security is a rather general requirement which falls 
outside the remit of  the agencies mentioned so far. However, the reality and/or 
perception of  security problems can be a strong deterrent to investment, so a set of 
actions to attract investment would be incomplete without addressing this issue in 
territories where it applies. Business associations and the sector ministries keen to 
mobilize investment can advise on the measures they think should be taken to improve 
security but the onus for action will rest with the security agencies and their parent 
ministry. 
Assisting Local Entrepreneurs 
13.  Assistance to local entrepreneurs and investors may be needed in those 
countries which were for some years under a command economy regime. Lack of, or 
insufficient knowledge of, investment vehicles and ways to raise capital restricts the 
potential that exists. Where this situation is applicable, investment promotion efforts 
can be supported by the provision of  information to local investors and of  training to 
entrepreneurs. Investment promotion agencies have a specific role to provide 
information to potential investors on different types of  investment opportunities; and 
many agencies receive donor support for this activity. Generally, however, the 
emphasis is on attracting inward investment from developed or emerging economies. 
Under the investment facilitation road map, equal emphasis would be given to 
stimulating local and cross-border investment. 
14.  Training, encompassing such topics as corporate governance, preparing 
business plans, raising capital, marketing, quality control, and business administration, 
must be accessible and affordable. Relevant training materials already exist on these 
topics and these can be adapted and translated to suit local needs. Institutions most 
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associations (particularly professional firms), and banks. Clearly identified needs can 
often be met through donor-supported training projects and the institutional 
arrangements would be defined during project design. 
Promoting Interaction between Local and Foreign Investors 
15.  Both new foreign investors and local investors requiring a foreign 
technical partner seek appropriate counterparts. Whilst the Internet is providing an 
easier way to ascertain information and make contacts it is not yet readily available to 
most small African businessmen and presentational quality, data reliability, and cost 
are constraints. Hence, business associations, the investment promotion agency, and 
sector ministries (particularly the Ministry of  Trade & Industry or equivalent) have an 
important role to play in bringing together local and foreign investors. Overall 
responsibility for promoting a good interaction between these two groups of  investors 
surely rests with the investment promotion agency. Where they have not already done 
so, two early steps that they should take are: (i) setting up and maintaining databases 
of foreign and local investors; and (ii) collecting information from past deals, current 
investors, and from business associations in order to better understand the 
requirements for facilitating introductions and for ensuring a better interaction. 
Selective Legal and Judicial Reforms 
16.  Professor Winston P. Nagan, Professor of  Law at the University of  Florida, 
and Professor Dean Visser, Dean and Professor of  Law at the University of  Cape 
Town, have prepared a document setting out their proposal for a project to harmonize 
the commercial laws of Southern Africa (SADC countries). Their proposal 
encompasses company law, insolvency, recognition and enforcement of  foreign 
judgements, conflicts of  law, industrial property rights, banking law, contracts, 
consumer protection, labour, shipping law, environmental law, and taxation. They 
envisage three phases with the first phase taking three years and the second phase 5-10 
years. While the selective and judicial reforms in this Road Map are parallel only with 
their first phase, the CBI participating countries might, nevertheless, wish to consider 
the longer term prospect of  harmonization of  commercial laws and the possibility of 
using a project management arrangement similar to that proposed by Professors Nagan 
and Visser. 
Creating a Regional Enterprise Legal Form 
17.  As the CBI countries move towards greater integration and already have a 
shared need and desire to increase investment, especially cross-border, so the 
argument for eliminating unnecessary barriers to investment grows. One such barrier 
is the legal requirement in every country for a continuing business to be registered, 
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the cost of  doing business significantly lower if  a company registered in one CBI 
country were to be recognized throughout the participating countries and were thereby 
able to commence commercial activity in any other of  those countries without the need 
to incorporate a new and separate legal entity. For this to be feasible, the participating 
countries would have to adopt common registration requirements and procedures. 
18.  At the national level, given the need to amend existing legislation, the 
government legal office would have prime responsibility for this action. This office 
should liaise with the registrar of  companies, the accounting and legal professions, and 
business associations in order to canvas their experiences, ideas and support. Since, in 
some countries, incorporation triggers tax registration and there may be differences in 
tax provisions for different types of  companies, it will be essential to involve the tax 
authorities; and it may be necessary to establish an alternative tax registration 
mechanism. However, the essential point to be borne in mind is that the changes are to 
be designed to be investor friendly, not merely the adoption of  a set of  uniform but 
complicated provisions and requirements. 
19.  The creation of  a "regional enterprise" form does not necessarily imply the 
introduction of  a new, additional category of  incorporated company; it could be 
achieved merely by a country recognizing the registration of  a company in another 
participating country (most usually a company with limited liability and the liability 
limited to the amount of  the called up capital). Overall regional coordination would 
have to be provided to ensure legal consistency between participating countries. Since 
all CBI participating countries are members either of  CO  MESA or SADC or both, 
they would appear to be the logical institutions to be assigned this responsibility. 
Adoption of  Common Registration Procedures 
20.  At the national level, this action should be the responsibility of  the 
company registrar (or equivalent in the non-Anglophone countries), under the overall 
umbrella of  the government legal office which would draft and process any necessary 
legislative changes. Inputs would also be required of  the tax authorities, and the 
accounting and legal professions (who typically handle registration procedures on 
behalf of  clients). Investment promotion agencies should also be consulted as they will 
have to advise investors of  forthcoming changes. 
21.  At the regional level, it would also be logical for this action to be 
coordinated by COMESA/SADC. However, there will need to be close consultation 
among the company registration bodies in the CBI participating countries in order to 
agree on the common procedures and the specifications for the system for accessing 
and transferring registration data across borders. The latter is an essential step before 
being able to adopt the regional enterprise form. 
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22.  In many African countries, the difficulties experienced by creditors 
wishing to pursue recovery claims through the courts - whether due to significant 
delays in reaching a final settlement or because of  the uncertain outcome despite 
clarity in the legislation-is a major deterrent to investment. Existing investors testify 
to these difficulties; and it applies not only to them but also to lending institutions 
(which, in part, explains the acute shortage of  term lending in most CBI countries). 
The establishment of  separate commercial courts, with specific responsibility for 
hearing and deciding on these cases and with the requisite expertise to do so, would 
represent a major step to facilitate investment. 
23.  Overall responsibility at the national level would fall to the Ministry of 
Justice, while the legal profession would provide important inputs to the design of 
streamlined case application, submission, and hearing procedures. The Ministries of 
Justice would need to coordinate to ensure consistency and this could be facilitated by 
COMESA which has recently established its regional commercial court in Lusaka. 
Selective Tax Reforms 
Lowering of  Import Tariffs in Line with CBI Road Map for Trade Reform 
24.  The first step in the proposed selective tax reforms, the lowering of  import 
tariffs in line with the CBI road map on harmonization of  tariffs, would be a 
continuation of  the existing initiatives which are currently under way. The existing 
institutional arrangements will suffice for this purpose. 
Simplifying the Income Tax Structure and Introducing Lower Tax Rates 
25.  At the national level, responsibility for simplifying the income tax 
structure and lowering rates rests with the Ministry of  Finance and its relevant tax 
authority. However, in the general spirit of  private/public dialogue and the specific 
joint aim to facilitate investment, the ministry and tax authority should hold detailed 
consultations with the accounting profession, business associations, and the 
investment promotion agency. 
26.  Regional institutions will not be directly involved but they will act as an 
important source of  comparative information on experiences among CBI and other 
countries. 
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27.  This action will involve the same institutions as for the previous item. 
However, the focus is different. Simplifying the structure and reducing rates would be 
designed to make investment more attractive whilst not adversely affecting the 
government budget; improving tax administration would be aimed at improving the 
manner in which tax assessment and collection are administered. The aim would be to 
introduce changes whereby assessment and collection procedures would be 
streamlined, with the tax authority providing a speedy and cordial service, with steps 
taken to minimize unprofessional behaviour. Again, the consultative process, and the 
tax authority's responsiveness to proposals, will be important to making real progress. 
Concluding Double Taxation Agreements 
28.  Conclusion of  double taxation agreements, obviously a matter for the 
respective finance ministries and their tax authorities, should be undertaken in the 
three stages proposed in the road map. The first stage, conclusion of  agreements 
among CBI participating countries, could be greatly facilitated if  a standard form and 
content were to be adopted. Finance ministries should consult with the accounting 
professions (who work on the details of  their practical application) and with the 
regional economic institutions to develop a standard agreement. 
Africa Achievements Awards 
29.  This proposal could not only provide the incentives referred to in the road 
map, it could also help to identify success stories to be used for investment promotion. 
However, it must be launched and administered professionally; otherwise it could 
cause embarrassment and have a negative impact on image. Also, to attract the interest 
of  sponsors and entrants, it will require a credible institutional umbrella, one that has a 
good reputation in the private sector. For this reason it would be preferable that the 
awards scheme be administered by a private organization. Consideration should be 
given to using the newly established enterprise networks since these are attractive to 
fledgling businesses, have no hint of  political affiliations, and have the enthusiasm and 
understanding of  what is required. To broaden the field to embrace countries outside 
the CBI and the enterprise networks, organizations such as the Africa Business 
Roundtable could be involved. The first step would be to consult with these and 
similar organizations to ascertain their views, to specify the scope of  the scheme, to 
discuss how the scheme would be administered, what it would cost, and to identify 
possible sponsors. The selected organization(s) should then prepare a document 
setting out the outcome of  the consultations which could be adapted to mobilize 
sponsorship and would later form the basis of  a brochure on the scheme for 
distribution to firms throughout the CBI participating countries. 
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1.  Lors du troisième Conseil des ministres de 1  'Initiative trans  frontalière (ITF) 
qui s'est tenu à Hararé en février 1998, les pays participants sont convenus de poursuivre 
et d'élargir l'ITF, et d'axer les activités futures  de l'Initiative sur la promotion de 
1  'investissement. Les participants ont prié les organismes de parrainage de 1  'ITF (BAfD, 
UE, FMI et Banque mondiale) de préparer un schéma directeur à cette fin. La première 
ébauche de ce document a été examinée par les groupes de travail techniques (GTT) à 
Maurice, en novembre 1998, et cet exercice a débouché sur la préparation du présent 
document qui sera présenté à la quatrième réunion ministérielle. Les pays participants 
pourront utiliser ce schéma directeur individuellement ou conjointement pour promouvoir 
et faciliter les investissements provenant de l'intérieur comme de l'extérieur de la zone 
visée par l'ITF. 
2.  Si le présent schéma directeur a été conçu à l'intérieur du cadre de l'ITF, il 
n'en demeure pas moins applicable par d'autres pays ne participant pas à 1  'ITF. Il pourra 
donc être diffusé, par l'entremise de la Coalition mondiale pour l'Afrique, à d'autres 
organisations régionales et sous-régionales africaines qui pourront participer à sa mise 
en œuvre et en tirer parti. 
Performance récente de l'ITF en matière d'investissement et d'épargne 
3.  Un examen sélectif  de la performance des pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne et 
des pays de l'ITF en matière de croissance et d'investissement révèle les tendances 
principales suivantes : 
t  même si la croissance réelle moyenne du PIB a amorcé une remontée en Afrique 
sub-saharienne au cours des récentes années, tout indique que : (i) la crise est-
asiatique et l'intensification des conflits armés annoncent l'arrivée d'une nouvelle 
et imprévisible période d'incertitude; (ii) la croissance des pays d'Afrique sub-
saharienne et des pays de l'ITF au cours des quelques prochaines années ne sera 
vraisemblablement pas suffisamment robuste et diversifiée pour assurer une 
amélioration sensible du niveau de vie des habitants; 
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minimal de 25 %du PIB suggéré par la Coalition mondiale pour l'Afrique; 
t  l'investissement direct étranger (IDE) dans les pays en développement a augmenté 
entre  1990 et 1996, mais ces apports ont surtout été concentrés dans un petit 
groupe de pays dont aucun n'appartenait à l'Afrique sub-saharienne; l'IDE a 
certes augmenté dans les pays de l'ITF de 1993 à 1997, mais il n'a pas dépassé 
1,2 % du PIB de ces pays; 
t  de 1994 à 1998, la part du PIB consacrée à l'épargne n'a pas augmenté dans les 
pays de l'ITF. 
4.  On peut tirer de ce qui précède les principales leçons suivantes : 
t  la confiance des investisseurs est fondée non seulement sur 1' idée que les réformes 
sont solides, mais aussi qu'elles sont mises en œuvre de façon suivie et soutenue; 
t  même dans certains des pays ayant entamé des réformes en vertu de 1  'ITF, les 
efforts de réforme (dont les effets ne se font généralement sentir qu'à long terme) 
n'ont pas été poursuivis avec suffisamment de persévérance pour regagner la 
confiance des investisseurs; 
t  du point de  vue des investisseurs, les conditions qui existent actuellement en 
Afrique ne sont pas propices aux affaires; 
t  si l'évaluation des risques laisse constater une certaine amélioration de la situation 
depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'ITF dans les pays participants, aucun de ces derniers 
n'a encore réussi à maintenir un faible niveau de risque à long terme; 
t  il faudra faire un effort concerté, sur une période prolongée, pour établir fermement 
de meilleures conditions générales pour attirer l'investissement et façonner une 
image plus positive. 
Conditions essentielles pour attirer l'investissement 
5.  De nombreuses mesures ont déjà été prises en faveur de  l'investissement 
dans le cadre de 1  'ITF, mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire, notamment dans les domaines 
suivants: 
t  La stabilité  politique. Les pays de l'ITF pourraient progresser considérablement 
dans l'estime des investisseurs s'ils déclaraient de façon explicite qu'ils 
considèrent la stabilité régionale comme un impératif primordial. 
p.  188 •  La bonne gestion  des  affaires publiques et privées.  La préférence des 
investisseurs va aux pays dirigés par un gouvernement démocratique et ouvert, 
qui agit dans la transparence et est prêt à s'attaquer à la corruption à tous les 
niveaux de la société. En plus de réformer le  secteur public par le biais de la 
privatisation, les pouvoirs publics doivent également : 
•  s'attaquer à la corruption ou se montrer prêts à s y attaquer sérieusement; 
•  réorganiser et réorienter les institutions publiques de sorte qu'elles procurent 
des services qui faciliteront les activités des investisseurs plutôt que de les 
réglementer. 
t  Les réformes et la  stabilité macroéconomique. Grâce aux programmes 
d'ajustement, les pays de l'ITF sont parvenus dans une certaine mesure à assurer 
une croissance économique par habitant continue et largement répartie,  des 
positions extérieures plus solides, des taux d'inflation faibles et en diminution, 
une progression maîtrisée des variables monétaires et une meilleure gestion 
budgétaire. Il n'en reste pas moins nécessaire : 
•  d'exercer plus de  vigilance sur le plan macroéconomique pour pouvoir 
surmonter les tempêtes qui secouent actuellement l'ensemble de l'économie 
mondiale et menacent d'annuler les gains si chèrement acquis par la région; 
•  de poursuivre les réformes des finances publiques, tant du côté des recettes 
que du côté des dépenses, qui sont indispensables pour étayer les mesures de 
promotion de l'investissement décrites dans le présent document; 
•  de restructurer les dépenses publiques pour réduire le fardeau du service de 
la dette afin de réaffecter les ressources limitées au profit de la santé et de 
l'éducation et de l'infrastructure matérielle. 
t  La libéralisation du commerce extérieur. Le schéma directeur de l'ITF pour la 
réforme des régimes du commerce extérieur préconise la simplification, la 
rationalisation et la réduction des tarifs douaniers. Jusqu'à présent, des progrès 
importants mais inégaux ont été accomplis, et il convient d'accélérer la mise en 
œuvre de  cette réforme afin de  réduire davantage le biais anti-exportation, 
d'encourager l'utilisation des technologies étrangères et d'exploiter l'avantage 
comparatif. 
•  L'intégration des marchés. En dépit des progrès accomplis ces dernières années 
sur le plan de la croissance économique, l'Afrique est en train de perdre sa part 
déjà faible des marchés mondiaux. En plus de poursuivre ses efforts à l'intégration 
dans l'économie mondiale, elle aurait donc intérêt à promouvoir l'intégration 
des marchés régionaux afin de multiplier les occasions d'investissement et de 
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en particulier, de la taille actuelle des économies des pays de 1  'ITF. Les efforts 
actuels de certains pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest et d'Afrique centrale constituent 
des exemples à suivre. 
t  La libéralisation des  régimes de  change. Des progrès remarquables ont été 
accomplis en matière de libéralisation des régimes de change, et il faut poursuivre 
les efforts afin de : i) supprimer le reste des restrictions afférentes aux transactions 
courantes (ce qui exige notamment la résorption des arriérés; ii) libéraliser encore 
plus les mouvements de  capitaux, ainsi que les règles de rapatriement et de 
rétrocession des devises. 
t  La déréglementation de l'investissement. Les procédures d'approbation ont bien 
été libéralisées, mais les progrès ont été lents ou inégaux en ce qui concerne la 
conclusion d'accords de double imposition, l'autorisation des cotations croisées 
en bourse et la solution des problèmes du marché du travail. 
t  La cohérence des politiques et de leur application. Gagner la confiance des 
investisseurs est un travail de longue haleine et il faut pour cela créer les conditions 
nécessaires et les maintenir à long terme. 
Principales mesures requises pour faire augmenter l'investissement à moyen 
terme 
6.  Les investisseurs ne sont pas tous homogènes et ils accordent des priorités 
différentes à des facteurs différents. En plus de maintenir la stabilité macroéconomique 
et d'atteindre les objectifs fixés par l'ITF en matière de réforme du commerce, d'autres 
grands domaines d'action peuvent également servir à  attirer et à  promouvoir 
1' investissement : 
t  La réforme fiscale.  Cette réforme pourrait viser les objectifs suivants : 
abaissement des taux d'imposition; suppression des exonérations temporaires; 
amélioration des méthodes de calcul et de recouvrement des impôts; conclusion 
de traités de double imposition entre les pays de  l'ITF, ainsi qu'avec leurs 
partenaires commerciaux traditionnels et potentiels. 
t  Les réformes juridiques et judiciaires.  Des réformes sont nécessaires pour 
protéger les droits de paiement et de propriété et pour redorer le blason du système 
judiciaire en assurant le traitement des réclamations dans des délais raisonnables, 
conformément à  la bonne application des lois pertinentes. Les principaux 
domaines qui devraient faire l'objet de réformes sont: le droit des sociétés, le 
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les droits de propriété. Il ne suffira pas de rédiger de nouvelles lois pour obtenir 
les changements souhaités; les réformes judiciaires sont également nécessaires 
pour veiller à ce  que les lois  soient bien appliquées.  Soumis aux pressions 
inhérentes à la mondialisation, les pays de l'ITF devront finir par adopter, à long 
terme, des lois communes sur le commerce et le travail. 
t  Les réformes institutionnelles. Même si la plupart des pays de  l'ITF se  sont 
dotés d'agences de  promotion des  investissements qui  constituent en fait un 
guichet unique,  il  n'en reste pas moins nécessaire de  réformer l'appareil 
réglementaire et administratif afin de réduire le coût de la conduite des affaires et 
de  démontrer que les procédures sont appliquées systématiquement et 
efficacement. D'autres mesures s'imposent également pour encourager le 
développement des professions comptable, bancaire et juridique. 
t  Le développement du  secteur financier.  Il  convient de porter une  attention 
spéciale à la  création d'instruments qui favoriseront l'épargne intérieure et 
l'investissement à moyen et à long terme. Par ailleurs, les entreprises ont besoin 
de  pouvoir compter sur une gamme améliorée de  services financiers qui leur 
permettront de fonctionner plus efficacement. Il convient d'avancer rapidement 
dans les secteurs suivants : 
•  financement à moyen et long terme : vu la faible réaction de 1' offre, il faut 
encourager la croissance des institutions privées qui  fournissent des  fonds 
propres et du crédit à long terme; 
•  intermédiation financière : il faut s'efforcer de sensibiliser les épargnants aux 
possibilités d'investissement à long terme en actions ainsi qu'à l'existence 
d'autres instruments financiers,  et élargir les marchés pour multiplier les 
occasions d'investissement. Toutefois, un marché de capitaux régional et la 
multiplication des cotations croisées ne pourront être réalisés que si les capitaux 
et dividendes peuvent franchir librement les frontières,  et cela présuppose 
l'acceptation de normes et procédures communes; 
•  services directs à la clientèle : il faut utiliser les ressources technologiques les 
plus avancées pour améliorer et étendre la gamme des services à la clientèle. 
t  La mise en  valeur des  ressources humaines. Les  investisseurs préfèrent les 
endroits où ils peuvent trouver une main-d'œuvre qualifiée, mobile, efficace et 
bon marché.  Les efforts de  coopération et d'harmonisation entre participants 
peuvent notamment mener à l'adoption de  normes communes d'éducation 
technique et de  normes internationales communes à 1  'usage des  organismes 
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d'accroître l'efficacité de  la main-d'œuvre. Malheureusement, les ravages du 
VIH et du SIDA en Afrique de  l'Est et en Afrique australe se répercutent 
actuellement sur tous les secteurs et tous les aspects du développement, y compris 
l'investissement. Les pays de  l'ITF doivent donc unir leurs forces pour lutter 
contre ce fléau. 
•  La crédibilité de la privatisation. Outre qu'elle permet de catalyser d'importants 
flux d'IDE, la privatisation aide également à établir et développer la concurrence 
et fournit un tremplin au développement du secteur privé. L'impression dominante 
est que les dirigeants africains ont accepté la privatisation à contrecœur. Le manque 
d'information du public et de transparence est une source de préoccupation. La 
façon dont les programmes de privatisation sont gérés influe donc sur le climat 
de l'investissement de chaque pays. 
•  Des infrastructures nouvelles et revalorisées. Beaucoup des pays de l'ITF ne 
sont pas dotés d'infrastructures propres à attirer 1' investissement. En même temps 
qu'on s'applique à  corriger ce problème, des pressions supplémentaires 
s'exerceront pour qu'on utilise les  installations existantes avec un maximum 
d'efficacité. En réponse aux difficultés que le secteur public rencontre dans le 
financement et la gestion de grands et nouveaux projets d'infrastructure, il convient 
de s'appuyer sur la tendance croissante à privilégier la participation privée aux 
infrastructures en favorisant l'application stricte d'une réglementation crédible 
et l'encadrement des projets d'infrastructure dans un contexte régional pour que 
les prêts concessionnels des institutions financières internationales puissent servir 
de garantie aux investisseurs. 
•  La  promotion de l'investissement. Les pays de l'ITF ont mutuellement intérêt à 
se construire une meilleure image, qui dépeigne les succès, les ressources et les 
opportunités de ce groupe de pays. 
Proposition de programmes prioritaires 
7.  Il n'est pas possible d'aborder ici tout à la fois l'ensemble des aspects de la 
promotion des investissements. C'est la raison pour laquelle le présent schéma directeur 
définit des domaines d'action prioritaires. Le programme présenté ici ne constitue donc 
qu'une ébauche dont chaque pays pourra s'inspirer pour concevoir son propre parcours 
selon le schéma directeur. Des mesures autres que celles proposées ci-après pourraient 
donc être envisagées. On insiste surtout (mais non exclusivement) sur les initiatives 
régionales qui pourraient être mises en œuvre collectivement ou à l'unisson par les pays 
de l'ITF. Les mesures suivantes sont recommandées: 
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•  mise en  œuvre complète et rapide des réformes des  droits d'importation 
proposées dans le schéma directeur de l'ITF pour la réforme des régimes du 
commerce extérieur. Ces actions contribueraient à une meilleure harmonisation 
des régimes tarifaires des pays de l'ITF et à la réduction de leur biais anti-
exportation; 
•  officialiser les réformes tarifaires en adoptant le plafonnement tarifaire de 
l'OMC à des taux ne dépassant pas trop ceux envisagés dans le  schéma 
directeur pour la réforme des régimes du commerce extérieur. Une telle mesure 
augmenterait de beaucoup la crédibilité des pays de 1  'ITF en créant une structure 
appropriée d'incitatifs pour des investissements et des échanges commerciaux 
efficaces; 
•  dépasser les  objectifs fixés dans  le schéma directeur pour la  réforme des 
régimes du  commerce extéri.eur en réduisant encore le taux maximum, le 
nombre de taux appliqués et le tarif  moyen pondéré par les échanges (comme 
l'a fait l'Ouganda). De tels efforts seront d'une grande utilité pour aider les 
pays de l'ITF à intégrer l'économie mondiale et à demeurer concurrentiels. 
t  Promotion de 1  'investissement : 
•  au  niveau régional (!TF).  Les pays doivent coopérer à la promotion en : 
i) mettant sur pied une campagne de relations publiques pour améliorer la 
réputation du climat des affaires; ii) partageant l'information en créant un site 
Internet consacré à l'ITF; iii) étudiant la faisabilité de la création de fonds 
d'investissement transfrontaliers; 
•  au niveau national. Il convient d'élaborer et de mettre en œuvre un train de 
réformes en vue d'améliorer l'information et les services et de faire en sorte 
que 1' on puisse se rendre dans chacun des pays de 1  'ITF sans craindre d'être 
importuné et en toute sécurité. Les GTT peuvent jouer un rôle important aux 
niveaux régional et national. 
t  Réformes juridiques et  judiciaires sélectives : 
•  reconnaissance de l'« entreprise régionale». Une société serait considérée 
comme une entreprise régionale à partir de sa constitution dans 1  'un des pays 
participants, quelle que soit la nationalité du propriétaire; 
•  adoption de procédures communes d'enregistrement des sociétés et des 
succursales. L'adoption de procédures communes représenterait un premier 
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propriété; 
•  création de tribunaux de commerce distincts. Une procédure accélérée est 
nécessaire afin que les bailleurs de fonds soient sûrs de pouvoir recouvrer 
leurs créances en cas de cessation de paiement. 
•  Réformes fiscales sélectives : 
•  taxes sur les biens et services. Il conviendrait d'élargir l'assiette fiscale par 
l'instauration d'une taxe nationale à taux unique et sans effet de cascade; 
•  impôts sur le revenu et les bénéfices. Des mesures devraient être prises pour 
simplifier l'impôt sur le revenu et les bénéfices et réduire les taux d'imposition 
à des niveaux propres à décourager l'évasion fiscale; 
•  mesures visant à améliorer et harmoniser l'administration fiscale et douanière; 
•  conclusion d'accords de double imposition entre les pays de l'ITF, et avec 
leurs partenaires commerciaux traditionnels et d'autres pays qui présentent la 
possibilité d'attirer l'investissement. 
•  Prix comme moyens de sensibilisation et d'incitation privés. Le schéma directeur 
propose également la création d'un prix annuel d'excellence en Afrique pour 
inciter le secteur privé à améliorer la qualité de ses services et ses résultats et 
pour assurer une meilleure diffusion de l'information. 
Il convient de noter que pour que les mesures énumérées ci-dessus portent fruit, il 
conviendra de créer et de maintenir les conditions propices, énumérées au paragraphe 5, 
pour attirer 1' investissement. 
Exigences institutionnelles et autres aux fins de l'exécution 
8.  Pour mettre en œuvre toutes ces mesures, les pays de l'ITF devront 
obligatoirement s'entendre sur les arrangements institutionnels appropriés qui devraient 
de préférence mettre 1' accent sur la participation du secteur privé. Pour favoriser ce 
processus, le  schéma directeur suggère des arrangements institutionnels et des étapes 
préparatoires à la mise en œuvre des actions immédiates proposées. 
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1.  Lors de la troisième réunion ministérielle des pays de 1  'ITF qui s'est tenue à 
Hararé en février 1998, les pays participants ont décidé de poursuivre et d'élargir l'ITF. 
Ils se sont également accordés sur une accélération du programme d'action de l'ITF, 
notamment dans  le domaine de la promotion de l'investissement, y  compris 
1  'harmonisation des politiques nationales et régionales, afin de créer un climat propice à 
des investissements efficaces. Ils ont également prié les organismes de parrainage (Banque 
africaine de développement, Commission européenne, Fonds monétaire international et 
Banque mondiale) de préparer une proposition-cadre pour 1' élaboration et la mise en 
œuvre d'un programme décrivant les mesures que pourrait prendre chaque pays participant 
à l'ITF afin d'encourager et de faciliter l'investissement en provenance de ces pays et 
d'ailleurs. Ce document, sorte de schéma directeur pour la promotion de l'investissement, 
a été préparé en réponse à cette requête. Il a été examiné par les Groupes de travail 
techniques (GTT) lors de leur quatrième réunion tenue à Maurice, en novembre 1998, et 
la présente version reflète les commentaires formulés  à cette occasion. Le présent 
document doit servir de cadre aux discussions qui auront lieu lors de la quatrième réunion 
ministérielle qui se tiendra à Maurice, en 1999. Cette réunion sera également 1  'occasion 
d'examiner et d'entériner les mesures que les pays de  l'ITF devront prendre pour 
harmoniser leur action de manière à ce que tous en recueillent les fruits. 
2.  Le présent document s'articule comme suit.  La section B  résume la 
performance récente des pays de l'ITF en matière d'investissement et d'épargne. La 
section C décrit les conditions de base requises pour attirer les investissements. On y 
résume les progrès accomplis dans le cadre de l'ITF sur le plan de la libéralisation des 
régimes de  change,  des réformes commerciales et de  la déréglementation de 
l'investissement qui sont essentiels pour la promotion de l'investissement. La section D 
énumère les mesures nécessaires pour attirer plus d'investissements à moyen terme, en 
mettant l'accent sur celles qui joueraient à l'avantage mutuel des pays de l'ITF. La section 
E dresse la liste des actions immédiates de promotion de l'investissement- à mettre en 
œuvre collectivement ou à 1  'unisson-qui pourraient donner lieu à des progrès mesurables 
sur une période de  temps relativement courte. La section F  examine les exigences 
institutionnelles et autres à respecter pour la mise en œuvre de ces actions. 
3.  Si le présent schéma directeur a été conçu à l'intérieur du cadre de l'ITF, il 
n'en demeure pas moins applicable par d'autres pays ne participant pas à l'ITF. Il pourra 
donc être diffusé, par l'entremise de la Coalition mondiale pour l'Afrique, à d'autres 
organisations régionales et sous-régionales africaines qui pourront participer à sa mise 
en œuvre et en tirer parti. 
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d'épargne 
4.  S'il est vrai que la croissance réelle du PIB en Afrique a  amorcé une 
remontée bienvenue, se situant à environ 5% en 1996 (5,9% pour l'ensemble des 
pays de l'ITF), on est encore loin du niveau nécessaire pour réduire la pauvreté. Bien 
que la tendance de la période  1995-1997 soit encourageante, tout indique que de 
nombreuses économies africaines ont régressé en 1998, subissant le contrecoup de la 
crise financière est-asiatique et de conflits armés. Le taux de croissance global du PIB 
des pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne en 1998 a subi une baisse estimée à plus de 2% par 
rapport au niveau de 1997, pour se situer à environ 1,4 %. Notons toutefois que dans 
les pays de l'ITF, le taux de croissance du PIB a atteint 3,4% en moyenne et que ces 
pays ont donc réussi dans l'ensemble à maintenir leur taux de croissance au niveau de 
celui de 1' année précédente. 
5.  En dépit des progrès accomplis ces dernières années sur le plan de la 
croissance économique, 1  'Afrique est en train de perdre sa part déjà faible des marchés 
mondiaux. En plus de trouver des moyens d'intégrer le marché mondial, les pays doivent 
également examiner les possibilités d'étendre et de diversifier les marchés régionaux. À 
1  'heure actuelle, le commerce régional en Afrique sub-saharienne, tout en étant plus 
important au niveau sous-régional, ne représente qu'environ 7% du commerce total.
1 
Les tendances en matière d'investissement sont également inférieures aux niveaux 
souhaités. Dans un rapport récent de la Coalition mondiale pour l'  Afrique2 , on lit «qu'il 
faut faire passer le niveau des investissements en Afrique de ses taux actuels de 16-18 % 
du PIB à un taux annuel de 25 % ou mieux, pour mettre la région sur la voie d'une 
croissance et d'une réduction de  la pauvreté soutenue et adéquate.» Non seulement 
importe-t-il d'augmenter le niveau des investissements, mais il faut également en améliorer 
la qualité.  3 
6.  Les données portant sur le niveau des investissements intérieurs bruts de 
1  'ensemble des pays de 1  'ITF, comparativement au reste de 1  'Afrique (annexe II), 
montrent que : i) l'investissement intérieur brut de l'ensemble des pays de l'ITF a été 
inférieur au minimum de 25 % préconisé par la Coalition mondiale pour 1  'Afrique et 
1 Le faible niveau du commerce régional en Afrique sub-saharienne est dû principalement à la structure de production et d'exportations axée 
principalement sur les besoins des pays industrialisés. Il convient toutefois de souligner que le secteur du commerce sous-régional est plus actif 
(par exemple, environ 10% au sein de l'UEMOA et 17% au sein de la SADC). Par ailleurs, il existe un important commerce transfrontalier 
non répertorié en Afrique sub-saharienne. Très récemment, on a annoncé que le volume des échanges entre les pays de la COMESA avait 
connu une croissance soutenue à 20% par année depuis 1995, et que dans la période écoulée entre 1994 et 1998, le commerce intra-COMESA 
avait triplé. 
2<Œnhancing the Investment Environment in Africa», document GCAIEC/n°2/03/l998, préparé pour la réunion du Comité économique tenue 
à Gaborone en mars 1998. La section B s'inspire beaucoup de ce rapport. 
'Pour souligner la nécessité d'améliorer la qualité des investissements, un document récent (<<ls Investment in Africa Too High or Too Low>>, 
par Devarajan, Easterly et Pack, mai 1999) présente des données qui trahissent la faible productivité des investissements en Afrique et conclut 
qu'à moins de trouver une solution pour supprimer une partie ou l'ensemble des obstacles qui ont nui, par le passé, à la productivité des 
investissements, les résultats qu'on obtiendra risquent d'être décevants. 
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(avec ou sans l'Afrique du Sud et le Nigéria); et ii) quelques-uns seulement des pays 
de 1  'ITF ont atteint 1' objectif  de 25 %et seulement trois- les  Seychelles, le Swaziland 
et Maurice - ont maintenu ce niveau depuis cinq ans. Compte tenu des limites des 
ressources publiques, il est peu vraisemblable que l'investissement public augmente 
sensiblement. En conséquence, il conviendra de mobiliser davantage l'investissement 
privé pour maintenir les niveaux cités plus haut (qui représentent la somme de 
l'investissement public et de l'investissement privé).4  Dans ce contexte, il convient de 
relever les efforts consacrés non seulement par les pays de l'ITF mais également par 
certains pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest et d'Afrique centrale à l'exploration et à l'élaboration 
de mécanismes d'élargissement des échanges commerciaux et d'amélioration du climat 
commercial national et régional.  5 
7.  La situation de l'investissement privé brut est peut-être un peu plus 
encourageante. Au cours des six dernières années, la part des investissements provenant 
du secteur privé a constamment avoisiné les deux tiers environ du total (annexe III). 
Toutefois, le niveau des investissements privés est demeuré passablement stable, à environ 
13 % du PIB. Ainsi, la plupart des pays auront beaucoup à faire pour faire passer le 
niveau des investissements au minimum préconisé de 25 % du PIB s'ils choisissent pour 
cela de mobiliser l'investissement privé. 
8.  La mondialisation des systèmes économiques et financiers a entraîné une 
croissance spectaculaire de 1  'investissement étranger privé depuis la fin des années 80. 
Ces dernières années, le montant total des flux d'investissement privé étranger en faveur 
des pays en développement a dépassé celui de 1' aide publique au développement. S'il est 
vrai que les flux  d'investissement direct étranger (IDE) en direction des pays en 
développement ont continué à augmenter de 1990 à 1996, la plupart de ces flux ont été 
concentrés dans une douzaine de pays, dont aucun ne fait partie de 1  'Afrique sub-
saharienne. En fait, la part des flux de capitaux dont les pays de cette région ont bénéficié 
est restée stationnaire, quand elle n'a pas diminué. Même si l'IDE en direction des pays 
de  l'ITF et de  l'ensemble des pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne a laissé constater une 
croissance régulière jusqu'en 1997 (annexe IV  a), ces flux nets n'ont représenté qu'environ 
1% du PIB (annexe IVb). 
9.  Il est également utile de se reporter aux données disponibles sur l'épargne 
dans les pays de l'ITF. Les données sur les taux d'épargne intérieure brute6 (en pourcentage 
411 convient de noter que l'objectif proposé de 25% du PIB présume d'une efficacité raisonnable de l'utilisation des investissements actuels et 
futurs. On peut obtenir la croissance par l'utilisation plus efficace de l'investissement, mais à l'inverse, des investissements plus importants ne 
seront pas nécessairement garants de la croissance. 
'L'Organisation pour l'harmonisation du droit des affaires en Afrique (OHADA) est une initiative visant à harmoniser le droit commercial en 
Afrique centrale et en Afrique de l'Ouest grâce à l'adoption d'  «actes uniformes», à la mise en place des procédures judiciaires appropriées et 
à la promotion de l'arbitrage. L'ouvrage intitulé <<New Business Law in Africa: OHADA», publié par Priee Waterhouse, Fidafrica, présente un 
résumé utile de cette initiative. 
'Correspondant à la différence entre le produit intérieur brut et la consommation totale. 
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augmenté par rapport au PIB dans les pays de 1  'ITF (voir annexe V). Des données limitées 
semblent par ailleurs indiquer qu'il en est de même pour 1' épargne nationale brute 
7  (annexe 
VI), avec des niveaux légèrement plus élevés. Pour achever le tableau, l'annexe VII 
indique les taux d'épargne extérieure
8  de chaque pays, qui sont presque tous affectés 
d'un signe négatif. 
C.  Conditions essentielles pour attirer l'investissement 
1  O.  Les statistiques de la section B démontrent clairement que la plupart des 
pays de l'ITF, et du reste de l'Afrique en général, n'arrivent pas à attirer suffisamment 
d'épargnes et d'investissements. Cette situation s'explique essentiellement par  1' absence 
d'une ou de plusieurs des conditions générales à respecter pour attirer 1  'investissement : 
stabilité politique, bonne gestion des  affaires publiques, réforme et stabilité 
macroéconomique, liberté du commerce et des changes, libéralisation de l'investissement 
et (pour les gros investisseurs) marché de taille suffisante. Ces conditions sont reprises 
ci-dessous. Reste, en outre, le problème d'image. 
L'image 
11.  L'image de la plupart des pays d'Afrique, comme terre d'investissement, est 
mauvaise. L'ampleur de la fuite des capitaux que 1' on a pu observer prouve que cela vaut 
aussi bien pour les investisseurs nationaux que pour les investisseurs étrangers. Quand 
on leur demande leur opinion sur le  potentiel d'affaires en Afrique, la plupart des 
investisseurs mentionnent l'instabilité politique, les coûts et les risques élevés, et le fait 
qu'il est possible de faire des affaires ailleurs, à un coût et à un risque moindres. Pour 
illustrer cette situation, l'annexe VIII présente la cotation du crédit des pays de l'ITF 
préparée par The Institutional Investor à certaines dates choisies depuis la mise en œuvre 
de l'ITF. Ce tableau montre qu'un seul des pays de l'ITF, Maurice, a obtenu la cote de 
crédit de 50 %, les Seychelles et le Zimbabwe partageant le  deuxième rang avec une 
moyenne d'environ 30 %.  Pour l'ensemble des pays de l'ITF, les cotes moyennes de 
crédit sont passées d'environ 20% en 1993 à environ 28% en 1998. 
'Correspondant à la somme de 1  'épargne intérieure brute, nette d'un facteur de revenus provenant de 1' étranger (tirés de l'investissement direct 
étranger, y compris les  dividendes, les revenus locatifs et les honoraires professionnels), et nette des transferts privés de l'étranger (par 
exemple, les envois de fonds, les transferts de migrants, les dons, les dots, les héritages et les pensions alimentaires), 
'Correspondant à la position financière nette d'un pays vis-à-vis du reste du monde, représentée par le solde des transactions courantes (de la 
balance des paiements) à l'exclusion des subventions d'équipement. Le solde des transactions courantes correspond à la différence entre les 
exportations des biens et de l'ensemble des services auxquels s'ajoutent les importations courantes sans contrepartie, et l'importation des biens 
et services auxquels s'ajoutent les exportations sans contrepartie à destination du reste du monde. 
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investisseurs est fondée non seulement sur l'idée que les réformes sont solides, mais 
aussi qu'elles sont mises en œuvre de  façon suivie et soutenue. Du point de vue de 
1' investisseur, les conditions pour faire des affaires en Afrique ne sont pas satisfaisantes. 
Il faut par conséquent faire un effort concerté sur une période prolongée pour établir 
fermement de meilleures conditions générales pour attirer l'investissement et façonner 
une image plus positive. 
La stabilité  politique 
13.  La paix et la stabilité, tant entre les pays partenaires qu'au sein de chacun 
d'eux, sont des conditions nécessaires au déroulement normal des affaires. Même s'il 
existera toujours des spéculateurs disposés à intervenir lorsque les marges bénéficiaires 
des opérations risquées sont élevées, les investisseurs, notamment ceux qui travaillent à 
long terme, évitent en général les pays et les sous-régions qui sont, ou ont la réputation 
d'être, instables ou qui présentent des risques de conflit. Les pays de l'ITF pourraient 
progresser considérablement dans l'estime des investisseurs s'ils déclaraient de façon 
explicite qu'ils considèrent la stabilité régionale comme un impératif primordial. Ils 
devraient alors prévoir de travailler dans le cadre des groupements et organismes régionaux 
pour déterminer le moyen de créer et de maintenir des relations de voisinage stables et 
paisibles. 
La bonne gestion des affaires publiques et privées 
14.  Les investisseurs de bon aloi, qui s'intéressent au long terme plutôt qu'à des 
profits éclairs, veulent pouvoir conduire leurs affaires de façon simple et ouverte. En 
général, leur préférence va aux pays où les coûts des transactions sont moindres, où les 
affaires publiques et privées sont bien gérées par un gouvernement démocratique et ouvert, 
qui agit dans la transparence et qui est prêt à s'attaquer à la corruption à tous les niveaux 
de la société. Tout porte à croire, par ailleurs, que la corruption nuit au développement 
économique en réduisant l'investissement intérieur et en décourageant l'investissement 
direct étranger.  9 
'Voir, par exemple, Shang-Jin Wei, <<Corruption in Economie Development: Beneficiai Grease, Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle?>>, février 
1999, document de travail no 2048 de la Banque mondiale (quel'  on peut consulter sur l'Internet à l'adresse suivante : http://www. worldbank.org/ 
htrnl/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2048/wps2048-abstract.htrnl). 
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les investisseurs internationaux sont de plus en plus influencés par les articles de presse 
et par les indices de corruption qui ressortent des sondages d'opinion. L'annexe IX présente 
le classement des indices de corruption pour l'année 1998, tirés de la liste de 85 pays 
parue dans Transparency International. On y constate que, à l'exception de la Namibie 
et de Maurice, les pays de 1  'ITF ne figurent pas dans ce tableau ou obtiennent une note 
plutôt faible. Les pays de l'ITF doivent donc être prêts- et se montrer prêts- à relever le 
défi de la corruption. 
16.  Un moyen important de lutter contre la corruption et d'améliorer la gestion 
des  affaires publiques et privées serait d'accélérer le  développement de la fonction 
publique; d'adopter et de mettre en vigueur un ensemble adéquat de règles et de règlements 
financiers et d'améliorer la qualité des professions comptable et juridique pour rehausser 
les normes tout en les harmonisant.  Les investisseurs seraient favorablement 
impressionnés s'ils se trouvaient en présence d'une fonction publique efficace ainsi que 
de bureaux professionnels, d'entreprises privées et de tribunaux de commerce bien gérés. 
Réformes et stabilité macroéconomiques 
17.  Pour atteindre les objectifs de l'ITF -libéralisation des échanges de biens 
et services, promotion du commerce, libéralisation des régimes de change, renforcement 
de l'intermédiation financière, déréglementation de l'investissement et libre circulation 
des personnes-un des impératifs fondamentaux est la stabilité politique et économique, 
qui doit être durable. Bien qu'il ait déjà été question ailleurs de la stabilité politique et de 
la bonne gestion des affaires publiques, on pourrait mesurer la stabilité économique à 
1  'aune de certains critères : croissance du PIB par habitant continue et bien répartie, taux 
d'inflation faibles, amélioration des opérations du secteur extérieur (en particulier, stabilité 
des marchés de change et viabilité de la dette extérieure), et amélioration des opérations 
budgétaires. Les pays de 1  'ITF ont enregistré quelques succès sur tous ces fronts, souvent 
dans le cadre de programmes d'ajustement appuyés par la Banque mondiale, le FMI et 
d'autres organismes de parrainage. Ainsi, la croissance du PIB réelle par habitant, 
nettement négative en 1993, est passée à plus de 1 % en 1997; on a aussi pu constater un 
recul (de plus de 50%) de l'inflation et une amélioration très nette des comptes extérieurs 
courants  10 • 
18.  Bien qu'ils soient encourageants, ces progrès ne devraient pas inciter les 
participants à la complaisance. La stabilité macroéconomique est vitale pour soutenir les 
mesures de promotion de  l'investissement envisagées dans le présent document. Un 
10Voir page 3 du document de synthèse préparé pour discussion à la Troisième réunion ministérielle, tenue à Hararé les 19 et 20 février 1998. 
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terme, les taux d'intérêt nominaux; il importe en outre de poursuivre les réformes des 
finances publiques (tant du côté des recettes que du côté des dépenses) pour favoriser 
une baisse des taux d'intérêt réels et ainsi promouvoir l'investissement intérieur privé. 
Par ailleurs, 1' élargissement et la restructuration de 1  'assiette des recettes fiscales sont 
essentiels pour mener à bien le programme de réforme des régimes du commerce et des 
changes dans le cadre de 1  'ITF. La réorientation des dépenses publiques au profit de 
l'infrastructure sociale (santé et éducation) et matérielle est également indispensable 
pour créer les  conditions propices à la croissance future.  Pour maintenir la stabilité 
budgétaire (et donc, macroéconomique), il convient aussi de réduire les dépenses non 
essentielles. Les organismes de parrainage sont également pleinement conscients de la 
nécessité d'alléger le fardeau de la dette des pays de l'ITF d'une façon équitable. Des 
initiatives dans ce domaine sont poursuivies avec énergie dans d'autres enceintes, peut-
être plus influentes et mieux adaptées, la plus remarquable étant l'initiative en faveur 
des pays pauvres très endettés (PPTE) (annexe X).  Ces initiatives doivent pouvoir 
s'appuyer sur des signes clairs d'une amélioration de la gestion de la dette. 
Libéralisation des échanges commerciaux 
19.  Un des éléments principaux du programme de l'ITF est la réduction du biais 
anti-exportation du régime commercial et la création d'une structure incitative propre à 
encourager des flux d'investissements et d'échanges commerciaux efficaces. Dans ce 
but, le schéma directeur pour la réforme des régimes du commerce extérieur de l'ITF 
préconise la simplification, la rationalisation et la réduction des tarifs. 11  Jusqu'à présent, 
des progrès importants mais inégaux ont été accomplis, une demi-douzaine de pays ayant 
atteint les objectifs de ce schéma directeur avant la date limite d'octobre 1998. Ainsi, le 
Kenya, l'Ouganda et la Zambie ou abaissé le tarif moyen pondéré par les échanges à 
15% ou moins, tandis que le Rwanda et la Tanzanie sont très près d'y parvenir; les 
Comores, le Kenya, Madagascar, le Rwanda, l'Ouganda et la Zambie ont réduit le nombre 
de taux autres que le taux zéro à trois ou moins; le Kenya, l'Ouganda et la Zambie ont 
abaissé le taux plafond à 25 % ou moins tandis que Madagascar, le Malawi et la Tanzanie 
utilisent un taux de 30 %. En 1994, Maurice a réduit le nombre de taux à 8; les réformes 
se sont poursuivies en 1999 avec la suppression des droits de douane pour la machinerie 
et 1' équipement industriels et la réduction des droits pour d'autres produits qui ont ramené 
le taux moyen pondéré à 26% (annexe XI). 
11Document de synthèse, paragraphe 11. 
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ont été plus lents pour ce qui est de la réduction des autres droits et redevances, et de leur 
intégration à la structure tarifaire. L'élimination des droits sur les échanges intra-régionaux 
est aussi en bonne voie (cinq pays ont atteint l'objectif d'une marge de préférences de 
80 % ),  encore que la réduction des exemptions tarifaires (de nature à augmenter les 
recettes et la transparence des taxes sur le commerce international) ait été limitée (annexe 
XII).  Quant à l'élimination des obstacles non tarifaires (sauf pour une série limitée 
d'articles), les progrès ont été inégaux (annexe XIII); par contre, les restrictions à 
l'exportation ont été levées en très grande partie (annexe XIV). Dans l'ensemble, les 
pays de 1  'ITF ont donc assez bien progressé sur la voie de 1  'harmonisation des tarifs 
extérieurs, mais aucun d'eux n'a encore réussi à procéder à l'ensemble des changements 
préconisés par le schéma directeur pour la réforme des régimes du commerce extérieur 
et il leur incombe donc de s'exécuter rapidement. 
Intégration des marchés 
21.  En plus de poursuivre leurs efforts d'intégration dans l'économie 
mondiale, les pays de 1  'ITF, par une intégration plus poussée des marchés régionaux, 
pourraient créer plus d'opportunités pour les investisseurs et permettre aux marchés 
financiers d'atteindre une masse critique. L'économie d'un pays africain «pèse» en 
moyenne environ 8 milliards de dollars, contre 50 milliards de dollars dans d'autres 
régions en développement, et le PIB total de l'ensemble des pays de l'ITF est de 
55 milliards de dollars. La somme des économies de l'Afrique sub-saharienne, Afrique 
du Sud non comprise, équivaut à peu pr~~s à l'économie de la Thaïlande (même en 
comptant 1  'Afrique du Sud, on arrive à un total inférieur au poids économique du 
Mexique). Il ne faut donc pas s'attendre à ce que beaucoup de pays puissent faire 
seuls des progrès substantiels et durables à moins d'accroître leur accès aux marchés 
régionaux et mondial. 
22.  L'intégration régionale pourrait aussi aider les pays de l'ITF à éviter la 
répétition inutile des efforts de promotion des investissements dans les mêmes secteurs, 
et ainsi éviter la création d'un trop grand nombre d'entreprises dans le même secteur 
industriel avec de faibles niveaux de production et de technologie. Certains prétendront 
que cela conduirait logiquement à  une concentration des investissements et du 
développement dans un nombre limité d'endroits, mais si cela risque d'être le cas à court 
terme, l'expérience vécue dans d'autres régions du monde porte à croire que la mobilité 
de la main-d'œuvre et des capitaux, combinée à la disponibilité des infrastructures pour 
la conduite des affaires, aurait tôt fait d'attirer l'attention des investisseurs sur d'autres 
endroits. 
p.202 Libéralisation des régimes de change 
23.  Au cours des récentes années, la libéralisation des régimes de change a bien 
progressé dans les pays de l'ITF, comme en a témoigné l'élimination très générale des 
restrictions afférentes aux transactions courantes et le  passage à des  taux de  change 
déterminés par le marché (annexes XV et XVI). Le recours moins fréquent aux contrôles 
directs a, par contrecoups, donné plus de relief  au rôle de la politique macroéconomique 
et augmenté la nécessité de renforcer les systèmes financiers. Il n'en reste pas moins 
nécessaire d'accroître 1' efficacité des marchés interbancaires au comptant. Pour renforcer 
la confiance des investisseurs et créer un climat plus propice aux activités d'exportation, 
il conviendra en outre de supprimer le reste des restrictions afférentes aux transactions 
courantes (ce qui suppose la résorption des arriérés), et de libéraliser encore davantage 
les mouvements de capitaux ainsi que les obligations de rapatriement et de rétrocession 
des devises. L'annexe XVII résume la situation des pays de l'ITF en ce qui concerne le 
respect des  exigences relatives au rapatriement et à la rétrocession des devises, fin 
décembre 1998. 
Déréglementation de l'investissement 
24.  La réforme du cadre réglementaire et l'harmonisation progressive des 
incitations à l'investissement (national et étranger) sont des objectifs primordiaux de 
l'ITfl
2
• À cet égard, les pays participants sont déjà convenus de simplifier et de codifier 
toutes les dispositions de leur réglementation dans un document unique qui sera largement 
diffusé. Ils ont décidé de créer des agences de promotion des investissements à guichet 
unique qui traiteront toutes les demandes dans un délai de 45 à 60 jours et accorderont 
une autorisation automatique en l'absence d'objections à la fin de la période. D'autres 
mesures précises visent la conclusion, par les pays participants, d'accords de double 
imposition sur une base bilatérale, l'autorisation des  cotations croisées d'actions sur 
différentes bourses de la région, la réduction des délais de  délivrance des permis de 
séjour et de travail et l'assouplissement des formalités de visa pour les investisseurs. 
25.  Globalement, les progrès accomplis sur le plan de la déréglementation de 
l'investissement ont été inégaux (annexe XVIII). Fin décembre 1998, presque tous les 
pays avaient donné suite aux recommandations en matière de  libéralisation des 
procédures d'approbation (notamment par la création d'un bureau d'approbation des 
investissements à guichet unique); la publication de  codes de  l'investissement était 
chose faite dans une majorité de pays participants. Cependant, les progrès sont moins 
encourageants pour ce qui est du respect des délais légaux. Compte tenu des réformes 
"Document de synthèse, paragraphe 28. 
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amendements apportés à la législation de l'investissement qui suppriment en général 
la discrimination à l'encontre des IDE, la ratification de la charte MIE du COMESA 
est devenue inutile. Les pays participants étaient en outre invités à devenir membres 
de l'Agence multilatérale de garantie des investissements (AMGI) et, si nécessaire, 
d'agences bilatérales de  garantie des investissements comme la Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC). Tous les pays de l'ITF sont aujourd'hui membres de 
l'AMGI. 
26.  Pour ce qui est de la conclusion d'accords de double imposition, les progrès 
ont été lents et il reste encore beaucoup à faire. Le tableau de l'annexe XIX résume la 
situation telle qu'elle existait au milieu de 1998, mais d'autres accords pourraient être 
intervenus depuis  13  • 
27.  S'agissant du marché du travail (formalités de visa, permis de séjour et de 
travail, permis de séjour court), les progrès sont inégaux. Si des pays non insulaires ont 
pris des mesures relatives aux permis de séjour court pour les frontaliers, il n'y a guère 
eu d'avancées en ce qui concerne l'application du protocole du COMESA relatif aux 
visas14 • Il n'y a pas eu beaucoup de progrès non plus pour ce qui est de l'accélération des 
délivrances de permis de séjour et de travail. 
Cohérence des politiques et de leur application 
28.  À la réunion des GTT de novembre 1998, la plupart des pays de l'ITF ont 
estimé qu'ils avaient fait des progrès dans l'établissement des conditions nécessaires 
décrites ci-dessus. Ils s'inquiétaient cependant de ce que les répercussions attendues de 
ces progrès sur 1  'offre ne s'étaient pas matérialisées. Les réticences persistantes des 
investisseurs montrent bien la nécessité de faire preuve de cohérence dans la création 
des conditions nécessaires à l'investissement, notamment la stabilité macroéconomique 
et les réformes structurelles, sur une période prolongée pour faire en sorte que tout risque 
perçu de retour en arrière soit négligeable. 
"Les rapports des pays participant à !'!TF n'ont pas été livrés régulièrement: i) certains ont fait état des accords qu'ils avaient conclus (par 
exemple, de nouveaux traités); ii) d'autres ont fourni la liste (présumément complète) des pays avec lesquels ils avaient conclu des accords; 
iii) il existe des cas où un pays de !'!TF mentionne avoir conclu un accord alors que l'autre pays soi-disant partie à cet accord omet de le 
mentionner (par exemple, les Comores et Maurice). 
14Il est à noter que le Kenya, la Tanzanie et l'Ouganda n'exigent plus de visa des ressortissants de la CAE pour les déplacements entre ces pays. 
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à moyen terme 
29.  De nombreux facteurs influent sur le comportement et les décisions des 
investisseurs, et il est clair que les effets des malaises ou des conflits économiques 
sévissant dans un pays se répercutent sur les pays voisins. En outre, les investisseurs 
ne sont pas homogènes et ils accordent des priorités différentes à des facteurs différents. 
La présente section ne traite pas des  réformes politiques, macroéconomiques ou 
structurelles, ni  des problèmes de la dette ou du commerce qui influent sur 
l'investissement et dont il a été question à la section C, toutes ces questions ayant été 
traitées en détail sur des tribunes plus appropriées
15
• Au lieu de cela, elle présente les 
principales actions concrètes que les pays de l'ITF peuvent mener dans un cadre régional 
en vue d'attirer et de  faciliter les  investissements. Ces actions se  divisent en huit 
domaines :  réformes  fiscales,  réformes juridiques et judiciaires, réformes 
institutionnelles, développement du secteur financier, mise en valeur des ressources 
humaines, crédibilité de  la privatisation, développement et revalorisation des 
infrastructures et promotion de l'investissement. 
Réforme fiscale 
30.  Les investisseurs potentiels souhaitent connaître et comprendre le régime 
d'imposition ainsi que la façon dont les impôts sont évalués et recouvrés. Ils prêtent une 
attention parti  cul  ère à 1' équité de 1' impôt, à la simplicité du calcul et à la réputation des 
procédures rapides qui permettent d'éviter les pots-de-vin ou les propositions de 
dégrèvement officieux, et ils comparent ces dispositions fiscales à celles des pays qui 
leur sont familiers. Par conséquent, une réforme fiscale visant à concilier équité, cohérence, 
efficacité, transparence et harmonisation permettra d'encourager les investissements. Si 
le présent schéma directeur pour la promotion de 1  'investissement reçoit l'aval des pays 
participants, les étapes visant à rationaliser et à harmoniser les impôts (par exemple, sur 
le revenu et les bénéfices) prendront une plus grande importance. Il convient de rappeler 
que la réforme fiscale ne devrait pas être réalisée aux dépens d'autres dépenses essentielles. 
Cependant, il apparaît déjà que la diminution des taux d'imposition-favorisée par une 
assiette fiscale plus adéquate-qui signifierait pour les investisseurs une augmentation 
des rendements nets, serait plus attrayante et inciterait moins à la fraude et à la corruption. 
Le tableau de l'annexe XX résume les taux de l'impôt sur le revenu des particuliers et 
sur les bénéfices des sociétés appliqués par les pays de l'ITF. 
15Par exemple: les questions politiques dans le contexte de l'OUA; les problèmes de l'endettement dans le contexte de l'initiative PPTE; les 
réformes macroéconomiques et structurelles dans le contexte des programmes d'ajustement appuyés par les institutions de Bretton Woods et 
d'autres intervenants; les questions du commerce dans le contexte du schéma directeur de l'ITF pour la réforme des régimes du commerce 
extérieur. 
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i) la finalisation des traités de double imposition entre tous les pays de l'ITF et avec tous 
leurs partenaires commerciaux traditionnels et potentiels; ii) 1' abaissement des taux 
d'imposition; iii) la suppression des  exonérations temporaires d'impôt, de manière à 
garantir l'égalité entre les catégories d'investisseurs; iv) l'admission de la nécessité de 
déductions fiscales  pour certaines formes  de dépenses (par exemple, recherche-
développement et formation du personnel); v) l'amélioration des procédures de calcul et 
de recouvrement (voir Réformes institutionnelles). Il convient de noter que les mesures 
de réforme fiscale citées ici incluent uniquement les mesures susceptibles d'infléchir le 
comportement des investisseurs. Il reviendrait aux gouvernements individuels de traiter 
les autres aspects de la réforme fiscale. 
Réformes juridiques et judiciaires 
32.  L'existence de  problèmes dans la pratique des  droits patrimoniaux et du 
recouvrement des créances est bien établie, et il est donc grand temps d=y remédier. Ce 
n=est pas tant la législation dépassée - ou la logique d'harmonisation - qui rend le 
changement nécessaire, mais le dysfonctionnement des tribunaux. Dans un certain nombre 
de pays participants à l=ITF, les banques et en particulier les banques nationales qui ont 
été soumises à des politiques de crédit dirigé, ont dû subir une restructuration financière 
non pas parce que leurs marges étaient insuffisantes ou leurs frais généraux excessifs 
(encore que ces derniers aient effectivement eu une incidence) mais parce qu=elles ne 
pouvaient pas récupérer les actifs donnés en nantissement des créances en souffrance. 
Trop  souvent,  la lenteur des actions  e;n  recouvrement devant les tribunaux et 
l'imprévisibilité des résultats de ce qui devrait être un processus juridique simple de 
recouvrement des créances ont provoqué une perte de confiance dans le système judiciaire. 
Du coup, il est plus difficile pour les entreprises, en particulier les entreprises détenues 
par des investisseurs locaux, de réunir des capitaux d'emprunt (ce qui influe par ricochet 
sur la mobilisation de l'épargne). 
33.  Dans un contexte visant à faciliter les  investissements, les pays de  l'ITF 
devraient achever le travail déjà entrepris par les GTT et déterminer quelles sont les 
réformes juridiques nécessaires qui permettraient de faire disparaître les anomalies et les 
contraintes exercées sur les investissements. Les principaux domaines dans lesquels les 
réformes sont généralement les plus nécessaires sont les suivants : droit des entreprises, 
droit des contrats, droit des faillites, droit du travail et droit de la propriété. Les réformes 
opérées dans ces  domaines,  qui devraient également mettre fin  à la discrimination 
pratiquée à l'encontre de certaines catégories d'investisseurs, contribueraient beaucoup 
à créer un climat d'égalité favorable aux investissements et aux échanges commerciaux. 
Cependant, il est unanimement reconnu qu'il ne suffira pas de rédiger de nouvelles lois 
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pour veiller à  la bonne application des  lois.  Alors seulement, les  investisseurs 
commenceront à gagner confiance et à croire qu'il existe réellement un soutien juridique 
pour leurs créances et leurs droits de propriété. 
34.  Compte tenu de la pression exercée par la mondialisation, les pays de l'ITF 
doivent, à moyen terme, s'efforcer d'adopter un droit commercial et un droit du travail 
communs. L'harmonisation du droit des entreprises, des contrats et de la faillite sera une 
tâche complexe et délicate. Cependant, le fait que les pays de l'UEMOA ont déjà approuvé 
cette démarche essentielle montre bien que cela est possible.  16  Il existe en outre un projet 
d'harmonisation des lois commerciales en Afrique australe.  17 
Réformes institutionnelles 
35.  La réforme de  la fonction publique, le renforcement des règles et de  la 
réglementation financières et la privatisation sont les principaux moyens utilisés pour 
améliorer la bonne gestion des  affaires publiques et réaliser les  autres réformes 
institutionnelles nécessaires dans le secteur public. Toutefois, dans un contexte visant à 
faciliter les investissements, il convient également d'améliorer les institutions publiques 
qui traitent avec les entreprises (par exemple, les autorités fiscales, les douanes et l'accise, 
et les ministères responsables de l'approvisionnement, du commerce, de la délivrance 
des permis, du travail et de l'administration sectorielle). Les membres du personnel de 
toutes ces institutions devraient comprendre l'importance d'être attentif aux demandes 
qui  leur sont faites  et de  promouvoir l'investissement et la croissance de  l'activité 
commerciale. Autrement dit, la fonction publique est là pour aider les gens, et non pour 
surveiller leurs actions. L'objectif  devrait être d'inspirer le respect des investisseurs pour 
ces institutions, en traitant leurs demandes avec un minimum de  complications, de 
paperasserie et de retards, et en évitant les faveurs et les propositions de pots-de-vin (ou 
leur équivalent). 
36.  Les réformes juridiques et judiciaires doivent être étayées par des réformes 
institutionnelles adéquates, qui sont inséparables. Les coûts de transaction élevés dus au 
poids des réglementations gouvernementales et à la fragilité des institutions publiques 
ont découragé les investisseurs étrangers. Des réformes des systèmes réglementaires et 
administratifs sont donc indispensables si  l'on souhaite réduire le  coût des échanges 
commerciaux et démontrer que les procédures actuelles sont appliquées de manière 
cohérente et efficace. Voir à ce propos l'exemple présenté dans l'annexe XXI. 
"Le dernier texte de l'Avant-projet de règlement portant Code communautaire d'investissement des pays membres de l'UEMOA a été publié 
par la Commission de l'UEMOA en juillet 1998. 
17M. Winston P. Nagan, professeur de droit à la University of  Florida, et M. Dean Visser, doyen et professeur de droit à la University of  Cape 
Town,  ont préparé un projet d'harmonisation des lois commerciales pour les pays d'Afrique australe (SADC). 
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commerce dans certains pays d'Afrique. Il s'agit d'un ensemble fictif, mais les divers 
éléments qui le composent sont fondés sur les expériences réelles des investisseurs et 
illustrent parfaitement les différents points qui nous intéressent. En premier lieu, il est 
très peu probable qu'un guichet unique puisse délivrer l'ensemble des approbations 
nécessaires aux investissements. Étant donné la nature complexe du commerce décrit 
dans 1' exemple, c'est en réalité à peine surprenant. Par ailleurs, à moins de disposer 
d'importantes ressources juridiques, l'agence d'investissement à guichet unique ne saurait 
être informée de 1' ensemble des lois et réglementations applicables à chacun des secteurs. 
Parallèlement, certains ministères n'accepteront pas que la procédure d'approbation soit 
déléguée à cette agence.  Il est par conséquent inévitable que les investisseurs aient 
quelquefois affaire à plusieurs ministères, services gouvernementaux ou autorités de 
tutelle pour certaines autorisations. En second lieu, ces institutions publiques qui font 
partie de la chaîne des affaires risquent de devenir méfiantes à 1  'égard du secteur privé 
en raison de son comportement passé. Au lieu d'entretenir un climat de méfiance et de 
contrôle, ces institutions devraient plutôt promouvoir la collaboration et faciliter le travail 
des investisseurs. Dans beaucoup de cas, elles ne sont pas enclines à répondre aux 
demandes d'information ni à travailler en partenariat avec le secteur privé afin d'accélérer 
les procédures. Le problème suivant est typique :qui doit donner l'autorisation et signer 
le document requis? Et,  fait tout aussi regrettable que typique, la nécessité d'une 
autorisation crée l'occasion de soutirer une gratification pour le «service». En dernier 
lieu, l'exemple démontre que de nombreux services (comptabilité, architecture, ingénierie, 
services financiers ou juridiques, etc.) sont un soutien essentiel aux investissements. 
Plus ces derniers sont importants, plus le commerce devient complexe et plus la gamme 
des services nécessaires s'enrichit. 
38.  Ainsi, alors que la plupart des pays de l'ITF ont un guichet unique pour les 
investissements, des réformes dans le secteur public restent nécessaires afin que les 
institutions réglementaires et administratives puissent répondre au secteur privé et 
travailler avec lui,  traiter la documentation correctement et rapidement et ce,  sans 
s'attendre à une gratification en plus du salaire. Cela exige un programme de sensibilisation 
pour expliquer comment les investisseurs privés opèrent et réagissent, ainsi qu'une 
évolution de la structure et des procédures de ces institutions. De plus, il serait souhaitable 
de prendre des mesures d'aide au développement des professions de la comptabilité, de 
la banque et du droit. 
39.  Nombre des actions nécessaires doivent être engagées à l'échelon national. 
Toutefois, la crédibilité régionale est importante et il y a beaucoup à dire en faveur de 
l'adoption de normes et pratiques communes par les organismes professionnels des pays 
participants. Par conséquent, plus les pays prendront des mesures visant à rationaliser 
les procédures administratives et à faciliter les investissements, plus 1' ensemble des pays 
de l'ITF bénéficiera à la fois de l'expérience et de la confiance accrues des investisseurs. 
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40.  Le développement du marché des capitaux joue un rôle déterminant en matière 
de promotion des investissements en créant les conditions propices à l'augmentation de 
l'épargne intérieure qui, par ricochet, stimule l'investissement en capital. Les marchés 
financiers intérieurs ont besoin d'être renforcés afin de devenir une source utile du capital 
à long terme si nécessaire (dette, quasi-fonds propres et cofinancement) qui manque 
actuellement aux nouveaux entrepreneurs locaux, exception faite d'un nombre 
relativement restreint de petits fournisseurs de capital de risque. En outre, les investisseurs 
et les entreprises ont besoin d'une gamme de services financiers modernes, qui n'existent 
généralement pas dans les pays de l'ITF, pour fonctionner efficacement dans le contexte 
de la mondialisation des marchés. 
41.  Le développement du marché des capitaux est actuellement inhibé par la 
petite taille des économies et le faible niveau des échanges.  Dans un tel contexte, 
l'intégration régionale des marchés financiers procurerait aux investisseurs un choix 
plus vaste et une plus grande souplesse, deux conditions particulièrement importantes 
pour les marchés des obligations et des valeurs mobilières. Toutefois, dans beaucoup de 
pays, on doit s'attaquer en priorité à la création d'un secteur financier solide et d'un 
système de paiements efficace pour les échanges de biens et de services et les mouvements 
de  capitaux qui sont essentielles à l'intensification des échanges transfrontaliers et à 
1  'ouverture des marchés. Dans ce contexte, il convient de libéraliser les marchés financiers 
intérieurs et d'en améliorer la compétitivité en favorisant l'entrée libre des institutions 
financières privées et en mettant en place les systèmes renforcés appropriés de gestion 
prudentielle et de surveillance des banques. 
42.  Pour assurer la solidité des institutions financières dans le contexte actuel de 
libéralisation financière, l'Initiative transfrontalière préconise une intensification des 
efforts en vue d'améliorer l'aptitude des banques centrales à assurer l'application des 
règles prudentielles et la surveillance, d'encourager le développement du secteur bancaire 
commercial et des autres institutions financières et de renforcer le système intérieur de 
paiements18 •  Les mesures supplémentaires à envisager comprennent la création 
d'instruments du commerce extérieur et l'établissement des  liens interbancaires 
correspondants à l'intérieur de la région. 
43.  Malgré les problèmes de toutes sortes auxquels les pays de l'ITF continuent 
d'être confrontés, des progrès encourageants ont été accomplis en ce qui a trait à 1' efficacité 
des systèmes bancaires. Les instruments monétaires directs tels que les plafonds de crédit 
individuels et le contrôle sélectif du crédit ont été graduellement abandonnés dans la 
plupart des pays qui utilisent aujourd'hui des instruments monétaires indirects comme 
18Voir le document de réflexion adopté lors de la première conférence ministérielle, à Kampala, en août 1993. 
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réescompte. Parallèlement, les taux d'intérêt contrôlés ont été graduellement remplacés 
par des mécanismes fondés sur le marché dans la plupart des pays (annexe XXII). 
44.  On s'est également employé à renforcer les règles prudentielles et la capacité 
des banques centrales à en assurer la mise en vigueur. À cette fin, des lois ont été adoptées 
ou sont en voie de révision dans plusieurs des pays participants (annexe XXIII). L'intérêt 
accru porté aux questions de réglementation a coïncidé avec une expansion des marchés 
financiers; le nombre de banques commerciales et de banques étrangères actives dans 
ces pays a augmenté. Plusieurs des pays participants ont également pris des mesures 
pour privatiser les institutions financières d'État ou pour réduire la participation financière 
de l'État dans les banques privées.  Le développement d'instruments du commerce 
extérieur et la levée des obstacles à l'entrée donnent à conclure que des progrès sensibles 
ont été réalisés dans plusieurs pays. 
45.  Malgré les progrès récents réalisés dans plusieurs domaines, le degré de 
concurrence sur les marchés financiers de nombre des pays participants reste limité à 
quelques opérateurs et à un petit nombre d'instruments. Les limites de la capacité 
institutionnelle et des ressources humaines constituent également des obstacles importants 
à la mise en place des systèmes internes et externes de surveillance et d'inspection 
essentiels à la mise en œuvre, en temps utile, de règles prudentielles et efficaces. Si la 
création de nouvelles institutions et de nouveaux instruments financiers doit conduire à 
une plus grande efficacité des opérations du secteur financier, elle doit pouvoirs'  appuyer 
sur des mesures de formation visant à renforcer les règles prudentielles, les exigences de 
publicité et la capacité de réglementation. 
46.  Lorsque toutes les mesures susmentionnées seront bien engagées, on pourra 
alors envisager d'autres types d'améliorations. Du point de vue des investisseurs, le 
développement rapide du secteur financier est nécessaire dans les trois domaines suivants : 
financement à moyen et long terme, intermédiation financière et services directs à la 
clientèle. 
Crédit à moyen et long terme 
47.  La demande de crédit est un sujet bien connu et décrit. L'offre étant plutôt 
lente à réagir dans ce domaine, il est nécessaire d'encourager la croissance des institutions 
privées qui proposent un financement des fonds propres et du crédit à moyen et à long 
terme. Les organismes de parrainage de l'ITF ont un rôle crucial à jouer pour aider les 
pays et les conseiller sur les moyens de combler le fossé existant entre les besoins en 
investissements et les fonds mobilisables, qu'il s'agisse de l'épargne locale ou des IDE. 
p.210 48.  Dans ce contexte, il  convient de noter que des efforts sont en cours pour 
trouver une solution au problème du risque politique. Dans beaucoup de pays africains, 
la réticence des institutions financières à prêter sans garantie contre le risque politique 
perçu est la raison principale pour laquelle les investisseurs intéressés sont incapables 
d'obtenir le crédit commercial dont ils ont besoin. Pour aider à solutionner ce problème, 
la Banque mondiale, en collaboration avec la caisse d'émission du COMESA, a élaboré 
un projet de création d'un Mécanisme de garantie pour l'Afrique (AGF), qui aura pour 
nom officiel «Projet de promotion des échanges régionaux» (PPER). Le AGF/PPER a 
été brièvement abordé lors de la réunion des GTT de novembre 1998; une équipe technique 
de la Banque mondiale s'est rendue dans un certain nombre de pays de l'ITF qui avaient 
fait part de leur intérêt pour ce projet, afin de discuter des aspects pratiques de cette 
facilité. Un état des lieux sera présenté lors de la prochaine réunion ministérielle. L'annexe 
XXIV présente une brève description du projet. 
Intermédiation financière 
49.  La mobilisation de l'épargne intérieure est elle-même un indicateur important 
du degré de confiance dans le système bancaire et dans 1' opinion des marchés sur les 
perspectives économiques d'un pays. Elle agit également comme un signal aux 
investisseurs étrangers. L'élargissement des services financiers aux petits épargnants, en 
particulier en zones rurales, élargirait et approfondirait l'intermédiation financière. Ainsi, 
il faut consacrer plus d'efforts à la création d'instruments d'épargne, sensibiliser les 
épargnants aux investissements à plus long terme et leur donner 1' assurance qu'ils pourront 
négocier aisément leurs instruments de placement. À cet égard, il convient de prendre 
des mesures propres à favoriser l'expansion des places boursières d'Hararé, de Lusaka 
et de Nairobi. Une de ces mesures consisterait à augmenter les cotations croisées sur 
plusieurs bourses. 
50.  Certaines économies sont de taille trop réduite pour alimenter une bourse 
des valeurs et celles qui sont de taille intermédiaire ont du mal à attirer un plus grand 
nombre de cotations alors que le volume de transactions est faible. Un des moyens évidents 
permettant aux sociétés et aux investisseurs des petites économies de tirer parti d'un 
marché boursier actif est de mettre en place des bourses régionales, mais celles-ci ne 
peuvent être efficaces que si les capitaux et les dividendes peuvent librement franchir les 
frontières. Par ailleurs, les économies de plus grande taille bénéficieraient de la réputation 
associée à une capitalisation boursière accrue ainsi que de la demande connexe de services 
p.211 d'intermédiation financière
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•  Toutefois, la mise en place de marchés de capitaux 
régionaux passe par l'acceptation de procédures et de normes communes. Par exemple, 
les sociétés cotées dans les différents pays auraient à adopter des pratiques et des normes 
uniformes en matière de comptabilité et de publicité des comptes
20
• 
Services directs à la clientèle 
51.  Dans la plupart des pays africains, il importe d'exploiter des technologies 
modernes afin d'améliorer et d'enrichir la gamme des services à la clientèle. Par exemple : 
i) les transferts de capitaux devraient être rapides et leur coût minime; ii) toute personne 
devrait pouvoir encaisser d'emblée des chèques de voyage sur présentation d'une carte 
d'identité (ou d'un document équivalent) sans avoir à signer plusieurs formulaires et à 
patienter plus d'une heure pour une telle démarche; iii) un investisseur ayant acheté des 
actions devrait pouvoir confier ces titres en garde à une banque et être certain de pouvoir 
les retirer sur demande. 
Mise en valeur des ressources humaines 
52.  La nécessité d'une meilleure mise en valeur des ressources humaines a été 
soulevée plusieurs fois pendant la réunion des GTT de novembre 1998. Il s'agit sans 
l'ombre d'un doute d'une question importante et il convient de consacrer plus d'efforts 
et de ressources à 1' investissement dans 1  'éducation primaire et technique, mais ces formes 
d'éducation devront pouvoir compter sur un soutien à long terme pour pouvoir engendrer 
des changements dans l'activité commerciale. Les organismes de parrainage ont soutenu 
activement les efforts de renforcement des capacités dans les pays de l'ITF, mais les 
initiatives régionales font 1' objet d'un intérêt croissant. Il faudrait exploiter ces possibilités 
d'aide autant que faire se peuf'. 
53.  Comme le renforcement des capacités nécessitera un effort à long terme et 
que la durée de vie de l'ITF est courte, aucune proposition particulière n'a encore été 
incluse à ce propos dans le schéma directeur. Toutefois, un schéma directeur axé sur 
19Une étude a été réalisée avec l'aide financière de l'UE sur la faisabilité d'une bourse régionale africaine (AFREX). L'étude a proposé de faire 
de  l'  AFREX une bourse des valeurs indépendante, intermarché, électronique et réglementée qui  traiterait principalement des actions, des 
créances et des instruments du marché monétaire émis par les sociétés privées et les banques commerciales. L'objectif principal serait de 
mobiliser les fonds des régimes aux capitaux excédentaires et de les acheminer dans les économies africaines, notamment celles de 1  'Afrique 
de l'Est et de l'Afrique australe, plus efficacement qu'on ne le fait actuellement ou que ce qui pourrait être fait en mettant simplement en place 
un réseau de bourses nationales. AFREX répondrait principalement aux besoins des économies de petite taille. 
20La nouvelle bourse d'Abidjan donne un exemple des mesures à prendre et des réalisations possibles. 
21Par exemple: i) l'UE a soutenu le renforcement des capacités à l'échelon régional grâce à ses progranunes de coopération régionaux; et ii) le 
Conseil de la Banque mondiale a récemment entériné un nouvel instrument permettant au Fonds de développement institutionnel d'accorder 
des subventions aux entités régionales pour des activités afférentes au renforcement des capacités. 
p.212 1' intervention à moyen terme (au moins cinq ans) devrait certainement inclure des efforts 
visant à accroître les aptitudes, particulièrement dans le domaine de la formation tertiaire 
et professionnelle. Néanmoins, les pays de l'ITF devraient faire en sorte de partager 
leurs programmes de renforcement des capacités. Au nombre des possibilités de 
coopération et d'harmonisation des efforts de développement du capital humain, on peut 
mentionner: i) l'adoption de programmes et de matériel de formation et d'éducation 
communs
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;  ii) l'adoption de normes communes (internationales) pour les organismes 
professionnels; iii) la fusion des organismes professionnels nationaux pour en faire des 
institutions régionales qui auraient une influence plus grande et seraient mieux équipées 
pour offrir de la formation et du développement. 
54.  Malheureusement, les progrès réalisés en matière de renforcement des 
capacités sont aujourd'hui sérieusement menacés par la propagation du VIH/SIDA. 
L'Afrique de l'Est et l'Afrique australe sont les régions du monde où cette maladie est la 
plus répandue. L'annexe XXV montre les taux de fréquence de cette maladie chez les 
adultes dans les pays de 1  'ITF à la fin de 1997. À cette époque, plus de la moitié des pays 
participants présentaient des taux de fréquence de plus de 10 %, et quatre de ces pays 
avaient des taux proches ou supérieurs à 20 %. Ces statistiques sont l'illustration d'une 
véritable tragédie humaine, d'autant plus qu'on s'attend à une augmentation de la 
fréquence de la maladie dans la plupart des pays. Cette réalité a des répercussions 
profondes sur le développement, y compris sur l'investissement. 
55.  À  mesure qu'on reconnaîtra le problème du VIH/SIDA et qu'on en 
comprendra les causes (deux conditions essentielles au traitement efficace de cette 
maladie), elle deviendra un obstacle de plus en plus formidable à  la promotion de 
l'investissement, à moins qu'on ne découvre des moyens efficaces de la combattre. Les 
entreprises de la plupart des pays touchés doivent envisager la possibilité de hausses 
sensibles des coûts de main-d'œuvre liées à l'absentéisme (dû à la maladie et au décès 
des membres de la famille), d'un renouvellement accéléré de la main-d'œuvre (dû aux 
maladies et aux décès), de dépenses croissantes pour le recrutement, la formation et les 
avantages sociaux du personnel (assurance et dépenses médicales, aide aux employés 
touchés). L'absentéisme, le renouvellement du personnel et l'emploi de personnel sous-
qualifié risquent par ailleurs d'influer sur la production et la qualité et d'accroître ainsi 
encore davantage le fardeau des gestionnaires (qui font partie eux-mêmes d'une des 
catégories les plus touchées par la maladie). Dans ces conditions, l'avantage comparatif 
que représente une main-d'  œuvre abondante subit une érosion rapide et les pays touchés 
perdront rapidement leur avantage concurrentieF3 • À défaut de pouvoir constater la miSe 
22Le Consortium pour la recherche économique en Afrique, avec l'aide d'un groupe de bailleurs, a mis en œuvre un programme coopératif 
d'études universitaires de deuxième cycle en économie. Vingt universités réparties en 15 pays africains collaborent pour offrir ce programme 
d'études universitaires de haute qualité. 
23Dans un rapport récent du U.S.  Census Bureau (World Population Profile: 1998), on estime que d'ici à l'an 2010, les pays de l'Afrique sub-
saharienne compteront 71  millions de  moins de gens qu'ils n'en auraient comptés n'eut été des effets du SIDA. Ce rapport indique que 
l'espérance de vie moyenne d'un habitant du Zimbabwe est aujourd'hui de 39 ans, alors qu'elle atteignait 65 ans avant l'arrivée de l'épidémie 
dans ce pays, et il estime que le Zimbabwe a déjà perdu 1,6 million d'habitants à cause des effets directs et indirects du SIDA. 
p.213 en place de mesures immédiates pour lutter contre la menace du VIH/SIDA, les 
investisseurs étrangers hésiteront à créer ou à développer dans ces pays des entreprises à 
forte intensité de main-d'œuvre. Il faudra leur offrir des incitatifs qui limiteront les coûts 
de la main-d'œuvre à des niveaux compétitifs à l'échelle internationale. La lutte contre 
le VIH/SIDA n'est donc plus simplement un problème médical. Ses effets se font sentir 
sur 1' ensemble des  secteurs et sur tous les aspects du développement, y  compris 
l'investissement. En conséquence, les pays de l'ITF doivent montrer qu'ils reconnaissent 
le problème et prendre des mesures concertées pour faire face à ses répercussions de plus 
en plus lourdes. 
Crédibilité de la privatisation 
56.  La privatisation est un facteur déterminant pour attirer les investisseurs. Outre 
qu'elle permet de  catalyser d'importants flux d'IDE, elle aide également à établir et 
développer la concurrence et fournit un tremplin au développement du secteur privé 
dans de nombreux pays africains. Toutefois, s'il doit se poursuivre, il faut que le processus 
soit crédible, ce qui signifie qu'il doit éviter les retours en arrière et porter vraiment ses 
fruits, c'est-à-dire notamment attirer les bonnes catégories d'investisseurs. 
57.  Si la privatisation est en plein essor dans la plupart des pays participants, les 
résultats sont variables et peu de  programmes sont considérés comme des réussites. 
L'impression générale est que les gouvernements africains n'ont adopté la privatisation 
qu'à contrecoeur et que les programmes n'ont généralement pas été bien gérés. Le manque 
de  transparence et d'information du public est en particulier une  source de 
préoccupations
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•  La tendance récente à inclure les grandes sociétés de services publics 
dans le processus de privatisation n'a fait qu'accentuer ces problèmes, car on rapporte 
dans plusieurs pays des manœuvres en coulisses (des dessous-de-table qui assurent un 
traitement préférentiel à certains investisseurs) visant à  contourner les procédures 
officielles conçues pour que chacun soit sur un pied d'égalité. En Ouganda, un exemple 
de ce type dévoilé au grand jour a récemment forcé le Parlement à suspendre le programme 
de privatisation. Malgré les difficultés que cela peut occasionner pour les opérations de 
privatisation en cours, il est fort probable que cette attitude du Parlement sera en fin de 
compte bénéfique pour le climat de l'investissement en Ouganda puisqu'elle a prouvé sa 
détermination à lutter contre les pratiques inacceptables. Il  apparaît de plus en plus 
nettement que la façon dont sont gérés les programmes de privatisation, y compris le 
degré de participation des parties prenantes et la qualité de l'information du public, est 
déterminante pour la qualité de la gestion des affaires publiques et, dans un avenir proche, 
pour le climat général de l'investissement dans chaque pays. 
24Voir «La privatisation en Afrique>> d'Oliver Campbell White et Anita Bhatia, Banque mondiale, avril 1998. 
p.214 58.  Il est par ailleurs tout aussi important que les opérations de désengagement 
de l'État soient négociées et conclues d'une manière professionnelle et efficiente. On 
peut citer de nombreux cas, en Afrique, où d'importants programmes de privatisation 
ont été gérés d'une manière telle qu'ils ont miné les  efforts des  pays à  attirer 
l'investissement (par exemple, retards dans  la négociation d'un accord avec un 
soumissionnaire de premier rang, ou arrivée d'un acteur supplémentaire après la fermeture 
du processus d'appel d'offres). Les gouvernements et leurs agences de mise en œuvre 
devraient être pleinement conscients du fait  que  leurs efforts de promotion de 
l'investissement peuvent être réduits à néant si les investisseurs et les marchés reçoivent 
de  mauvais messages. Il convient donc de faire preuve en tout temps d'équité et de 
transparence. 
L'investissement dans des infrastructures nouvelles et revalorisées 
59.  Les infrastructures, y compris les sources d'énergie et d'eau, les routes, le 
transport et les services y afférant et les télécommunications, sont essentielles à la conduite 
des  affaires.  Du point de  vue de  l'investisseur, ces  installations et ces services sont 
inadéquats dans plusieurs des pays de l'ITF (mauvaise qualité ou manque de fiabilité) ou 
sont trop coûteux. La plupart des pays participants ont entrepris de bâtir ou de revaloriser 
leurs infrastructures par 1  'entremise de la privatisation, en encourageant la participation 
du  secteur privé dans de  nouveaux projets importants d'investissement dans les 
infrastructures. Toutefois, dans certains cas, ces efforts pourraient prendre du temps à 
porter fruit et les capacités existantes subiront entre-temps des pressions accrues afin de 
fonctionner avec un maximum d'efficacité. 
60.  La privatisation porte ses fruits, mais il est possible d'utiliser davantage le 
processus afin d'accélérer l'indispensable mise à niveau des infrastructures. Les pays de 
l'ITF sont encouragés à examiner cette possibilité, en particulier dans le contexte des 
infrastructures communes (par exemple, les routes frontalières). 
61.  Au vu des difficultés que pose dans de nombreux pays participants 1' accès 
rapide à des services publics (et autres) fiables, il faudrait s'attacher davantage à établir 
des zones industrielles dotées d'infrastructures de qualites. Par ailleurs, les investisseurs 
réagiraient positivement si les services publics étaient fournis aux prix du marché mondial. 
Plusieurs des pays de l'ITF ont déjà commencé à établir des zones franches industrielles, 
y compris Maurice, la Namibie, le Zimbabwe et la Zambie. Les résultats obtenus au 
chapitre de  la performance ont été variables.  Il  est nécessaire d'harmoniser le  cadre 
réglementaire des zones franches de traitement des exportations et de se conformer aux 
"L'expérience des complexes industriels et des zones franches pour l'industrie d'exportation du monde entier porte à conclure qu'ils auraient 
plus de chances de réussir s'ils étaient privés ou gérés par le secteur privé. 
p.215 dispositions de l'OMC. Toutefois, selon certains observateurs, comme les zones franches 
risquent de créer des conditions favorables à la fraude fiscale, on devrait plutôt chercher 
à les éliminer et recourir plutôt au remboursement des droits d'importation versés pour 
les produits exportés admissibles. 
62.  Dans  le  monde entier,  en réponse aux difficultés que le  secteur public 
rencontre dans  le  financement et la gestion de  grands et nouveaux projets 
d'infrastructures, la tendance actuelle privilégie la participation privée aux 
infrastructures (PPI).  Mis à part quelques exemples en Afrique sub-saharienne, ce 
mouvement n'a pas vraiment pris d'essor dans d'autres parties du monde. En 1' absence 
d'engagements significatifs sur les tarifs des services et de dispositions réglementaires 
crédibles, les sociétés privées n'ont pas voulu prendre le risque d'investir dans la région. 
Dans certains cas, elles ont accepté un certain degré de risque commercial sous forme 
de contrats de location-exploitation. Dans d'autres cas, leur participation s'est limitée 
à des contrats de gestion. Cependant, les projets élaborés dans les pays de  l'ITF et 
auxquels  la PPI serait adaptée nécessitent de  grosses sommes d'argent et les 
investisseurs sont méfiants en raison de la durée de récupération des investissements à 
long terme et de l'ampleur des risques pressentis. Il existe pourtant des instruments 
permettant de  limiter les  risques,  entre autres  les  garanties partielles fournies  par 
l'  AMGI,  la BIRD et l'IDA, ainsi que des  traités  internationaux de protection des 
investissements.
26  Mais les pays de l'ITF pourraient s'attacher davantage à joindre les 
efforts de chacun de manière à utiliser les prêts sur mesure proposés par les institutions 
financières  internationales et les crédits et subventions équivalents offerts par des 
sources bilatérales pour fournir les garanties nécessaires au recouvrement des crédits à 
moyen et long terme des investisseurs étrangers et nationaux. 
Promotion des investissements 
63.  L'image que  donne l'Afrique par delà le  continent est sans appel.  Cette 
perception est fortement influencée par les tristes nouvelles en provenance d'Afrique, 
décrivant des événements et situations causés par la famine, la pauvreté, la maladie, la 
sécheresse, le tribalisme, le racisme, les guerres civiles et la corruption. Quelques pays 
se sont aujourd'hui libérés de l'ensemble ou de la plupart de ces maux; et nombreux sont 
ceux qui ont récemment entrepris d'y porter remède. Malgré tout, les efforts déployés 
par chacun des pays afin de promouvoir une meilleure image ne suffisent pas à rectifier 
la perception collective de l'Afrique. Il est donc dans l'intérêt commun des pays africains 
et des pays qui participent à l'ITF d'améliorer leur image, en mettant en lumière les 
26À noter que: a) la Banque mondiale peut désormais fournir des garanties de l'IDA aux pays admissibles uniquement aux concours de l'IDA. 
Ces nouvelles facilités (300 millions de dollars pour la phase pilote) peuvent servir à promouvoir des projets transfrontaliers parrainés par le 
secteur privé; b) si la Facilité de garantie pour l'Afrique est adoptée, elle deviendra un nouvel outil important. 
p.216 réussites et le potentiel de ressources et d'opportunités présentes sur le continent, et de 
montrer que des efforts sérieux sont déployés pour lutter contre la corruption, le VIH/ 
SIDA, l'instabilité et la pauvreté, et vaincre ces fléaux. 
E.  Propositions de programmes prioritaires 
64.  Il n'est pas possible d'aborder ici tout à la fois l'ensemble des aspects de la 
promotion des investissements. Il est par conséquent essentiel de définir d'un commun 
accord des domaines d'action prioritaires. Soulignons d'abord d'entrée de jeu  1' importance 
primordiale des conditions préalables énumérées à la section C, notamment en ce qui 
concerne la stabilité macroéconomique. La présente section examine les mesures 
immédiates qui pourraient être prises par ailleurs par les pays de 1  'ITF pour promouvoir 
et faciliter l'investissement. On en distingue cinq catégories : 
i)  accélération de la mise en oeuvre des réformes commerciales de l'ITF; 
ii)  intensification des efforts de promotion de l'investissement; 
iii)  réformes juridiques et judiciaires sélectives; 
iv)  réformes fiscales sélectives; 
v)  mise en place d'un système de prix d'excellence en Afrique capable de 
promouvoir l'amélioration de la qualité des services qui influent sur l'investissement. 
65.  Il serait possible d'en envisager davantage, mais quelles que soient les étapes 
convenues, il sera nécessaire de mettre 1' accent sur leur mise en œuvre rapide, efficace et 
coordonnée, pour obtenir sans tarder des résultats positifs. Le programme présenté n'est 
qu'une ébauche: chaque pays devra concevoir son propre parcours selon ce schéma 
directeur. À la lumière des recommandations de la Conférence interministérielle, chaque 
GTT devra, en collaboration avec son agence nationale de promotion de l'investissement, 
préparer un échéancier détaillé pour la mise en œuvre des mesures adoptées, ainsi que 
des initiatives nationales supplémentaires qui refléteront ses priorités sectorielles. Par 
ailleurs, il conviendra d'élaborer un programme complet de mise en œuvre des mesures 
collectives de 1  'ITF et de la coordination des efforts qui devront être déployés 
simultanément à l'échelle nationale. 
66.  Si les initiatives nationales et régionales sont complémentaires, les moyens 
utilisés pour leur mise en œuvre n'en seront pas moins différents. Par exemple, les efforts 
de promotion nationale - ceux suggérés dans le présent document et tous les autres -
ne peuvent relever que des institutions locales privées ou publiques. Ils peuvent - et 
devraient-être mis en œuvre peu importe le contexte de l'ITF. Toutefois, chaque pays 
p.217 participant doit mettre en œuvre les actions adoptées dans le cadre de l'ITF à l'unisson 
afin d'en assurer la cohérence et la coordination avec celles des autres pays et de contribuer 
ainsi à redorer 1  'image et la réputation de la région toute entière. Les initiatives régionales, 
par contre, doivent être mises en œuvre collectivement, par la coordination des efforts et 
des contributions et l'utilisation des institutions et des véhicules adoptés d'un commun 
accord. 
67.  Les efforts de promotion de l'investissement déployés au niveau national et 
qui sont décrits ci-dessous devront clairement être organisés et gérés dans chaque pays, 
mais des mesures devront également être prises au niveau national, à 1' appui de la plupart 
des autres actions proposées. Il sera donc crucial de déterminer comment on parviendra 
à coordonner les efforts déployés par les pays participants. On pourra peut-être y parvenir 
ens'  accordant sur des mesures institutionnelles satisfaisantes (section F) pour ces actions 
qui nécessitent clairement un véhicule régional approprié. 
Libéralisation des échanges commerciaux 
68.  Il paraît urgent de donner une impulsion sensible aux réformes afin de mener 
à bien la libéralisation des régimes commerciaux de manière à réduire le biais anti-
exportation (ce qui est essentiel pour promouvoir l'investissement dans les petites 
économies en développement), à encourager l'utilisation des technologies étrangères et 
à accroître l'avantage comparatif que beaucoup de pays de l'ITF pourraient exploiter 
pour améliorer la distribution du revenu. Il conviendrait à cette fin,  dans un premier 
temps, d'achever rapidement les réformes des droits d'importation décrites dans le schéma 
directeur de l'ITF pour la réforme des régimes du commerce extérieur en ramenant le 
droit d'importation moyen pondéré par les échanges à 15% au maximum, avec tout au 
plus un barème de trois taux applicables (autres que le taux zéro), en ramenant le taux 
maximum à  20-25 %  et en supprimant les  exonérations des droits de douane 
conformément aux clauses des traités internationaux. Par ailleurs, tel que suggéré dans 
le schéma directeur pour la réforme des régimes du commerce extérieur, les droits 
applicables aux biens d'équipement et aux matières premières ne devraient pas dépasser 
5%27. 
"Document de synthèse, paragraphe Il. 
p.218 69.  L'adoption des consolidations tarifaires de l'OMC est une question connexe. 
Jusqu'à présent, la plupart des pays de l'ITF n'ont pas consolidé les taux sur beaucoup 
de produits, et lorsqu'ils 1' ont fait, ils ont retenu des taux beaucoup plus élevés que ceux 
de  l'OMC. En approfondissant la réforme tarifaire et en rehaussant la crédibilité de 
1  'irréversibilité du processus de réformes, les pays de 1  'ITF devraient entreprendre 
l'introduction des consolidations tarifaires de l'OMC à des taux qui ne dépassent guère 
ceux que préconise le  schéma directeur et accroître le nombre de  lignes tarifaires 
consolidées. Une telle mesure rehausserait sensiblement la crédibilité des pays de l'ITF 
en créant une structure d'incitations propice à des flux efficaces d'investissements et 
d'échanges commerciaux. En outre, elle donnerait une certaine souplesse en cas de besoin 
et une marge de manœuvre discrétionnaire pour poursuivre la libéralisation des tarifs. 
70.  Finalement, comme le suggérait déjà le document de synthèse examiné à la 
Troisième réunion ministérielle de 1  'ITF, il convient de poursuivre les efforts pour dépasser 
les objectifs fixés dans le schéma directeur pour la réforme des régimes du commerce en 
réduisant encore le droit maximum, le nombre de taux et le taux moyen pondéré par les 
échanges. L'Ouganda a déjà donné l'exemple en ramenant le nombre de taux autres que 
le taux zéro à deux, le taux maximum à 15 % et le taux moyen pondéré par les échanges 
à environ 10 %. De tels efforts seront essentiels pour aider les pays de l'ITF à s'intégrer 
dans 1' économie mondiale et à rester concurrentiels. 
Promotion de l'investissement 
Efforts de promotion de l'investissement à l'échelle régionale (ITF) 
71.  Pour promouvoir l'investissement avec succès, les pays africains doivent 
aller de l'avant, se montrer confiants en leurs capacités et faire la preuve qu'il existe 
chez eux des possibilités valables d'investissement et que les obstacles qui nuisaient à la 
conduite des affaires ont été supprimés. Une fois les obstacles levés, on ne pourra obtenir 
des flux substantiels d'investissement qu'au moyen de programmes d'incitations soutenus 
accompagnés de messages cohérents, dans un climat stable et propice aux affaires. Les 
pays de l'ITF ont besoin d'engager des actions concrètes propres à revaloriser l'image 
de l'Afrique et de promouvoir de ce fait l'investissement à deux niveaux: régional et 
national. Au niveau régional (ITF), les actions suivantes pourraient être menées : 
a)  en s'appuyant sur les progrès déjà accomplis, simplifier et libéraliser davantage 
les procédures d'approbation et consolider les codes de l'investissement et autres 
dispositions réglementaires en un document unique pour chaque pays afin de 
faciliter 1' accès des investisseurs potentiels aux marchés régionaux et mondiaux 
d'ici la fin de l'an 2000; 
p.219 b) coopérer aux mesures incitatives grâce à l'adoption de politiques communes et à 
l'organisation en commun de campagnes publicitaires et promotionnelles et de 
missions de promotion de 1  'investissement28 • Cependant, sans le soutien total de 
l'ensemble des gouvernements participant à l'ITF, en particulier par la mise à 
disposition des ressources adéquates, il ne sera pas aisé d'aborder le volet de 
l'incitation à l'investissement de manière unifiée (annexe XVI). Une approche 
commune a néanmoins été adoptée par les agences de promotion des investissements 
du Kenya, de la Tanzanie et de 1' Ouganda. Il s'agirait de consolider et de développer 
cette approche
29 
•  Il faudrait que la pièce maîtresse de ces incitations soit une 
campagne de relations publiques destinée à revaloriser l'image des échanges 
commerciaux dans les pays de l'ITF. En amont du recrutement d'experts à même 
de conseiller et de coordonner les tâches, les GTT assumeraient une grande partie 
du travail de préparation. Ils seraient par exemple chargés de la collecte de 
1  'information sur les cas de réussite industrielle ou commerciale et les autres éléments 
susceptibles de véhiculer les bons messages pour stimuler l'investissement. Les 
GTT devraient envisager de cibler des branches et des secteurs économiques donnés 
(par exemple, les routes et autres infrastructures) ainsi que des investisseurs précis 
appartenant à trois grandes catégories. La première de ces catégories regroupe les 
sociétés publiques admises à la cote internationale. Ce groupe est le plus important 
à cause de  son aptitude à mobiliser l'investissement, à introduire les nouvelles 
technologies, à élargir 1' accès aux marchés et à servir de catalyseur pour les nouvelles 
entreprises locales. La présence de ces sociétés enverrait un message clair aux 
marchés. La deuxième catégorie est celle des ressortissants des pays participants 
qui ont choisi de placer leur épargne en dehors de la région et la troisième est celle 
des investisseurs non traditionnels30 ; 
c)  améliorer et partager les informations en créant un site Internet consacré à 1  'ITF 
qui proposerait aux investisseurs des données susceptibles de les intéresser telles 
que  des données macroéconomiques, les progrès réalisés en matière 
d'harmonisation des régimes tarifaires et de  la libéralisation des régimes de 
change, les derniers cours de la Bourse, le volume des échanges commerciaux et 
la disponibilité des services d'aide. Ce site devrait être relié électroniquement 
aux services d'information «IPAnet» et «PrivatizationLink» du Groupe de la 
Banque mondiale, ainsi qu'aux bases de données concernant la privatisation en 
Afrique et aux autres sites pertinents (d'ici la fin de 1999); 
d)  étudier la faisabilité de la création de fonds d'investissement transfrontaliers (voir 
encadré 1). 
"Ces efforts pourraient être menés en coordination avec l'IPAnet, le réseau de communications et d'échanges de renseignements en ligne de 
l'  AMGI, et «PrivatizationLink», le service d'information consacré à la privatisation du Groupe de la Banque mondiale. 
29Des actions similaires sont envisagées en vertu du Programme régional intégré de développement des échanges (PRIDE) mis en place par la 
Commission de l'Océan indien. 
30Ces derniers devraient être choisis avec soin, selon la niche technique spécialisée à laquelle ils appartiennent et leur viabilité financière. 
p.220 Encadré 1 :Promotion de l'épargne et de l'investissement grâce aux fonds 
transfrontières 
L'extension de l'actionnariat est un des problèmes récurrents de la privatisation 
dans la plupart des pays africains. Dans la majorité des pays, les possibilités sont 
limitées non seulement par la faiblesse de l'épargne mais également par le manque 
de bons projets d'investissement et par l'état embryonnaire du marché de capitaux. 
Les occasions d'investir sont rares parce que la plupart des sociétés parapubliques 
soumises à la privatisation ont besoin d'une recapitalisation très substantielle, d'une 
mise à niveau technologique et de meilleures conditions d'accès aux marchés, en 
plus de la nécessaire amélioration de leur gestion. Ces besoins signifient qu'il faut 
mettre en place un noyau dur d'investisseurs stratégiques ou, pour les entreprises 
plus petites, céder d'emblée l'affaire aux investisseurs intéressés. Les offres publiques 
de vente d'actions des sociétés ayant des antécédents crédibles sont rares ou encore 
inexistantes dans certains pays. Parallèlement, au vu de la taille d'un grand nombre 
d'économies, il y a lieu de se demander si le nombre de titres en circulation et le 
volume des échanges peut atteindre la masse critique suffisante pour,  à l'avenir, 
alimenter l'activité d'une place boursière. L'idée de  créer des marchés boursiers 
régionaux a déjà été émise et la première bourse régionale d'Afrique a récemment vu 
le jour à Abidjan. Cependant, pour les pays qui participent à l'ITF, il faudra peut-être 
attendre quelques années avant de mettre en place une ou plusieurs bourses régionales. 
D'ici là, les organismes de privatisation ont besoin de moyens pour proposer à la 
vente des participations minoritaires dans le capital des  entreprises rentables de 
manière à en étendre 1' actionnariat.  Par ailleurs, de  nouveaux instruments de 
participation sont nécessaires pour stimuler l'investissement des petits épargnants. 
Les fonds  transfrontières pourraient figurer parmi ces instruments. Certaines 
organismes de privatisation, en Tanzanie et en Zambie par exemple, travaillent déjà 
à la création de fonds d'investissements. Les pays qui participent à l'ITF devraient 
envisager d'étendre ce concept afin que les fonds puissent permettre de détenir un 
portefeuille d'actions dans plusieurs pays. En dépit d'un certain nombre de détails 
qu'il faudra revoir, ces fonds d'investissements transfrontières ou fonds communs 
de placement permettraient de : 
t  faciliter la mise en place de fonds grâce à un noyau solide de titres attrayants; 
t  Fournir un moyen adapté pour la cession des participations publiques résiduelles, 
en particulier dans les petites entreprises et 
t  développer l'actionnariat et stimuler l'épargne en proposant aux petits 
épargnants de plusieurs pays la possibilité d'investir dans des fonds dont les 
risques sont répartis sur une gamme d'actions plus large. 
p.221 Efforts de promotion de l'investissement à l'échelle nationale 
72.  Au niveau national, l'initiative proposée comporte quatre volets. 
Premièrement, concevoir et mettre en œuvre un ensemble de modifications qui ferait de 
chaque pays participant une destination plus attrayante et qui améliorerait 1' accès à 
l'information et les services aux investisseurs étrangers potentiels
31
• Cela supposerait 
que l'on améliore l'accueil à l'aéroport en installant un bureau d'informations pour les 
visiteurs équipé de cartes et de guides des hôtels et des services d'aide aux entreprises 
(cabinets comptables, experts-conseils, services juridiques, experts et secrétariats), et 
des services de taxi de qualité que 1  'on puisse emprunter sans avoir à se frayer un chemin 
à travers la foule. 
73.  Deuxièmement, il conviendrait de prêter une plus grande attention aux 
problèmes de sécurité. Non seulement les investisseurs, qu'ils soient locaux ou étrangers, 
préfèrent commercer dans un environnement où ils se sentent personnellement en sécurité, 
mais le degré de sécurité est perçu par beaucoup comme un indicateur de stabilité à long 
terme. Il est donc nécessaire de prendre des mesures en liaison avec les organes 
responsables de  l'ordre public afin d'élaborer et d'exécuter des programmes de 
sensibilisation de la population à la nécessité d'une meilleure sécurité, qui ne décrivent 
pas simplement les mesures de maintien de l'ordre mais fassent aussi comprendre que la 
société en général a tout à gagner à ce que chacun se sente en sécurité. 
74.  Troisièmement, dans beaucoup des pays de  l'ITF, le  secteur privé a dû 
composer pendant un certain nombre d'années avec une économie dirigée.  En 
conséquence, beaucoup d'entrepreneurs potentiels ont une connaissance et une expérience 
très limitées de la préparation des plans d'affaires, de la mobilisation des capitaux, de la 
commercialisation, du contrôle de la qualité et de la gestion des affaires. Dans une telle 
situation, les efforts de promotion de l'investissement devraient donc chercher à fournir 
1  'information et la formation voulues pour répondre aux besoins des entreprises naissantes. 
75.  Quatrièmement, les efforts déployés pour attirer les investisseurs étrangers 
devraient s'accompagner, en parallèle, d'efforts équivalents pour la promotion d'une 
bonne interaction avec les investisseurs locaux. À cette fin, les agences de promotion de 
l'investissement devraient jouer un rôle actif (y compris, par exemple, en maintenant 
des bases de données sur les investisseurs étrangers et locaux) pour faciliter les contacts 
des uns avec les autres. 
31Il faut noter que le rythme imprimé à ces actions pourra varier d'un pays à un autre. Chaque GTT devra préparer son propre schéma directeur 
pour la promotion des investissements. Les organismes de parrainage peuvent contribuer à ce processus (par exemple, le service-conseil pour 
l'investissement étranger où FIAS a aidé plusieurs pays dont l'Ouganda et le  Swaziland à préparer leur schéma directeur concernant les 
investissements à l'échelle de l'entreprise). 
p.222 Réformes juridiques et  judiciaires sélectives 
76.  Comme 1' explique un récent document de  la Banque mondiale, le 
renforcement des  supports juridiques, réglementaires et judiciaires est nécessaire au 
développement du secteur privé en Afrique32 • Dans le contexte des efforts qui visent à 
attirer à la fois les investisseurs étrangers et locaux et à harmoniser les procédures afin 
de  faciliter les  investissements, les pays de  l'ITF pourraient: a) créer une nouvelle 
catégorie d'  «entreprises régionales»;  b) adopter des procédures communes 
d'enregistrement des sociétés et des succursales; c) créer des tribunaux de commerce 
distincts pour veiller à 1' exécution des contrats. 
77.  Toutefois, 1' étape essentielle entre toutes et qui enverrait un message clair 
aux investisseurs consisterait pour les pays de 1  'ITF à résoudre tous les problèmes fonciers. 
Les investisseurs doivent pouvoir être convaincus qu'ils pourront acheter ou louer à 
long terme des terres en quantités suffisantes. À défaut d'une telle réforme, les efforts de 
promotion décrits ci-dessus paraîtront vides de sens et inutiles. 
Entreprises régionales 
78.  Les coûts opérationnels baisseraient considérablement pour les investisseurs 
si une société enregistrée dans un pays participant était reconnue comme une entreprise 
régionale et avait la possibilité d'étendre ses activités dans d'autres pays participants 
sans avoir à se  constituer en une nouvelle entité juridique. Une société serait ainsi 
considérée comme une entreprise régionale au moment de sa constitution dans l'un des 
pays participants, quelle que soit la nationalité du propriétaire. De cette manière, toute 
société constituée à l'intérieur de la région, y compris les multinationales étrangères, 
serait considérée comme résidente. 
Amélioration des procédures d'enregistrement des sociétés 
79.  L'adoption des procédures communes d'enregistrement est étroitement liée 
à  la mesure antérieure. Toutefois, on pourrait l'adopter plus facilement et plus 
rapidement. Si des différences risquent de persister, à tout le moins à court terme, dans 
les formules juridiques des sociétés et la réglementation de leur propriété et de leur 
gérance, rien ne devrait empêcher les agences responsables de 1' enregistrement des 
entreprises d'adopter des procédures d'enregistrement communes, modernes et 
simplifiées (voir encadré 2). 
ùvoir <<Africa  Can Compete!, cadre du soutien apporté par le Groupe de la Banque mondiale au développement du secteur privé en Afrique 
sub-saharienne», publié par le Groupe de financement du secteur privé, région Afrique, Banque mondiale, août 1998. 
p.223 80.  Une telle démarche prouverait les intentions et la détermination des autorités 
de réduire les coûts de transaction et d'harmoniser graduellement les lois régissant les 
entreprises et les activités commerciales.  Selon leur histoire coloniale, le droit des 
entreprises des pays participants est fondé sur l'un des droits suivants :le droit commun 
et le droit des entreprises anglais, le droit romain néerlandais et le Code civil. L'adoption 
de procédures d'enregistrement communes serait un premier pas significatif vers 
1  'harmonisation de 1' appareil juridique (droit des contrats, des sociétés, de la faillite, du 
travail et droit foncier33 )  qui fait partie intégrante du régime de l'investissement34 • 
81.  La refonte et l'harmonisation des procédures d'enregistrement des sociétés 
auraient les effets positifs suivants : 
t  il serait plus facile pour les investisseurs d'enregistrer les sociétés; 
t  les bureaux d'enregistrement pourraient partager des informations sur les 
entreprises avec leurs homologues d'autres pays; 
t  les liens avec les autres obligations d'enregistrement (par exemple, pour l'impôt 
et les licences) seraient automatisés; 
t  les possibilités d'accès à l'information (utiles aux planificateurs et aux décideurs 
du gouvernement, aux analystes économiques, aux investisseurs et aux créanciers 
existants ou potentiels) seraient énormément accrues; 
t  les procédures de facturation et de recouvrement des amendes seraient améliorées. 
33Y compris les droits de la propriété intellectuelle. 
34Les règlements d'application de ces lois seraient également inclus. En fait, un schéma directeur dont l'application s'étend au moyen terme 
pourrait fort bien inclure l'harmonisation ou l'intégration des cadres réglementaires. 
p.224 Encadré 2: Refonte et harmonisation des procédures d'enregistrement des 
sociétés 
La constitution d'une société -la  forme la plus fréquente mais non exclusive 
étant la société à responsabilité limitée - suppose en général son enregistrement 
auprès d'un bureau spécialisé. Dans le cas des pays anglophones, il est généralement 
appelé Registre des sociétés et 1' agent qui signe le  certificat est le Receveur de 
1' enregistrement des sociétés. La constitution d'une société peut ou devrait également 
entraîner d'autres obligations de déclaration auprès des services fiscaux et autres 
organismes professionnels, pour l'obtention des licences professionnelles et le dépôt 
du nom de la société. Dans un délai imparti et, par la suite, chaque année, il  est 
demandé aux sociétés enregistrées de remplir et de soumettre un «Rapport annuel» 
avec en annexe une copie des états financiers vérifiés. Des processus semblables 
s'appliquent dans les pays non anglophones. 
Dans certains pays, en raison du mauvais équipement des bureaux et du manque 
d'investissement en ressources humaines et en moyens techniques, le nombre des 
tâches non accomplies est considérable, les procédures ne sont pas appliquées de 
manière cohérente et les liens entre les différentes obligations d'enregistrement se 
sont relâchés. Il est fréquent que les sociétés ne remettent pas leurs déclarations dans 
les délais prévus. L'inefficacité administrative signifie que des mesures ne sont pas 
toujours prises pour exiger la reddition des comptes et recouvrer les cotisations ou 
amendes. Un investissement relativement faible dans la création et la mise en place 
d'un système informatique classique d'enregistrement des sociétés dans les pays de 
1' ITF permettrait de  faciliter 1  'enregistrement des investisseurs et améliorerait 
considérablement la connaissance du fonctionnement des entreprises et des secteurs. 
Ceci faciliterait les investissements pour les raisons suivantes : i) les investisseurs 
sauraient que les procédures et obligations d'enregistrement sont identiques dans 
chacun des pays participants; ii) l'interconnexion des registres des sociétés donneraient 
à une entreprise enregistrée dans un des pays participants la possibilité d'ouvrir 
automatiquement une succursale dans un autre pays et iii) en créant des liens directs 
entre les systèmes fiscaux,  les raisons sociales et les licences professionnelles, il 
deviendrait possible de réduire la plupart, si ce n'est la totalité, des formalités 
d'enregistrement. 
Des systèmes et des procédures d'enregistrement normalisés faciliteraient 
également le commerce en permettant aux acheteurs et aux vendeurs de se renseigner 
sur les fournisseurs et les clientèles présents outre-frontière. 
p.225 Le registre des sociétés est pour l'essentiel une base de données à laquelle les 
actionnaires, les créanciers et autres parties intéressées peuvent légalement accéder 
(contre paiement d'un droit d'accès). La mise à niveau de  cette base de  données 
informatique permettrait d'améliorer considérablement le  suivi de l'évolution 
économique. Une gestion correcte de cette base permettrait de fournir des données 
sur la croissance économique, l'évolution des différentes catégories d'entreprises 
(création/disparition) et les performances financières  des  sociétés par type de 
propriétaire, par secteur, par taille, par zone géographique, etc. Cependant, afin qu'elles 
donnent un maximum de  résultats, il  faudrait revoir les  obligations de publicité 
financière  des  sociétés et mettre en place un système uniforme de  déclarations 
obligatoires qui centraliserait les formalités requises par les services fiscaux et par le 
registre des sociétés. Une mise à jour de la législation serait alors nécessaire afin que 
les données concernant la propriété, les finances et autres informations contenues 
dans le rapport annuel et les états financiers vérifiés des entreprises constituées puissent 
être plus largement diffusées. 
Création de tribunaux de commerce distincts 
82.  Une procédure accélérée est nécessaire afin que les bailleurs de fonds soient 
sûrs de pouvoir recouvrer leurs créances en cas de cessation de paiement. Les pays de 
l'ITF pourraient donc créer des tribunaux de commerce spécialisés qui s'occuperaient 
des différends commerciaux, du recouvrement des créances et des procédures de faillite. 
L'Ouganda s'est déjà engagé dans ce processus et sera un modèle très utile. Le GTT de 
l'Ouganda pourrait être invité à transmettre les leçons de son expérience dans ce domaine 
aux autres GTT.  Plus récemment, le COMESA (à présent désigné comme zone 
d'investissement) a créé un tribunal de  commerce. Cette Cour de justice spéciale est 
composée de sept juges qui se réunissent avec un greffier permanent basé à Lusaka.  35 
Réformes fiscales sélectives 
83.  Les propositions en cette matière sont regroupées en quatre domaines distincts 
-taxes  sur les biens et les services, impôts sur le revenu et les bénéfices, gestion fiscale 
et accords de  double imposition- et accompagnées d'un calendrier annuel détaillé 
couvrant les trois prochaines années. L'annexe XXVII résume les bonnes pratiques fiscales 
et tarifaires. Toutefois, tel que mentionné auparavant, les réformes fiscales ne devraient 
pas être réalisées aux dépens des dépenses budgétaires essentielles. 
35Cette Cour sera appelée, entre autres, à statuer sur des affaires de pratiques conunerciales déloyales et sur l'interprétation du traité, et à faire 
en sorte que les membres respectent les décisions prises. 
p.226 Taxes sur les biens et les services 
84.  Des préparatifs détaillés en vue de l'adoption d'une taxe à la consommation 
(TVA)  assise sur une large base, de préférence à un seul taux, avec un minimum 
d'exonérations et un seuil défini constitueraient un progrès important. 
Impôts sur le revenu et les bénéfices 
85.  Des mesures devraient être prises afin de simplifier les impôts sur le revenu 
et les bénéfices et ramener les taux à des niveaux qui n'encouragent pas autant la fraude. 
Les pays de l'ITF pourraient adopter à l'intention des sociétés : i) une politique commune 
sur les concessions fiscales  et les exemptions spéciales (prônant de  préférence leur 
suppression); ii) une réduction de l'impôt sur les bénéfices/le revenu des sociétés, à un 
seul taux modéré et une baisse des retenues à la source36 • Parallèlement, les déductions 
pour amortissement sur l'ensemble des biens d'équipement devraient être uniformes 
d'un secteur à l'autre, avec des possibilités d'amortissement accéléré, et les dépenses de 
recherche-développement et de formation du personnel devraient être déductibles en 
totalité. 
86.  Pour les particuliers, les pays de l'ITF devraient abaisser les impôts sur le 
revenu, limiter les exemptions personnelles et les déductions et viser à limiter les tranches 
d'imposition et à fixer un taux marginal maximal modéré. 
Gestion fiscale 
87.  Parmi les divers aspects de la gestion fiscale qui pourraient être améliorés, le 
plus important pour l'investissement serait probablement l'informatisation des douanes 
de la façon la plus simple possible. Il existe à ce propos un certain nombre de systèmes, 
mais celui recommandé est le Système douanier automatisé (SYDONIA) qui a déjà été 
adopté par le COMESA37 • Les pays de l'ITF devraient prendre des mesures pour assurer 
la coordination des politiques entre les services fiscaux et douaniers et les ministères 
responsables de ces politiques (Finances et Plan) en association étroite avec le Comité 
d'exécution des politiques (CEP) de l'ITF. 
36Les retenues à la source devraient être créditées au moment des déclarations d•impôt individuelles. Il conviendrait également de réviser le 
statut des non-résidents afin de prendre en compte les retombées des traités de double imposition (ou de leur inexistence). 
"Plusieurs des pays de !'!TF ont déjà adopté le système SYDONIA, souvent dans le cadre d'un projet du CO  MESA appuyé par l'UE. 
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88.  Comme indiqué précédemment, le processus de conclusion d'accords de 
double imposition est en bonne voie, mais il  reste beaucoup à faire pour 1' étendre à tous 
les pays présentant des investisseurs potentiels. Il est suggéré que les pays de 1  'ITF abordent 
cette question en trois étapes : i) conclusion d'accords réciproques de double imposition 
entre tous les pays de l'ITF, de préférence sous une forme normalisée; ii) conclusion 
d'accords avec l'ensemble des partenaires commerciaux traditionnels (lorsque ces accords 
n'existent pas actuellement ou sont inadaptés); iii) négociation en vue d'accords avec de 
nouveaux pays susceptibles de générer des flux d'investissement. 
Un système de prix comme méthode de sensibilisation et d'émulation 
89.  Comme expliqué dans la section D, la disponibilité et la qualité de certains 
services d'appui ont une incidence sur 1' investissement.  Les priorités sont : 
i) l'amélioration de l'information à l'intention des investisseurs; ii) l'amélioration des 
normes et pratiques professionnelles; iii) l'amélioration des services financiers et non 
financiers. Certaines questions se posent alors : comment les pays de l'ITF peuvent-ils 
faire comprendre la nécessité de ces améliorations et quelles mesures incitatives peuvent 
être mises en place pour susciter une réaction rapide du secteur privé? L'encadré 3 esquisse 
une proposition de système de prix qui soutiendrait les efforts de sensibilisation et aurait 
une fonction d'émulation. 
F.  Conditions institutionnelles et autres à respecter pour la mise en vigueur 
90.  Pour mettre en vigueur les mesures proposées dans le cadre du présent schéma 
directeur pour la promotion de 1  'investissement, les autorités des pays participants devront 
prendre une décision sur: i) l'ampleur et l'échelonnement des actions; ii) les étapes 
préparatoires; iii) les institutions internes et régionales qui seront responsables de ces 
actions. Pour porter fruit, ces actions devront également bénéficier d'efforts et d'un soutien 
constants qui devront se prolonger au-delà de la période de la prise des décisions politiques. 
Il  faudra pour cela pouvoir compter sur une planification solide et des  accords 
institutionnels efficaces fondés sur les principes suivants : 
t  uniformité dans l'application des conditions générales pour l'investissement; 
t  reconnaissance du principe de l'élargissement du marché (nécessité d'établir un 
marché régional et de  poursuivre l'intégration dans l'économie mondiale) et 
nécessité, de  ce fait,  pour les pays de  l'ITF, de  collaborer et de  mettre leurs 
ressources en commun de manière à maximiser la quête d'investissements; 
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de prix d'excellence en Afrique 
Il est aujourd'hui communément admis que le secteur privé doit être le moteur 
de la croissance économique. Cependant, une question subsiste : que faire pour inciter 
le secteur privé à améliorer comme il faut la qualité des services et des résultats? Et 
y a-t-il un moyen d'améliorer rapidement et sensiblement la situation sans que l'État 
n'ait à intervenir? Parce que ce serait un moyen de fournir des incitations financières 
et publicitaires aux entreprises du secteur privé présentes dans des secteurs clés, 
l'instauration d'un système de prix d'excellence en Afrique (PEA) qui  seraient 
décernés chaque année pourrait être une méthode envisageable. 
Il est par exemple nécessaire d'emichir la gamme des services et d'exploiter la 
technologie moderne afin d'améliorer l'efficacité et la convivialité des services directs 
à la clientèle. On pourrait imaginer de créer un prix pour la banque commerciale 
ayant réalisé les progrès les plus tangibles grâce au lancement de nouveaux produits 
et à l'amélioration de la qualité de ses services à la clientèle. 
Un autre pourrait récompenser la hausse de la croissance des exportations due à 
des efforts d'amélioration de la qualité et de promotion. Ce prix serait ouvert aux 
sociétés de toutes tailles puisqu'il serait possible de mesurer la croissance en termes 
relatifs et non absolus.  D'autres prix pourraient récompenser une hausse de la 
production (ventes sur le marché intérieur ou à l'exportation) ou une plus grande 
diversification des produits. 
Si le concept est reçu favorablement puis adopté par l'ITF et si les organismes 
privés et publics de parrainage s'engagent à fournir l'appui financier nécessaire, les 
entreprises implantées dans les pays participants pourront concourir pour les prix 
annuels, par exemple, dans les domaines suivants : 
Meilleurs services financiers  Technologie de l'information 
Publicité financière  Innovation 
Amélioration de l'efficience  Nouvelle entreprise 
Protection de 1' environnement  Hausse ou diversification de la production 
Croissance des exportations  Formation du personnel 
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privés, les PEA pourraient offrir des récompenses pécuniaires (prix annuels dotés 
d'environ 50.000 à 250.000 dollars). Les entreprises récompensées acquerraient un 
surcroît de  publicité et de  prestige considérable monnayable sur le  marché. Le 
processus d'évaluation et de sélection des lauréats contribuerait par ailleurs au partage 
des informations entre les pays participants, et donc à leur plus large diffusion en 
même temps qu'à leur meilleure compréhension. 
~  participation du secteur privé dans toute la mesure du possible; 
~  reconnaissance générale et prise en compte de  la nécessité de  maintenir la 
crédibilité sur le marché; 
~  aptitude des pays de l'ITF à communiquer et à coordonner leurs actions; 
~  aptitude à susciter et à maintenir l'aide des  bailleurs et des organismes de 
parrainage du secteur privé; 
~  qualités d'initiative et mise en œuvre des politiques inspirées du secteur privé 
(non bureaucratiques, rigoureuses et rapides). 
91.  Le tableau A présenté ci-dessous énumère chacune des actions proposées 
par le schéma directeur (section E), les institutions principales qui pourraient être mises 
à contribution et les principales options d1:  mise en œuvre, afin d'aider les CEP et les 
GTT à élaborer des dispositifs institutionnels efficaces. L'annexe XXVIII fournit des 
détails supplémentaires afin d'aider les décideurs et les GTT à s'acquitter de cette tâche. 
92.  Quatre facteurs principaux influeront sur la réalisation des conditions 
nécessaires à la mise en œuvre : 
a)  la présence d'un «champion» capable de donner son impulsion au programme et 
à en maintenir le rythme par des contacts continuels avec les GTT et les autres 
organisations engagées dans diverses activités; 
b) la conclusion d'un accord sur les dispositifs institutionnels régionaux; 
c)  l'autorité et la capacité des GTT. Les GTT doivent participer très étroitement à 
1' élaboration des politiques et au dialogue entre les secteurs privé et public; ils 
doivent être durables pour maintenir le rythme des réformes et les mener à bon 
terme. Dans certains pays, il faudra peut-être pour cela institutionnaliser le rôle 
des GTT (par exemple, les intégrer dans des institutions politiques privées ou 
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presque certainement besoin de voir leurs capacités renforcées pour pouvoir 
s'acquitter de leur mandat; 
d)  l'appui des organismes de parrainage et des autres bailleurs de sorte que les 
ressources nécessaires aux étapes b) et c)  soient disponibles en quantités 
suffisantes et en temps utile. 
93.  Le présent schéma directeur est un défi que les pays de l'ITF devront relever 
pour démontrer le sérieux de leur intention de mobiliser l'investissement. Les GTT auront 
un rôle important à jouer dans la surveillance du programme et la diffusion des résultats 
obtenus, mais les agences de  promotion de  l'investissement seront les principales 
responsables de  la mise en vigueur de l'initiative. Il est par conséquent vital que ces 
agences reçoivent leurs instructions le plus tôt possible afin d'entreprendre la tâche de 
contact et de  mobilisation des  institutions qui devraient contribuer aux actions 
individuelles. Beaucoup d'institutions, principalement du secteur privé, seront appelées 
à participer (plus en fait que celles mentionnées dans les notes de 1' annexe XXVIII) et la 
coordination risque d'être complexe. Le recours à des réunions virtuelles pourrait 
grandement faciliter cette coordination. Ceci montre bien la nécessité pour les agences 
d'examiner leurs ressources pour s'assurer qu'elles auront les moyens de s'acquitter de 
leur mandat. 
94.  Finalement, il  convient de  souligner les efforts constants que demandera 
1' application du schéma directeur pour la promotion de 1' investissement : outre un travail 
de préparation détaillé, il faudra consacrer des efforts constants aux examens détaillés 
des  politiques et à l'appui de  ces politiques sur plusieurs années. Plusieurs années 
pourraient en fait s'écouler avant que ces mesures n'induisent, chez les investisseurs, 
des réactions mesurables, ce qui illustre bien la nécessité d'une intervention durable. 
Ainsi, les pouvoirs publics et leurs agences de mise en œuvre, les institutions régionales 
participantes et les organismes de parrainage devront s'engager à long terme afin de 
pouvoir un jour cueillir les fruits de cette initiative. 
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Action proposée  Principales institutions nationales *  Principales institutions  Principales options de mise en oeuvre 
ré2ionales (plus les GTT) 
Libéralisation des échanges 
commerciaux 
a)  achèvement des réformes proposées  Maintien de la situation actuelle  COMESA, EAC, COI,  Maintien de la situation actuelle 
dans le schéma directeur de l'ITF sur  SADC 
la réforme des régimes du commerce 
b)  intégration des réformes commerciales  Maintien de la situation actuelle  COMESA, EAC, COI,  Maintien de la situation actuelle 
SADC 
c)  dépassement des objectifs du schéma  Maintien de la situation actuelle  COMESA, EAC, COI,  Maintien de la situation actuelle 
directeur de l'ITF pour la réforme des  SADC 
régimes du commerce 
Efforts de promotion à l'échelle 
régionale: 
a)  simplification des codes de  Agence de promotion de l'investissement  COMESA, EAC, COI,  Les API retiennent la responsabilité 
l'investissement, des procédures  (API), services juridiques du gouvernement  SADC  principale et s'occupent de l'impartition 
d'approbation et des dispositions  des tâches diverses 
réglementaires 
b)  promotion conjointe  API, associations de gens d'affaires,  COMESA, EAC, CEA,  Southern African Enterprise Network, 
ministères gouvernementaux  COI, SADC  réseaux d'entreprises et autres institutions 
transfrontalières privées, mais impartition 
des diverses tâches 
c)  site Internet d'information  API, associations de gens d'affaires, Banque  BAfD,CEA  La BAfD et les institutions sont 
centrale, ministères gouvernementaux  responsables de la promotion conjointe 
d)  examen de la faisabilité de fonds  Agence de privatisation, trust de privatisation,  COMESA, EAC, CEA,  Organisme de parrainage ou agence ou 
d'investissement trans  frontaliers  bourse des valeurs, institutions financières,  COI, SADC  trust de privatisation, avec impartition de 
ministère des Finances  l'étude 
Efforts de promotion à l'échelle 
nationale: 
a)  amélioration de l'information et  API, associations de gens d'affaires,  API ou chambres de commerce 
facilitation des déplacements  administrations aéroportuaires et portuaires, 
Douanes et Immigration 
b)  amélioration de la sécurité  Associations de gens d'affaires, police,  Ministère responsable de la sécurité 
ministère de l'Intérieur, ministère du  intérieure 
Commerce/Industrie Action proposée  Principales institutions nationales *  Principales institutions  Principales options de mise en oeuvre 
régionales (plus les GTT) 
c)  aide aux entrepreneurs locaux  API, associations de gens d'affaires, banques  Projets particuliers 
d)  promotion de l'interaction des  API, associations de gens d'affaires, ministère  API ou chambre de commerce si elle est 
investisseurs locaux et étrangers  du Commerce et de 1  'Industrie  très active 
Réformes juridiques et judiciaires 
sélectives : 
a)  création d'une forme juridique  Services juridiques du gouvernement,  CO  MESA et services juridiques du 
régionale des entreprises  professions comptable et juridique,  COMESA, EAC, COI,  gouvernement 
associations de gens d'affaires  SADC 
b)  adoption de procédures communes  Registre des entreprises, services juridiques  Bureaux d'enregistrement sous la 
d'enregistrement  du gouvernement, autorités fiscales,  COMESA, EAC, COI,  gouverne de la Cour commerciale du 
professions comptable et juridique, API  SADC  CO  MESA 
c)  mise en place de cours  Ministère de la Justice, profession juridique,  Ministères de la Justice, sous la gouverne 
commerciales distinctes  appareil judiciaire  CO MESA  de la Cour commerciale du CO  MESA 
Réformes fiscales sélectives : 
a)  réduction des droits d'importation  Maintien de la situation actuelle  Maintien de la situation actuelle 
conformément au schéma directeur  Maintien de la situation 
de l'ITF  actuelle 
b)  simplification de la structure de  Ministère des Finances, autorités fiscales,  Ministères des Finances 
l'impôt sur le revenu et réduction  profession comptable, associations de gens  COMESA, EAC, CEA, 
des taux  d'affaires, API  COI, SADC 
c)  amélioration de la gestion fiscale  Ministère des Finances, autorités fiscales,  Ministères des Finances 
profession comptable 
d)  conclusion d'accords de double  Ministère des Finances, autorités fiscales,  Ministères des Finances 
imposition  profession comptable  COMESA, SADC 
Prix d'excellence en Afrique  Associations de gens d'affaires, instituts  Réseaux d'entreprises, Sou  them African 
professionnels, ministères gouvernementaux  COMESA, EAC, CEA,  Enterprise Network, entreprises privées 
COI, SADC 
Note : Les organismes de parrainage participeront également à ces actions et les appuieront, sous réserve des politiques de chacune des institutions et des programmes d'assistance Annexe 1 
Taux de croissance du PIB dans les pays de l'ITF (%) 
(taux négatifs en italique) 
Pays /TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Burundi  -5,7  -3,1  -7,0  -8,6 
Comores  3,0  -5,3  -3,9  -0,4 
Kenya  0,4  2,6  4,4  4,1 
Madagascar  2,1  0,0  1,7  2,1 
Malawi  9,7  -10,2  14,7  10,7 
Maurice  5,4  4,1  4,7  5,4 
Namibie  -2,0  6,7  3,4  2,9 
Rwanda  -8,1  -19,3  36,6  12,0 
Seychelles  6,2  -0,8  -0,6  4,7 
Swaziland  3,3  3,5  2,7  3,9 
Tanzanie  12,2  1,4  2,6  4,1 
Ouganda  8,3  6,4  11,4  9,3 
Zambie  6,8  -3,4  -2,3  6,5 
Zimbabwe  1,3  6,8  -0,7  7,3 
Total des pays ITF :  3,3  0,9  4,8  5,9 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  -23,8  1,4  11,2  11,6 
Botswana  -0,1  4,1  3,1  7,0 
Lesotho  4,0  12,9  9,1  12,7 
Mozambique  8,6  7,5  4,3  7,1 
Nigéria  2,2  -0,6  2,6  6,4 
Afrique du Sud  1,3  2,7  3,4  3,2 
Ensemble de l'Afrique  0,9  2,0  5,9  4,9 
sub-saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 0,5  2,1  8,1  5,6 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
*Les données de  1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Taux calculés en chiffres constants de  1987. 
Source : World Bank  Africa Region Live Database (12 mai 1999) 
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1997  1998* 
0,4  4,5 
0,0  1,0 
2,1  1,5 
3,6  3,6 
5,1  4,0 
5,0  5,3 
1,8  1,5 
10,9  10,0 
4,3  4,1 
3,7  2,0 
4,0  3,4 
5,4  5,7 
3,4  -2,0 
3,2  2,4 
3,8  3,4 
7,6  -1,1 
6,9  6,0 
8,0  1,5 
12,4  9,1 
3,9  -3,2 
1,7  -0,5 
3,6  1,4 
4,5  3,7 Annexe Il 
Investissement intérieur brut dans les pays de l'ITF, en pourcentage du PIB 
Pays /TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  15,7  8,6  7,2  9,9  6,8  6,7 
Comores  20,6  21,0  19,9  18,9  21,3  19,8 
Kenya  17,6  19,3  21,8  20,4  19,1  18,4 
Madagascar  11,4  10,9  10,9  11,6  11,8  13,3 
Malawi  15,2  29,3  16,6  12,4  12,3  18,2 
Maurice  30,7  32,3  25,7  25,1  27,6  26,1 
Namibie  16,1  23,1  20,7  22,5  19,8  19,0 
Rwanda  15,2  4,3  8,6  10,3  10,0  9,8 
Seychelles  28,7  26,2  30,3  50,9  36,0  30,6 
Swaziland  26,6  32,1  34,1  30,1  33,9  33,4 
Tanzanie  26,1  24,9  21,9  18,0  16,3  16,0 
Ouganda  15,2  14,6  16,2  16,0  15,3  15,4 
Zambie  15,0  13,5  13,9  14,9  14,5  16,2 
Zimbabwe  22,8  23,5  19,4  23,2  18,7  23, 
Total des pays ITF :  19,6  20,7  19,2  19,3  17,8  18,3 
Sélection de pas non !TF : 
Angola  26,4  23,2  25,0  22,7  24,7  20,1 
Botswana  27,9  25,5  28,2  25,8  25,9  26,0 
Lesotho  75,0  80,3  83,2  89,2  85,5  80,0 
Mozambique  26,5  31,3  36,1  30,1  29,5  35,2 
Nigéria  23,3  19,6  16,1  12,8  15,3  21,4 
Afrique du Sud  14,5  17,0  18,9  17,4  15,9  17,0 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 17,5  19,3  19,9  19,1  18,4  20,2 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 19,0  21,2  21,2  22,0  21,3  22,0 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
* Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision  .. 
Taux calculés à partir des séries actuelles de monnaies. 
Source: World BankAfrica Region Live Database (12 mai 1999) 
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Investissement privé brut dans les pays de l'ITF, en pourcentage du PIB 
Pays ITF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  2,9  1,4  1,1  1,4  1,7  2,1 
Comores  9,8  9,5  11,5  12,5  14,6  13,8 
Kenya  9,6  9,9  13,5  12,3  11,3  13,4 
Madagascar  3,7  4,7  5,2  5,0  5,5  6,1 
Malawi  2,6  11,6  5,0  5,8  5,2  4,3 
Maurice  20,6  21,7  16,3  16,8  20,0  22,9 
Namibie  13,6  12,9  14,7  13,5  11,5  12,0 
Rwanda  7,6  1,6  0,7  1,1  1,8  3,4 
Seychelles  14,9  14,6  15,2  40,6  25,8  23,2 
Swaziland  15,5  21,9  27,0  24,4  21,1  27,8 
Tanzanie  21,6  20,9  18,5  14,3  13,5  12,1 
Ouganda  8,5  9,1  10,0  10,1  10,4  9,9 
Zambie  7,0  5,6  4,5  8,8  9,5  8,8 
Zimbabwe  19,9  18,6  21,3  22,4  21,5  21,3 
Total des pays ITF :  12,8  13,1  13,6  13,0  12,1  13,0 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  19,8  28,4  14,1  4,7  20,5  17,0 
Botswana 
"  "  "  "  "  " 
Lesotho  28,1  26,0 
"  " 
70,0  64,4 
Mozambique  15,1  18,4  25,1  20,8  19,5  26,0 
Nigéria  12,5  10,7  9,1  6,1  6,7  15,4 
Afrique du Sud  10,8  11,7  12,6  12,6  12,7  14,6 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 11,7  12,6  12,8  12,5  12,7  15,8 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 11,1  12,8  12,9  13,7  14,2  14,9 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
*Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Taux calculés à partir des séries actuelles de monnaies. 
Source: World BankA/rica Region Live Database (12 mai 1999) 
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Investissement privé brut dans les pays de l'ITF en pourcentage de 
l'investissement intérieur brut 
Pays/TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Burundi  18,4  18,3  19,1  18,0  32,9 
Comores  47,6  45,1  57,7  66,2  63,8 
Kenya  54,7  51,1  61,9  60,3  58,9 
Madagascar  32,2  43,2  45,2  42,7  46,5 
Malawi  30,3  40,0  29,7  26,1  22,3 
Maurice  67,1  67,3  63,4  66,7  72,5 
Namibie  83,3  54,9  67,8  68,9  65,2 
Rwanda  50,0 
" 
8,1  10,7  18,0 
Seychelles  54,5  68,5  77,7  79,7  71,8 
Swaziland  58,1  68,4  79,1  78,4  83,0 
Tanzanie  83,0  84,2  84,5  79,0  83,0 
Ouganda  55,7  62,6  62,0  64,4  64,6 
Zambie  46,5  46,8  47,5  58,0  54,0 
Zimbabwe  87,6  76,8  110,4  86,4  88,5 
Total des pays ITF :  65,2  63,2  70,5  67,5  67,8 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  74,7  122,6  56,3  20,7  82,7 
Botswana 
"  "  "  "  " 
Lesotho  37,5  32,4 
"  " 
81,8 
Mozambique  56,7  58,8  69,6  69,0  66,1 
Nigéria  53,7  54,8  56,2  47,6  43,9 
Afrique du Sud  74,4  69,0  66,6  72,6  79,8 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 67,3  65,4  64,5  65,5  68,8 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 64,5  63,7  63,4  62,7  66,2 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
*Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
1998* 
31,8 
69,4 
72,8 
45,6 
23,4 
87,7 
63,2 
34,7 
76,0 
83,2 
76,0 
64,5 
54,4 
90,2 
71,2 
84,6 
"  80,5 
74,0 
71,9 
85,9 
74,6 
67,9 
Les ratios supérieurs à  100 % correspondent aux situations où 1' investissement intérieur brut 
était inférieur à la composante privée, par suite d'un changement négatif des actifs du secteur 
public. 
Taux calculés à partir des séries actuelles de monnaies. 
Source: World Bank A/rica Region Live Database (12 mai 1999) 
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Investissement direct étranger net des pays de l'ITF (millions de dollars 
courants) (sorties nettes en italiques) 
Pays/TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  0,3  -0,1  1,4 
Comores  0,2  0,4  0,9  0,9  0,2 
Kenya  1,5  4,0  12,9  36,0  37,1  19,0 
Madagascar  15,4  5,7  9,7  10,2  13,8 
Malawi  0,0  0,0  0,0  30,0  25,0  39,6 
Maurice  -18,4  10,2  26,6  18,2  30,3  25,0 
Namibie  49,0  60,0  118,3  151,0  125,0 
Rwanda  5,8  0,0  2,0  2,2  2,6 
Seychelles  6,4  16,6  26,6  16,7  44,5  28,0 
Swaziland  44,1  -1,4  10,4  23,0  34,1  32,0 
Tanzanie  61,7  63,0  104,1  134,1  150,0  165,0 
Ouganda  4,0  5,0  2,0  110,0  160,0  190,0 
Zambie  0,0  40,0  97,0  117,0  125,4  163,5 
Zimbabwe  26,7  80,0  162,0  32,0  146,0  108,3 
Total des pays ITF :  196,7  283,4  573,9  681,3  894,0 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  302,0  171,0  472,4  181,0  184,6 
Botswana  -296,4  -23,8  29,5  90,6  0,0 
Lesotho  15,0  18,7  31,8  26,0  18,0 
Mozambique  32,0  35,0  45,0  72,5  64,4 
Nigéria  581,0  588,0  677,0  761,0  1.141,0  1.151,0 
Afrique du Sud  -312,0  184,0  -225,0  144,0  684,0  400,0 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 662,8  1.519,2  2.114,5  2.656,3  3.894,8 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 393,8  747,2  1.662,5  1.751,3  2.069,8 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
*Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Source: World BankAfrica Region Live Database (12 mai 1999) 
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Investissement direct étranger net des pays de l'ITF en pourcentage du PIB 
(sorties nettes en italiques) 
Pays /TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  0,0  0,0  0,0  0,1  0,0 
Comores  0,1  0,2  0,4  0,4  0,5 
Kenya  0,0  0,1  0,1  0,4  0,1  0,18 
Madagascar  0,5  0,2  0,3  0,3  0,4 
Malawi  0,0  0,0  0,0  1,3  1,0  2,20 
Maurice  -0,6  0,3  0,7  0,4  0,7  0,59 
Namibie  1,7  3,0  3,5  4,7  3,8 
Rwanda  0,3  0,0  0,2  0,2  0,2 
Seychelles  7,0  6,6  4,6  4,3  4,7  5,12 
Swaziland  4,1  -0,6  -1,9  2,6  3,2  2,76 
Tanzanie  1,4  1,5  2,2  2,3  2,21 
Ouganda  0,1  0,1  0,0  1,8  2,4  2,86 
Zambie  0,0  1,3  2,8  3,5  5,1  4,93 
Zimbabwe  0,4  1,2  2,2  0,4  1,6  1,92 
Total des pays ITF :  0,6  0,8  1,2  1,4  1,2 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  5,7  4,2  9,3  2,4  2,4 
Botswana  -7,2  -0,6  0,6 
Lesotho  2,1  2,5  3,7  3,0 
Mozambique  1,9  1,9  2,3  3,1  2,3 
Nigéria  1,8  1,8  2,1  1,6  2,2  2,26 
Afrique du Sud  -0,3  0,2  -0,2  0,1  0,5  0,36 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 0,1  0,4  0,6  0,8  1,1 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 0,1  0,4  1,0  1,1  1,1 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
* Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Ratios calculés à partir des séries courantes de dollars des États-Unis. 
Source : World Bank Africa Region Live Database (1 2 mai 1999) 
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Épargne intérieure brute dans les pays de l'ITF, en pourcentage du PIB 
(épargne négative en italiques) 
Pays /TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998* 
Burundi  -4,5  -9,6  -7,2  0,2  2,6  -2,0 
Comores  2,9  -5,9  -6,9  -6,1  -2,6  -5,0 
Kenya  22,4  22,4  15,9  16,3  11,4  13,4 
Madagascar  2,5  3,4  3,6  5,8  4,7  5,8 
Malawi  -0,9  8,3  8,1  0,8  2,1  5,3 
Maurice  24,5  23,4  23,2  23,9  24,1  24,2 
Namibie  9,6  16,9  12,8  13,5  14,2 
Rwanda  -0,1  -54,5  -13,7  -9,7  -7,8  -7,7 
Seychelles  18,4  22,1  23,5  39,6  22,3  20,3 
Swaziland  26,3  26,0  29,0  18,8  19,5  18,0 
Tanzanie  -2,4  -1,0  2,0  3,6  5,4  6,0 
Ouganda  1,1  4,3  7,1  4,7  7,5  5,8 
Zambie  9,0  9,3  8,1  8,7  9,3  6,5 
Zimbabwe  21,0  21,6  16,7  23,4  11,9  19,4 
Total des pays ITF :  10,9  12,4  11,2  12,4  9,8  9,8 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  25,2  32,7  15,7  20,2  27,3  20,3 
Botswana  32,9  38,7  39,1  41,9  44,7  41,9 
Lesotho  -33,2  -14,6  -16,9  -1,8  -9,8  -16,8 
Mozambique  -11,4  -4,8  10,6  9,4  13,6  16,0 
Nigéria  20,2  20,6  18,2  33,5  21,9  16,3 
Afrique du Sud  18,5  18,8  19,1  18,7  17,0  18,0 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 9,3  11,7  10,7  13,1  11,3 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 1,6  6,6  4,4  6,1  6,8 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
* Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Taux calculés à partir des séries actuelles de monnaies. 
Source: World BankAfrica Region Live Database (12 mai 1999) 
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Épargne nationale brute dans les pays de l'ITF, en pourcentage du PIB 
(épargne négative en italiques) 
Pays /TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Burundi  7,6  4,6  4,3  3,3  6,5 
Comores  24,2  9,3  8,8  9,6  9,1 
Kenya  17,7  19,0  16,4  18,2  14,2 
Madagascar  3,6  1,4  1,2  5,4  6,2 
Malawi  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  -0,5  1,1 
Maurice  27,7  25,6  25,5  25,7  26,1 
Namibie  20,7  26,2  25,3  25,6  25,6 
Rwanda  8,7  s.o.  5,4  5,6  2,3 
Seychelles  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Swaziland  47,0  39,2  46,3  39,1  41,1 
Tanzanie  5,4  6,8  -0,6  1,5  3,7 
Ouganda  3,6  9,5  12,1  11,1  12,3 
Zambie  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Zimbabwe  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Total des pays ITF :  12,4  14,3  12,5  14,0  11,4 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  -11,9  -17,1  -35,7  -22,6  -14,4 
Botswana  42,7  35,1  37,7  41,8  s.o. 
Lesotho  21,1  55,4  59,8  72,9  47,2 
Mozambique  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Nigéria  11,2  11,6  11,1  27,8  17,3 
Afrique du Sud  16,1  16,7  16,9  16,0  14,4 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 6,2  8,6  7,4  9,7  8,3 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- -1,6  3,5  0,5  2,1  3,1 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
* Les données de 1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Taux calculés à partir des séries actuelles de monnaies. 
Source: World BankA/rica Region Live Database (!  2 mai 1999) 
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Épargne extérieure dans les pays de l'ITF, en pourcentage du PIB 
(épargne négative en italiques) 
Pays /TF:  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Burundi  -8,1  -4,0  -2,9  -6,6  -0,3 
Comores  -2,5  -11,7  -11,1  -9,2  -12,1 
Kenya  1,2  -0,2  -5,4  -2,4  -3,7 
Madagascar  -7,8  -9,4  -9,7  -6,2  -5,6 
Malawi  -16,5  -23,1  -12,1  -12,0  -12,6 
Maurice  -3,2  -6,5  -0,4  0,9  -1,1 
Namibie  4,8  4,3  4,6  3,1  5,9 
Rwanda  -6,4  -6,2  -1,1  -5,1  -7,9 
Seychelles  -9,0  -4,4  -8,7  -10,8  -12,7 
Swaziland  -6,4  3,2  2,4  -2,5  -3,7 
Tanzanie  -24,5  -25,5  -21,1  -16,1  -11,9 
Ouganda  -11,8  -6,6  -7,7  -8,2  -7,9 
Zambie  -14,4  -11,9  -13,3  -12,9  -11,3 
Zimbabwe  -4,7  -4,6  -5,2  -2,1  -9,3 
Total des pays ITF :  -7,9  -7,1  -7,0  -5,7  -6,6 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  -16,0  -13,9  -19,6  -4,5  -9,2 
Botswana  12,3  5,5  7,4  12,3  11,4 
Lesotho  -53,0  -27,9  -33,3  -32,1  -38,3 
Mozambique  -48,4  -47,1  -34,9  -27,9  -22,4 
Nigéria  -10,1  -6,8  -3,2  11,2  4,7 
Afrique du Sud  1,6  -0,3  -2,1  -1,6  -1,5 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- -4,8  -4,3  -4,9  -3,0  -3,6 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- -9,5  -7,9  -8,0  -7,5  -7,5 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
* Les données de  1998 sont des estimations sujettes à révision. 
Taux calculés à partir des séries actuelles de monnaies. 
Source : World Bank Africa Region Live Data  base (1 2 mai 1999) 
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1998* 
-4,6 
-13,0 
-3,1 
-6,7 
-16,6 
-1,4 
-8,7 
-11,5 
-5,1 
-15,0 
-10,4 
-16,0 
-8,6 
-8,5 
-13,2 
3,9 
-50,0 
-26,1 
-6,8 
-1,4 
-5,5 
-8,2 Annexe VIII 
Comparaison de la cote de crédit des pays de l'ITF déterminée par 
The Institutional Investor, 1993-98* 
Pays ITF:  1993  1995  1997  1998 
Burundi 
Comores 
Kenya  24,7  24,9  28,6  25,9 
Madagascar 
Malawi  16,2  18,8  21,0  19,8 
Maurice  38,4  45,4  51,9  53,0 
Namibie 
Rwanda 
Seychelles  20,7  23,7  29,5  28,9 
Swaziland  22,2  28,5  33,3  32,0 
Tanzanie  12,9  15,5  18,7  19,9 
Ouganda  7,3  12,8  20,1  19,9 
Zambie  11,7  14,6  16,0  17,2 
Zimbabwe  27,7  30,7  33,8  29,8 
Total des pays ITF :  20,2  23,9  28,1  27,4 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  13,7  10,9  13,6  12,3 
Botswana  41,1  48,5  51,2  51,9 
Mozambique  8,4  12,6  14,6  17,9 
Nigéria  20,3  17,5  15,3  16,4 
Afrique du Sud  39,6  42,5  46,4  46,6 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 24,6  26,4  28,2  29,0 
saharienne 
Ensemble de l'Afrique sub- 18,7  19,9  21,9  23,3 
saharienne, moins l'Afrique 
du Sud et le Nigéria 
Source:<< The Institutional Investor >>,  1993-novembre 1998 
*  Données fondées sur les informations fournies par les principales banques 
internationales priées d'accorder à chaque pays une note variant de zéro à 100, 100 
représentant le moindre risque de défaut de paiement 
p,243 Annexe IX 
Comparaison des indices de corruption des pays de l'ITF déterminés par 
Transparency International en 1998 
Classement*  Indice de 
(1 = premier rang et  perception de la 
corruption minimale)  corruption 
(1 = corruption maximale 
Pays ITF: 
Burundi  n.c.  n.c. 
Comores  n.c.  n.c. 
Kenya  74  2,5 
Madagascar  n.c.  n.c. 
Malawi  45  4,1 
Maurice  33  5,0 
Namibie  29  5,3 
Rwanda  n.c.  n.c. 
Seychelles  n.c.  n.c. 
Swaziland  n.c.  n.c. 
Tanzanie  81  1,9 
Ouganda  73  2,6 
Zambie  52  3,5 
Zimbabwe  43  4,2 
Sélection de pays non !TF : 
Angola  n.c.  n.c. 
Botswana  23  6,1 
Lesotho  n.c.  n.c. 
Mozambique  n.c.  n.c. 
Nigéria  n.c.  n.c. 
Afrique du Sud  32  5,2 
Source : Transparency International 
*Sur une liste de 85 pays 
n.c. = noa classé 
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L'Initiative PPTE 
L'Initiative en faveur des Pays Pauvres Très  Endettés (PPTE) a été conçue à 
l'intention des pays qui ont obtenu des résultats satisfaisants en matière de politique 
économique, afin de ramener le fardeau de leur dette à un niveau supportable. L'objectif 
principal de l'Initiative PPTE est de faire en sorte que la charge continue de la dette et du 
service de la dette ne sape pas les efforts de réforme et d'ajustement. Du fait qu'elle 
demande la participation de tous les créanciers intéressés, l'Initiative PPTE vise à trouver 
une solution globale au problème de la dette. Cette initiative, qui a été avalisée par le 
Comité du développement en septembre 1996 pour une période initiale de deux ans 
(jusqu'en septembre 1998), a été prorogée jusqu'à la fin de l'an 2000 et est en cours 
d'exécution. D'autres démarches sont actuellement examinées, notamment dans le cadre 
du G7, qui permettraient de renforcer l'Initiative PPTE. 
Caractéristiques principales 
• Admissibilité: pour pouvoir bénéficier de 1  'Initiative, un pays doit être admis 
exclusivement aux concours de l'IDA, être confronté à un endettement insupportable 
malgré le recours aux mécanismes d'allégement de la dette disponibles, et établir des 
antécédents positifs dans la mise en oeuvre de programmes d'ajustement et de réformes 
économiques. 
• Des objectifs de viabilité de la dette sont établis au cas par cas dans une fourchette 
de 200 à 250% de la valeur actuelle nette (VAN) du ratio dette/exportations et de 20 à 
25% du ratio service de la dette/exportations, la dette étant déterminée à la lumière des 
facteurs de vulnérabilité propres au pays tels que la concentration et la variabilité des 
exportations, et compte tenu d'indicateurs du poids budgétaire du service de la dette. 
Pour les économies très ouvertes, (où 1  'utilisation des seuls indicateurs extérieurs ne 
rend pas fidèlement compte de la charge de la dette extérieure sur le budget), le ratio-
objectifVAN de la dette/exportations peut être fixé à moins de 200% à la fin du processus, 
à condition que le pays concerné remplisse deux critères à la date de prise de décision : 
un ratio exportations/PIB d'au moins 40 % et un ratio recettes budgétaires/PIB minimum 
de 20%. 
• Antécédents positifs.  Au bout d'une première période de trois ans de bonne 
application des programmes appuyés par la Banque et le FMI, la communauté 
internationale octroierait un allégement de la dette, si nécessaire, pour assurer la viabilité 
de la dette au cours des trois années suivantes à condition que les bons résultats soient 
maintenus. Le délai total de six ans serait appliqué avec souplesse, au cas par cas; les 
p.245 programmes déjà entamés seraient pris en compte pour la première étape (avant la date 
de prise de décision), et la deuxième étape de trois ans pourrait être raccourcie à titre 
exceptionnel si le pays avait établi de bons antécédents sur une période prolongée. 
• Mesures à la jin du processus. L'assistance fournie correspond au montant promis 
à la date de décision si 1' allégement de la dette ainsi engagé permet de ramener les ratios 
effectifs dette/exportations ou service de la dette/exportations aux niveaux de viabilité 
déterminés, à la fin du processus. Si les objectifs ne sont pas atteints, il sera demandé 
aux créanciers d'apporter un complément d'assistance pour assurer la viabilité de la 
dette. 
Bilan à la fin février 1999 
Sur les 12 PPTE dont les dossiers ont été examinés, dix ont été déclarés admissibles 
à un allégement de la dette, ce qui pourrait représenter un montant d'environ 4,3 milliards 
de dollars en valeur actuelle nette (VAN) et, au total, un allégement du service de la dette 
d'environ 8,5 milliards de dollars en valeur nominale. 
La Bolivie, le Burkina Faso, la Côte d'Ivoire, la Guyane, le Mali, le Mozambique et 
1  'Ouganda ont bénéficié d'allégements de la dette (VAN) totalisant environ 3, 1 milliards 
de dollars, ce qui représente au total, en valeur nominale, un allégement du service de la 
dette de 6, 1 milliards de dollars. 
Les examens préliminaires de l'admissibilité ont été achevés pour l'Éthiopie, la 
Guinée-Bissau et la Mauritanie. L'allégement de la dette pour ces pays (VAN) pourrait 
totaliser 1  ,2 milliard de dollars à la fin du processus, soit au total, en valeur nominale, un 
allégement de la dette d'environ 2,5 milliards de dollars. La prise de décision pourrait 
survenir pendant le deuxième trimestre de 1999 dans le cas de la Mauritanie, mais 1' étude 
des programmes d'allégement de la dette de l'Éthiopie et de la Guinée-Bissau a été 
suspendue à cause des conflits armés qui sévissent dans ces pays. 
La viabilité de la dette du Bénin et du Sénégal est assurée par le biais de mécanismes 
traditionnels et ne nécessite pas le recours à un allégement supplémentaire au titre de 
l'Initiative. 
Deux pays, la Bolivie et l'Ouganda, ont atteint la date de fin du processus et 
bénéficient d'allégements de la dette (VAN) totalisant près de 800 millions de dollars 
E.U. et de plus de 1,4 milliard en allégement du service de la dette. Pour la Bolivie, qui 
a atteint la date de fin du processus en septembre 1998, l'allégement accordé totalise 
448 millions de dollars (VAN), ou 760 millions de dollars d'allégement du service de la 
dette, ce qui porte le ratio-objectifVAN de la dette/exportations à 218 %, comparativement 
à environ 350% au début des années 90. Grâce à une APD supplémentaire de l'ordre de 
p.246 300 millions de dollars accordée par le Japon, le ratio VAN de la dette/exportations sera 
réduit à environ 202 %. La Guyane et le Mozambique devraient atteindre la date de fin 
du processus en 1999. 
À 1  'heure actuelle, on travaille activement à la préparation des  documents de 
1  'Initiative PPTE pour la Guinée, le Honduras, le Nicaragua et le Niger. 
Financement 
La Banque mondiale a transféré 850 millions de dollars au Fonds fiduciaire en faveur 
des  PPTE jusqu'à maintenant. Lors des réunions annuelles de  1998, le  Conseil des 
gouverneurs de la Banque a approuvé un nouveau transfert de 100 millions de dollars, 
tirés du revenu net de la BIRD pour l'exercice 1998-99. La Banque compte toujours 
s'acquitter de la totalité de la part des coûts qui lui revient. 
Le FMI a versé 520 millions de dollars à son Fonds fiduciaire FASR/PPTE afin de 
financer les opérations spéciales de la FASR en vertu de l'Initiative. 
La Banque africaine de développement s'est engagée à verser environ 206 millions 
de dollars de ses ressources propres en faveur de l'Initiative PPTE au cours de la période 
1998-2000. 
Le Fonds fiduciaire en faveur des PPTE a obtenu environ 450 millions de dollars de 
contributions bilatérales ainsi que la promesse, de 19 pays, de 1  'aider à défrayer les coûts 
de la BAfD et des autres banques multilatérales de développement autres que la Banque 
mondiale. 
Source : BAJD, FMI et Banque mondiale 
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Résumé des régimes tarifaires en vigueur dans les pays de l'ITF, comparés aux 
objectifs du schéma directeur, fin décembre 1998 
Taux minimal/  Droits extérieurs  Incorporation  Suppression  Réduction du 
maximal (doit  harmonisés en  des autres  des droits sur  tarif  moyen 
Objectif du  varier entre 20  limitant à trois le  droits et  le commerce  pondéré par les 
schéma  et 25 %) (a)  nombre de taux  taxes dans le  intra-ITF (a)  échanges à au 
directeur:  autres que  tarif (a)  (marge de  plus 15% (a) 
zéro (a)  préférences - (k) 
pourcentage) 0) 
Burundi  10/100  5  Non  60  35,4 
Comores  Non  70  30,0 
Kenya  Non  80 
Madagascar  Non  80 (b)  18,0 (rn) 
Malawi (i)  Non  70  22,0 
Maurice  Non  80 (n)  s.o. 
Namibie  0/75  Aucune 
Rwanda  10/40  Aucune  17,5 
Seychelles  0/200 (e)  Aucune (c)  s.o. 
Swaziland  0/75  Aucune 
Tanzanie  0/30  80 (d) 
Ouganda  80 (/) 
Zambie  60 
Zimbabwe  80 (g) 
Source : Données préparées par les organismes de parrainage 
*  Les chiffres en caractères gras indiquent les objectifs du schéma directeur qui ont été atteints ou dépassés. 
(a)  Avant octobre 1998. 
(b)  Décision prise en principe, mais pas encore mise en vigueur (sauf pour les importations en provenance de 
Maurice). 
(c)  Autre qu'une préférence de 5 %des États membres de la COI. 
(d)  Mise en vigueur en juillet 1998. 
(e)  Sous forme d'impôt commercial. Le nombre de taux a récemment été porté à plus de neuf. 
(j)  L'Ouganda appliquait une surtaxe de 10% à certains produits importés particuliers. 
(g)  Exception faite d'un accord de libre-échange conclu entre Maurice et le Zimbabwe. 
(h)  Tarif moyen pondéré par les échanges (pour 1997, en ce qui concerne le Kenya et le Zimbabwe). 
(i)  Le Malawi applique une surtaxe uniforme aux importations et à la production intérieure. 
Les fabricants sont admissibles à un remboursement des impôts payés sur les facteurs de production. 
(])  La marge de préférences devait être de 90% en octobre 1997, et supprimée au plus tard en octobre 1998. 
(k)  Non pondéré, sauf mention du contraire, et excluant les « autres droits et taxes ». 
(!)  Nombre de bandes de fluctuation; le nombre de taux est de 30. 
(rn)  En 1997. 
(n)  Portée à 90 % en juin 1999 
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État des exemptions tarifaires dans les pays de l'ITF en fin décembre 1998 
Catégorie d'exemptions 
Code 
Pays  Secteur  Secteur  d'investissement  ONG  Biens 
public  parapublic  ou convention  reconnues  destinés aux  Autres (a) 
générale  projets 
financés de 
1' extérieur 
Burundi  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Comores  Oui  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Kenya  Non  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Madagascar  Oui  Non  Oui  Oui  Non  Oui 
Malawi  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Maurice  Non  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Namibie  Oui  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Rwanda  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Seychelles  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Swaziland  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non  Non 
Tanzanie  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Non 
Ouganda  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Zambie  Non  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Zimbabwe  Oui  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Source : Rapports de la Banque mondiale et des services du FML et données fournies par les autorités 
(a)  Y compris les exemptions discrétionnaires et les dérogations. 
p.249 Pays 
Burundi 
Comores 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maurice 
Namibie 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Tanzanie 
Ouganda 
Zambie 
Zimbabwe 
Annexe XIII 
Sommaire des obstacles non tarifaires à l'importation 
dans les pays de l'ITF, en fin décembre 1998 
Restrictions quantitatives  Délivrance de 
(importations)  licences 
d'importation  Taux 
Monopoles  discriminatoires 
commerciaux  de la taxe 
d'État  d'accise/TVA 
Interdictions  Contingents  Tous  Certains  (etc.) sur 
les  produits  certaines 
produits  importations 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Oui 
Non  Oui  Non  Oui  Oui  Non 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Non  Oui  Oui  - Oui  Oui 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Oui 
Oui  Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui 
Non  Non  Non  Non  Non  Oui 
Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non  Non 
Source : Rapports de la Banque mondiale et des services du FMI, et données fournies par les autorités 
Autres 
(a) 
Oui 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Non 
Note: Aucun des pays de 1  'ITF n'applique de restrictions fondées suries normes de qualité, mais tous appliquent 
des restrictions fondées sur des motifs de santé, de sécurité, d'environnement et de patrimoine national. 
(a)  Incluant les droits compensateurs, anti-dumping, etc. 
p.250 Annexe XIV 
État des régimes d'exportation des pays de l'ITF en fin septembre 1998 
Pays  Restrictions g,uantitatives  Licences (a)  Droits  Monopoles 
Interdictions  Contingents  commerciaux 
Burundi  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Oui 
Comores  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non 
Kenya  Non  Non  Oui  Non  Non 
Madagascar  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Malawi  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Maurice  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Namibie  Non  Non (b)  Oui (c)  Non  Oui 
Rwanda  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non 
Seychelles  Non  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Swaziland  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Oui 
Tanzanie  Non  Non  Non  Oui  Non 
Ouganda  VIII  Non  None  Non  Non 
Zambie  Oui  Non  Non  Non  Non 
Zimbabwe  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Source : Rapports de la Banque mondiale et des services du FMI, et données fournies par les autorités 
(a)  Uniquement à des fins de restriction (et non statistiques). 
(b)  À l'exclusion des contingents d'exportation de diamants. 
(c)  Toutes les exportations, exception faite  de celles à destination des pays membres de  la SACU, 
nécessitent la délivrance d'une licence. À l'intérieur de la SACU, les exportations de textiles, de 
produits camés et de matériel d'occasion exigent une licence. 
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Suppression des restrictions sur les paiements et transferts afférents aux 
transactions internationales courantes par les pays de l'ITF en fin septembre 1998 
Pays  Acceptation des articles VIII et XIV des Statuts du FMI 
Article  Date  Restrictions à  Arriérés  Restrictions à  Projet 
d'acceptation  l'application de  extérieurs  1  'application  d'acceptation 
l'article VIII  de l'article  de l'article 
XIV  VIII 
1.  Burundi  XIV (a)  s.o.  s.o.  oui  oui (a)  oui; en temps et 
lieu 
2.  Comores (b)  VIII  1  ec juin 1996  aucune  OUI  s.o.  s.o. 
3.  Kenya (c)  VIII  30 juin 1994  oui (d)  oui  s.o.  s.o. 
4.  Madagascar (b)  VIII  18 août 1996  aucune  oui  s.o.  s.o. 
5.  Malawi  VIII  7 déc. 1995  aucune  OUI  s.o.  s.o. 
6.  Maurice (b)  VIII  29 août 1993  aucune  aucun  s.o.  s.o. 
7.  Namibie  VIII  20 août 1996  aucune (e)  aucun  s.o.  s.o. 
8.  Rwanda  XIV (a)  s.o.  s.o.  oui  aucune (a)  oui; dans les 10 
prochains mois 
9.  Seychelles (b)  VIII  3 janv. 1978  oui (j)  OUI  s.o.  s.o. 
10. Swaziland  VIII  11  déc. 1989  aucune (e)  aucun  s.o.  s.o. 
11. Tanzanie (c)  VIII  15 juil. 1996  aucune  oui (i)  s.o.  s.o. 
12. Ouganda (c)  VIII  5 juin 1994  aucune  oui 0)  s.o.  s.o. 
13.Zambie  XIV  s.o.  aucune  OUI  oui (g)  oui; en temps et 
lieu 
14.Zimbabwe  VIII  5 févr.  1995  oui (h)  aucun  s.o.  s.o. 
Source : Rapports des services de FMI et données fournies par les autorités 
(a)  Le Burundi et le Rwanda continuent de se prévaloir des dispositions transitoires au titre de l'article XIV, section 2. Le 
Rwanda ne maintient aucune restriction sur les paiements et transferts réalisés dans le cadre des transactions 
internationales courantes.  En novembre 1997, le Burundi a rétabli des restrictions aux transactions courantes qui 
avaient été supprimées à la fin de 1995. Toutefois, il existe des arriérés sur les paiements extérieurs. 
(b)  Membre de la Commission de l'Océan Indien. 
(c)  Membre de la EAC. 
(d)  Pratique de taux de change multiples pour les opérations en cours en vertu d'une caisse de garantie du risque de 
change. 
(e)  La Namibie et le Swaziland font partie d'une zone monétaire commune (CMA) comprenant le Lesotho, la Namibie, 
l'Afrique du Sud et le Swaziland qui constitue une zone unique de contrôle des changes. 
(f)  Sur paiements courants (pipeline), y compris les restrictions sur les transferts de dividendes et les frais de gestion. 
(g)  Sur les paiements du service de la dette privée (principal) détenue avant janvier 1991, avant la libéralisation du régime 
de change survenue en 1994. 
(h)  Découlant de régimes bloqués de dividendes des sociétés et de paièments d'intérêts (suppression prévue au milieu de 
1999) et d'une pratique de devises multiples pour contrats conclus en vertu d'un régime discontinué de réserve de 
change à terme (suppression prévue avant la fin de l'an 2000). 
(i)  Auprès de pays non membres de Club de Paris. 
0)  Sur paiements rééchelonnables avec les créanciers bilatéraux non membres du Club de Paris. 
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Caractéristiques des marchés des devises dans les pays 
de l'ITF à la fin décembre 1998 
Marché à 
Marché  terme pour  Comptes en  Opéra-
Pays  inter  ban- protéger contre  devises  te  urs 
caire unifié  le risque de  (restrictions)  agréés 
change  (a) 
Burundi  Non  Non  Limités  b.c. 
Comores  Non  Oui  Francs  b.c. 
français 
(limités) 
Kenya  Oui (1993)  Oui  Libéraux  b.c. et bu 
Madagascar  Oui (1994)  Non  Libéraux  b.c. 
Malawi  Oui (1994)  Oui  Libéraux  b.c. et bu 
Maurice  Oui (1994)  Oui  Libéraux  b.c. et bu 
Namibie  Non  Oui  Limités (i)  b.c. et bu 
(membre de 
laCMA) 
Rwanda  Oui (1995)  Non  Libéraux  b.c. et bu 
Seychelles  Non  Non  Limités  b.c. 
Swaziland  Non  Oui  Limités  b.c. 
(membre de 
laCMA) 
Tanzanie  Oui (1994)  Oui  Libéraux  b.c. et bu 
Ouganda  Oui (1993)  Oui (h)  Aucun  b.c. et bu 
Zambie  Oui (1996)  Oui  Libéraux  b.c. et bu 
Zimbabwe  Oui (1995)  Non  Limités  b.c. et bu 
Source : Rapports des services du FMI et données fournies par les autorités 
(a)  Banques commerciales (b.c.) ou bureaux de change étrangers (bu). 
(b)  Uniquement à l'extérieur de la zone franc (compte d'opérations). 
Restrictions 
prudentielles 
(limites 
d'exposition) 
Oui 
Non 
Oui 
Oui 
Oui 
Oui 
Non 
Oui 
Non 
Non 
Oui 
Oui 
Oui 
Oui 
Restrictions 
sur les flux 
de capitaux 
Oui 
Oui (b) 
Assouplis-
sement (c) 
Oui 
Assouplis-
sement (g) 
Assouplis-
sement 
Oui (d) 
Oui 
Oui 
Oui (d) 
Oui 
Non(e) 
Assouplis-
ssement 
Oui(/) 
(c)  Sauf  pour l'achat d'actions et de titres par des non-résidents (jusqu'à 40 %) et par des particuliers (jusqu'à 5 %). 
(d)  Uniquement à l'extérieur de la CMA. Toutefois, en ce qui a trait à la Namibie, il existe une restriction même à 
l'intérieur de la CMA: les caisses de retraite et les compagnies d'assurance-vie doivent investir 35% de leurs 
actifs à l'intérieur du pays. 
(e)  À partir du l"  juillet 1997. 
(/)  En 1996, le taux maximal de propriété étrangère des compagnies inscrites à la Bourse du Zimbabwe a été porté à 
40%. 
(g)  Le Malawi a supprimé les restrictions à l'entrée et au rapatriement des profits de l'investissement direct étranger 
et a adopté une attitude libérale à l'égard de l'investissement de portefeuille par les non-résidents. 
(h)  Même s'il n'existe pas de marché officiel à terme de devises, les banques agréées peuvent intervenir sur ce marché 
si elles le font en vertu d'un contrat approuvé d'importation ou d'exportation. 
(i)  Peuvent être gérés par des compagnies de la zone franche et par des particuliers pour des montants atteignant 
jusqu'à 350 000$ namibiens. 
p.253 Pays 
1.  Burundi 
2.  Comores 
3.  Kenya 
4.  Madagascar 
5.  Malawi 
6.  Maurice 
7.  Namibie 
1  ~- Rwanda 
9.  Seychelles 
10.  Swaziland 
11.  Tanzanie 
12.  Ouganda 
13.  Zambie 
14.  Zimbabwe 
Annexe XVII 
Obligations de rapatriement et de rétrocession des devises 
dans les pays de l'ITF en fin décembre 1998 
1992  1995  1997 
(fin décembre)  (fin décembre)  (fin décembre) 
Rapatriement complet;  Entreprises de la zone franche  Aucun changement. 
rétrocession complète, à  exemptées de la rétrocession. 
l'exclusion de 30% des  Aucun autre changement. 
exportations non traditionnelles. 
Rapatriement et rétrocession  Pas de changement.  Aucun changement. 
complets aux banques agréées. 
Rapatriement et rétrocession  Rapatriement sans obligation de  Aucune restriction. 
complets, à 1' exclusion de  rétrocession. 
50 % des exportations non 
traditionnelles. 
Rapatriement complet;  Rapatriement et vente des  Rapatriement à 100% dans 
rétrocession à 60 %; rétrocession  recettes de 1' exportation des  les 4 mois. 
à 40 % aux banques agréées.  marchandises dans les 90 jours 
de la date d'expédition; 
rétrocession dans les 30 jours de 
la prestation des services. 
Rapatriement et rétrocession  Rapatriement complet et  Aucun changement. 
complets.  rétrocession à 60 %. 
Rapatriement; rétrocession aux  Ouvert depuis juillet 1994. (a)  Aucune restriction. (b) 
opérateurs agréés des bénéfices 
non utilisés en deçà de six mois. 
Rapatriement et rétrocession  Rapatriement complet dans les  Aucun changement. 
complets.  six mois de l'expédition; 
rétrocession dans les 30 jours du 
rapatriement. 
Rapatriement et rétrocessiOn  Rapatriement; rétrocession de  Rapatrœment de toutes les 
complets aux banques agréées.  90 % des recettes du café et du  recettes en devises par le 
thé.  canal des banques 
commerciales. (/) 
Régime entièrement ouvert.  Obligation de rétrocession de  Obligation de rapatriement 
19 % des entrées en devises des  et de rétrocession de tous les 
banques commerciales à la  gains en devises par le canal 
Banque centrale. (c)  des banques commerciales 
nationales. (e) 
Rapatriement et rétrocession.  Rapatriement et rétrocession.  Aucun changement. 
Rapatriement complet :  Rapatriement dans les 180 jours.  Rapatriement dans les 60 
rétrocession de 1  0 % des  Aucune obligation de rétrocession.  jours. 
exportations traditionnelles et 
de 50 % pour les autres 
marchandises. Rétrocession des 
recettes sur invisibles. 
Rapatriement : 100 % des  Rapatriement aux banques  Aucune restriction. (  d) 
recettes du café; autrement,  agréées. 
rétrocession aux opérateurs 
agréés. 
Rétrocession à 100 % des  Rétrocession réduite à 45 %  Aucune restriction. 
exportations de métaux de la  pour la ZCCM; aucune 
ZCCM; rétrocession à 10 %  restriction dans les autres cas. 
dans les autres cas. 
Rapatriement et rétrocession.  Rapatriement.  Aucun changement. 
Source : Rapports des services du FMI et données fournies par les autorités 
1998 
(fin décembre) 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucune 
restriction. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucune 
restriction. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucun 
changement. 
Aucune 
restriction. 
Aucune 
restriction. 
Aucun 
changement. 
(a)  Soixante-quinze pour cent des recettes de l'exportation du sucre par le Syndicat du sucre de Maurice doivent être rétrocédées à la Banque de Maurice. 
{b)  Obligation de rétrocession par le Syndicat du sucre de Maurice supprimée à partir du 1  cr juillet 1997. 
(c)  Aucune réglementation concernant le rapatriement des recettes d'exportation. 
(d)  Aucune restriction à partir du  1er juillet 1997, avec la libéralisation des mouvements de capitaux. 
(e)  À compter du 1" janvier 1997. 
(/)  Après une première réduction à 50 % opérée en décembre 1996, l'obligation de rétrocession des recettes du thé et du café a été supprimée en décembre 1997. 
p.254 Pays 
Libéralisation des 
procédures 
d'approbation (a) 
Burundi  Complète 
Comores  En instance (b) 
Kenya  Complète 
Madagascar  Complète 
Malawi  Complète 
Maurice  Complète 
Namibie  Complète 
Rwanda  s.o. 
Seychelles  Complète 
Swaziland  Complète 
Tanzanie  Complète 
Ouganda  Complète 
Zambie  Partielle 
Zimbabwe  Complète 
Annexe XVIII: 
Déréglementation des investissements et mesures touchant le marché du travail 
dans les pays de l'ITFen fin décembre 1998 
Déréglementation des investissements  Marché du travail 
Traitement des  Ratification/ mise  Traitement 
Publication du  demandes dans  en œuvre de la  Accords sur la  Cotations  Application du  amélioré des 
code d'investis- un délai de 45 à  charte MIE  double imposition  croisées  protocole de la  permis de séjour 
sement  60 jours  CO  MESA sur les  et de travail 
VISaS 
Complète  Partielle  En instance  En instance  En instance  Partielle  Partielle 
Complète  Complète  Complète  En instance  - En instance  En instance 
En instance  Complète  En instance  Partielle  Partielle  Partielle  Partielle 
Complète (c)  Partielle  En instance  Partielle  - En instance  Partielle 
Complète  Partielle  En instance  Partielle  Partielle  Complète  En instance 
Complète (d)  En instance  En instance  Partielle  En instance  En instance  En instance 
Complète  Complète  s.o.  Partielle  Partielle  Partielle  Complète 
s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Complète  Complète  En instance  Partielle  En instance  Complète  Partielle 
Complète  Complète  En instance  Partielle  Partielle  En instance  En instance 
Complète  Complète  Partielle  Partielle  En instance  Complète  Complète 
Complète  Complète  Partielle  Partielle  En instance  Complète  Complète 
Complète  En instance  Partielle  Partielle  Partielle  Complète  En instance 
Partielle  Partielle  En instance  Partielle  Partielle  Partielle  Partielle 
Source : Informations à jour  fournies par les groupes de travail techniques 
Permis de 
séjour à court 
terme pour 
résidents des 
zones 
frontalières 
En instance 
Complète 
Complète 
s.o. 
Complète 
s.o. 
Complète 
s.o. 
s.o. 
Complète 
Complète 
Complète 
Complète 
Partielle 
Nota : La catégorie « En instance » englobe une vaste gamme de situations, de celles où les dispositions administratives/législatives sont en voie de préparation à celles où aucune donnée n'est 
disponible. 
(a)  Y compris la création d'un guichet unique pour l'approbation. 
(b)  Adoptée par le Parlement, mais pas encore en vigueur. 
(c)  Intégrées dans la loi générale sur l'impôt. 
(  d)  Loi de  1993 sur l'expansion de l'industrie. Pays 
Burundi 
Comores 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Maurice 
Namibie 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Tanzanie 
Ouganda 
Zambie 
Zimbabwe 
Annexe XIX 
Accords de double imposition répertoriés 
au milieu de 1998 dans les pays de l'ITF (a) 
Stade  Accords conclu avec : 
d'exécution 
Non déclaré 
Partiel  Maurice 
Partiel  Tanzanie, Ouganda, Zambie 
Partiel  Maurice 
Partiel  Kenya, Afrique du Sud 
Partiel  Botswana, Namibie, Madagascar, Afrique du Sud, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Partiel  Afrique du Sud,  Maurice 
Non déclaré 
Partiel  Afrique du Sud 
Partiel  Botswana, Afrique du Sud 
Partiel  Kenya, Malawi, Ouganda, Zambie 
Partiel  Afrique du Sud, Zambie 
Partiel  Botswana, Kenya, Tanzanie, Ouganda 
Partiel  Botswana, Maurice, Namibie, Afrique du Sud 
Source : !mani Development Internationa/1998 Mid-Year Report : Status of  the CBI Initiative 
(a)  Avec les pays membres du CO  MESA ou de la SADC 
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Taux normaux de l'impôt sur le revenu des particuliers et sur les bénéfices 
des sociétés dans les pays de l'ITF en fin décembre 1998 
Pays  Sur le revenu des particuliers (a)  Sur les bénéfices des sociétés (pourcentage) 
(pourcentage) 
Résidentes  Non résidentes 
Burundi  60 (b); 20 (c)  40 
Comores  30 (d);  15 (e)  40 
Kenya  30 (f)  30 (g) 
Madagascar  35 (h); 25  (i);  15 0)  35 
Malawi  35 (l)  38 
Maurice  30 (n)  35 (m) 
Namibie  22.500 $N + 40% (p), 10 (q)  40 
Rwanda  40 (r)  40 
Seychelles  40 (s)  40 
Swaziland  39 (u),  (v)  37,5 (t) 
Tanzanie  35 (w)  30 
Ouganda  U Sh 546.000 et 30 (x)  35 
Zambie  30 (y)  35 (z) 
Zimbabwe  40 (bb)  37.5 
Source : Données fournies par les organismes de parrainage 
(a)  Taux maximum. 
(b)  Sur les revenus salariaux de plus de 4,0 millions de FB, et les revenus locatifs de plus de 1,5 million de FB. 
(c)  Revenu du capital (dividendes, intérêt, etc.). Revenus distribués des compagnies étrangères établis à 48 %. 
(d)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 3,5 millions de FC. 
(e)  Sur le revenu du capital, les dividendes distribuées et les intérêts versés. 
(j)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 0,45 million de K Sh. 
40 
40 
40 (g) 
35 
43  (k) 
35 (m) 
40 (o) 
40 
37,5 (t) 
30 
35 
35 (z) 
46,0 (aa) 
(g)  Pour les entreprises de la zone franche, 25 % après dix ans; pour les dividendes des entreprises résidentes, 5 % et pour les entreprises 
non résidentes, 15% (impôt définitif). 
(h)  Sur les revenus salariaux supérieurs à 1,0 million de FMG et sur les revenus non salariaux supérieurs à 45 %. 
(i)  Revenu du capital. 
(j)  Transferts à l'étranger à des entreprises ou à des particuliers non résidents. 
(k)  Dérogation dans les cas où le taux d'imposition des pays étrangers est inférieur à 40 %. 
(1)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 42.000 MK (excluant un droit de 3% pour l'assurance-sécheresse). 
(rn)  Taux de 15% dans la zone franche; 25% pour les entreprises inscrites à la Bourse; 15% pour les sociétés d'investissement à capital 
variable; 0-35 %pour les compagnies off-shore. 
(n)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 55.000 roupies. 
(o)  Sociétés autres que minières. Cinquante-cinq pour cent pour les sociétés productrices de diamants. 
(p)  Sur les revenus salariaux supérieurs à 100.000 $ N. 
(  q)  Sur les actionnaires non résidents. 
(r)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 1,0 million de FR. 
(s)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 96.000 FR. 
(t)  Vingt-sept pour cent des bénéfices des entreprises minières, jusqu'à concurrence de 20.000 E. 
(u)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 40.000 E. Les dividendes au-delà d'un seuil de 20.000 E sont imposés à 10% pour les entreprises inscrites 
à la Bourse du Swaziland; taux de 20 % pour les autres revenus. 
(v)  En plus, les revenus d'intérêts des non-résidents sont imposés à 10 %, les dividendes à 15 % (12,5 %pour les entreprises incorporées 
au Botswana, au Lesotho ou en Afrique du Sud). 
(w)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 700.000 T Sh. 
(x)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 4,8 millions de U Sh. Il existe une retenue d'impôt de 15% sur les revenus du capital des non-résidents 
(par exemple, intérêts, dividendes). 
(y)  Sur les revenus supérieurs à 1,8 million de K. Il existe une retenue d'impôt de 15% sur le revenu du capital (intérêts, dividendes, plus-
values, etc.). 
(z)  Les entreprises inscrites à la Bourse de Lusaka sont imposées à 30 %. 
(aa) Incluant 8,5 % sur les revenus imposables gagnés par les filiales locales de compagnies étrangères à partir de sources locales. 
(bb) Sur les revenus supérieurs à 60.000 $ Z. Non-résidents: impôt des actionnaires de 15% (compagnies inscrites); 10% sur les intérêts; 
20 % sur les envois de fonds et les redevances. Résidents : 15 % pour les actionnaires, et 30 % sur les intérêts. 
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Le parcours d'un investisseur dans un pays africain 
Un investisseur étranger (conglomérat international) fort de son expérience dans le 
secteur des produits chimiques, doté de capitaux à investir et pouvant obtenir du crédit à 
long terme, apprend que les opportunités commerciales se multiplient en Afrique. Une 
équipe visite alors plusieurs pays africains dans lesquels le groupe n'a encore jamais 
investi. Dans le pays X, 1' équipe détecte un besoin en produits pharmaceutiques, et s'assure 
de la présence des ressources humaines et matérielles nécessaires ainsi que de partenaires 
locaux potentiels. Cette combinaison laisse entrevoir des possibilités intéressante de 
faire des affaires. 
L'investisseur se rend alors au guichet unique pour l'approbation des investissements 
où sont disponibles les informations sur le code de l'investissement. La documentation 
décrit en détailla marche à suivre pour 1' enregistrement d'une société, et en ce qui concerne 
le nom de la société et les brevets, l'obtention d'une licence de commerce, le code du 
travail, les procédures et barèmes de l'impôt sur les sociétés et des cotisations patronales. 
Grâce aux différents incitatifs (fiscaux et autres), 1' idée devient de plus en plus séduisante. 
Le choix d'un emplacement est arrêté, les plans de construction de l'usine sont élaborés 
et le moment est venu d'établir la présence juridique de l'entreprise dans le pays. 
Malgré les informations et 1' assistance obtenues auprès du guichet pour 1' approbation 
des investissements, l'investisseur sait bien que les nouvelles entreprises en général et 
celles du secteur pharmaceutique en particulier nécessitent des autorisations et licences 
supplémentaires. À présent commencent les tracasseries administratives. 
Tout d'abord surgit la question du titre de propriété et de l'usufruit du terrain, qui 
bien que non utilisé est détenu par un important organe parapublic. La législation actuelle 
ne permet pas à un investisseur étranger de détenir un titre de pleine propriété. Une 
société enregistrée localement peut-elle détenir un titre de pleine propriété, en particulier 
lorsque certains de ses actionnaires sont des ressortissants du pays ? Le conseil de 1  'agence 
de promotion des investissements, qui consiste à laisser les investisseurs locaux acquérir 
la pleine propriété du terrain, que la nouvelle société louerait-n'est pas très convaincant. 
Il faut s'adresser à un spécialiste du droit commercial. Deux problèmes apparaissent 
aussitôt : i) on ne sait pas avec certitude quelle forme doit prendre 1' entité juridique -
société enregistrée ou succursale et ii) l'usufruit requiert une autorisation à trois niveaux 
:celui du district (qui examine la procédure d'objection), de la région (qui examine les 
implications régionales et détermine les autorisations nécessaires avant soumission au 
Ministère) et de 1  'État (par exemple, le Ministère). L'avocat spécialisé accepte ce dossier 
et engage une recherche sur le titre de propriété concernant la propriété immobilière en 
question. Il découvre qu'il n'existe pas de titre de propriété au cadastre. Personne ne 
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possession de la société Y. En outre, un titre de bail ne peut évidemment pas être rédige 
sans la preuve du titre de propriété principal. L'affaire se complique lorsqu'on apprend 
que la propriété a été confisquée par un gouvernement antérieur quelques années plus tôt 
: si  le  gouvernement (par l'intermédiaire de l'actuel propriétaire parapublic) essaye 
aujourd'hui de vendre la propriété, il est très probable que le propriétaire initial formule 
une revendication.  L'investisseur demande alors au cadastre, au guichet des 
investissements et à l'avocat d'étudier l'ensemble du dossier et de proposer une série de 
recommandations définitives afin de résoudre ces problèmes. 
Entre-temps, l'avocat a également prévenu l'investisseur que bien que le guichet 
des investissements puisse faciliter l'enregistrement de la société et la délivrance d'une 
licence de commerce, d'autres licences et autorisations sont exigées. Premièrement, il 
est nécessaire d'obtenir pour 1  'usine une autorisation émanant du Ministère des ressources 
naturelles et de l'environnement. Ce Ministère s'inquiétera des niveaux éventuels de 
pollution de 1' air et des effluents. Des négociations concernant les niveaux acceptables 
ainsi que 1' enregistrement et le contrôle de ces niveaux devront être menées. Ensuite, un 
permis de construire est nécessaire. Il faut donc soumettre les plans de 1  'usine au Ministère 
du logement et de la construction pour accord. Troisièmement, parce que l'usine fabriquera 
des médicaments, il faut obtenir auprès du Ministère de la santé des licences individuelles 
pour chaque produit. Cela prendra probablement un certain temps car le Ministère n'a 
pas d'expérience en matière de fabrication de certains des futurs produits, ni de laboratoires 
de recherche susceptibles d'effectuer les analyses. 
Entre-temps, les représentants de l'investisseur étranger se rendent à une banque 
locale pour retirer une somme d'argent liquide équivalant à ce qu'ils ont dépensé depuis 
leur arrivée. Nouveau problème: l'argent a été transféré deux semaines auparavant mais, 
à ce moment-là, aucun compte n'avait été ouvert car en réalité il n'est pas possible 
d'ouvrir un compte avant l'enregistrement de la société ou de la succursale ni si le client 
ne réside pas dans le pays. Les ennuis ne font que commencer. 
L'investisseur aura-t-ille temps et la patience d'affronter ces difficultés au cours 
des prochaines années afin de  faire démarrer l'entreprise, acceptera-t-il des coûts de 
transaction extrêmement élevés et aura-t-il toujours dans trois ans  des  capitaux 
d'investissement voulus? 
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Évolution des opérations monétaires et du marché financier 
dans les pays de l'ITF en fin décembre 1998 
Instruments monétaires  Évolution du marché financier 
Directs  Indirects (a)  Détermination 
(d)  du taux d'intérêt 
Burundi  s.o.  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  s.o. 
Comores  Oui  Aucun  Oui 
Kenya  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Madagascar  Non  oom/r.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Malawi  Non  oom/r.o./g.p.r./d.r.  Non 
Maurice  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Namibie (g)  Non  oom/r.o./g.p.r.  Déterminé par 
le marché (/) 
Rwanda  Non  r.o./g.p.r./d.r.  Non 
Seychelles  Non  r.o./l.o.  Oui (h) 
Swaziland (g)  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Déterminé par 
le marché (/) 
Tanzanie  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Ouganda  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Zambie  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Zimbabwe  Non  oom/r.o./l.o./g.p.r.  Non 
Source : Rapports des services du FMI et données fournies par les autorités 
(a)  oom =opérations d'open market 
r.o.  =réserves obligatoires 
l.o.  = liquidités obligatoires 
g.p.r. =guichets permanents de réescompte 
d.r.  = dispositifs de refinancement 
(b)  Pas très évolué. 
(c)  Limité. 
(d)  Plafonds de crédit et contrôles sélectifs de crédit. 
(e)  Existe, mais inactif. 
(/)  Sous forte influence de 1  'Afrique du Sud. 
(g)  Membre de la CMA. 
(h)  Taux d'intérêt maximal et minimal. 
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Prim.  Sec.  Interb.  Boursier 
s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Non  Non  Non  Non 
Actif  Actif  Oui  Actif 
Actif  Actif(b)  Oui (e)  Non 
Actif  Actif  Oui  Oui 
Actif  Actif(b)  Oui  Oui 
Actif  Non  Oui  Actif 
Non  Non  Oui (c)  Non 
Actif  Non  Non  Non 
Actif  Actif(b)  Oui (c)  Oui 
Actif  Non  Oui (c)  Oui (c) 
Actif  Actif  (c)  Oui (c)  Oui (c) 
Actif  Actif  Oui  Actif 
Actif  Actif  Oui  Actif Annexe XXIII 
Structure du système bancaire des pays de l'ITF en fin décembre 1998 
Pays  Surveillance  Infrastructure (b)  Règles prudentielles 
Nombre  Loi sur  Révisions  Autonomie  Progr""Ime  Instruments  Efficacité  Adéquation  Limites à  Réserves  Liquidités  Exposition 
de  les  prévues  de la  complet  de  du  capital (e)  l'emprunt (d)  obligatoires  obligatoires  au risque 
~anques (a)  banques  Banque  de  commerce  système  minimales  de change 
Centrale  réforme  extérieur  de 
du secteur  paiement 
financier 
Burundi  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  s.o. 
Comores  1 (-)  Oui(-)  Non  Partielle  4  2  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  Non  Non  Oui 
Kenya  67 (8)(g)  Oui  1991)  Oui  Partielle  1  1 (c)  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Madagascar  5  (3)  Oui (1995)  Non  Complète  2  2  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  s.o.  Oui  Oui 
Malawi  4  (-)  Oui (1989)  Non  Partielle  1  2  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Maurice  10  (5)  Oui (1988)  Oui  Complète  1  1  Bonne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Non  Oui 
Namibie  5  (4)  Oui (1998)  Non  Complète  4  4  Bonne  Oui  Non  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Rwanda  5  (l)  En instance  Oui  Complète  s.o.  s.o.  Faible  Oui  Oui  Oui  s.o.  Oui 
Seychelles  5  (4)  Oui (1997)  Non  Complète  1  1  s.o.  s.o.  s.o.  Oui  Oui  s.o. 
Swaziland  5  (4)  En instance  Oui  Complète  3  1  Bonne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Non 
Tanzanie  18  (10)  Oui (1991)  Non  Partielle  2  2  Faible  Oui  Oui  Oui  s.o.  Oui 
Ouganda  20  (11)  Oui (1993)  Oui  Complète  2  1  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Zambie  21  (6)  Oui (1994)  Oui  Partielle  1  2  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Zimbabwe  7  (3)  Oui (1965)  Oui  Complète (/)  2  2  Moyenne  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui  Oui 
Source : Rapports des services du FMI,  et données fournies par les autorités 
(a)  Succursales et filiales de banques étrangères entre parenthèses. 
(b)  1 =Mise en œuvre complète;  2. =Mise en œuvre partielle ou substantielle;  3. =Dispositions prises pour la mise en oeuvre;  4 =Aucune disposition pour la mise en oeuvre. 
(c)  Projet kenyan de développement des exportations. 
(d)  Prêts de faveurs et transactions individuelles. 
(e)  Selon le traité de Bâle. 
(/)  Toutefois, le ministère des Finances se réserve le pouvoir de délivrer des licences aux banques. 
(g)  Incluant 53 banques commerciales et 14 institutions financières non bancaires Annexe XXIV 
Projet de promotion des échanges régionaux 
Raison d'être 
Même s'il existe des banques commerciales, des firmes d'assurance spécialisées et 
des agences nationales de crédit à 1' exportation prêtes à assumer le risque politique des 
transactions transfrontalières auxquelles participent des pays africains, le marché souffre 
malgré tout d'importantes lacunes qui nuisent à l'investissement et à la croissance de 
1' activité productive en Afrique. Dans certains pays africains, aucune entreprise 
commerciale ni aucune agence de crédit d'exportation ne couvre le risque politique, et 
lorsqu'une telle couverture existe, elle est habituellement très coûteuse et assortie de 
termes défavorables. Par ailleurs, la couverture disponible est soit très partielle, soit 
inexistante pour les transactions à moyen terme, ce qui limite l'importation de biens 
d'investissement essentiels. 
Comme les banques commerciales, les agences de crédit à 1  'exportation et les sociétés 
commerciales d'assurance du risque de crédit observent des limites strictes de risque 
politique, la situation des pays africains en cette matière pose un problème de taille. Ces 
limites sont nécessaires pour respecter les politiques prudentielles d'étalement du risque 
et respecter les exigences des organismes de réglementation. Toutefois, de temps à autres, 
lorsqu'elles imposées de l'intérieur, elles ont pour effet de réduire la disponibilité des 
financements de projets pour des raisons qui n'ont rien à voir avec la viabilité de ces 
projets ni avec le risque que présente la conduite des affaires dans des pays où ces limites 
seraient dépassées. 
L'absence de couverture du risque politique pour les exportations africaines nuit 
sensiblement à la disponibilité des financements pour les exportations en provenance de 
la région et les échanges intra-régionaux, notamment pour le développement de 
l'assurance-crédit à l'exportation. 
Un projet qui portait à 1' origine le nom de Mécanisme de garantie pour 1  'Afrique et 
qui sera désormais appelé Projet de promotion des échanges régionaux (PPER) a été 
conçu pour régler ces problèmes et combler les lacunes susmentionnées. 
Aperçu général 
Le PPER utiliserait les crédits de 1  'Association internationale de développement 
(IDA) et les fonds provenant d'autres bailleurs afin d'offrir une garantie ou de mettre en 
place une agence d'assurance (1 'Agence régionale de services à 1' exportation ou ARSE) 
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l'activité productive dans les pays africains. 
Voici quels seraient les principaux éléments du PPER : 
a)  chaque pays acceptant de participer au PPER conclurait une entente de crédit 
avec l'IDA en vertu de laquelle cette dernière lui prêterait des fonds assortis de 
ses conditions de remboursement habituelles pour les fins du PPER; 
b) les crédits de l'IDA et toute contribution provenant d'autres bailleurs 
représenteraient la contribution du pays au PPER; 
c)  en vertu du PPER, les polices d'assurance seraient fournies par le biais d'une 
garantie ou d'une ARSE au nom des pays participants; 
d)  les crédits de l'IDA donneraient une certaine crédibilité aux opérations de 
1  'ARSE et fourniraient à cette dernière les moyens de régler les demandes 
d'indemnité valides; 
e)  les polices d'assurance émises par 1  'ARSE couvriraient les pertes des parties 
engagées dans une activité productrice ou à l'appui d'une telle activité, 
découlant des risques politiques survenant ou engendrés dans un pays 
participant; 
f)  la notion de risque politique couvrirait des événements tels que les guerres ou 
les troubles civils, ou certaines actions des gouvernements connues sous le 
nom de risques de « performance du gouvernement » comme 1' expropriation 
ou l'imposition de contrôles des changes; 
g)  les polices d'assurance ou les garanties seraient émises par une agence donnée 
au nom de l'ensemble des pays participants, mais chacun d'eux disposerait au 
départ de son propre programme et ne serait pas tenu responsable des 
obligations assumées par l'  ARSE au nom des autres pays; 
h)  les obligations de l'  ARSE contractées en vertu des polices d'assurance seraient 
totalement appuyées par les crédits de l'IDA et des autres bailleurs détenus par 
1  'ARSE dans des comptes de garantie bloqués. 
Le PPER portera pleinement ses fruits pour l'ensemble des participants lorsqu'il 
deviendra un véritable programme régional auquel auront adhéré suffisamment de pays 
de la région. Ce n'est qu'à ce moment qu'il pourra lutter efficacement contre la perception 
selon laquelle la conduite des affaires en Afrique est une opération risquée. 
Source : Mécanisme de garantie pour 1  'Afrique : Document de travail à 1  'intention des groupes de travail techniques, 14 octobre 1998 
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Taux de prévalence du VIH/SIDA chez les adultes des pays 
de l'ITF à la fin de 1997 
Taux de VIH/SIDA (%) 
chez les adultes (15 à 49 ans) 
Burundi  8,30 
Comores  0,14 
Kenya  11,64 
Madagascar  0,12 
Malawi  14,92 
Maurice  0,08 
Mozambique  14,17 
Namibie  19,94 
Rwanda  12,75 
Seychelles  Inconnu 
Swaziland  18,50 
Tanzanie  9,42 
Ouganda  9,51 
Zambia  19,07 
Zimbabwe  25,84 
Ensemble des pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne  8,00 
Moyenne mondiale  1,10 
Source: UNAJDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemie, juin 1998 
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Un exemple des difficultés d'une approche unifiée 
Pour les agences de promotion des investissements (API) de la SADC, la 
mauvaise image de la région est imputable au manque de soutien du 
gouvernement 
En juin 1998 s'est tenue à Pretoria (Afrique du Sud) la première réunion du sous-
comité pour l'investissement de la SADC, au cours de laquelle ont été examinés les 
résultats d'une étude financée par l'UE concernant le climat de l'investissement dans la 
région de la SADC. L'étude a été critiquée principalement parce que qu'elle affirmait 
que les campagnes de promotion animées par les API de la SADC n'étaient pas efficaces. 
La plupart des API estimaient pâtir du manque de soutien véritable de leurs gouvernements 
respectifs. La concurrence entre les API dans la région a également été ressentie comme 
un problème car elle menait à des politiques du chacun pour soi. La compétition ouverte 
n'est pas perçue comme la meilleure réponse. En effet, puisqu'elles desservent un marché 
commun, les API devraient, au contraire, développer leurs relations de travail mutuelles. 
À la même réunion, il a également été convenu que toutes les API de la région 
devront apporter leur contribution au Protocole d'investissement et de financement de la 
SADC. Un groupe de travail composé de six pays a été constitué à cette fin. 
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Résumé des bonnes pratiques en matière de systèmes fiscaux et tarifaires 
Des études théoriques et pratiques ont conduit à l'élaboration d'un ensemble de 
pratiques jugées propices au bon fonctionnement des systèmes fiscaux et tarifaires 
dans les pays en développement. Les bons systèmes fiscaux sont ceux qui causent une 
distorsion minimale de la répartition des ressources, qui sont équitables et faciles à 
gérer. 
t  Les taxes sur le commerce international devraient jouer un rôle minimal. Les 
droits à 1' importation devraient utiliser un taux moyen faible et un nombre minimal 
de taux afin de réduire les possibilités d'exonérations arbitraires ou excessives. 
Les exportateurs devraient bénéficier de remboursements des droits payés sur 
les facteurs  de  production des produits exportés. Les droits à 1' exportation 
devraient être évités. 
t  Il conviendrait de mettre en place ou de renforcer une taxe à la consommation à 
large base (couvrant les  secteurs de la fabrication,  de l'importation et de la 
distribution), en particulier une TVA assortie de préférence d'un taux unique et 
d'exemptions minimales ainsi que d'un seuil visant à exhonérer les petites 
entreprises. Les droits d'accise devraient être limités à un ensemble circonscrit 
de produits. La TVA et les droits d'accise devraient s'appliquer également aux 
importations et aux produits locaw~. 
t  L'impôt sur les  sociétés devrait être levé avec un seul taux modéré. 
L'amortissement devrait être uniforme dans tous les secteurs. L'utilisation 
d'incitatifs fiscaux devrait être limitée. L'impôt sur le revenu des particuliers ne 
devrait utiliser qu'un nombre réduit de tranches d'imposition et un taux marginal 
supérieur modéré; les exemptions et les déductions personnelles devraient être 
limitées; une exemption standard devrait exclure les particuliers à faible revenu; 
la retenue d'impôt finale devrait être largement utilisée. 
t  Les réformes énumérées ci-dessus pourraient être utilement complétées par la 
mise en place d'un régime simplifié d'impôt pour les petites entreprises et le 
secteur informel. 
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moderniser les systèmes et les méthodes. La simplification des systèmes fiscaux 
et tarifaires est une condition préalable aux réformes administratives. Les réformes 
mettront typiquement 1' accent sur la réorganisation de 1' administration de 1' impôt 
et des douanes pour en faire une organisation fonctionnelle,  1' adoption de 
procédures efficaces pour la mise en place d'un système national d'identification 
unique des contribuables, le renforcement des audits et l'amélioration des services 
aux contribuables. L'informatisation constitue en général une des composantes 
centrales des réformes, avec le perfectionnement des agents de l'impôt et des 
douanes et l'adoption, pour ces derniers, de l'autonomie de gestion et d'incitatifs 
financiers. 
Source: Rapports du FMI SM/98/254, supplément 1,  17 novembre 1998 
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Notes sur les conditions institutionnelles et autres à réaliser aux fins de la mise en 
œuvre de l'Initiative 
1.  Les présentes notes complètent la description des options institutionnelles 
présentées au tableau A (section F) et énumèrent certaines des étapes préparatoires requises 
en vue de la mise en œuvre des actions préconisées dans le schéma directeur pour la 
promotion de l'investissement. L'ordre de présentation des diverses rubriques est celui 
utilisé dans la section E et dans le tableau A. 
Libéralisation des échanges commerciaux 
2.  Les dispositions institutionnelles prévues pour la mise en œuvre des actions 
proposées devraient être celles qui ont été appliquées pour les réformes commerciales 
réalisées dans le cadre du schéma directeur pour la réforme des régimes du commerce. 
Une seule réserve pourrait être envisagée : compte tenu de 1' objectif  qui consiste à redorer 
l'image de l'Afrique, il pourrait être souhaitable, le cas échéant, de chercher à obtenir 
une plus grande participation du secteur privé. 
Efforts de promotion à l'échelle régionale 
Simplification des codes de l'investissement, des procédures d'approbation et des 
dispositions réglementaires 
3.  La simplification des  codes de 1  'investissement et des  dispositions 
réglementaires (un processus déjà engagé au niveau national et qui est bien avancé dans 
certains pays) conduira, à terme, à l'adoption d'un code et d'un régime réglementaire 
communs. Les décisions et la mise en œuvre des réformes relèveront des  instances 
nationales, mais le travail préparatoire devra être entrepris au niveau régional afin de 
comparer les codes et les pratiques en cours dans les divers pays de l'ITF et de proposer 
des codes et des dispositions communes qui pourraient être adoptés à l'intérieur d'un 
échéancier accepté par tous. 
4.  Dans chaque pays, les institutions clés qui seront chargées de ce travail seront 
l'agence de  promotion de  l'investissement (API) et les  services juridiques du 
gouvernement. La première étape consistera pour les Comités d'exécution des politiques 
(CEP) et les GTT à renseigner ces institutions sur l'ITF et à convenir d'un plan d'action, 
p.268 du partage des responsabilités et des méthodes de diffusion des résultats. Les GTT 
pourraient jouer le rôle temporaire de surveillance des progrès accomplis et faciliter la 
prestation de services d'assistance technique, le cas échéant. À la fin de  1999, chaque 
pays participant devrait avoir publié un document unique décrivant ses codes de 
l'investissement, les procédures d'approbation et l'ensemble de sa réglementation. À ce 
moment, des accords devraient avoir été pris à long terme pour la coordination nationale 
et régionale du travail. Les agences publiques seront responsables de la mise en œuvre 
du programme, mais le secteur privé devrait participer étroitement, et les entreprises et 
les associations professionnelles pertinentes devraient être consultées sur les changements 
envisagés. Pour accélérer le processus et assurer une participation large du secteur privé, 
les travaux détaillés devraient être confiés, dans toute la mesure du possible, à  des 
entreprises professionnelles, par voie de sous-traitance. 
5.  Au niveau régional, il conviendra à la fois de surveiller et de coordonner 
l'application des changements survenant dans les pays et de proposer des politiques et 
des procédures aux fins de l'adoption par les pays de l'ITF. Ce travail pourrait être confié 
à un comité de coordination mis en place dans ce but précis, ou par une ou plusieurs des 
institutions économiques régionales. Un comité de coordination risque de ne pas jouir 
d'un statut suffisant et d'être difficile à mettre en place et à gérer; cela équivaudrait par 
ailleurs à créer une institution supplémentaire. Le recours à une des institutions régionales 
existantes paraît donc plus pratique, et plus conforme à leurs responsabilités. Les pays 
participants auront à décider des institutions qu'ils souhaitent inviter à assumer cette 
responsabilité. 
Promotion conjointe 
6.  Pour ce qui est de la promotion conjointe, la clé du succès résidera dans une 
campagne thématique, conçue et exécutée d'une façon professionnelle, et fondée sur 
l'application cohérente des conditions générales propres à attirer l'investissement. Pour 
réaliser ces conditions, il conviendra de confier au secteur public la plus grande partie du 
travail; une entreprise de relations publiques justifiant de l'expérience et des aptitudes 
voulues en matière de promotion internationale et de constitution d'une image de marque 
devrait être engagée à cette fin. Il faudra en outre choisir ou former une institution régionale 
du secteur privé qui sera chargée de 1' organisation du travail. Une des solutions possibles 
serait d'utiliser une ou plusieurs chambres de commerce régionales, ou encore de faire 
appel à des institutions comme le East African Enterprise Network, le Southern African 
Enterprise Network, la A/rica Business Round Table  ou le ESABO, qui devraient de 
toute façon participer au processus. Idéalement, les GTT devront désigner des institutions 
appropriées du secteur privé dans leurs pays respectifs et songer au meilleur moyen 
d'encourager leur participation et aux institutions à mettre à contribution à cette fin. 
p.269 7.  La promotion conjointe peut-et doit-engager la participation de plusieurs 
ou de 1' ensemble des pays participants. La cohérence des messages envoyés au marché 
est l'aspect le plus important. Certaines institutions du niveau national pour lesquelles le 
succès de ces activités de promotion présente une importance primordiale devront être 
appelées à fournir informations et ressources.  Les principaux intervenants seront 
probablement les API, les associations de gens d'affaires (y compris, par exemple, les 
chambres de commerce, les associations de fabricants et les organismes professionnels) 
et les ministères gouvernementaux responsables des secteurs dans lesquels on souhaite 
attirer 1' investissement privé. Lorsque les pays de 1  'ITF seront convenus des dispositions 
générales de l'effort de coordination, la première étape consistera pour chacun des GTT 
à désigner et à informer les intervenants sur l'Initiative et le schéma directeur pour la 
promotion de 1' investissement, et à décider d'un mécanisme qui assurera leur participation 
aux efforts de promotion. 
8.  Les activités de promotion ne seront pas axées principalement sur les pays 
de l'ITF en tant que groupe particulier, mais plutôt sur l'investissement dans les pays 
d'Afrique de l'Est, d'Afrique australe et de l'Océan Indien ainsi que dans l'ensemble des 
pays africains. Les résultats de ces efforts présenteront un intérêt certain pour les 
institutions régionales susmentionnées (COMESA, EAC, COI et SADC) ainsi que pour 
les organisations panafricaines comme la CEA et l'OUA. 
Établissement et maintien d'un site Internet d'information sur l '!TF 
9.  Lors de la réunion des GTT tenue à Maurice en novembre 1998, il a été 
décidé de créer un site Internet sur l'ITF afin de faciliter l'échange d'informations et 
d'expériences entre les pays participants. Ce site Internet, qui sera accueilli et entretenu 
par la Banque africaine de développement, pourrait également servir à la promotion de 
l'investissement. Comme pour tous les sites Internet, son utilisation et sa pertinence 
dépendront de la portée et de la qualité des informations diffusées. Pour contribuer à en 
assurer la qualité,  le  Comité directeur des  organismes de parrainage en surveillera 
l'élaboration et l'entretien. Le site Internet de l'ITF ne sera qu'un des nombreux véhicules 
de diffusion des informations et de publicité utilisés par les institutions choisies pour 
servir de fer de lance aux efforts de promotion; les GTT, les API, les associations de gens 
d'affaires, les banques centrales et les ministères gouvernementaux en constitueront les 
principales sources de données. Une question reste à résoudre : les données en provenance 
des pays devraient-elles être approuvées avant d'être transmises à la BAfD et diffusées 
sur l'Internet, et dans l'affirmative, d'où cette approbation devrait-elle venir? Entre-
temps, les GTT devraient participer à l'élaboration de ce site et à sa mise en place le plus 
tôt possible en fournissant toutes les données disponibles. On pourra, dans un deuxième 
temps, améliorer le contenu et la présentation du site. 
p.270 Examen de la faisabilité de fonds d'investissement interfrontaliers 
1  O.  Cette proposition présente un intérêt particulier pour les  agences de 
privatisation et celles qui oeuvrent sur les marchés des capitaux, y compris les banques 
commerciales et les bourses de valeurs;  comme ces dernières ont un rôle essentiel à 
jouer et qu'elles s'intéressent directement aux résultats de l'étude, elles devraient y 
participer étroitement. Les organismes régionaux s'intéresseraient eux aussi à l'étude, 
mais étant donné la nature particulière des marchés de capitaux, la recherche et le travail 
préparatoires devraient être confiés à  des personnes justifiant d'une expérience 
considérable en gestion financière. Au stade actuel, compte tenu de leur participation au 
développement des marchés de capitaux dans beaucoup de pays africains et de  leurs 
contacts fréquents avec des entreprises professionnelles pertinentes, il serait probablement 
plus pratique d'inviter un des organismes de parrainage à assumer la responsabilité de 
l'étude, ce qui inclurait l'examen des options de mise en œuvre. 
Efforts de promotion à l'échelle nationale 
Amélioration de l'information et des conditions de déplacements 
11.  Cette question intéressera les  institutions qui représentent les  intérêts du 
monde des affaires (par exemple, les associations de gens d'affaires) et celles qui, outre 
1' intérêt commercial qu'elles portent au projet, auront un rôle important à jou  er dans sa 
mise en œuvre (par exemple,  les API,  les  autorités aéroportuaires et portuaires,  les 
responsables de  l'immigration et des  douanes et les administrations fiscales).  Ces 
institutions ont certainement intérêt à participer, mais cette participation servira d'abord 
et avant tout à modifier les attitudes et les perspectives de leur personnel afin d'attirer les 
investisseurs et d'établir des rapports productifs entre les secteurs public et privé. 
Amélioration de la sécurité 
12.  L'amélioration de  la sécurité est une exigence plutôt générale qui sort du 
mandat des agences mentionnées jusqu'à maintenant. Toutefois, les problèmes de sécurité 
réels ou perçus peuvent nuire sérieusement à l'investissement et tout programme visant 
à promouvoir l'investissement serait incomplet s'il passait cette question sous silence. 
Les associations de gens d'affaires et les ministères sectoriels désireux de  mobiliser 
l'investissement peuvent conseiller sur les mesures qu'ils jugent appropriées pour 
améliorer la sécurité, mais les agences de sécurité et les ministères dont elles relèvent 
seront les premiers responsables des mesures concrètes à prendre en cette matière. 
p.271 Assistance aux entrepreneurs locaux 
13.  Les entrepreneurs et les investisseurs locaux auront peut-être besoin 
d'assistance dans les pays qui, pendant un certain nombre d'années, ont été caractérisés 
par une économie dirigée. L'absence ou l'insuffisance de connaissances sur les véhicules 
d'investissement et les  moyens de mobiliser les capitaux limitent le potentiel de  ces 
pays.  Dans une telle situation, les  efforts de  promotion de  l'investissement peuvent 
s'appuyer sur des programmes d'information destinés aux investisseurs locaux et de 
formation des entrepreneurs. Les API ont un rôle particulier à jouer en informant les 
investisseurs potentiels des opportunités d'investissement qui se présentent; plusieurs 
de ces agences bénéficient à cette fin de 1' aide des bailleurs de fonds. En général, toutefois, 
on met 1' accent sur la promotion de 1' investissement provenant des économies développées 
ou émergentes. Dans le cadre du schéma directeur pour la promotion de l'investissement, 
on accorderait une importance égale à la promotion de  l'investissement local et de 
l'investissement interfrontalier. 
14.  La formation portant sur des sujets aussi variés que la bonne gestion des 
entreprises,  la préparation des plans d'affaire, la mobilisation des  capitaux, la 
commercialisation, le contrôle de la qualité et la gestion des affaires doit être accessible 
et abordable. Il existe déjà du matériel didactique portant sur ces questions qui peut être 
adapté et traduit pour répondre aux besoins locaux. Les institutions qui auront le plus 
vraisemblablement besoin de formation sont les API, les associations de gens d'affaires 
(notamment les firmes professionnelles) et les banques. Les projets de formation financés 
par les bailleurs peuvent souvent répondre aux besoins clairement circonscrits et les 
dispositions institutionnelles seraient définies pendant la conception du projet. 
Promotion des interactions entre les investisseurs locaux et étrangers 
15.  Les  investisseurs étrangers nouveaux et les  investisseurs locaux à la 
recherche de partenaires techniques étrangers ont tous besoin de  collaborateurs 
appropriés. L'Internet offre un moyen facile d'obtenir l'information et d'établir des 
contacts, mais il  n'est toujours pas facilement accessible à  la plupart des petits 
entrepreneurs africains et la qualité de la présentation, la fiabilité des données et les 
coûts posent des difficultés. En conséquence, les associations de gens d'affaires, les 
API et les ministères sectoriels (notamment ceux chargés du commerce et de 1' industrie) 
ont un rôle important à jouer dans la promotion des contacts entre les investisseurs 
locaux et étrangers. Il est clair que 1  'API doit être généralement responsable de la 
promotion d'une bonne interaction entre ces deux groupes d'investisseurs. Là où ce 
travail reste à faire,  deux étapes devraient être envisagées au départ : i) création et 
entretien de bases de  données sur les investisseurs étrangers et locaux;  ii) collecte 
d'informations sur les marchés conclus antérieurement, auprès des investisseurs actuels 
p.272 et des associations de gens d'affaires afin de mieux définir les besoins, faciliter les 
prises de contact et assurer une meilleure interaction entre les deux groupes. 
Réformes juridiques et judiciaires sélectives 
16.  M. Winston P.  Nagan, professeur de  droit à la University of  Florida,  et 
M. Dean Visser, doyen et professeur de droit à la University of  Cape Town ont préparé 
un document décrivant un projet d'harmonisation des lois commerciales des pays 
d'Afrique australe (SADC). Leur projet englobe le droit des sociétés et des faillites, la 
reconnaissance et l'application des jugements rendus à l'étranger, les conflits de 
juridiction, les droits de propriété industrielle, le  droit des banques, les contrats, la 
protection des  consommateurs, le  droit du travail, le droit des transports, le droit 
environnemental et la fiscalité.  Ils envisagent une application en trois phases dont la 
première prendrait trois ans et la deuxième de cinq à dix ans. Si les réformes juridiques 
et judiciaires sélectives énumérées dans le présent schéma directeur correspondent 
uniquement à la première phase de ce projet, les pays de l'ITF souhaiteront néanmoins 
peut-être envisager les perspectives à plus long terme de 1  'harmonisation des lois 
commerciales et la possibilité d'utiliser un dispositif de gestion des projets semblable à 
celui proposé par les professeurs Nagan et Visser. 
Création d'une forme juridique d'entreprise régionale 
17.  À mesure que les pays de 1  'ITF progressent vers une intégration plus poussée 
et qu'ils partagent les mêmes besoins et le même désir d'accroître 1  'investissement, 
notamment l'investissement transfrontalier, ils ont des motifs supplémentaires de 
supprimer les obstacles à l'investissement. Un de ces obstacles est la nécessité pour les 
entreprises installées en permanence dans ces pays d'être enregistrées comme entreprises 
distinctes ou filiales  d'une entreprise étrangère.  Les coûts d'administration seraient 
sensiblement réduits pour les investisseurs s'il était possible pour une entreprise 
enregistrée dans un des pays de 1  'ITF d'être reconnue par 1' ensemble des pays participants 
et d'être en mesure d'entreprendre des activités commerciales dans n'importe quel de 
ces pays sans avoir à s'enregistrer à nouveau comme entité juridique séparée. Pour y 
parvenir, les pays participants devraient adopter des exigences et des procédures 
communes d'enregistrement des entreprises. 
18.  À 1' échelle nationale, compte tenu de la nécessité de modifier la législation 
existante, le  service juridique du gouvernement se verrait accorder la principale 
responsabilité de ce dossier. Il devrait entrer en contact avec l'agent d'enregistrement 
des entreprises, les professions comptable et juridique et les associations de gens 
d'affaires pour s'enquérir de leurs expériences et de leurs idées et obtenir leur appui. 
p.273 Comme, dans certains pays, l'incorporation entraîne un enregistrement fiscal et qu'il 
peut exister des différences entre les dispositions fiscales prévues pour différents types 
d'entreprises, il sera essentiel d'obtenir la collaboration des autorités fiscales; il sera 
aussi peut-être nécessaire d'établir un mécanisme d'enregistrement fiscal de rechange. 
Toutefois, le point essentiel à retenir est que ces changements doivent être conçus pour 
être conviviaux, et non se limiter à un ensemble uniforme mais complexe de dispositions 
et d'exigences. 
19.  La création d'une« entreprise régionale» n'entraîne pas nécessairement la 
création d'une catégorie nouvelle et supplémentaire d'entreprise incorporée; il pourrait 
simplement s'agir d'une reconnaissance, par un pays, de 1' enregistrement d'une entreprise 
dans un autre pays participant (habituellement une entreprise à responsabilité limitée, la 
responsabilité correspondant au montant du capital appelé). La coordination régionale 
d'ensemble devrait permettre d'assurer 1  'uniformité juridique entre les pays participants. 
Comme tous les pays de l'ITF sont membres du COMESA, de la SADC ou des deux 
organisations à la fois, ces institutions seraient toutes désignées pour s'acquitter de cette 
responsabilité. 
Adoption de procédures communes d'enregistrement 
20.  Au niveau national, ce dossier devrait relever du registre des sociétés (ou 
l'équivalent dans les pays non anglophones), sous la supervision générale du service 
juridique du gouvernement qui  serait chargé d'ébaucher tout changement législatif 
nécessaire et d'en assurer la gestion. Les autorités fiscales seraient également appelées à 
collaborer, tout comme les professions comptable et juridique (qui s'occupent typiquement 
des procédures d'enregistrement au nom de leurs clients). Les API devraient également 
être consultées puisqu'elles seront appelées à  conseiller les investisseurs sur les 
changements à venir. 
21.  Au niveau régional, il serait logique que cette mesure soit coordonnée par le 
CO  MESA ou la SADC. Toutefois, les services d'enregistrement des entreprises des pays 
de l'ITF devront être étroitement associés au processus pour pouvoir s'entendre sur les 
procédures communes et les caractéristiques du système qui permettront 1  'accès et le 
transfert des donnés d'enregistrement de part et d'autre des frontières nationales. Cette 
dernière étape est une condition préalable à 1' adoption du concept d'entreprise régionale. 
p.274 Création de cours commerciales distinctes 
22.  Dans beaucoup de pays africains, les difficultés éprouvées par les créanciers 
qui souhaitent passer par les cours de justice pour recouvrer leurs créances - que ce soit 
par suite de retards importants dans la négociation d'un accord final ou à cause de résultats 
incertains en dépit de la clarté des textes législatifs- constituent un obstacle majeur à 
l'investissement. Les investisseurs existants témoignent de ces difficultés; les institutions 
prêteuses n'échappent pas non plus à ce problème (qui explique, en partie, la pénurie 
aiguë du crédit à terme dans la plupart des pays de l'ITF). La création de  cours 
commerciales distinctes, responsables spécifiquement de se pencher et de statuer sur ces 
cas et qui justifient de l'expérience nécessaire présenterait un progrès majeur pour la 
promotion de 1  'investissement. 
23.  Le ministère de la Justice est 1  'organe qui, à 1' échelle nationale, assumerait 
la responsabilité générale de ce dossier, tandis que la profession juridique apporterait 
une contribution importante à la conception de procédures modernes d'application, de 
soumission des cas et d'audiences. Les ministères de la Justice devraient coordonner 
leurs efforts pour assurer l'uniformité, processus qui pourrait être facilité par le CO  MESA, 
qui a récemment établi sa propre cour commerciale régionale à Lusaka. 
Réformes fiscales sélectives 
Réduction des droits d'importation conformément au schéma directeur de l '!TF 
pour la réforme des régimes du commerce 
24.  La première étape des réformes fiscales sélectives proposées, la réduction 
des droits d'importation conformément au schéma directeur de 1  'ITF sur 1  'harmonisation 
des tarifs, constituerait la suite logique de 1  'initiative actuellement en cours. Les 
dispositions institutionnelles existantes suffiront à cette fin. 
p.275 Simplification de la structure de l'impôt sur le revenu et adoption de taux 
d'imposition plus bas 
25.  À  l'échelle nationale, le  ministère des Finances est responsable de la 
simplification de la structure de l'impôt sur le revenu et de la réduction des taux 
d'imposition. Toutefois, dans le contexte général d'un dialogue entre les secteurs privé 
et public et compte tenu de  l'objectif conjoint de  promotion de  l'investissement, le 
Ministère et l'autorité fiscale devraient organiser des consultations détaillées avec la 
profession comptable, les associations de gens d'affaires et l'API. 
26.  Les institutions régionales ne participeront pas directement à cette réforme, 
mais elles constitueront une source importante d'informations comparatives sur 
l'expérience des pays de l'ITF et des autres pays. 
Amélioration de la gestion fiscale 
27.  Cette mesure fera appel aux institutions nommées au point précédent. 
Toutefois, 1' objectif sera différent. La simplification de la structure et la réduction des 
taux seraient conçues pour rendre l'investissement plus attrayant sans nuire au budget de 
1  'État; 1' amélioration de 1  'administration fiscale viserait à moderniser les méthodes de 
calcul et de recouvrement de l'impôt. Il s'agirait essentiellement de moderniser les 
procédures utilisées, l'autorité fiscale devenant ainsi en mesure de fournir un service 
rapide et cordial, et de prendre des mesures pour lutter contre les comportements non 
professionnels. Ici encore, les progrès réalisés dépendront du processus de consultation 
et de l'accueil fait par les autorités fiscales aux propositions avancées. 
Conclusion d'ententes sur la double imposition 
28.  La conclusion d'ententes sur la double imposition, une question relevant de 
toute évidence des ministères des Finances respectifs et de leurs autorités fiscales, devrait 
passer par les trois étapes proposées dans le schéma directeur. La première, c'est-à-dire 
la conclusion d'ententes entre les pays de 1  'ITF, serait grandement facilitée si on pouvait 
adopter une présentation et un contenu standards. Les ministères des Finances devraient 
consulter les professions comptables (qui travaillent sur les détails de leur application 
pratique) et les institutions économiques régionales pour élaborer un accord standard. 
p.276 Prix d'excellence en Afrique 
29.  Celte proposition permettrait non seulement de fournir les incitatifs 
souhaités dans  1~ schéma directeur, mais également de relever les succès remportés 
pour les utiliser aux fins de la promotion de l'investissement. Toutefois, le lancement 
et la gestion d'un tel système doivent être faits d'une façon professionnelle. Dans le 
cas contraire, ils pourraient causer des embarras et avoir une incidence négative sur 
l'image de l'Afrique. Par ailleurs, pour attirer l'intérêt des organismes de parrainage et 
des participants, il conviendra de faire appel à une institution d'encadrement crédible 
jouissant d'une bonne réputation auprès du secteur privé. Pour cette raison, il serait 
préférable que le système de prix soit administré par une organisation privée. On devrait 
songer à utiliser les réseaux d'entreprises nouvellement créés puisque ces derniers 
attirent les nouvelles entreprises, qu'ils sont libres de toute affiliation politique et qu'ils 
font preuve de l'enthousiasme et de la compréhension nécessaires. Pour élargir 
l'admissibilité aux pays de l'extérieur de l'ITF et aux réseaux d'entreprises, on pourrait 
inviter des organisations comme laAfrica Business Round Table à participer au projet. 
La première étape consisterait à consulter ces organisations et d'autres organisations 
semblables pour obtenir leur point de vue, préciser la portée du projet, discuter de 
1' administration et du coût et identifier des organismes de parrainage possibles. Les 
organisations choisies prépareraient ensuite un document présentant les résultats des 
consultations qui pourrait être adapté pour mobiliser la participation des bailleurs et 
qui formerait plus tard la base d'une brochure explicative à diffuser aux entreprises de 
l'ensemble des pays de l'ITF. 
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p.278 1.  The special nature of  CBI and its history of  partnership with co-sponsors 
explains why no logical framework ("logframe") has been found for the overall 
initiative. The consultants have, however, constructed an ex-post logical framework 
which is presented in Table 8 according to the standard format that is used by the 
European Commission for project formulation. In brief, this framework tries to 
confront the activities undertaken with the results achieved, the programme objectives 
and the overall goals set or implicit during the development - and evolution - of  the 
CBI. 
2.  The logframe shows the coherence between the goals, the objectives the 
activities and the results; and secondly, the assumptions made at each step. In general, 
the programme does seem to achieve a good degree of  coherence. The assumptions 
made may have been somewhat optimistic in some cases. For example, improved 
revenue collection or willingness to implement what was agreed were not always up to 
expectations. This is perhaps inevitable with a programme of  this magnitude and 
scope. 
3.  In addition, an overview of  the strengths and weaknesses of  the CBI 
process has been made in order to summarise and highlight several aspects of  CBI's 
operations for further consideration, in Table 9. 
4.  Taking into account the above findings, the major findings from country 
reports as explained in volume 2 and the findings from the research as documented in 
volume 3, the following conclusions and recommendations are presented. 
Conclusions 
5.  At the beginning of  the 1990s, many countries in the Southern and Eastern 
African region had begun to undertake economic reforms but were still characterised 
by inward-looking industrialisation policies, high foreign trade barriers, foreign 
exchange controls and other restrictive business laws and practices. In addition, 
progress to regional integration was modest and slow. 
6.  The CBI was conceived as a framework for regionally harmonised policies 
to facilitate a market-driven concept of  economic integration in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. This framework was intended to be complementary with continuing national 
structural adjustment processes, while adding the elements of  the regional dimension, 
greater national and regional ownership and public/private partnership. 
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within the countries to maintain and deepen the policy changes in the face of  a 
difficult economic climate. Various elements of  its policy reform proposals became the 
generally accepted norms. What was originally proposed through the CBI process as 
an innovative course of  action and as new policy priorities, is now widely accepted as 
an integral part of  necessary policy reforms. 
8.  In promoting new open regionalism, the Initiative made a flexible and 
pragmatic contribution to African structural reforms and economic integration and 
helped countries in moving towards a more open and dynamic economic environment. 
The CBI became an instrument for realising outward-oriented reforms, notably in the 
areas of  trade liberalisation and facilitation, liberalisation of  exchange and payments 
systems, and investment deregulation both within the regional and the global context. 
9.  Macro-economic performances through global and outward-looking 
liberalisation in the goods and factor markets have indeed improved. The aggregate 
trade restrictiveness ratings have reduced drastically and some participating countries 
have reached open trade regimes in the late nineties. 
10.  There has been generally good progress in lowering and simplifying tariffs 
and considerable progress in freeing export trade restrictions. Considerable progress 
has been made in the area of  facilitation of  international payments and moving toward 
market-based exchange rates and there has been near full compliance in setting up one 
stop investment centres. Other progress in related business environment areas has 
been impressive, although uneven. In the area of  free movement of  persons, for 
example, progress has been rather limited. 
11.  There have been a number of  constraints on the operations of  the CBI. 
Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros were hindered by conflict. The SACU members 
Namibia and Swaziland were limited in some policy areas by their membership of 
CMA and SACU. In some countries, a discrepancy between declared policies and 
effective implementation has been noted. 
12.  Although external tariffs have been lowered and simplified by many 
participants, the removal of  intra-regional tariffs has been more difficult. This is considered 
to be due to a combination of  factors, including concerns over trade deflection, revenue 
loss, the absence of  competition policies and lobbying by specific sectors. 
13.  Peer pressure has had a positive impact through positive demonstration 
effects of  results achieved in some countries, and through the insistence by other 
participating countries on the need for all countries to respect their voluntary 
undertakings as elaborated in the Letters of  CBI Policy. Yet policy setbacks or even 
reversals have been noted in several countries. 
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collaboration between private and public sector has been established. The CBI has 
contributed to raising awareness within the private sector on the importance of 
regional integration, of  reducing impediments to trade and of  realising less restrictive 
trade regimes. The participation of  the private sector in the TWG has made the private 
sector more outward-looking. Bilateral and regional contacts between TWGs proved 
to be useful vehicles for better understanding and faster implementation of  trade and 
investment issues. The commitment and quality of  the chair and the various members 
are important issues. 
15.  Donor co-ordination of  support and their involvement in regional and 
individual country policy reforms has been enhanced through the CBI. The 
constructive dialogue between co-sponsors in terms of  combining unilateral 
liberalisation (advocated by Bretton Woods Institutions) with a regional focus as a step 
towards globalisation (advocated by the EU) has been remarkable. Co-ordination of 
approaches towards regionalism and outward reforms as expressed in the Road Map 
for Tariff Reforms is one of  the Initiative's achievements. 
16.  Financial contributions, linked to the transitional cost of  implementing 
tariff reductions, were promised, and acted as an incentive for governments that were 
sometimes in deep trouble to finance the budget. Unfortunately, participants and co-
sponsors have different understandings and perceptions of  what has been promised. 
The countries understood that the financing of special envelopes was promised; the 
co-sponsors thought that an indication was given of  financing needs in order to cover 
transitional costs as they would arise. Disbursements have indeed taken place and 
have been specifically linked by the EU to CBI activities (Annex 1 -Table 2), while 
the World Bank and ADB chose to integrate such contributions in their over-all 
country reform support; the IMF having said always that it would not go beyond the 
financing of  technical assistance. 
17.  Regional organisations were supported through the CBI. As a "virtual 
organisation", the CBI has avoided competing with existing regional organisations and 
assisted them in realising their objectives instead. The collaboration with COMESA 
and EAC is especially effective, with the CBI acting as a fast track. There has been 
less active participation by SADC and the overlap between COMESA and SADC 
poses a problem of  policy harmonisation. 
18.  Some events such as different perceptions in terms of  financial 
contributions, the hesitations to implement measures in some countries, the fears 
concerning possible closure of  non competitive factories, may have contributed to a 
certain degree of  fatigue and diminished enthusiasm for the Initiative. On the other 
hand, political decision-making in general has become more open and a free(r) press 
in particular has become stronger in the participating countries during the nineties, 
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involved in the decision processes towards freer trade and factor liberalisation. 
19.  Since the CBI is a voluntary process, the limited role ofRSA as an 
observer in CBI is understandable in an historical perspective. However, South Africa 
being clearly the leading economy of  the region in terms of  trade and investment, 
many CBI stakeholders and observers see the need for some kind of  closer 
relationship. 
20.  The overall conclusion is that CBI has been a timely and useful initiative 
in introducing and spreading the paradigm of  new open regionalism. Although of 
course this process is not a panacea for economic development, it has been a necessary 
condition for it, because the CBI has helped inward-looking countries to change their 
policies and was part of  their transformation into more open and dynamic economies. 
This will increase the likelihood that additional investment will be mobilised. Both the 
participants and the co-sponsors have recognised that the CBI agenda remains 
unfinished and have recently adopted The Investment Road Map. 
Recommendations 
21.  Taking into account the achievements on the one hand and the challenges 
ahead on the other,  it is desirable that the CBI should be continued in some way as 
was agreed in the Ministerial Meeting of 1998, and confirmed during many 
interviews. The CBI paradigm of  new open regionalism and the basic approach of  a 
flexible partnership, variable speed and geometry, self-selection of  participating 
countries and public/private partnership are useful contributions to the process of 
economic integration in this part of  Africa. 
22.  Careful attention needs to be paid to sequencing the rationalisation of  and 
reduction in the external tariff, the progressive elimination of  intra-regional tariffs, 
reforms to national revenue collection and implementation of  effective rules of  origin 
and competition rules. 
23.  In order to counter fears of  de-industrialisation and improve the 
investment climate, reform measures for investment facilitation under the Initiative as 
foreseen in the Road Map for Investment Facilitation are timely, necessary and urgent 
for augmenting private sector growth in participating countries. 
24.  The issue of  misunderstandings or different perceptions regarding 
financial contributions should be settled by the co-sponsors' formulation of  a 
transparent system for financial interventions. A clear understanding concerning 
p.282 financial contributions under the CBI should, after clarification between co-sponsors, 
be discussed with participating countries. 
25.  TWGs are a useful forum for continuing dialogue on policy reforms. TWG 
being one of  the strong features of  CBI, it is recommended they continue to work 
further along the lines they are organised now, with attention being paid to the quality 
of  the chair, the local consultant, as well as the breadth of  representation of  its 
members. As national independent bodies they should not be responsible to a Regional 
Organisation. 
26.  Enhanced networking among economic operators in the participating 
countries through chambers of  commerce, producer associations and involvement in 
regional  TWG meetings and other fora of  a regional and global nature is 
recommended. Joint cross-border business activities or trade exhibitions sponsored by 
CBI may improve bilateral and regional trade development. 
27.  The CBI web-site should be further developed as an instrument to 
specifically improve the awareness and the dissemination of  opportunities in trade and 
investment in the region. It is an excellent forum for accelerating the distribution of 
information on changing laws and regulations. 
28.  Civil society organisations such as trade unions, NGOs, or consumer 
organisations should be better involved in the CBI process through a balanced 
participation in TWGs, allowing policy-makers to listen to the voice of  civil society 
while sending messages that open markets matter, and discussing with them short term 
impact and long term benefits of  measures taken. 
29.  A more active involvement of  South Africa would benefit the process of 
CBI and regional co-operation. Given the importance of  South Africa within the 
region, many observers consider the CBI process would benefit, should they choose to 
take a more active role. 
30.  In summary the CBI should continue as a flexible instrument and a 
"virtual organisation" for new open regionalism in the region along current lines, and 
further help participating countries to implement and broaden their agenda. 
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1.  BREF APERÇU  SUR L'INITIATIVE TRANSFRONTALIÈRE 
D'INTÉGRATION  RÉGIONALE 
Depuis 1992, des pays membres du CO  MESA, de la Commission de 1  'Océan Indien 
et de la SADC ont entrepris une initiative d'intégration régionale visant l'accélération 
des investissements, des échanges commerciaux et des paiements transfrontaliers, sous 
les auspices de la Banque Mondiale, de 1  'Union Européenne, de la Banque Africaine de 
Développement et du Fonds Monétaire International. 
Le Burundi a répondu positivement à l'invitation lui adressée en vue de participer à 
l'initiative transfrontalière d'intégration régionale depuis 1992. Le Burundi a participé 
aux différentes réunions préparatoires jusqu'à la réunion décisive d'Août 1993 tenue à 
Kampala au cours de laquelle il a exprimé officiellement sa volonté d'adhérer à l'initiative. 
La participation initiale du Burundi à cette initiative a été motivée par le fait que 
cette initiative s'inscrivait parfaitement dans les orientations économiques du pays. Elle 
s'intégrait également dans la stratégie économique qui visait à la fois une croissance 
accélérée et durable tout en contribuant à la réduction de la pauvreté. 
Au moment de la naissance de l'initiative, les flux d'investissements intra-régionaux 
étaient inexistants tandis que les flux commerciaux étaient freinés par le non-respect des 
clauses relatives à la réduction des mesures tarifaires et non tarifaires par certains 
partenaires du Burundi. 
Au niveau des échanges, bien que les importations du Burundi soient libéralisées, 
les exportations souffrent encore d'une certaine protection de  la part des partenaires 
régionaux (non-respect des conventions de réduction tarifaire et non tarifaire CO  MESA). 
Le respect de ces dispositions par ses partenaires accroîtrait nécessairement les 
exportations burundaises des produits manufacturés dans la sous région. 
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s'accroître une fois que toutes les mesures du PACy relatives auront été instaurées. Mais 
il  convient de  souligner qu'à partir de  ce moment, la fréquence  des investissements 
dépendra principalement des critères comme l'étendue du marché et le coût de la main 
d'œuvre, du pouvoir d'achat, de la monétarisation de l'économie et dans une certaine 
mesure des infrastructures physiques existantes. 
L'initiative transfrontalière d'intégration régionale a été bien reçue au Burundi aussi 
bien par le secteur public que privé. La principale motivation était qu'elle voulait prendre 
appui sur les progrès réalisés dans le  cadre du programme d'ajustement structurel et 
renforcer le processus d'intégration régionale lancé par le  COMESA, la SADC et la 
COI.  Elle rentre également dans le  cadre de  la promotion et la déréglementation du 
secteur privé. 
2.  ACTIVITÉS DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL TECHNIQUE (GTT) 
2.1. Réunions du GTT depuis le début de l'initiative 
Afin d'atteindre les objectifs de l'initiative, chaque pays participant a mis sur pied 
un groupe de travail technique composé des représentants des ministères intéressés et du 
secteur privé. La mission de ce groupe de travail est définie comme suit : 
t  Evaluer dans chaque pays la situation en matière d'échanges commerciaux, des 
paiements et des investissements intra - régionaux ; 
t  Identifier les contraintes majeures rencontrées ; 
t  Identifier les mesures qui pourraient être adoptées ; 
t  Formuler un plan d'actions; 
t  Identifier les domaines dans lesquels l'assistance technique et financière des 
bailleurs de fonds serait requise. 
En tant que pays participant, le Burundi a mis en place un groupe de travail technique 
et un comité de mise en œuvre. Le GTT est composé de fonctionnaires émanant des 
ministères en relation avec 1' intégration régionale ainsi que du secteur privé. Les ministères 
représentés sont le Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie et du Tourisme, le Ministère 
des Finances, le Ministère des Transports, le Ministère du Plan et le Ministère de 1  'Intérieur 
et la Banque Centrale.  S'agissant du secteur privé, il est représenté par cinq chefs 
d'entreprises, la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie, deux représentants des banques. 
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t  évalué la situation en matières d'échanges commerciaux, des paiements et des 
investissements intra - régionaux ; 
t  identifié les contraintes majeures rencontrées ; 
t  identifié les mesures à adopter pour éliminer ces contraintes ; 
t  formulé un plan d'action; 
t  identifié les domaines dans lesquels 1' assistance technique et financière des 
bailleurs de fonds est nécessaire. 
Cette évaluation, comme celles des autres pays participants, a servi à 1' élaboration 
d'un plan d'actions commun approuvé en août 1993  par la réunion ministérielle de 
Kampala. 
En mars 1995, une autre réunion ministérielle s'est tenue à l'Ile Maurice et c'est à 
cette occasion que les premières discussions avec les bailleurs de fonds ont eu lieu sur 
1  'assistance financière à consentir au Burundi pour 1' appui de sa balance de paiements 
en vue de compenser les coûts compensatoires entraînés par la libéralisation. Même si le 
Burundi n'a pas encore bénéficié de ces financements à cause de la crise socio-politique 
qu'il traverse depuis octobre 1993, il a réalisé quelques progrès dans la mise en œuvre de 
l'initiative d'intégration régionale. 
En juin 1996, le groupe technique a été actualisé et organisé en quatre sous-groupes 
d'au moins quatre membres. Cette organisation devait permettre aux membres de se 
répartir les thèmes à analyser par spécialisation et d'avancer ensuite plus rapidement. 
Les quatre sous groupes sont : 
1er sous - groupe : Commerce 
2ème sous - groupe : Paiement et régime de change 
3ème sous-groupe :Investissement 
4ème sous-groupe : Développement institutionnel 
Chaque sous-groupe a travaillé sur son thème et a ainsi participé à 1' enrichissement 
de la lettre de politique. 
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les pays membres de la ZEP, est déficitaire. Avec la crise, le déficits'  est creusé parce que 
les exportations ont fortement baissé de 1993-1998. A cause de la guerre, les productions 
ont fortement chuté. 
2.2. Activités de sensibilisation 
Dès la mise en place du GTT, il avait été jugé important d'associer les membres en 
provenance de la presse écrite et télévision nationale pour que toute la communication 
nécessaire soit facilitée. Il faut dire qu'il n'y a pas eu beaucoup de réalisations au niveau 
de la sensibilisation. Par manque de financement, les séminaires et ateliers prévus n'ont 
pas été organisés. 
2.3. Etudes réalisées 
En plus des études sectorielles sur la situation de l'intégration régionale au Burundi, 
l'élaboration du programme d'action commune, la préparation du rapport final  sur 
l'évaluation des actions réalisées, des mesures en application et des perspectives d'avenir, 
deux autres études ont été réalisées. 
Il s'agit de: 
1)  Evaluation des coûts 1 avantages de l'initiative transfrontalière pour 
l'économie burundaise, juillet 1996 par KADEDE Tharcisse. 
Cette étude a procédé à une analyse« ex-ante» de l'impact sur l'économie burundaise 
des mesures de libéralisation contenues dans l'initiative transfrontalière durant la période 
transitoire. 
Elle a évalué les pertes fiscales et douanières à subir par le Burundi en éliminant les 
diverses barrières tarifaires et non tarifaires dans le contexte du commerce intra -
CO  MESA. L'étude note que le partenariat commercial fait intervenir la notion d'origine 
des produits qui n'est pas nécessairement bien comprise par l'ensemble des praticiens. 
C'est ainsi qu'une réserve a été émise sur l'exactitude des données sur certains produits. 
Une autre difficulté a  été soulevée au niveau de la confusion entre l'origine des 
marchandises et leur provenance. Ces réserves impliquent qu'en l'absence des règles 
d'origine suffisamment strictes, il y a lieu de craindre que des produits non CO  MESA 
soient déversés sur le territoire burundais. Ceci aurait pour conséquence d'alourdir le 
manque à gagner avec la mise en application du tarif extérieur harmonisé. 
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du tarif zéro sur la production des entreprises locales. Une étude complémentaire 
approfondie est nécessaire pour permettre de prendre des décisions argumentées et éviter 
des conséquences négatives sur l'outil de production local. 
2) Etude réalisée par le consultant NIBITANGA Donatien. 
Cette étude a fait le point sur l'état d'avancement de l'application au Burundi des 
mesures contenues dans le Plan d'Action Commun (PAC).  Il  a analysé la situation 
législative et réglementaire liée au commerce, à 1' investissement, aux paiements et régime 
de  change et a identifié par la même occasion les contraintes réelles au sein de  ces 
instruments légaux pour déterminer les sections et provisions à amender pour les rendre 
conformes aux mesures du «Concept Paper ».  Les recommandations importantes de 
cette étude se résument comme suit : 
t  Le règlement sur le droit d'administration de 1% de la valeur FOB par licence 
validée, perçue par la Banque Centrale, devrait être revu pour que cette 
commission soit perçue par les banques commerciales qui sont responsables de 
la gestion des importations ; 
t  Création des organismes de crédits à l'exportation pour promouvoir et financer 
les exportations ; 
t  Harmonisation et réglementations relatives au transport aérien en vue de libéraliser 
le droit de trafic aérien ; 
t  Elaboration d'un programme d'amélioration des infrastructures existantes pour 
les différents modes de transport ; 
t  Développement d'un système de traitement, d'analyse et de diffusion de 
l'information sur le  commerce intra-régional à  l'intention des  opérateurs 
économiques ; 
t  Révision du code des investissements en ce qui concerne : 
•  l'automaticité et la transparence des procédures d'approbation 
•  les dispositions relatives aux avantages fiscaux devraient être rationalisées et 
incorporées dans le code fiscal 
•  l'instauration d'un mécanisme institutionnel de type guichet unique afin de 
faciliter les procédures d'approbation et d'agrément. 
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leur importante. 
3.  RÉALISATIONS DE L'INITIATIVE D'INTÉGRATION 
RÉGIONALE EN  MATIÈRE DES RÉFORMES 
3.1.  Commerce Extérieur 
Dans le cadre de la libéralisation du commerce extérieur préconisée par le Programme 
d'Ajustement Structurel (PAS) adopté en 1986, un vaste programme de libéralisation 
des importations et des exportations a été entrepris depuis 1988. Des mesures importantes 
ont été prises à cette fin et sont les suivantes : 
t  Décret-Loi no  111  du 15 janvier 1979 relatifs aux sociétés commerciales; 
t  Décret - Loi no  1/28  du 30 septembre  1988 portant réglementation et de la 
profession d'importateur; 
t  Décret- Loi no  100/160 du 30 septembre 1988  portant réglementation de 
l'importation des produits pétroliers ; 
t  Décret - Loi no  1/36 du 31  décembre 1988 portant instauration de la taxe de 
service à l'importation; 
t  Décret-Loi no 1/008 du 25 mars 1989 portant modification des articles 2 et 3 du 
Décret-Loi no 1/36 du 31 décembre 1988 portant création de la taxe de service 
à l'importation et à la réexportation; 
t  Décret-Loi no 045 du 09 juillet 1993 portant dispositions générales du Code de 
Commerce. 
3.1.1. Libéralisation des importations 
Au cours de la 3ème phase du programme d'ajustement structurel (1991- 1994), le 
Gouvernement du Burundi a entrepris des efforts de libéralisation du Commerce extérieur. 
C'est dans ce cadre que le nouveau règlement en matière d'importation autorise quiconque 
à importer sans devoir produire une licence d'importation. Le système des  licences 
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de paiement. » Les banques commerciales sont délégués pour viser les dites déclarations 
d'importation et de paiement sans limitation de montant. Aucune restriction ne frappe 
les importations. La liste négative des produits prohibés à l'importation n'existe plus au 
Burundi. Cependant, à cause de la crise et de l'embargo qui a duré plus de deux ans, les 
mesures de libéralisation adoptées et mises en œuvre ont été suspendues. La suspension 
ne  sera levée que  dès que les  conditions seront améliorées et que la coopération 
internationale aura repris. 
Depuis 1' entrée en vigueur du Règlement Général du Contrôle des changes en mai 
1992, 1' accès aux devises est devenu automatique pour toute personne physique ou morale 
ayant la qualité d'importateur ou d'exportateur. Comme évoqué précédemment, cette 
libéralisation a marqué le pas à cause de l'insuffisance des réserves en devises compte 
tenu du ralentissement de l'activité économique. Mais ceci n'est que provisoire. 
3.1.2. Libéralisation des exportations 
Dans le domaine des exportations, un certain nombre de mesures avait déjà été pris 
mais cela n'avait pas suffit pour promouvoir les exportations. Il s'agit entre autres de : 
t  Décret- Loi n°  1/012 du  15  avril  1988 portant mesures de  promotion des 
exportations au Burundi ; 
t  Décret n°  100/161 du 30 décembre 1988 portant création du comité permanent 
de promotion des exportations ; 
t  Ordonnance Ministérielle no  750/306 du 06 octobre  1988  portant mesures 
d'exécution du Décret- Loi n°  11012  du  15  avril  1988 portant mesures de 
promotion des exportations au Burundi. 
Comme pour les importations, tout le secteur des exportations a été libéralisé. Les 
principales modifications contenues dans le nouveau Règlement Général du Contrôle 
des Changes sont entre autres : 
t  la licence d'exportation a été supprimée et remplacée par la déclaration 
d'exportation qui donne droit à quiconque le veut, d'exporter sans autorisation 
préalable de la Banque Centrale ; 
t  l'obligation pour le vendeur de souscrire une licence d'exportation pour chaque 
expédition a été supprimée ; 
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qu'une même déclaration d'exportation puisse être utilisée pour plusieurs 
expéditions. 
Les exportateurs remplissent uniquement les déclarations d'exportations. Des 
incitations fiscales nouvelles ont été accordées. On pourrait citer à ce sujet le régime de 
la zone franche qui accorde aux investisseurs exportateurs toutes les facilités requises. 
3.1.3. Libéralisation des échanges de services 
Jusqu'aujourd'hui, la plupart des secteurs de service tels les assurances, les transports 
(de marchandises et de personnes) sont soumis à une certaine réglementation. Les frais 
de transport sur certains tronçons sont obligatoirement réglés en monnaie locale. Cette 
exigence écarte la concurrence des transporteurs étrangers. 
S'agissant de 1  'assurance, elle doit également être obligatoirement souscrite auprès 
des compagnies d'assurance locales. Il est aussi souhaitable qu'il y ait une harmonisation 
des réglementation relatives au transport aérien en vue de libéraliser le droit de trafic. 
Les infrastructures au niveau régional restent faibles sur le plan du transport routier et 
ferroviaire.  Les différents modes de transport devraient être améliorés avec 1' aide du 
COMESA et des autres organisations régionales. 
3.1.4. Réduction des tarifs douaniers régionaux et des barrières non tarifaires 
S'agissant des tarifs douaniers, ils ont été réduits de 10% en 1988, de 10% en 1989 
et de 10% en 1992. En plus le Nouveau Tarif  National a intégré les produits admis sur la 
liste commune du COMESA et les trois colonnes du tarif  préférentiel COMESA établies 
en fonction de la part nationale du capital - action dans 1' entreprise exportatrice ont été 
remplacées par une colonne unique, plus précise et favorable à l'importateur. Ce tarif 
comporte de substantielles réductions tarifaires. Le Burundi a adopté parfaitement le 
calendrier des réductions des tarifs douaniers convenu dans la ZEP. Le tarif zéro sera 
applicable à partir du 1er novembre 2000, date à laquelle prendra naissance la zone de 
Libre Echange dans les pays membres du COMESA. Néanmoins, le Burundi a subi des 
effets de l'embargo qui l'ont empêché d'avancer normalement dans cette voie et avait 
obtenu une dérogation.  Une prolongation de  cette dérogation sera demandée s'il ne 
parvenait pas à respecter ce calendrier. 
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préférentiel dont la réduction par rapport aux droits normalement en vigueur va de 5% à 
90%. 
On peut regrouper les tarifs ZEP en cinq tranches se présentant comme suit : 
0% à 10% 
10% à40% 
40% à 60% 
60% à 80% 
Il faut noter que rares sont les produits importés dans les tranches de 40% à 60% et 
60% à 80%. 
S'agissant de 1' adhésion du Burundi au calendrier des réductions de tarifs douaniers 
convenus dans la ZEP,  le  Burundi est d'accord avec le  calendrier mais les  effets de 
l'embargo l'ont empêché d'avancer normalement dans cette voie. C'est pourquoi une 
dérogation lui avait été accordée jusqu'au 31  juillet 2000. Une prolongation de  cette 
dérogation a été demandée parce que les effets de l'embargo pèse toujours lourdement 
sur 1' économie du Burundi. 
En ce qui concerne les barrières non tarifaires, le  Burundi a le mérite de figurer 
parmi les pays à cvoir libéralisé l'octroi des licences d'importation et d'affectation des 
devises pour les produits en provenance de la sous - région. 
Avant la suspension des mesures de libéralisation des importations, tout importateur 
agréé pouvait obtenir des devises pour importer sur simple déclaration d'importation et 
de paiement sans limitation de montant pour les banques commerciales. 
3.1.5. Facilitation des échanges intra régionaux 
Au Burundi, la plupart des mesures envisagées dans ce domaine sont déjà en vigueur. 
Il s'agit notamment de : 
t  la mise en application du système ZEP de redevances harmonisées de transit 
routier; 
t  la carte jaune d'assurance; 
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t  l'  ASYCUDA; 
t  le SYDONIA. 
3.2. Système de paiement et régime des changes 
Dans le  cadre du programme d'ajustement structurel entrepris en 1986, la 
libéralisation du régime des changes a constitué une mesure prioritaire et une réforme 
importante du régime des changes a été réalisée et est entrée en vigueur le 14 mai 1992. 
Une nouvelle législation bancaire qui édicte des normes prudentielles renforcées a 
été adoptée par le Décret - Loi no  1/068 du 07/07/1993  ainsi que les règlements 
d'application. Les normes étaient conçues pour garantir la lucidité, la solvabilité et 
l'équilibre de la structure financière des banques. 
Auparavant, d'autres mesures avaient été prises à ce sujet, à savoir: 
t  Décret- Loi n° 1/024 du 16 septembre 1991 portant modification de certaines 
dispositions du Décret - Loi n°  1/3 7  du 27 novembre  1990 relatif à  la 
réglementation de la profession d'importateur; 
t  Ordonnance Ministérielle portant mesures d'exécution du Décret-Loi n° 1/03 7 
du 2  7 novembre 1990 et du Décret-Loi no 024 du 16 septembre 1991 relatif à la 
réglementation de la profession d'importateur. 
En juin 1996, des modifications ont été apportées au Règlement Général du Contrôle 
des Changes. La Banque Centrale a accordé pleine délégation aux banques commerciales 
pour gérer les opérations de change relatives aux importations, toutes les Déclarations 
d'Importation et de paiements doivent être déposées auprès de ces banques. D'autres 
modifications importantes méritent d'être relevées. Il s'agit de la non exigence par ce 
système de certains documents justificatifs (facture de fabricant, coût estimatif  des frais 
d'expédition, document de l'organe compétent de gestion, etc.) ; de la suppression de la 
disposition relative à l'importation d'un délai de validité aux déclarations d'importation; 
de la suppression de l'obligation d'importation et de l'automaticité de l'accès aux devises 
pour importer. 
Les paiements interviennent dans n'importe quelle devise. Toutefois concernant les 
importations en provenance des pays membres du COMESA, le paiement ne s'effectue 
plus dans la monnaie du pays du fournisseur ou dans 1  'unité du compte ZEP comme à 
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en ce qui concerne les importations du Burundi. 
Concernant les transferts financiers, les modifications essentielles ont porté sur la 
hausse des quotités transférables, la suppression de 1' obligation de déclarer les devises 
importées à l'entrée et à la sortie du pays, la délégation de pouvoirs d'autorisation de 
transfert aux banques commerciales agréées, laquelle délégation est limitée aux seuls 
dossiers concernant les transferts des revenus professionnels des expatriés. L'accès au 
secteur financier du Burundi ne rencontre pas d'obstacles bien qu'il n' y  ait pas de 
concurrence réelle entre institutions financières actuellement. Les institutions financières 
spécialisées opérant dans la fourniture de capitaux et de facilités de crédit à 1' exportation. 
Le dernier créneau reste ouvert d'autant plus qu'il n'existe pas encore au Burundi les 
facilités de crédit et autre comme 1' assurance à 1' exportation et les garanties à 1' exportation. 
Des études d'une réforme du secteur financier pour le rendre plus compétitif  ont été 
initiées avec le concours de la Banque Mondiale. La composantes des financements 
destinés à ce volet ayant été annulée, il n'a pas été possible de terminer ces études. 
D'après la modification du Règlement Général du Contrôle des Changes de 1996, 
les banques commerciales et les bureaux de change agréés peuvent gérer librement leurs 
avoirs en devises tant sur le marché intérieur qu'extérieur. Elles peuvent acheter et vendre 
des devises à leurs clients et 1 ou entre elles, effectuer des opérations d'arbitrage et de 
placement des monnaies étrangères. Les cours acheteur et vendeur utilisés dans ces 
opérations sont fixés  librement à condition qu'elles restent à l'intérieur de la marge 
déterminée par la Banque Centrale. Cette dernière communique les cours applicables à 
ses propres transactions avec les banques commerciales et ses autres clients. Toutes ces 
dispositions reflètent une modification importante concernant la gestion des devises. 
Au mois de novembre 1999, la Banque Centrale a pris la décision d'autoriser un 
deuxième marché des devises et d'étendre à des résidents la possibilité de détenir des 
comptes dans les banques commerciales. Cependant, on note que cette libéralisation a 
des obstacles dans la mise en œuvre à cause du manque de devises. Cette indisponibilité 
résulte de l'arrêt de la coopération internationale, de l'embargo qui a duré plus de deux 
ans, du ralentissement de l'activité économique comme pour les banques, les bureaux de 
change sont autorisés à fixer librement leur taux de change à 1' intérieur des marges 
déterminées par la Banque Centrale. 
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En matière de promotion et de protection des investissements, il existait déjà au 
Burundi avant la naissance de  l'initiative d'intégration régionale toute une série 
d'instruments dont les principaux sont: 
t  Loi n° 1/005 du 14 janvier 1987 portant code des investissements du Burundi; 
t  Décret- Loi no  100/121  su 12 juin 1988 portant statut du Fonds National de 
Garantie; 
t  Décret- Loi n°  1/25 du 30 septembre 1991  portant modification de certaines 
dispositions du Code des Investissements du Burundi ; 
t  Décret- Loi n°  1/21  du 12 août 1991  relatif à la privatisation des entreprises 
publiques; 
t  Décret-Loi no 1/30 du 31 août 1992 portant création d'un régime de zone franche 
au Burundi; 
t  Ordonnance Ministérielle no  750/415  du 28  septembre  1992 portant mesures 
d'exécution du Décret- Loi n°  1/30 du 31  août 1992 portant régime de zone 
franche au Burundi. 
Le Gouvernement a continué d'améliorer les instruments existants et 1 ou a créé 
d'autres instruments. Ceux créés après l'adhésion du Burundi à l'initiative d'intégration 
régionale sont : 
t  Décret-Loi no  114 du 28 juin 1995 portant ratification du protocole relatif à la 
libéralisation et à l'élimination des formalités de demande et d'octroi des visa. ; 
t  Décret-Loi no 045 du 09 juillet 1993 portant dispositions générales du Code de 
Commerce; 
t  Décret - Loi n°  1/007 du 30 avril  1998  portant modification de certaines 
dispositions du Code des Investissements du Burundi ; 
t  Décret n°  100/034 du 27 juillet 1998 portant composition de la Commission 
Nationale des Investissements et fixation du plafond d'investissement dont 1' octroi 
des avantages du code des investissements du Burundi relève de la compétence 
de cette commission ; 
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délai d'agrément des entreprises prioritaires et composition de la commission 
technique chargée de l'analyse préalable des dossiers soumis à la Commission 
Nationale des Investissements. 
3.3.1. Procédure d'approbation des investissements 
Depuis la mise en œuvre d'une politique de réglementation effectuée en 1990, les 
procédures administratives et réglementaires ont été fortement simplifiées au Burundi. 
Les formalités à remplir pour créer une entreprise sont les suivantes : 
t  Présentation du projet des statuts chez le notaire du Gouvernement (en quatre 
exemplaires) en vue d'une passation d'un acte notarié. Les délais de passation 
d'un acte notarié vont certainement être réduits avec la privatisation des services 
du Notariat en vigueur actuellement. Des notaires privés peuvent s'établir partout 
dans le pays. 
t  Publication des statuts et de l'acte notarié du Bulletin Officiel du Burundi (BOB) 
auprès du Département des Affaires Juridiques et du Contentieux du Ministère 
de la Justice. 
t  Dépôts des statuts et de l'acte notarié au greffe du Tribunal de Commerce en vue 
d'un registre de commerce. 
Les frais de publications et de dépôt des statues et de 1' acte notarié au greffe du 
Tribunal de Commerce devraient être revus à la baisse car aujourd'hui jugés très élevés 
par les créateurs d'entreprise. Les procédures actuelles d'approbation de l'investissement 
et les incitations offertes par le code devraient être accessibles à tous de façon automatique 
et non discrétionnaire. 
Les procédures actuelles d'approbation sont trop complexes tandis que la multitude 
d'exonérations de droits et taxes et de régimes divers dans le code le rendent confus et 
susceptible de décourager l'investisseur étranger.  Les investisseurs recherchent 
normalement un régime sans équivoque où les conditions sont claires et ne nécessitent 
pas de négociations avec les autorités. 
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Les Code des Investissements est un outil de promotion des investissements mis en 
place depuis 1  'indépendance pour stimuler les investissements tant nationaux qu'étrangers. 
Le premier code promulgué par la loi du 06 août 1963 visait les entreprises de 
transformation, de conditionnement et de transport des produits agricoles, industrielles, 
minières, les entreprises d'hôtelleries et de tourisme, les entreprises de production et de 
transformation d'énergie ainsi que les entreprises commerciales et de transport dont 1  'objet 
et la forme d'activités sont de nature à valoriser de façon déterminante des productions 
locales et à améliorer sensiblement le niveau des prix. 
Ce Code a été revu en 1967 et les nouveaux secteurs prioritaires d'intervention 
reconnus étaient: l'agriculture, le commerce, l'artisanat et l'industrie. 
La modification du Code des Investissements intervenue en 1979 a supprimé les 
entreprises commerciales parmi les décentralisation dans 1' optique d'un équilibre régional 
et a accordé des garanties supplémentaires aux capitaux étrangers notamment pour le 
transfert des dividendes, des salaires et des capitaux à la fin de l'activité. Elle a introduit 
une Commission Technique des Investissements qui analyse les dossiers et donne ses 
avis à la Commission Nationale des Investissements. 
Le Code de 1987 reconnaît les secteurs prioritaires suivants : Agriculture, industrie, 
artisanat, tourisme, transport et exportation. En plus, pour 1' octroi des avantages aux 
entreprises, il est introduit le caractère régional, la maturité lente de plus de quatre ans et 
1' exportation. 
La modification de 1987 fait suite aux recommandations du programme d'ajustement 
structurel qui était entrée en vigueur en 1986. Elle a permis de raccourcir les délais 
d'aboutissement des dossiers notamment en supprimant la Commission Technique des 
Investissements dont la composition et les attributions étaient identiques à la Commission 
Nationale des Investissements. Les secteurs touristique, de transport et d'exportation ont 
été introduits parmi les activités prioritaires. 
Elle a introduit la périodicité de la tenue des réunions de la Commission (tous les 
deux mois au moins). L'exonération sur les matériaux de construction et sur le matériel 
roulant a été supprimée. Des avantages spécifiques ont été introduits pour les entreprises 
exportatrices, les entreprises à maturité lente de plus en plus de quatre ans et les entreprises 
à caractère régional. 
Des avantages additionnels ont été accordés aux entreprises décentralisées notamment 
les terrains gratuits, la bonification des crédits et l'imposition sur les bénéfices à 35 % 
après la période d'exonération. 
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pour tenir compte des attributions des Ministères, à la possibilité d'exonérer la taxe de 
transaction sur les équipements dont la perception se fait à la douane depuis la réforme 
de la taxe de transaction intervenue en 1989. 
La modification de  1991  a introduit les services parmi les secteurs prioritaires, a 
supprimé 1' obligation des entreprises naissantes ou en extension de déposer une étude de 
pré - investissements, a introduit des avantages automatiques pour 1  'Artisanat et les 
PME après la décision de la Commission sans délibération du Conseil des Ministres. 
La modification de 1997 a relevé le niveau des investissements qui ne requiert pars 
l'accord préalable du Conseil des Ministres de 20 à 60 millions de FBU. 
La modification de  1998 a revu ce plafond à 100 millions de  FBU, a rehaussé le 
niveau de représentativité à la Commission Nationale des Investissements, a réintroduit 
la Commission Technique chargée de l'analyse préalable des dossiers et a fixé un délai 
d'agrément de 45 jours pour les projets dont le plafond ne dépasse pas 100 millions. 
Depuis la mise en place du Code des Investissements, on remarque que l'approche 
de ce code reste orienté vers le contrôle plutôt que vers la promotion de l'investissement 
et il manque de transparence malgré les diverses améliorations y apportées. Certains 
aspects tels que l'automaticité et la transparence des procédures d'approbation devraient 
être introduits dans le code pour le rendre plus attrayant. 
3.3.3. Harmonisation du régime 
La promotion des investissements est réalisé à travers un ensemble d'instruments 
tels qu'indiqués ci-haut. Pour mieux les rentabiliser, il est indispensable qu'il y ait une 
harmonisation du régime des investissements. C'est ainsi que les dispositions relatives 
aux avantages fiscaux devraient être rationalisées et incorporées dans le code fiscal pour 
éviter toute contradiction entre dispositions et gaspillages de ces avantages. 
Des mécanismes institutionnels de type guichet unique doivent être mis en place 
afin de faciliter les procédures d'approbation et d'agrément. Il faut toutefois reconnaître 
que d'importants progrès ont été réalisés au niveau de  la réduction des procédures 
administratives. 
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Les conditions de délivrance de visa d'établissement et de permis de travail pour les 
étrangers ont été entièrement assouplies. 
Pour obtenir un visa d'établissement, il faut présenter: 
t  une lettre de demande adressée à 1' Administrateur Général des Migrations ; 
t  une copie du curriculum vitae ; 
t  une note sur la nature des activités à entreprendre ou une copie des statuts de 
société agréées ; 
t  une attestation de non poursuite délivrée par le pays du demandeur ; 
t  verser une caution de $1.250 si le visa sollicité est individuel ou$ 3.000 si le visa 
est pour une famille. 
Lorsqu'une demande d'un permis de travail est introduite, les pièces suivantes sont 
exigées: 
t  une lettre de demande adressée au directeur de 1  'Inspection du Travail ; 
t  une copie de la carte d'installation; 
t  une attestation de services rendus ; 
t  une copie de curriculum vitae. 
Les permis de séjour pour une brève durée sont délivrés aux personnes en provenance 
des pays membres de la ZEP. 
3.3.5. L'adhésion à des agences de protection des investissements 
i)  Adhésion à la MIGA 
En mars 1998, le Burundi a rempli toutes les conditions requises pour devenir membre 
à part entière de la MIGA. L'étape suivante sur laquelle le Burundi focalise toute son 
attention porte sur l'assistance technique en faveur des investisseurs et l'octroi des 
assurances contre les risques politiques aux investisseurs. 
S'agissant de l'assistance technique, le Burundi compte bénéficier de la MIGA des 
services conseils et assistance en ce qui concerne les politiques et programmes susceptibles 
d'attirer de nouveaux investissements et de renforcer les institutions intervenant dans la 
promotion. 
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la MIGA présente, à la communauté des hommes d'affaires du Burundi, ses activités et 
l'assistance qu'elle est capable de pourvoir. 
ii)  Double imposition 
Le  Burundi ne pratique pas de double imposition à l'égard de  ses ressortissants 
basés à l'étranger. Par ailleurs, il n'existe pas de convention de double imposition entre 
les pays membres de la ZEP et le Burundi. 
iii)  Le projet Régional de Facilitation du Commerce Extérieur 
Ce projet régional propose de  couvrir les risques politiques sur les transactions 
commerciales à court et moyen terme par des polices d'assurance appropriées. Le Burundi 
participe à la préparation de ce projet et soutient fortement sa mise en œuvre pour la relance 
du secteur privé et l'abaissement du coût des facteurs de production. Le Burundi a déjà 
signé l'Accord portant création de l'Agence pour l'assurance du commerce en Afrique. 
3.4. P osition actuelle du CBI 
*Lettre de politique de l'Initiative d'Intégration Régionale 
Le Gouvernement du Burundi a transmis depuis juillet 1996 aux co-sponsors de 
l'initiative une lettre de politique qui n'a jamais eu de  suite. Aujourd'hui il s'agit de 
l'actualiser et de la transmettre à nouveau aux co-sponsors. 
4.  AUTRES COMMENTAIRES 
Le groupe de travail technique est à relancer pour qu'il s'acquitte effectivement de 
sa mission. Pour ce faire, il est important que les co-sponsors s'expriment sur la lettre de 
politique leur transmise et mettent à la disposition du GTT les ressources nécessaires. 
En tant qu'initiative d'intégration, les résultats du programme d'actions atteints sur 
une période de 7 ans sont insuffisants. Il faudrait que l'initiative soit poursuivie afin de 
préserver les  acquis  et achever le  programme d'actions. La poursuite de  l'initiative 
permettra au GTT du Burundi de mener la sensibilisation auprès du secteur privé sur le 
processus d'intégration par des  ateliers et des séminaires. Les conséquences de 
l'intégration doivent être bien connues des opérateurs économiques qui doivent entrer 
en compétition avec leurs collègues de  la région.  Les unités de production doivent 
également être préparés à affronter la concurrence des produits importés qui vont inonder 
le marché dans le cadre d'une zone de libre échange. 
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1.  REVUE DE L'ITF DANS NOTRE PAYS: 
La volonté des Comores à intégrer le pays dans 1' ensemble économique régional est 
née depuis le début des années 80, lorsque notre pays a participé aux réunions constitutives 
avec treize autres pays de la sous région qui ont abouti en 1982 à la signature du traité 
instituant la Zone d'Echanges préférentiels des pays de l'Afrique de l'Est et de l'Australie 
(ZEP) devenu actuellement le  Marché Commun de l'Afrique de l'Est et Australe 
(COMESA). 
Les Comores ont signé le traité en novembre 1994. C'est également dans ce cadre 
que les autorités comoriennes ont souscrit pleinement à l'Initiative Transfrontalière ou 
CBI en Afrique de l'Est, de l'Australe et de l'Océan Indien. 
Les Comores ont participé aux efforts préparatoires de cette initiative. 
L'arrêté ministériel N° 94- 64 en date du 12 juin 1994 a fixé la composition du 
Groupe Technique de Travail (GTT) chargé au niveau du pays de tous les problèmes 
d'intégration régionale. Ce groupe a élaboré la Lettre de Politique Nationale d'Intégration 
Régionale comportant tout engagement que le pays avait sur toutes les Initiatives 
d'Intégrations Régionales. 
Cet arrêté a été revu à plusieurs reprises à chaque fois qu'on restructure le GTT qui 
est formé par des représentants du Ministère des Finances, de 1  'Economie et du Plan, des 
Affaires Etrangères et le  secteur privé représenté par l'Organisation Patronale des 
Commerçants (OPACO), l'Union des Chambres de  Commerce, de  l'Industrie et de 
1' Artisanat (UCCIA), le Syndicat National des Commerçants (SYNACO), 1  'Association 
por la Promotion du Secteur Privé (APSP) et le Bureau des Entreprises (PRIDE). 
Il convient de souligner que depuis le début de 1  'Initiative, notre pays a espéré profiter 
du Marché Régional pour accroître ses exportations. 
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1' appréciation des efforts consentis, dans la détermination des abattements du tarif  douanier 
et dans le financement du manque à gagner sur les recettes fiscales. 
C'est pourquoi notre pays n'a cessé de demander une assistance technique pour 
aider la réforme de la fiscalité intérieure pour pallier les manques à gagner résultant de 
l'application de l'abaissement tarifaire. 
Notre pays a également sollicité une assistance technique pour évaluer le manque à 
gagner effectif sur la mise en place du Tarif Extérieur Harmonisé, chose qui n'a pas été 
fait jusqu'à maintenant. C'est d'ailleurs parmi les raisons que les  autorités avancent 
pour montrer pourquoi les échéances prévues pour l'abaissement tarifaire n'ont pas été 
respectées. 
Il faut noter que les divers engagements pris par les autorités comoriennes dans le 
cadre de l'ITF sont poursuivis. 
La Lettre de Politique Nationale d'Intégration Régionale élaborée en 1996 reste 
toujours en vigueur et elle est complétée par 1  'addendum qui met en évidence un ensemble 
de mesures visant à promouvoir l'investissement. 
• L'intérêt que porte le CBI pour le secteur privé et pour le secteur public : 
Grâce aux mesures imposées par le CBI, le secteur privé comorien a pu améliorer 
certaines conditions qui n'étaient pas favorables au développement des échanges, à savoir 
l'utilisation des autorisations d'importations, la consolidation des tarifs douaniers, grâce 
au CBI le secteur privé a pu bénéficier de l'abaissement tarifaire de 80% qui est déjà 
accordé et qui attend l'autorisation du secrétariat de la COI pour être appliqué. 
Le secteur privé a également bénéficié des différentes reformes du secteur financier, 
à savoir la libéralisation des opérations en capital, la mise en place d'un système de 
surveillance pour les Banques qui est généralisée même aux Mutuelles d'Epargne 
Communautaires et aux SANDUK. 
Au cour des réunions du GTT, le  secteur privé comorien a pu négocier avec le 
Service de l'Immigration pour alléger la procédure d'obtention de visas de long séjour 
pour l'investisseur éventuel. 
Le service de 1  'immigration a également accordé d'ouvrir un guichet spécial pour le 
passage des partenaires de la région (COI, COMESA et ITF). 
Grâce au GTT, les décrets d'application du code des investissements ont pu être 
signés. 
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développement des échanges. 
Toutes mesures prises par le gouvernement, si  elles sont défavorables au 
développement des échanges, le secteur arrive à les négocier lors des réunions du GTT 
grâce à la présence du secteur public. 
La stratégie pour le développement du pays est la même que les mesures prévues 
dans le cadre du CBI. La participation de la Direction de l'Economie au sein du GTT a 
permis au Ministère de l'Economie d'intégrer les mesures du CBI dans la stratégie de 
développement économique de notre pays. 
Notre pays est admis comme membre observateur au sein de l'OMC, grâce aux 
travaux de GTT qui se sont basés sur le programme des reformes prévues dans le cadre 
du CBI. 
Le CBI aux Comores a permis l'interférence du secteur privé et le secteur public, 
rôle qui devrait être joué par l'Union des Chambres de Commerce, mais comme le GTT 
se réunit régulièrement, cela a permis de rapprocher les deux secteurs pour réfléchir sur 
tous les problèmes de l'intégration régionale. 
Grâce également au CBI, le secteur public dispose d'un organe qui est le GTT qui 
réfléchit sur les grands axes du développement économique du pays. 
• Les éléments bénéfiques du CBI : 
L'intégration régionale est une composante du programme global de rénovation 
économique (ou Programme d'Ajustement Structurel). Comme la plupart des mesures 
prévues dans le cadre du CBI sont réalisées, c'est un pas pour parvenir à l'objectif du 
PAS. 
Les propositions des réformes préconisées dans le cadre du CBI, à savoir la stabilité 
politique, la stabilité macro-économique, la bonne gouvérnance, les réformes fiscales, 
les reformes tarifaires et toutes les propositions sur la Promotion de l'Investissement, 
telles que la création du guichet unique, la déréglementation de 1  'investissement, 
l'abaissement tarifaire sont tous des éléments bénéfiques pour le CBI dans notre pays. 
Le CBI est un cadre auquel les autorités devraient se référer, qui montre les efforts 
que notre pays devait fournir pour attirer les investissements. 
Son efficacité .dépend de l'efficacité d'autres paramètres d'ordre politique, 
économique et social, et la stabilité politique de notre pays, etc. 
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Les Comores participent aux organisations régionales suivantes : le CO  MESA et la 
COI. 
Les responsables des dossiers de CO  MESA et COI sont intégrés dans le GTT. Tout 
ceci pour permettre d'harmoniser les  actions puisqu'elles rentrent dans le cadre de 
1  'intégration régionale. 
Nous pouvons dire que cette coopération est assez bonne, mais elle n'est pas très 
régulière pour cause de difficultés financières, ne permettant pas la participation régulière 
à toutes les rencontres, et les cotisations ne sont pas régulièrement à jour. 
Nous avons posé ce problème lors d'une réunion du GTT, mais il n'a pas eu de 
résultats appréciables. 
• Les conclusions et les commentaires du CBI et du GTT: 
En dépit des difficultés rencontrées pour 1' application des mesures CBI, certaines 
sont déjà appliquées au niveau national, en raison de 1' appréciation de nos autorités pour 
celles-ci. 
Quant au GTT, il joue le rôle primordial dans le dossier de l'Intégration Régionale. 
Il a permis au Gouvernement d'être attentif aux propositions du secteur privé à 
travers ses représentants au sein de cette structure. Nous pouvons citer à titre d'exemple, 
la participation du secteur privé à la préparation du nouveau code des investissements et 
à 1  'élaboration des décrets d'application de ce code. Le secteur privé a également participé 
à l'élaboration du tarif  des douanes d'août 1996. Il a été concerté lors de l'élaboration du 
nouveau tarif des douanes et la Direction des Douanes lui a promis de lui intégrer pour 
faire une étude sur 1  'harmonisation du tarif extérieur. 
2.  ACTIVITES DU GTT: 
2.1. Revue des réunions du GTT depuis sa création 
.Nous savons que le GTT a commencé avec le CBI dont le Ministère de Tutelles est 
le Ministère des Finances. 
Après, les  Comores ont participé aux Organisations Régionales telles que la 
Commission de l'Océan Indien (COI) dont le point d'attache est le Ministère des Affaires 
Etrangères et au Marché Commun de l'Afrique de l'Est et Australe (COMESA). 
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Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. 
Depuis que le PAS  a freiné, il y a eu des flottements sur certaines choses, durant 
cette période. Les services étaient paralysés. 
Le dossier du CBI était alors gelé à cause de l'échec du PAS. 
Il était difficile aux autorités de prendre ces mesures, faute de contre partie. Les 
seules mesures qui étaient appliquées sont celles qui rentrent dans  le  cadre du 
développement économique du pays en général. 
Tout ce qui devait avoir une incidence budgétaire était gelé. 
C'est pourquoi durant cette période qui  a précédé la nomination du Secrétaire 
Permanent, il n'y avait pas beaucoup d'activités. 
Les réunions, durant cette période, n'étaient pas régulières et n'ont laissé aucune 
trace des points essentiels auxquels on discutait durant cette période. 
Egalement, durant la période allant de 1992 jusqu'à 1998, le GTT ne disposait pas 
de Secrétariat, donc les activités n'allaient pas comme on l'aurait souhaité. 
Ce n'est qu'à partir de 1998 que les choses sont rentrées dans l'ordre. 
Cette situation est à tenir compte pour évaluer l'impact de l'Initiative dans notre 
pays. 
Vous avez déjà constaté à travers les procès verbaux et les comptes rendus que les 
réunions étaient régulières. Ces réunions étaient également complétées par des entretiens 
avec les départements concernés par l'initiative et qui ne sont pas représentés au sein du 
GTT, telles la Direction du Tourisme, des Transports Aériens et Maritimes, la Direction 
du Plan et la Direction de l'Environnement. Vous avez également remarqué que la majorité 
des membres du GTT assistaient à ces réunions et ils réfléchissaient sur tous les points 
qui aideraient à lever les obstacles au développement des échanges et à l'Intégration 
Régionale. 
Cependant, dans certaines réunions dont on désignait une commission pour réfléchir 
à un sujet particulier, les membres étaient restreints. 
Il convient de souligner que les hommes d'affaires sont très motivés par l'Intégration 
Régionale pour lever les obstacles aux développements des échanges dans notre pays. 
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secteur privé est très motivé par le partenariat sur le commerce et au niveau de 
l'investissement. Cela est dû également au fait que le Comorien aime voyager, partout 
dans les pays voisins, il y a toujours des Comoriens (au Mozambique, en Afrique du 
Sud, au Kenya, à Madagascar, à l'Ile Maurice, à la Réunion, etc.). 
La Direction des Douanes et le  secteur privé sont très attentifs aux mesures 
préconisées dans le CBI. Cependant, toute réforme qui a une incidence budgétaire prend 
beaucoup de temps pour être accordée par le Gouvernement. 
Par contre, les autres départements représentés au sein du GTT sont plus ou moins 
motivés. 
• Sommaire des discussions depuis 1992 : 
Juillet 1992 : 
Janvier 1994 : 
Juin 1995: 
Le 27 août 1998 : 
Le 09 septembre 1998 : 
- Le compte rendu du premier Atelier tenu à Maurice en 
juin 1992 des Groupes Techniques de Travail qui a réuni 
16 pays membres du CBI; -La possibilité de mise en 
œuvre des résultats de cet Atelier. 
- Une réunion a eu lieu suite au deuxième Atelier tenu à 
Harare en décembre  1992, dont on examinait le 
document comportant 1  'ensemble du Programme 
d'Action Commun (PAC) des pays participants. 
- Détermination de l'orientation de la reforme tarifaire, 
c'est à  dire la position du pays suite à  la réunion 
ministérielle qui a eu lieu en mars 1995 à l'Île Maurice. 
- Nous avons examiné les points suivants: 
•  La revue des objectifs, à savoir les propositions visant 
à réduire les contraintes réglementaires et politiques 
et économiques transfrontalières ; 
•  L'état d'avancement des différents travaux; 
•  La restructuration du GIT, suite à la mise en place du 
Secrétariat du GTT ; 
•  La mise en place d'un calendrier de travail. 
- Discussion des points qui n'ont pas été couverts à la 
précédente Réunion ; 
Le 06 et 08 octobre 1998:  - proposition  d'aménagements  du  code  des 
investissements de 1995 ; 
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Le 26 décembre 1998 : 
Le 27 décembre 1998 : 
Le 11 février 1999 : 
Le 23 février 1999 : 
Le 20 mars 1999 : 
Le 07 avril 1999 : 
Le 23 avril1999 : 
Le 13 mai 1999 : 
Le 20 mai 1999 : 
Le 08 juillet 1999 : 
Le 02 août 1999 : 
- la libération des investissements ; 
- le remplacement de la licence par un autre document 
statistique 
- rencontre avec le Ministre des Finances dont l'objectif 
est de nous aider à lever les contraintes qui sont liés à 
l'application des mesures CBI. 
- compte rendu de la réunion des GTT qui a eu lieu le 16 
et 17 novembre 1998. 
- Exposition des différentes conclusions tirées de cette 
réunion. 
- examen de la maquette de la fiche statistique ; 
- l'état d'avancement des réformes tarifaires. 
- les prévisions budgétaires pour les réformes tarifaires ; 
- révision des conclusions de la réunion des GTT qui a 
eu lieu à l'Île Maurice, le 16 et 17 novembre 1998. 
- le projet de loi sur l'abaissement tarifaire; 
- la question relative à la libre circulation des biens et 
des marchandises. 
- le projet de loi sur l'abaissement tarifaire; 
- les réformes fiscales préconisées dans la loi des Finances 
de 1999. 
- Rencontre du GTT avec le Ministre des Finances dont 
nous avons discuté de l'état d'avancement de l'Initiative 
Transfrontalière. 
- Préparation d'une réunion avec le Ministre des Finances 
et du Plan le 20 mai, relative à  la planification 
économique. 
- Projet de la mise en place du couloir COI, COMESA, 
ITF. 
- Le projet de la mise en place du couloir COI, CO  MESA, 
ITF, au sein de l'aéroport international; 
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Le 12 octobre 1999 : 
Le 16 novembre 1999 : 
Le 09 décembre 1999: 
Le 11 janvier 2000 : 
Le 13 janvier 2000 : 
Le 05 février 2000 : 
Le 08 février 2000 : 
Le 16 mars 2000: 
Le 10 avril2000: 
Le 18 avril2000 : 
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- Multiplication et distribution de la première version du 
Schéma  Directeur  pour  la  Promotion  de 
1  'Investissement. 
- Etude du Schéma Directeur pour la Promotion de 
l'Investissement ; 
- Préparation d'une journée de sensibilisation sur l'ITF, 
et l'application de l'abaissement tarifaire; 
- La formation sur l'application des règles d'origine. 
- Préparation de la position du pays par rapport au Schéma 
Directeur pour la Promotion de 1  'Investissement en vue 
de la 4ème réunion Ministérielle du CBI. 
- Le compte rendu de la réunion Ministérielle qui a eu à 
Maurice, le 18 et le 19 octobre 1999. 
- Etat d'avancement de 1  'Addendum à  la Lettre de 
Politique Nationale de l'ITF; 
- Examen d'une requête demandée par le Bureau de la 
Commission Européenne à  Moroni, relative à  la 
préparation du Cycle du Millénaire des négociations 
commerciales. 
- Préparation de l'  Addendum à la Politique Nationale de 
l'ITF. 
- Commentaire du Projet d'  Addendum à  la Lettre de 
Politique Nationale de l'ITF. 
- Proposition des modifications à faire sur l'  Addendum. 
- L'état d'avancement de 1  'Addendum ; 
- L'adoption de ce dernier au Conseil des Ministres. 
- Préparation d'un Atelier de Travail sur le Programme 
National de Promotion de l'Investissement. 
- Rencontre avec le Ministre de 1  'Economie, pour 
l'adoption de l'  Addendum en Conseil des Ministres. 
- Proposition de la date de 1  'Atelier ; 
- Détermination des thèmes à exposer ; 
- Propositions des intervenants. • Les problèmes rencontrés : 
Le GTT est institutionnalisé depuis sa création. Selon l'arrêté instituant le GTT, le 
président du GTT doit être un haut fonctionnaire du Ministère des Finances. Il est alors 
le Secrétaire Général du Ministre des Finances du Budget et du Plan. 
Ce dernier est trop chargé qu'il n'arrive pas à consacrer beaucoup de temps sur ce 
dossier, ce qui constitue un recul sur la réalisation des engagements. 
Il y a aussi les freins liés à la lourdeur de l'appareil administratif. 
Les changements fréquents du Gouvernement constitue aussi un obstacle majeur à 
la réussite de l'ITF. 
Malgré les efforts fournis par le GTT, il y a quand même ces difficultés. Il y a un 
autre problème qui concerne la collecte des informations : le retard chronique qu'on 
accuse pour les obtenir. 
• Autres points ou commentaires : 
En dehors des réunions du GTT, mais il y avait aussi les rencontres que nous avons 
entretenus avec d'autres services qui ne sont pas représentés au sein du GTT. 
Un premier entretien, je l'ai fait avec le Directeur du Tourisme, un autre avec le 
Directeur des Etudes pour voir la situation du système financier dans notre pays. Un 
autre entretien a eu lieu avec le Directeur du Transport Aérien, il nous a montré la situation 
des Transports Aériens dans notre pays. 
2.2. Revue des activités de sensibilisation depuis le début: 
• Détail de séminaires et activités promotionnelles depuis 1992 : 
Durant la période allant de  1992 à 1998, il y a eu un séminaire organisé dans le 
cadre de l'Intégration Régionale et dans le cadre du CO  MESA. Pour la période allant de 
1998, il y a eu tout d'abord une réunion de  sensibilisation sur l'ITF, adressée à des 
universitaires à l'Ecole Nationale d'administration et Commerce. Après, il y a eu une 
Formation et Promotion sur l'Application de l'Abaissement Tarifaire qui a été financée 
par le Secrétariat du GTT. 
Nous avons prévu faire un séminaire le 09 décembre 1999, mais il n'a pas eu lieu, à 
cause de la Conférence des Etats Membres de la COI. Nous l'avons reporté, mais il n'a 
toujours pas eu lieu, car il fallait avoir l'autorisation du Ministre des Finances. 
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(le Road Map de notre pays), nous avons envisagé faire un atelier, nous avons même 
évalué les dépenses, fixé la date, mais il ne s'est pas tenu jusqu'alors, car il fallait encore 
avoir l'autorisation du Ministre des Finances selon l'opinion du GTT, car il devrait y 
assister pour 1  'ouverture et comme c'est une période où il est très pris par la Préparation 
du Budget 2000, cet atelier n'a pas pu avoir lieu. 
Cependant, nous avons véhiculé le message à travers nos réunions, car nous avons 
sensibilisé tous les départements ministériels et le secteur privé sur l'Initiative. Nous 
avons écrit des  lettres à tous ces départements pour qu'ils nous transmettent leurs 
propositions sur le Programme National de Promotions de l'Investissement et certains 
ont répondu favorablement. 
2.3 : Revue des études réalisées depuis le début : 
Depuis la période de 1998 jusqu'à maintenant, il y a eu une seule étude faite par la 
Direction des Douanes, sur 1  'impact de 1  'Application du Tarif Extérieur Harmonisé. 
Les résultats de  cette étude sont provisoires, car nous devrions bénéficier de 
1' assistance technique pour nous aider à mieux évaluer cet impact, mais ç nous fait toujours 
attendre. 
3.  RÉALISATIONS DES RÉFORMES RELATIVES AUX  PAYS DE 
L'ITF: 
Durant la période, de 1992 jusqu'à 1998, le dossier de l'Intégration Régionale n'a 
pas beaucoup évolué depuis l'arrêté du PAS. Ce n'est qu'à partir de 1998 qu'il a pris une 
évolution importante. 
3.1. Libéralisation du Commerce Extérieur: 
• Libéralisation des importations et des exportations : 
En matière de Libéralisation du Commerce, tous les droits et taxes à 1  'exportation 
ont été supprimés à 1' exception de ceux appliqués à la vanille. 
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par fiche statistique. Et ceci grâce aux efforts du GTT. 
Toutes les restrictions quantitatives, sauf pour les produits qui feront l'objet d'une 
liste négative sont éliminées, dans le  domaine des importations comme pour les 
exportations. 
C'est cette situation qui existe depuis 1992 jusqu'à maintenant. 
• Les barrières non tarifaires : 
Le monopole qui existait sur les produits pétroliers est entrain d'être cassé, situation 
qui n'était pas auparavent.  Le Gouvernement s'est engagé au cours des premières 
négociations du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel conclu en 1991 avec les institutions 
de Brettons Wood de: 
t  Céder l'exploitation des  services d'importation et de stockages des produits 
pétroliers assurés par SCH à un Concessionnaire Privé. 
t  Vendre les équipements de transport à des Opérateurs Privés. Le Ministre des 
Finances, du Budget et du Plan était d'accord pour la date du 20 juillet 1998 pour 
la tenue de la Conférence des Soumissions. Mais à ce jour les travaux n'ont 
toujours pas commencé faute de financement. 
La date qui était prévue pour la finalisation est le 22 février 1999, mais échéance n'a 
pas été respectée. 
Il y a eu une amélioration pour l'importation du riz; actuellement, il n'y a que 
l'importation du riz populaire qui est sous monopole de l'Etat. Par contre, le riz de luxe 
est librement importé. 
• Tarifs intra-régionaux : 
La consolidation de la structure tarifaire à 1  'importation en un prélèvement unique 
comportant 3 taux a été fait depuis 1996. 
La Préférence Tarifaire de 70% du taux normal pour les pays du COME  SA prévue 
en 1996 n'a pas été faite, ainsi que celui de 80% prévue en octobre 1996 et l'élimination 
des barrières tarifaires entre les pays du CO  MESA prévue pour décembre 1998 est reportée 
à l'an 2000. La loi des Finances rectificatives de 1999 a adopté la Préférence Tarifaire de 
80% pour les marchandises originaires des pays de la Commission de l'Océan Indien 
(COI),  des pays membres du Marché Commun de l'Afrique de  l'Est et Australe 
(COMESA) et des pays participants à l'ITF. Cependant, l'application commencera dans 
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par l'Arrêté no  001  du 13/ 011 2000, a été déjà notifiée au Secrétariat de la COI, les 
autorités attendent la réaction du Secrétariat de la COI. 
• T.E.H. et Tarifs Externes : 
L'étude globale de la réforme tarifaire ainsi que l'impact de la mise en application 
du Tarif Extérieur Harmonisé, n'a jamais été fait. Une étude provisoire a été faite par la 
Direction des Douanes, mais les autorités attendent toujours l'assistance technique prévue, 
pour faire une étude finale. 
Donc les autorités n'arrivent pas à s'engager avant que l'impact de l'application du 
TEH ne soit pas connu. 
Egalement, tant que la fiscalité intérieure n'est pas réformée, le problème TEH ne 
pourra pas évoluer. 
• Facilitations du Commerce : 
• Le service bancaire : 
Ce service est libéralisé depuis longtemps, et, est régi par la loi bancaire no 80 - 7 
du 26/ 06/ 80, portant réglementation des Banques et Etablissements Financiers. Il y a 
aussi la loi cadre fédérale du 03 mai 1980 relative à la monnaie et à la Banque Centrale 
des Comores. 
Ces deux lois réglementent les Banques (Banque Centrale et autres Banques) en 
tant qu'institutions publiques ou privées. Ce qui est nécessaire mais insuffisant. 
En effet,  le droit bancaire doit comporter une indispensable réglementation des 
rapports Banques - Clients. 
Les lois des Etats modernes aménagent, en général : 
t  les conventions de crédit (nécessité d'une information des clients, formalités 
légales, taux d'intérêts, modalités de certains crédits documentaires, etc.) 
t  les grandes lignes des conventions de compte (ouverture du compte, caractère 
intuitus personae, compte joint, etc.) 
Il  est donc nécessaire que le  droit bancaire comorien soit complété par une ou 
plusieurs lois aménageant les rapports Banques-Clients. Cela est souhaitable pour la 
sécurité des affaires et pour éviter que la puissance économique des Banques ne conduise 
p.314 à des abus par l'introduction dans les conventions privées des clauses léonines. Le contrat 
Banque-Client est un contrat d'adhésion. Les pouvoirs publics doivent, par conséquent, 
prévoir une réglementation minimale de protection des clients. La commission de réforme 
des textes législatifs et réglementaires a mis ~n œuvre dans le cadre du Projet d'Appui 
aux Petites Entreprises des Réformes du droit bancaire dans le but de permettre 1' ouverture 
de ce secteur. 
• Le service des assurances : 
Le secteur des assurances est entièrement libéralisé. Seulement, il n'existe jusqu'alors 
un service d'assurance à l'importation comme à l'exportation. Il est importé dans notre 
pays. On ignore la raison. 
Actuellement, le droit comorien est régi par des  lois modernes en matière 
d'assurances. (Loi du 13 juillet 1930 sur les assurances, appliquées en France, et D.  19 
mars 1937; ord. 28 mars 1944 relative au fonctionnement et au contrôle des Entreprises 
d'Assurance : D. 1084 du 27 novembre 1968 sur la constitution des Sociétés d'Assurance). 
Il n'y a donc pas lieu de modifier le droit en vigueur, sous réserve d'une adaptation ou 
d'une actualisation portant sur des points de détail peut être que cela peut inciter des 
investisseurs dans ce domaine. 
• Les transports maritimes : 
Il est important de signaler que ce domaine est privatisé depuis 1994. 
Les activités de représentation et de consignation sont libéralisées et régies par la 
loi n° 95-008/ AF du 19 juin 1995, portant concession ou privatisation des sociétés à 
capitaux publics. 
Dans l'article 1er de cette loi est autorisée, le transfert de la gestion du profit des 
personnes physiques ou morales de  droit privé, de tout ou partie des participations 
financières détenues par 1  'Etat, dans les sociétés à capitaux publics suivants : 
•  Société Comorienne des Ports Maritimes (SOCOPOTRAM) 
•  Eau et Electricité des Comores (EEDC). 
Un décret signé en 1996 a libéralisé les activités de Consignation et de Représentation. 
D'ici décembre 1998, la Concession de la manutention doit être faite.  Les cahiers de 
charges pour la gestion portuaire, pour les infrastructures et pour l'assurance de l'ordre 
de la capitainerie sont prêts, la commission chargée de la privatisation attend 1' autorisation 
du Conseil des Ministres pour lancer un appel d'offre. 
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Le monopole de  la billetterie sur les transports aériens est supprimé. Toutes les 
Agences de Voyage  sont autorisées à émettre des billets à condition qu'elles soient 
habillées. Pour ce qui est de la mise en place de la nouvelle Compagnie Nationale de 
Transport Aérien aux Moyens de Capitaux Privés et Publics, la Direction du Transport 
Aérien travaille en collaboration avec la Banque Mondiale. Ces derniers imposent leurs 
conditions qui doivent être en Harmonie avec les demandes étrangères, ce qui n'est pas 
toujours le  cas d'où recul du processus. Un premier objet de la Commission de 
Privatisation est la vente des  droits aériens bilatéraux des Comores,  1' établissement 
(possible) et la désignation d'un transporteur aérien national. 
La Compagnie Aérienne sera soumise aux conditions établies par la convention sur 
l'Aviation Civile Internationale (la Convention de Chicago) de  1944. La désignation 
d'un nouveau transporteur Aérien National pour les Comores peut requérir la création 
d'une Compagnie Aérienne totalement nouvelle. 
En vertu de l'actuel code des investissements aux Comores, l'incorporation est une 
procédure assez simple qui n'empêche pas l'investissement étranger ou ne porte pas de 
restrictions sur le contrôle étranger de la gestion. 
Une telle flexibilité va faciliter la création d'une nouvelle Compagnie Aérienne et 
va permettre une participation étrangère significative et libre. 
C'est pour dire que la création d'une Compagnie Nationale est en cours de réalisation. 
L'assistance au sol est actuellement occupée par une régie en attendant sa 
privatisation, donc sa gestion est autonome. 
• Le tourisme : 
La République Fédérale Islamique des Comores amorce son développement 
touristique. 
En terme de  fréquentation et de retombées économiques, elle est encore très en 
retard par rapport à des pays insulaires voisins (Maurice, Seychelles, Réunion), mais ce 
retard peut se transformer en avantage si les Comores développent un tourisme compatible 
avec la protection et la valorisation naturelle et culturelle et du patrimoine historique. 
La forme de tourisme choisie aux Comores doit : 
t  s'intégrer dans le milieu social et culturel comorien 
t  favoriser 1  'épanouissement de la culture comorienne 
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~  valoriser la production et les services comoriens 
~  répondre à une demande touristique exprimée 
~  trouver un positionnement original pour se démarquer de l'offre régionale. 
Ceci pour répondre à une clientèle qui recherche le naturel (voir l'originel), la 
spontanéité et la découverte. 
Le tourisme est un secteur d'activité transversal, il a un impact sur toutes les activités 
économiques : 
~  Impact direct au niveau des hébergements professionnels et la restauration, mais 
aussi sur les locations de voitures, les agences respectives, les guides, les aéroports, 
les Compagnies Aériennes, etc. 
~  Impact indirect dans les commerces, les entreprises du bâtiment et les travaux 
publics, l'énergie, les télécommunications, l'agriculture, la pêche, l'artisanat, les 
marchés, etc. 
3.2. Les payements : 
Les réformes du secteur financier : 
Les mesures pour faciliter l'introduction de la concurrence dans le système bancaire 
et financier, sont régies par la loi bancaire de 1980. 
Les Comores ont souscrit aux dispositions de 1' article VIII des statuts du FMI (1996 
-1998). 
Les restrictions sur les transactions courantes de la Balance des Payements sont 
éliminées. 
La mise en place des marchés de changes SPOT dans le respect des engagements 
pris au sein de la zone franc est conditionnée par le respect des engagements pris au sein 
de la «zone franche». 
Les règles prudentielles et les moyens de surveillance des Banques sont déjà mis en 
place. Un 
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Comores. 
La Banque Centrale des Comores a mis en évidence le suivi permanent des activités 
des Banques. 
Pour les Instruments Monétaires Indirects, nous n'appliquons pas de plafond de 
crédit. 
Nous avons un système de réserve obligatoire (30% des dépôts) depuis 1999. 
Et également, nous avons un guichet permanent de réescompte. 
Pour les liquidités obligatoires rien n'a été entrepris et aucune date n'a été retenue 
pour la mise en œuvre. 
Quand la détermination du taux d'intérêt, il est fixé par l'arrêté du Ministre des 
Finances, car nous ne sommes pas encore dans un cadre de marché concurrentiel, nous 
n'avons qu'une seule Banque Commerciale. 
La libéralisation des opérations en capital est déjà faite. 
En tout cas, toutes les réformes préconisées par le programme CBI ont été réalisées 
en totalité. 
Les instruments de financement du commerce extérieur : 
t  la lettre de crédit ; 
t  le crédit documentaire ; 
t  les avances en compte ; 
t  1  'escompte documentaire (la traite), etc. 
Le contrôle de chan2e : 
Le franc comorien est librement convertible, et il n'y a pas de restriction sur les 
transactions en devises au titre du compte courant ou du compte en capital. 
Nous n'avons jamais connu un contrôle de change. 
Cependant, il n'y a qu'une réglementation de change qui est assoupli par la Banque 
Centrale des Comores (BCC). 
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contraintes en matière de devises ou de paiements. 
En matière de change, les règlements des transactions courantes sont libres et les 
Comores ont souscrit à 1' article VIII des statuts du FMI sur la libéralisation des opérations 
de change. 
Les Comores ont très peu eu recours aux mécanismes de la chambre de compensation 
de la ZEP. 
Le taux de change : 
Le secteur privé est libéralisé. Le KMF est lié au FF avec une parité fixe de 1 FF = 
75 KMF, avec l'avènement de l'EURO, 1 EUR = 491.96775 KMF. 
3.3. Les investissements : 
Les procédures d'approbation: 
Aux Comores, les procédures simplifiées ont été déjà instaurées en vue de faciliter 
l'implantation des entreprises, pour le développement du secteur privé. 
Le délai d'approbation des demandes d'investissements est de 45 jours au maximum. 
L'Association pour la Promotion du Secteur Privé (APSP) a mis en place un guichet 
unique pour s'occuper de toutes les documentations requises de la part d'un investisseur 
avant l'implantation de son entreprise. 
Cette démarche porte les fruits sur l'allégement du point de vue de l'entrepreneur. 
Le code des investissements : 
Le code des investissements de 1984 a été révisé dans le but d'éliminer les différents 
régimes pour compenser les effets d'un système de taxation lourde. Cela a permis de 
mettre en place des règles simples régissant les investissements et qui s'appliquent à 
tous les investisseurs sans discrimination. 
La loi n° 95-015/ AF du 30 juin 1995 portant code des investissements a instauré 
la libéralisation des investissements, la sécurité des investissements. 
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qu'aucune entrave ne puisse être opposée par l'administration à la libre initiative privée 
sous réserve de respecter 1' ordre public. Et pour éviter une discrimination, la loi assimile 
les entrepreneurs étrangers aux entrepreneurs nationaux. Elle assure la sécurité juridique 
des investisseurs en prévoyant des mesures spécifiques. Enfin, elle prévoit des incitations 
économiques aux investisseurs. 
Des mesures facilitent les Echanges Commerciaux, les investissements et les 
payements transfrontaliers entre les Comores et l'étranger ce qui est parmi les objectifs 
principaux de l'IIR. La loi facilite la liberté de circulation des personnes physiques et 
morales. 
La loi  donne une définition très  large des investissements conformément aux 
définitions données dans les différents traités bilatéraux ou multilatéraux.  Cette 
imprécision résulte du caractère évolutif des techniques d'investissements. 
Les décrets d'application du code des investissements sont signés par le décret n° 
99- 008/ PM pris en application de l'article 28 de la loi. Les décrets d'application du 
code des  investissements prévoient une intervention minimale des autorités 
administratives et excluent tout agrément préalable de  l'administration. Un examen 
préalable et général de la situation des entreprises bénéficiaires est prévu. La Direction 
des Affaires Economiques centralise les dossiers déposés par les investisseurs et se charge 
de collecter «toutes les déclarations et tous les documents nécessaires à 1' application du 
nouveau code des  investissements». Ainsi cette Direction, après avoir examiné les 
déclarations et les pièces justificatives fournies, devrait informer l'investisseur dans un 
délai maximum de 45 jours, des droits et avantages que bénéficie l'investisseur. Le contrôle 
de l'administration se limite à un strict contrôle de légalité et non d'opportunité et d'en 
informer les services concernés. 
Le code des investissements n'est qu'un cadre juridique qui fixe les conditions 
d'installation des investisseurs. Son efficacité dépend de 1' efficacité d'autres paramètres 
d'ordre politique, économique et social, la stabilité politique du pays d'accueil, la sécurité 
juridique avec une bonne administration de la Justice, etc. 
En résumé, l'investisseur est libre et cette liberté est réglementée. Les investisseurs 
étrangers sont libres d'investir aux Comores sans recourir à une autorisation. Cependant, 
cette liberté a des  limites, car il faut que l'on respecte la sécurité nationale, l'argent 
«sale» par exemple doit être refusé à l'investissement ce qui nécessite la recherche de 
l'origine de fonds.  Les avantages sont accordés aux étrangers au même titre que les 
nationaux, mais il faut un certain contrôle administratif pour le rapatriement des fonds, 
tout peut être transféré. 
Mouvement des personnes, Permis de Séjour : 
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n'existe aucun obstacle, hormis le cas des ressortissants des rares pays où les Comores 
ont une représentation diplomatique accréditée (et même pour eux, tous les voyageurs 
peuvent entrer librement aux Comores, c'est une fois sur place qu'ils doivent procéder à 
la régularisation. 
Le visa d'entrée est alors obtenu à l'entrée moyennant une taxe. 
Actuellement, plusieurs propositions ont été retenues en ce qui concerne le problème 
d'entrée et de séjour des investisseurs des pays de la région et d'ailleurs, à savoir: 
1)  L'ouverture d'un guichet spécial à 1  'Aéroport International de Hahaya, chargé 
de faciliter les entrées et les sorties des ressortissants de la région (COI, COMESA et 
ITF) dans les trois mois qui suivent. 
2)  Le service central de Surveillance du Territoire (ST) s'engage à coordonner 
ses activités avec tous les différents services concernés ayant pour rôle de fournir ou 
d'élaborer des dossiers administratifs pour les investisseurs aux Comores, notamment le 
Guichet et l'UCCIA. 
3)  Des procédures permettant le traitement rapide des demandes de résidence 
et de travail (  4 semaine au maximum) vont également être instituées tout en continuant 
d'œuvrer sur les mesures menant vers la libre circulation des personnes. 
4)  Le service central des visas touristiques exige de son coté que nos investisseurs 
se présentent au service de l'immigration dans les 72 heures après leur arrivée dans notre 
pays pour demander leur Visa touristique de 45 jours qui leur permettra d'en entamer les 
démarches en vue d'obtenir un Visa de Long Séjour. 
5)  Ce qui n'empêche pas la recherche d'informations complémentaires 
éventuelles par le service de la surveillance du territoire. L'Etat projette ainsi d'adhérer 
à INTERPOL pour permettre de respecter le délai de 4 semaines. 
6)  Lorsque l'investisseur aura obtenue sa carte de résidence, in devrait se rendre 
au Guichet Unique pour l'accomplissement des autres formalités. 
a)  Enregistrement au domaine du statut 
b) Certificat d'immatriculation (enregistré au greffe) 
c)  L'agrément 
d)  Le certificat de conformité et autres, etc. 
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services de l'immigration, toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour faciliter l'.entrée, la 
sortie, et 1' obtention de  tout titre de  séjour demandé par les  investisseurs et les 
ressortissants de la région (COI, COMESA, ITF, etc.) 
Adhésion des agences de protection de l'investissement: 
Il y a un fond de garantie pour les investisseurs disponibles à la Banque Centrale des 
Comores. 
Cependant, les  Comores n'ont pas adhéré à aucune Agence de  Protection des 
Investisseurs. La sécurité des investisseurs est prévue par la loi. 
A l'heure actuelle, notre pays a l'intention d'adhérer à la Facilité de Garantie pour 
l'Afrique (FGA), en vue de sécuriser davantage. 
Aussi, nous demandons à la Banque Mondiale de nous fournir la documentation 
nécessaire, pour que nous puissions prendre connaissance des conditions nous permettant 
de participer à ces initiatives. 
3.4. Statut de l'ITF: 
Etat d'avancement de l'addendum de la LCBI: 
Nous savons que le Schéma reflète la réalité de nos pays respectifs. 
Cependant, les mesures qui sont proposées doivent être adaptées à notre cas pour 
ensuite les soumettre au Gouvernement pour adoption. 
La première étape de ce travail a été déjà faite. La deuxième étape consiste à le faire 
adopter en Conseil des Ministres, chose qui n'a pas encore été fait jusqu'à maintenant. 
Cependant, nous avons revu 1  'Addendum avec le Ministre de 1  'Economie, du Commerce 
et de l'Investissement, et nous avons son accord. Il reste à être discuté par 1' ensemble des 
Ministres au sein du Conseil pour le mettre en application. 
Un effort doit être entrepris par le Ministre des Finances et du Plan pour le présenter 
en Conseil des Ministres dans les meilleurs délais. 
Etat d'avancement de la préparation du Road Map National pour la facilitation des 
investissements : 
p.322 S'agissant de la préparation du Road Map National pour la Facilitation de 
l'investissement, nous avons décidé de faire un Atelier ou Séminaire qui regroupera les 
différents départements suivants : Ministère de la Production, Ministère des Finances et 
du Plan, Ministère des Transports et Tourisme, Direction de 1  'Environnement, l'Union 
des  Chambres de Commerce (UCCIA), l'Organisation Patronale des Commerçants 
(OPACO), l'Association pour la promotion du Secteur Privé (APSP), le Syndicat National 
des Commerçants (SYNACO), le CAPE, le Ministère de 1  'Economie, du Commerce et 
de l'Investissement et comportant une large auditoire. 
L'objectif de cet Atelier est d'harmoniser les idées des différents départements et 
institutions pour faire le Programme National de Promotion de l'Investissement, car 
chaque département a ses propres projections pour l'avenir de l'investissement au niveau 
national. 
Nous avons à cet effet adressé une lettre à tous ces départements pour leur demander 
de nous fournir leurs propositions pour ensuite les discuter le jour de l'Atelier. Certains 
ont répondu favorablement, par contre d'autres n'ont pas encore répondu, raison pour 
laquelle l'Atelier n'a pas encore eu lieu. Une autre raison est qu nous n'avons pas encore 
eu l'autorisation du Ministre des Finances qui est le Ministre Tutelle de cette initiative. 
Une fois que cet Atelier sera fait, nous allons rassembler toutes les idées pour faire le 
Programme National pour la facilitation de l'investissement. Nous savons que l'  APSP a 
ses idées, l'UCCIA y réfléchisse pour la nouvelle vision de la Chambre de Commerce, 
l'OPACO a ses idées, etc. Nous voulons alors harmoniser toutes ces idées pour avoir un 
Programme National. 
4.  AUTRES OBJECTIFS: 
Vision future du GTT et du CBI : 
Selon 1' expérience que j'ai vécue, j'aimerai bien tout d'abord que le Président soit 
un Représentant du Secteur Privé et qu'il y ait aussi un Vice- Président, car confier la 
Présidence au Secrétaire Général du Ministre des Finances ne fera pas avancer le dossier, 
alors cette initiative qui est pris positivement par tous les opérateurs économiques et qui 
intéressent tout le monde. 
Ensuite, il faut créer des choses qui pourront motiver d'avantage le GTT, car des 
fois certains ne sont pas motivés. 
Quant à l'avenir de l'ITF, il faudra que le Secrétariat du COMESA puisse suivre le 
fonctionnement du GTT comme !MANI le faisait de façon très régulière. 
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1.  OVERVIEW 
1.1 First Involvement in CBI 
Kenya's first involvement in the CBI program was in June 1992, during the first 
workshop held in Mauritius to determine the CBI work program. Kenya along with other 
CBI participating countries conducted National level research in the areas ofCBI program 
focus, with the aim of  providing the status at the commencement of  the program. This 
research output was disseminated in the December 1992 workshop on facilitation of 
cross border trade and investment. 
The CBI program has received high profile recognition in Kenya ever since its 
inception as evidenced by Kenya's active participation in subsequent regional TWG 
meetings and the four CBI Ministerial meetings. In all the ministerial meetings, a Minister 
headed Kenyan delegation. The Vice President, who at the time was the Chairman of  the 
PIC, headed Kenyan delegation to the first CBI ministerial meeting held in Brussels in 
1993. 
Kenya submitted its letter of CBI policy to the Co-sponsors in September 1995, 
after national consultations on the Common Program Action (CPA) and the CBI Concept 
agreed by the CBI participating countries in the Mauritius Regional TWG meeting of 
December 1992. 
1.2 Ongoing perception of  the CBI  process in Kenya 
CBI program is perceived as a fast track of  Regional Integration, to which Kenya 
subscribes to. Relevance of  the CBI policy framework to Kenya's situation has rendered 
the program to be held with high esteem, not only by the Government but also by the 
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Regional meetings and most importantly, the implementation of  the CBI policies. 
1.3 Elements o(the CBI that have been helpful to Kenva 
The CBI Policy Matrix 
This has been an important tool for monitoring implementation of the policies 
prescribed in the CBI policy framework and Kenya's LCBIP. 
TheTWG: 
The TWG permits open dialogue on cross border issues between the private sector 
and the government. It has been instrumental in creating awareness among the private 
sector on regional integration programme. 
Support for the TWG activities 
Support for TWG Secretariat and activities, such as workshops, meetings and studies 
has been valuable in facilitating the progress in the CBI process in Kenya. 
1.4 Kenva's relationship with COMESA and EAC: the Role ofCBI 
programme. 
The  CBI policy framework co-opts COMESA and EAC policy frameworks. 
Therefore, the CBI programme has in essence facilitated implementation and monitoring 
of these policies, thereby complementing efforts of COMESA and EAC forums that 
look into monitoring implementation of the various agreed policy measures. The 
mechanisms applied under CBI include meetings and workshops to  sensitize the 
stakeholders of  the EAC and COMESA policy regimes and studies. 
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2.1 Composition ofthe TWG and Regularity TWG meetings 
Kenya TWG draws membership from the public and private sector. The institutions 
represented in the TWG are as follows: 
Public Sector: 
1)  Ministry ofTourism, Trade and Industry 
2)  Ministry of  Finance and Planning 
3)  Ministry of  Information, Transport and Communications 
4)  Central Bank of  Kenya 
5)  Kenya Revenue Authority 
6)  Capital Markets Authority 
7)  Export Promotion Council 
8)  Investment Promotion Centre 
Private Sector: 
1)  Kenya Association ofManufacturers 
2)  Kenya National Chambers of  Commerce and Industry 
3)  Kenya International Forwarding and Warehousing Association 
4)  Association of  Kenya Insurers 
5)  Kenya Bankers Association 
During the formative years (1993-1995), frequency of  TWG meetings was at least 
one meeting every two months. The frequency of  the meetings rose to at least one meeting 
per month since 1996 to the end of  the project. Attendance ofthe meeting averaged 70% 
through out the period. Cases of  absenteeism, with apologies, were more frequent among 
the private sector associations and one government agency. 
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The following are the key issues discussed in the TWG meetings: 
a)  In depth deliberation of  the CBI concept paper and Action Programme, leading 
to the conclusion ofKenya's Letter ofCBI Policy 
b) Planning and facilitating seven high profile national workshops, namely: -
1)  First Government-Private Sector Dialogue workshop on cross border trade 
and investment (1993). 
2)  Second Government-Private Sector Dialogue workshop on cross border trade 
and investment (1996). 
3) Third Government-Private Sector Dialogue workshop on cross border trade 
and investment (1997). 
4) Kenya Export Development Fund workshop (1998). 
5)  Trade Facilitation Workshop (1998). 
6)  Workshop on Industrial Competitiveness (1999). 
7)  Workshop on Development of Strategies for strengthening private sector 
associations in Kenya (2000). 
c)  Planning and hosting three EATWG meetings in 1994, 1996 and 1999. 
d)  Initiating, co-ordinating and disseminating results of  the following studies: -
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1)  CBI programme:  Kenya baseline survey (national level research project) 
(1992). 
2)  Study on laws affecting trade and investment (1994). 
3)  Study on Commercial Paper market (1996). 
4) Study on Harmonisation ofExternal tariff in EAC (1997/98) 
5)  Study on laws relating to investments (1997). 6)  Study on Trade and Investment Flow between Kenya and CO  MESA countries 
(1998). 
7)  Study on strategies for strengthening private sector associations in Kenya 
(1999). 
8)  Diagnostic study on the Decline of  specific Kenyan exports of  SITC 7 and 8 
to COMESA (1999). 
9)  Study on the case for establishment ofNational Data Base on Foreign Direct 
Investment (2000). 
10) Study on the implication of  a customs union on Kenya Economy (2000). 
During the TWG meetings, recommendations of  these studies were pursued through 
action matrices, which were forwarded to line ministries or private sector institutions 
identified as appropriate to implement the recommendations. 
2.3 Problems encountered 
(i)  Non implementation of  polices recommendations arising from CBI forums 
While,  as  will be evidenced in section 3 most of the CBI policies have been 
implemented, some recommendations from CBI forums went unheeded. The key areas 
where this problem was traced was, infrastructural sectors. 
It  is, however, important to note that during the CBI period, donor funding has been 
extremely limited. The IMF credit was suspended, while and World Bank went lean on 
its credit to Kenya. This meant a delay in implementation of  projects, especially in the 
roads and energy sectors. 
(ii)  Weak private sector representation 
Some of  the private sector associations were literally unable to participate consistently 
in the TWG meetings and activities. Personnel constraint was the key contributory factor. 
(iii)  Bureaucracy in access to the World Bank Grant 
Due to bureaucracy in the World Bank procedures for utilising a grant of US$85 
000.00 the TWG was only able to utilise about 50% of the grant.  This was despite 
submission of study proposals for consideration by the World Bank in 1996. 
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(i)  Investment Code 
The TWG has deliberated on this subject since 1993, in an endeavour to have Kenya 
comply with the requirement of the CBI policy framework,  which states that 'CBI 
participating countries publish their Investment Codes and regulations'. 
The process of  enacting the Investment code has benefited from two studies: -
•  Cross Border Initiative - Contract for Legal Support Project done in 1995 
covering Trade, Investment and Finance Laws. 
•  Study in Laws Relating to Investments, done in 1998. 
The output ofTWG meetings was communicated to Investment Promotion Centre, 
which has been steering the process of  enacting an investment code. This output includes 
TWG comments on the Draft Investment Code Bill (1999). 
The process of  enactment of  the Investment Code is thus at an advanced stage. The 
pace is,  however, being determined by the process of harmonisation of investment 
incentives in the EAC region. 
(ii)  Non-Tariff Barriers 
The TWG facilitated follow-up of the recommendations of the final report of a 
High Level Tripartite Committee of  Experts to Study the impediments to the promotion 
of inter-states trade within East Africa. From the search, the following position was 
reported in the context ofNTBs identified in the report. 
The need for institutionalisation of  monitoring and removal ofNTBs was raised in 
the East African TWG meetings ofMasaka, Uganda (1997) and Nakuru, Kenya (1999). 
The latter meeting recommended that the national mechanism for monitoring NTBs be 
established by the next EATWG meeting in the year 2000. 
(iii)  Consultation with the Co-Sponsors 
a)  Post Harare CBI Ministerial meeting 
The EC noted that CBI remains as a unique initiative. The Harare CBI Ministerial 
meeting recommended that it continues to be supported. 
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by deliberating on the CBI phase II concept paper: Investment Facilitation Road Map, 
prepared and presented by the Co-sponsors at the meeting. 
b) Future of  the CBI 
European Commission indicated that it was still reflecting on how to proceed with 
the CBI.  In the interim, it was considering extension of the current support under the 
existing framework of  contract until the end of 1999. 
CBI is currently seen as a first track option within CO  MESA as virtually all countries 
participating in the CBI are members of  the CO  MESA. In view of  this, there are proposals 
for COMESA to co-ordinate CBI TWG activities in the second phase. 
The meeting was informed of a recent EU funded project to  support regional 
integration activities ofEAC, broadly along the CBI model. 
The World Bank indicated its support for the CBI because of  the programme's unique 
Bottom Up Approach to issues. 
(iii)  The evaluation of  the CBI program 
The TWG played a key role, during its meeting with the evaluator of  the CBI program. 
In articulating the objectives of  the evaluation, the TWG aired the following concerns 
and views:-
t  The TWG observed that the implementation of  the CBI programme had deviated 
from the original aim of the programme as agreed in the Mauritius meeting of 
June 1992. Specifically, the promised US$30 million financial assistance for the 
costs anticipated, as the participating countries implemented the CBI policy 
programme was not forth coming. Conditionalities, which were not envisaged in 
the Mauritius meeting, were later introduced, thus rendering a country like Kenya 
not entitled to receive any of  this direct assistance. The meeting felt that if  this 
money were availed to participating countries, it would have made a difference, 
especially in implementation of  the tariff reduction programmes. 
t  The TWG expressed concern at the difficulties that the TWG had in accessing 
the World Bank US$85 000.00 which is the only contribution that the Bank gave 
towards direct assistance of  the CBI. Ultimately, the TWG was only able to use 
50% of these committed funds by the expiry of the first phase of the CBI 
programme, in 1998. 
t  The TWG observed that the EU had been very supportive of  the TWG activities 
through Technical Assistance and support to the National Secretariat of  the TWG, 
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the TWG may have ceased its operations. 
t  The following benefits were cited, by the TWG, as having been derived from the 
CBI programme: -
•  Promotion of  working relationship in the area of  trade and investment between 
Government and the private sector. This relationship has made a significant 
difference in terms of  government stance on issues affecting private sector. In 
particular, the current process towards enacting an Investment Code and uplift 
of suspension of  cigarettes from the COME  SA schedule were cited as cases 
where the Government obliged to requests emanating from the TWG's (other 
forums') deliberations. 
•  Through the workshops, the CBI programme has facilitated discussions of 
very important issues of interest to  regional integration.  For example, 
COMES  A Bond Guarantee scheme, which the forum organised in 1998 pointed 
at the implementation weaknesses. Based on this feedback, COMESA is in 
the process of  addressing the weakness, an action that will render most of  the 
countries which have not ratified the scheme to do so, thus easing problems 
associated with transit of goods from one country to the other, within the 
COMESA region. 
3.  OVERVIEW  OF SENSITIZATION  ACTIVITIES SINCE 
BEGINNING 
3.1 East  African TWG (EATWG) Meetings 
The following is a summary of issues discussed and agreed in the meetings of 
EATWG, hosted in Kenya in 1994, 1996 and 1999. 
EATWG meeting: August 17,  1994 
The purpose of  this meeting was to establish modalities of  operations ofEATWG. 
The meeting came up with the following recommendations:-
t  Chairmanship of EATWG should be rotating between the three Chairmen of 
TWGs in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. 
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··  EATWG meetings should take place twice annually. 
t  Composition of the CBI program sponsored delegation to EATWG meetings 
from each country should be limited to four. 
EATWG meeting: May 13-14, 1996 
The proceedings of  this meeting led to the following recommendations:-
1.  Private sector participation in the TWGs be increased. 
ii.  Minutes of National TWGs be  sent to  the co-sponsors and Regional 
Consultant on regular basis. 
111.  Tariff rates on trade between the three East African Countries be reduced to 
zero before end of  June 1997. 
iv.  The three East African Countries should adhere to the CBI implementation 
timetable including 80 % tariff reduction on intra-COMESA trade by October 1996. 
v.  East African Co-operation to commence work on harmonisation of the 
investment codes by October 1996. 
v1.  TWGs to update the 1992 study in the intra-sub-regional trade and investment 
by 15 August, 1996. 
vii.  Research Agenda to be done by TWG consultants, EAC, and World Bank 
by31 May, 1996 : Issues for discussion and study with regard to regional integration to 
include:-
•  Existing NTBs. 
•  Harmonisation of  tariffs and exemptions. 
•  Harmonisation of  domestic taxes preliminary proposals. 
•  Steps to improve customs administrations. 
•  Impediments to intra sub-regional trade. 
•  Rules of  origin. 
p.333 •  Transportation costs 
•  Competitiveness of  industry in the sub-region 
(viii)  Investigate further the modalities for establishing East African Export Credit 
Guarantee Scheme. 
(ix)  Establish the modalities for co-ordination with the EAC Secretariat to include: 
•  Involvement of  national TWGs in EAC experts meetings 
•  Utilising the EAC Secretariat as the permanent Secretariat ofEATWGs. 
(x)  Tanzania and Uganda to implement their Stock Exchanges by June,  1997. 
Cross listings on the Nairobi Stock Exchange of the stocks of Uganda and Tanzania 
companies to be left to the Capital Markets Authorities, institutions and the EAC Financial 
sector meetings of  the three countries 
(xi)  Legislative studies to be shared among the three members ofEATWG 
EATWG meeting: 7-8 December 1999 
The summary of  the deliberations of  this meeting was as follows:-
(i)  Status of  the implementation of  CBI policies 
After consideration of  the status of  implementation of  the CBI policies in the three 
EAC countries, the meeting identified the following issues as requiring attention in the 
second phase of  the CBI. 
(i)  Harmonisation of  external tariffs in line with the CO  MESA provisions for a 
90% reduction. The countries, which had not yet implemented this policy, were urged to 
do so. 
(ii)  Introduction of  a Single Customs Bond Guarantee Scheme. 
(iii)  Liberalisation of  the Capital Account. 
(iv)  Conclusion ofDouble Taxation Agreements with the countries of  CO  MESA. 
(v)  Cross-listing in the three E.A. Stock Exchanges. 
(vi)  Greater Private Sector involvement. 
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and CBI participating countries 
The meeting was informed that Tanzania issued a notice in May 1999 and submitted 
it to the CO  MESA Secretariat in September 1999 expressing her intentions to pull out of 
COMESA. This notice is valid for one year. The reasons given for this decision are as 
follows:-
1)  That Tanzania is a member of  too many regional organisations as a result of 
which it was over stretching itself and it was becoming difficult to effectively participate 
in their day-to-day affairs. 
2)  That Tanzania is still fully committed to regional integration and remains a 
member ofWTO, SADC, EAC. 
3)  That by pulling out ofCOMESA, the trade and other issues could be achieved 
through being a member of  other regional integration bodies such as SADC and EAC. 
Tanzania assured the EATWG's members that it was fully committed to the ideals 
and commitments made during the signing of  the East African Co-operation Treaty. 
In response, the participants noted that whereas Tanzania, as a sovereign state, was 
free to determine her own destiny, they requested that a technical and economic evaluation 
of  the implications of  such a decision be seriously considered in order to stave off  adverse 
consequences of  the withdrawal. 
(iii)  Non Tariff Barriers faced by traders/business communities when trading in 
EAC.: A presentation by the private sector 
In view of existence of NTBs which each of the three TWGs reported as  being 
experienced by their traders in partner states, the meeting recommended that a mechanism 
be established to ensure monitoring and elimination ofNTBs on a continuous basis. The 
mechanism should involve private sector associations, which should have an arrangement 
for their members to report NTBs on regular basis. These associations should pass on the 
list ofNTBs to the TWG during monthly meetings. The TWG should then, through the 
line Ministry, write to the TWG in the Partner State where the NTB is reported for action. 
(iv)  Immediate actions after signing of  the EAC treaty: A Presentation by EAC 
The EAC Secretariat made a presentation on the action matrix highlighting activities, 
and institutional implementation arrangement.  Some of the activities fell  within the 
EATWGs' mandate, hence the possibility of the  forum participating actively in the 
integration process as drawn by the Treaty. 
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The Meeting observed that: -
( 1)  CBI continues to be an engine for the implementation of  regional economic 
integration for investment facilitation; hence support from the co-sponsors was desirable 
to facilitate the process. 
(2)  The current administrative arrangement on the co-ordination of the CBI 
programme be used in the next phase of  the CBI. 
3.2 Workshops and Meetings 
(i)  First Workshop on the Government-Private Sector Dialogue on cross border 
trade and investments (1993) 
The workshop came up with the following recommendations: -
Trade: 
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•  The need to publicise PTA institutions in order for the business community to 
be made aware of the trade facilitation opportunities available in these 
institutions. 
•  Ease Border controls in order to promote cross border trade. 
•  Promote establishment of  commodity exchange market as a mechanism for 
financing trade and hedging price and foreign exchange fluctuations. 
•  Rationalise trade promotion institutions and projects as a way of  taking care 
of  the confusion caused by multiplicity of  these institutions and projects. 
•  Revise down telephone charges to render them comparable with international 
rates. 
•  The Central Bank should consider raising foreign currency retention from 
50% to 100%, since it was proved that at 50%, it amounted to a 10% export 
tax. 
•  Reinstate Export Compensation scheme. Investment: 
•  Develop capital markets as  away of raising domestic and foreign finance 
necessary for increased investment. 
•  Publish investment code. 
•  Design more investment incentives 
•  Investment inflows should be fully documented to enable interested parties to 
determine investment trends and opportunities. 
•  Set up export bank and a credit insurance institution to  assist small scale 
exporters and investors in export development. 
Role of  Donors: 
•  Kenya should exploit the opportunities, which are available under International 
Agreements such as the Lome Convention. 
(ii)  Second workshop on the Government-Private Sector Dialogue on cross border 
trade and investment 
The workshop came up with the following recommendations: -
Trade: 
•  Protect domestic industries from dumping of  cheap goods. On the other hand 
local manufacturers were asked to invest in Research and Development as a 
way of  improving their global competitiveness. 
•  Tariff on raw materials should be reduced and non tariff  barriers be completely 
abolished; this includes easing border controls and customs clearance 
procedures and reducing road blocks to those which must be erected for security 
reasons. 
•  The need to Harmonise External Tariff in the EAC was emphasised. 
•  Collection of duty at the point of entry for transit goods should be given 
consideration. 
•  Eliminate delays in VAT refund. 
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•  Pre-shipment inspection needs to be revisited to address features that were an 
impediment to intra-regional trade. 
Infrastructure: 
Roads: 
•  Local Authorities should explore other avenues of  raising revenue. For instance, 
they could float Municipal Bonds, Notes and Local Authorities Investment 
Pools. 
Telecommunication: 
•  Supply of telecommunication services, mainly telephone lines should be 
stepped up. The charges should be made internationally competitive. 
Power Sector: 
•  Kenya Power and Lighting was challenged to step up production of  electricity 
in  order to  avoid power rationing during drought spells.  In addition, the 
company was urged to consider making Kenya's electricity charges 
internationally competitive. In event of  power rationing, strict adherence to 
the power interruption schedule was recommended. 
Railway Transport: 
•  In order to  tum around the Railways services, the private sector should 
participate in the acquisition and maintenance of  the Railway Wagons. 
Ports Services: 
The workshop recommended that delays in processing customs documentation be 
given serious consideration. 
(iii)  Third workshop on the Government-Private Sector Dialogue on cross border 
trade and investment (1998) 
The workshop came up with the following: -
Trade: 
•  Value Added Tax 
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This process should ensure that exports and imports are given same treatment. 
•  Duty refund under EPPO scheme 
The workshop recommended that the isolated cases of delays in the processing of 
the refund be dealt with, to  avoid unnecessary expenses on the part of the business 
community. 
•  Tariff 
The workshop recommended that the  private sector and Treasury look into the 
classification of the raw materials to allow correct application of duty in line with the 
tariff structure. 
•  Customs Clearance 
The workshop was informed that delay in clearing of goods is due to be resolved 
once Trade Data Exchange System (between KPA and Customs) is  introduced. The 
workshop recommended that this process be expedited. 
•  Anti-Dumping Legislation 
On dumping, the workshop recommended an anti dumping legislation. 
Immigration: 
•  Entry Work Permits 
The workshop recommended that the three East African Member States consider 
reviewing their policies on entry (work) permit with a view to streamlining the conditions 
or requirements for issue and also harmonising the fees payable. 
Road Network: 
•  Axle Controls were recommended as  a means of managing road damage 
emanating from overloaded vehicles. 
Rail Network: 
While appreciating the reform progress being made by the Kenya Railways, the 
workshop recommended that; 
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need to be informed whenever such an  offer was floated,  so  that they can 
participate. 
b) Kenya Railway was asked to  reconsider the current rebate arrangement on 
rehabilitation and maintenance of wagons as  it was very costly to  business 
community and therefore untenable. 
(iv)  Kenya Export Development Fund Workshop (1998) 
The aim of  the workshop was to sensitise stakeholders on the proposed Kenya Export 
Development Fund project. The workshop came up with the following recommendations:-
a)  In view of  the limited size of  the fund (EUR5million), lending ceiling to allow 
for the spread of the facility to  cover a wider spectrum of exporters was 
recommended. 
b) The facilities be denominated in foreign currency. 
c)  Interest rate be based on simple average of the base lending rates of the lead 
commercial banks. 
d)  The project be a guarantee fund scheme instead of loan scheme. In view of  the 
level of  development of  the Kenyan Financial sector, the grant component of  the 
project be eliminated. 
e)  Non traditional financing mechanism through private sector associations be 
explored, as a way of  mitigating risks. 
(v)  Trade Facilitation Workshop (1998) 
This workshop was aimed at sensitising the business community on the four 
COMESA trade facilitation schemes. For each of  these schemes, the workshop came up 
with the following recommendations: 
(a)  The COMESA Yellow Card Insurance Scheme 
t  The COMES  A Yellow Card Insurance Scheme be popularised since most business 
persons were not aware of  the scheme and the underlying benefits. 
t  Delays in settlement of claims be resolved through prompt reporting of such 
claims.  COMESA was advised to  facilitate this through sensitisation of the 
countries where this problem is most prevalent, such as Rwanda. 
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t  The Workshop urged Kenya Revenue Authority to do its utmost in exposing the 
business community and KRA officials at the border points and other customs 
regulated points to the functioning of  this documents. KTWG was also asked to 
provide some inputs, technical or otherwise, towards further sensitisation of  the 
business community about this document. 
The COMESA Customs Bond Guarantee Scheme 
The workshop recommended: 
t  Monthly bond cancellation as a way of expediting the delay factors  in bond 
cancellation process. 
t  Harmonisation of  bond cancellation period among participating countries. 
t  A system akin to the CO  MESA Yellow Card Insurance Scheme be integrated in 
the operational modalities of  the Customs Bond Guarantee Scheme. 
t  KRA, Customs Department considers replacing BOFFIN system with 
ASYCUDA. 
The CO  MESA Harmonised Transit Charges 
The workshop recommended that:-
t  A facility for axle load control is put in place at strategic loading points, such as 
Mombasa to ensure that lorries are not overloaded at the point of  loading. 
t  Education on axle loading be introduced a soon as  possible to ensure that 
transporters do not suffer due to ignorance. 
t  Pre Inspection Companies should be advised to check on excess weight when 
verifying the weight and details of  the goods in question. 
(v)  Workshop on industrial competitiveness and trade and growth prospects in 
Kenya 
The purpose of  the workshop was to facilitate dissemination of  the results of  a study 
entitled "Industrial Competitiveness and Trade and Growth Prospects in Kenya" done 
under the EAGER USAID Project. A summary of  these results is as follows:-
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country by the year 2020, and given the environment of globalisation and liberalised 
trade,  it is  clear that increased competitiveness must become a major objective and 
challenge for all industries. This is true in international as well as in regional markets. 
2)  The study showed that some of the macroeconomic policies and variables 
are of  crucial importance for attainment of  competitiveness by industries. In particular, 
low cost of borrowing, a stable and well aligned exchange rate,  as  well as  a sound 
infrastructure in transport, communications, energy and water supply are a pre-condition 
for industrial growth. 
3)  The study noted that the opening of  the economy, while necessary, it is not a 
sufficient condition for  achievement of the goals of increased competitiveness and 
industrial growth. What is needed is a cautious progression of  trade liberalisation combined 
with an industrial strategy that recognises the importance of  the pace at which industries 
can adjust to the changing environment. 
4)  The study showed that the enactment ofliberal trade policy is not sufficient, 
but must be accompanied by effective enforcement of  the trade regime. The recent changes 
in trade regimes seems to be sufficient to create a level playing field for competing firms, 
but only if  the respective laws are enforced. 
5)  The recent trend of declining interest rates needs to be further pursued by 
sound fiscal policies, in order to  bring the cost of borrowing to  a level that permits 
industries to make new investments for increased competitiveness. 
6)  A cautious approach to currency depreciation is necessary to prevent new 
inflationary pressure, which would cancel the gains in competitiveness. 
7)  There seems to be an urgent need for more stringent quality controls and the 
enforcement of  standards, in order to ensure that Kenyan producers can compete in export 
markets. This is particularly important in the food industries and especially urgent in fish 
processing, where the ban of  exports from East Africa to the European Union has badly 
hurt the sector. 
8)  Some sectors require political support as  well as  regional co-operation in 
order to allow industries to exploit their natural comparative advantage. 
9)  Regional integration tends to flourish when intra-industry trade flourishes. 
The study contained some preliminary evidence of superior competitiveness in some 
fast growing industries in Uganda. This may be seen by some Kenyan producers as  a 
threat to their traditional export perspectives. But it can also be seen as an opportunity to 
develop intra-industry trade between the countries of  the East Africa region, which would 
benefit their economic growth. 
p.342 (vi)  Workshop on Development of  Strategies for Strengthening the Private Sector 
Associations in Kenya 
During the deliberation of  the study on the private sector associations, the workshop 
came up with the following recommendations: -
a)  Apex organisation: 
(i)  Modalities for establishing Apex Organisation for private sector associations 
be explored. This will include 
•  Provision of more details regarding operation and sustainability of such 
organisations in other countries, 
•  Drawing up a framework of memorandum of understanding, which should 
included the membership, constitution and mandate of the organisation and 
leadership. 
•  A careful consideration of  the East African Business Council and possibility 
of  the Kenyan chapter performing the role of  an apex organisation. 
•  Source of  Funding 
(ii)  The workshop recommended that once the apex organisation is formed, the 
government should help in identifying donors to support the initiative through provision 
of  seed capital to cater for operations in the first four years. 
(iii)  The workshop recommended that a follow up meeting be arranged where 
the memorandum of  understanding towards establishment of the apex association will 
be discussed and adopted as a document for the private sector association to use in carrying 
the process forward. 
b)  Capacity Building PSAs 
(i)  To facilitate organisational evaluation and subsequent strategic planning, the 
workshop recommended that Technical Assistance be availed to the PSAs, on their request. 
This assistance will help, through strategic planning sessions, streamlining mission and 
goals of  the PSAs, determining a parsimonious organisational structure that is in harmony 
with its mandate and expected roles. 
(ii)  In view of the liquidity problems that most PSAs were experiencing, the 
workshop expressed the need for donor funding as  seed capital that will facilitate in 
restructuring of  the PSAs and institutional capacity building along the recommendations 
of  the work emanating from the technical assistance. 
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A total of  ten studies have been conducted under the CBI program since 1993. The 
studies were motivated by the needs identified by the TWG in the course of  its deliberation 
on the CBI policy framework, follow up of  workshop recommendations and on the basis 
ofthe needs expressed by the private sector. On the basis of  the study findings, corrective 
recommendations were made as stipulated in each study. 
The TWG has been following up the implementation of the recommendations of 
these studies. The status of the implementation of some of these recommendations is 
reflected in section 3.0 on the achievements of CBI in policy reforms.  The 
recommendations of  these studies are summarised in the sections below. 
3.3.1 Legal support project on laws affecting trade and investments (1994) 
a)  Trade in goods and services 
(i)  Lower import duty and speed up implementation of  the PTA tariff  reduction. 
(ii)  More commodities should be removed from the negative list. 
(iii)  Trade Licensing Act S(5)(2) should be amended to make licensing 
requirements known and predictable. In addition, the following sections of  the Act should 
be amended; Sections 9(1)(b), 13(a), 25(1) and 27 
(iv)  Part X and Section 50A of  the companies Act should be amended 
(v)  Tourist Industry Licensing Act (Cap 381) was also recommended for 
amendment. 
b) Payments and Exchange System 
(i)  Foreign Investments Protection Act (Cap. 518) should be repealed. 
(ii)  The Exchange Control Act be amended in line with trade and foreign exchange 
liberalisation. 
(iii)  The following sections of the Central Bank of Kenya Act be amended to 
facilitate development of  the financial sector: Sections 21, 25, 39,40 to 43. New provisions 
should be introduced in the Act to facilitate the establishment of  off  shore banking facilities 
and the development of  forward markets for the Kenya shilling. 
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(i)  IPC Act (Cap 518) should be amended to give IPC authority to vet, approve 
and license investments without recourse to other Government departments. 
(ii)  In addition, the following laws were recommended for amendment in order 
to increase cross border investment: Income Tax Act (Cap 470); The Restrictive Trade, 
Monopolies and Price Control Act (Cap 504  ), The Industrial Registration Act (Cap 118) 
and Immigration Act (Cap 172). 
3.3.2 Study on Commercial Paper Market (1996) 
The paper recommended that a framework to  facilitate  establishment and the 
functioning of  the Commercial Paper (CP) market be developed. The Central Bank was 
therefore urged to rescind its decision and instead facilitate the development of  the CP 
market in collaboration with the Capital Markets Authority. 
3.3.3 Study on Harmonisation of  External Tariff  in EAC (1997/98) 
Based on an assessment of a number of alternative tariff structures, the  study 
recommended the achievement of  a simple harmonised external tariff  (HET) as a priority 
objective. After considering the various alternative options for the choice of  a common 
external tariff, the report concludes that a scheme broadly similar to the current Uganda 
structure of {0,  7,  and  15}  has a number of merits that recommend it as  a desirable 
common external tariff structure for East Africa. 
The study provides a note of caution against the current on early elimination of 
tariffs on intra-East Africa trade. 
3.3.4 Study on Laws Relating to Investments (1997) 
The study recommends amendment and rationalisation of  the following legislation: 
t  Industrial Registration Act, Sections 4 and 9. 
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t  The Land Planning Act, Section 11 ( 1) 
t  The Government Land Planning Act Sections 34, 35 and 40. 
t  The Crop Production and Livestock Act, Sections 4 and 5. 
t  Agricultural Act, Sections 64, 191 and 100. 
t  Tea Act, Sections 4, 8,9,10, 12, 13 and 15. 
t  Coffee Act, Sections 3, 13, 15, 16 21, 22 and 27. 
t  The Seeds and Plant varieties Act, Sections 3 and 20; Regulations 7,8,9, 11, 12 
and 18. 
t  The Pest Control Act, Sections 3 and 4; Regulations 2 and 4. 
t  Fisheries Act, Sections 4, 5 and 7-14. 
t  Tourist Industry Act, Sections 3, 4, 8 and 9. 
t  Hotel and Restaurant Act, Sections 4,5, 6, 8,  14, 15-25 and 29. 
t  The Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances Act, Section 28. 
t  The Pharmacy and Poisons Act, Sections 23-35 
t  Foreign Protection Act, Sections 3, 4 and 7 
t  Immigration Act, Sections 4, 5 and 6. 
t  Trade Licensing Act, Sections 3, 4, 5, 9 and 13. 
t  Mining Act, Sections 9,  11, 12, 13 and 18 
t  The Hide, Skin and Leather Trade Act, Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 20. 
t  The Insurance Act, Sections 5-8. 
t  Local Government Act, Sections 148, I 55(  d), 159(1), 161  and 201. 
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countries (1998) 
Trade 
a)  More effort be made at exploring other alternative markets to the traditional 
EAC market. The need for this is even more apparent when one considers the 
loss of  grip that Kenya is experiencing in this market. 
b) There is  also need for the country to consider broadening its  export base by 
exploiting potential in production and exportation of  the products that are currently 
traded marginally. This effort should, however, be guided by the comparative 
cost advantage. 
c)  KTWG should initiate some activities towards  sensitising the business 
communities ofthe business opportunities in the non-traditional markets within 
COMESA region. 
Investments 
•  Data on Foreign Direct Investments, Portfolio Investments and Investments 
in the money market should be collected and processed. This should detail the 
source of  investment by country of  origin. 
3. 3. 6  Study on Strategies for Strengthening Private Sector Associations in 
Kenya (1999) 
a)  PSAs should initiate the process for establishment of  an apex 'organisation' for 
private sector associations. 
b) Capacity Building PSA, to encompass:-
•  Evaluation of  the PSA's mission and goals in view of  the challenges posed by 
the global development. 
•  Enhancing human and financial resources capacity ofPSAs through a strategic 
planning based organisational restructuring 
•  De-politicise the associations by linking office bearers tenure of office to 
economic performance of these associations as revealed by Monitoring and 
Evaluation Reports. 
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and 8 to COMESA 
a)  Reduction of  import duties in the importing countries 
There is need to establish from Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia the duty which is 
charged on the following products, with a view to  establishing the extent to  which 
COMESA duty rebate is applied 
Under SITC 7 
•  Electric Generation-Sets not Exceeding 75 KVA 
•  Trailers and semi Trailers 
Under SITC 8 
•  Prefabricated Buildings, Furniture and Doors 
•  Mattresses 
•  Footwear with outer soles and uppers of  rubber 
b) Increase competitiveness ofKenyan products 
Companies of the affected products should devise strategies for being more 
competitive, because trade liberalisation is a global phenomenon, which as a country we 
can do nothing about, because of  our being bound by the WTO agreements, which Kenya 
is a signatory to. 
c)  Increase quality of  products 
The decline in exports of mattresses to Uganda on account of low quality merits 
some action by the affected companies to increase the quality, to meet the standards set 
up by the Uganda Bureau of  Standards. A brainstorming session between Kenya Bureau 
of Standards, the  affected companies could be facilitated by the TWG with view to 
identifying fiscal measures which may be needed to augment company level efforts. 
d)  Reduce bureaucracy in Customs clearance 
The TWG should facilitate a brainstorming session between the affected private 
sector companies, under the aegis of KAM and KNCCI to  come up with strategies, 
which could resolve the delays in customs clearance. The output of  this forum will be an 
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implementation. 
e)  Red tape bureaucracy in Tanzania 
The TWG, in liaison with the affected companies, under the aegis ofKAM should 
prepare a position for consideration by Tanzania TWG. 
f)  Export Development Strategy 
There is need for developing an export development strategy, which should inevitably 
be linked to the industrialisation strategy. This strategy should among other things seek 
to monitor performance of  Kenyan exports on a product by product basis, and using the 
rich information data base at the KRA statistics Department liase with exporters for 
quick feed back on national and regional policies on the performance of  Kenyan exports 
b) Lower duty on Raw material for production of agricultural and horticultural 
appliances. 
The TWG should facilitate,  in liaison with the affected companies and KAM 
preparation of  a position on this constraint for consideration by the Ministry of  Finance. 
3.3. 8 Study on the case for establishment ofF  oreign Direct Investment Data 
Base in Kenya (2000) 
Recommendations: 
a)  Strategy 
•  Conceptual Framework 
The standard Foreign Direct Investment definition should be applied in designing 
the survey instrument to be used in collection of  the FDI data. 
•  Source of  the FDI Data 
The FDI Data should be based on audited accounts. For public and private companies 
annual audits are a compulsory requirement under Companies Act. Hence, foreign 
enterprises or joint ventures should not find a problem in complying with this requirement. 
To  ensure authenticity of the data submitted in the survey instrument, the companies 
should submit audited accounts along with the forms. 
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suggested that a form similar to the industrial registration form be designed. The design 
should enhance the instrument's ability to capture FDI flows  for Joint ventures by 
distinguishing between foreign and local holding ofthe capital. The revision of  the survey 
instrument should, further, modify the caveat under the confidentiality clause, to allow 
for information sharing with other government departments (e.g.  Central Bureau of 
Statistics and Investment Promotion Centre). 
There is need to widen the scope of  sectoral coverage from the current narrow base 
by including more sectors. To facilitate this, the following institutional arrangement in 
the collection ofFDI data is recommended. 
Sector  Institution/Ministry or Department 
Manufacturing  Department of  Industry, MTT  &I 
Mining and Quarrying  Department of  Industry, MTT  &I 
Construction  Department of  Industry, MTT &I 
Agriculture  Ministry of  Agriculture 
Tourism (Restaurants and Hotels)  Department of  Tourism, MTT  &I 
Commerce - Trade  Departments of External and Internal 
Trade, MTT  &I 
Power (Oil, Electricity and gas)  Ministry of  energy 
Banking sector  Central Bank of  Kenya 
Capital market (Portfolio Investment)  Capital Markets Authority 
Information, Transport and Communication  Ministry of Information, Transport and 
Communications 
b) Plan of  Action 
•  The Role of  CBS, Line Ministries and other Institutions 
Central Bureau of Statistics should be the co-ordinating agency where all the 
institutions identified above would be remitting the returns for data processing and 
dissemination. Towards establishment of  a National FDI data base, the following activities 
are recommended: -
(i)  CBS should format the BoP data reporting to capture FDI data more explicitly. 
In particular, CBS should follow up with the IMF for purposes of  improving reporting of 
reinvested earnings, which even in the IFS publications is lumped together with other 
items under other investments. 
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with line ministries and other institutions, as identified above. 
(iii)  In view of  the current weakness in FDI data collection, there is need for a 
nation-wide baseline survey to establish the exact position ofFDI. 
(iv)  There is  need for  an assessment of the capacity of line ministries and 
institutions responsible for  FDI data collection, with a view to  identifying areas of 
weaknesses and recommending capacity building strategy aimed at enabling these 
institutions to  cope with the  demand to  be imposed by the National FDI Data Base 
requirement. 
(v)  To disseminate information on FDI flows, CBS should publish FDI data in 
the Economic Survey. 
•  Role of  Investment Promotion Centre 
There is a need for review of  laws relating to investments in order to provide that all 
new investments be notified to IPC for statistical purposes and where possible for 
facilitating the investor's access to investment incentives related information which IPC 
gives to the investors. 
IPC should then inform line ministries and other institutions of  the new investments 
in their areas of  jurisdiction for purposes of  prompt follow up and assistance. 
3.3.9 Study on the Implications of  East African Customs Union on the Kenyan 
Economy (2000) 
Based on the analysis of  the progress made and previous research on the subject of 
EAC Trade Regime, the following recommendations (which, as we were writing this 
report were being considered by Kenyan team of the High Level Task Force (HLTF)) 
were preferred. 
(i)  Customs Administration 
a)  There is need to provide for establishment of  an administrative and institutional 
systems and structures to facilitate management of  the aspects of  customs  .. This 
could be a special unit within the EAC  Secretariat or it could be  a separate 
commission or authority. 
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posts (shared by two countries). 
(ii)  Re-exportation of  goods; 
There is a need to come up with a clear policy on treatment of  re-exports under the 
customs union and procedures to be applied in implementing these policies. 
Among the issues to be considered is safeguard measures for re-exports destined 
for the partner state in order to avoid deflection of the goods into the economy of the 
importing country. Further, for goods that undergo some processing, there is a need to 
spell out the proportion of  the value added content that will render these goods be accorded 
preferential treatment. 
(iii)  Rules of  Origin 
There is need for the proposed study on the EAC Rules of  Origin to evaluate merits/ 
demerits of  a common and sectoral approach to the rules of  origin as means of  addressing 
the concerns about industrial development disparity between Kenya and the other two 
partner states. 
Further, the rules of  origin should ensure that the rules to be developed are common 
to both CO  MESA and SADC; otherwise complexities will occur with individual member 
states having to apply different rules of  origin to imports from the rest of  CO  MESA and 
SADC into EAC member states. 
In concluding the Rules of origin due regard of WTO requirements, specifically 
definition, consultations with the Rules of  Origin Committee and Notification should be 
adhered to. 
(iv)  Duty Drawback, refund and remission of  duties and taxes 
Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Duty Draw 
Back or Remission ofDuty and Taxes are classified as prohibited subsidies. This treatment 
needs to be reflected in the EAC guidelines. The aim will be to come up with guidelines 
that facilitate identification of  such subsidies and delineate countervailing measures that 
partner states should take against exports from such schemes. This will take care of  the 
current concerns in EAC about exports from Kenya's MUB schemes and EPZ zones. 
In drawing up a framework for handling cases of such exports in the EAC, each 
country should be required to notify the member states of  such schemes and the products 
concerned. 
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Details on dumping for inclusion in the protocol should constitute a rigorous 
framework on dumping, drawn along the WTO GATT 1994 framework but modified to 
suit EAC situation. 
The procedure would involve drawing up of the framework for inclusion in the 
protocol. After ratification of  the protocol, member countries would then enact dumping 
legislation, which should be in harmony with that of  the other partner states. 
(vi)  Subsidies and countervailing duties 
The framework drawn by HLTF needs some improvement taking cognisance of  the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing duties. 
A review of  the Agreement shows existence of  attributes which will inevitably be 
important in development of  an EAC subsidies and countervailing measures. For instance, 
distinction between allowable subsidies and prohibited subsidies and the procedures to 
be used in determining existence of subsidies and determination of the countervailing 
duties provides a universal yard stick which are considered appropriate for incorporation 
in the EAC framework. 
(vii)  Competition Policy 
A framework for EAC competition policy needs to  be developed. The National 
Legislation will then be premised on this framework.  Issues to be addressed include 
monopolies, mergers, cartels and administrative structure 
In developing this framework,  the critical analysis of Kenya's legislation on 
competition (as contained in Kijirah 2000) needs to be taken into account. The analysis 
recommended repeal of  the existing legislation and enactment of  a new legislation. 
The framework should, further: 
t  Provide for an institutional structure, which contains the Judicial right to appeal 
with an investigative and administrative body. 
t  Ensure independent decision making on the basis of  the policy principle. 
t  Remove discretionary authority, which may be subject to political pressure. 
t  Provide for establishment of a Competition Tribunal to grant interdicts and to 
protect victims of  restricted competition, pending the outcome of  a trial. 
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•  Principle of Asymmetry should, as  already provided for in the Treaty and 
articulated by the HLTF, be applied in the process of elimination of Internal 
Tariff. 
•  Tanzania and Uganda, as already proposed by the HLTF, should levy surcharge 
on Kenyan products. 
•  The Criteria for determining the products to be subjected to surcharge should 
be confined to infant industry. The definition of  infant industry, as applied in 
SACU is recommended. According to this definition, an infant industry is 
one, which is eight years, or less since its establishment. 
•  The surcharge should be 1  0% on processed input and final products from 
infant industries. A flat rate of  10%, which happens to be the maximum agreed 
by the three countries, takes care of revenue loss as well as protection of 
infant industry. It is also fairly easy to implement. 
However, where either Uganda or Tanzania is importing similar commodities from 
COMESA, COMESA tariff should apply,  in line with the principle of 'General Most 
Favoured-Nations Treatment' of  the WTO General Agreement on Trade and Tariff(1994). 
In the case of similar imports SOLELY from third countries, the surcharge should be 
10% or 50% of  the CET. whichever is less. 
Further, these products, as well as those which may be zero rated should enjoy the 
provisions of  the WTO 'National Treatment Clause' 
A request for a higher surcharge than 1  0% should not be entertained. However, in 
event that there may be strong case to levy a higher surcharge on certain products, adopting 
a 10% surcharge may accommodate this request but the phase out period be 8 years 
instead of  4 years. 
(ix)  Common External Tariff 
The Maximum Common External Tariff  should be between 20%-25% as prescribed 
under the CBI program. A tariffband of2 non-zero should be considered. The following 
options, which are suggested taking Uganda's tariff bands into account will need to be 
explored, through simulations.  The final  choice should ideally be that which causes 
minimal adverse effects on the revenue. 
•  An option would be to abolish the 15% band and to raise the 5% band to 10%. 
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to the Ugandan level of  7%. 
Either of these options will have some negative impact on Government Revenue 
and Industrialization. The latter will be as  a result of upward adjustment of duty on 
capital goods currently attracting 5% duty. This problem could be hedged by zero rating 
all products, which currently attract duty of  5%. 
As a way forward, therefore, after deciding on the two non-zero tariff band, the 
Member States should simulate the effects of rationalization of their tariff structure to 
either of  the above-suggested options. 
A phase in period will then be worked out based on the impact of  the chosen tariff 
structure on Government Revenue and Industrialisation strategy. 
4.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN POLICY  REFORM  AREAS 
4.1 Foreign Trade 
a)  Export and Import Licensing 
Prior to the launch of  the CBI program in 1992, all imports were being subjected to 
import licensing. Export licensing had been phased out an year earlier (1991). 
Import licensing was abolished in 1993. 
b) Non Tariff Barriers 
Before the CBI program, Kenya was extensively using administrative controls to 
manage the balance of  payments and to protect some industries. 
Import quantitative restrictions were abolished in 1993 except for a short list of a 
few  products controlled for health, security and environmental reasons. At the EAC 
level, the Government supported monitoring and elimination ofNTBs. 
c)  Intra-regional tariffs 
In 1992, COMESA tariff rebate was at 50%. This has been increased progressively 
in line with the COMESA timetable of tariff reduction, to  90% in January 1999. By 
October 2000, Kenya hopes to  raise the rebate to  100%, thus rendering goods from 
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Uganda and Tanzania are in the process of  working out modality for elimination of  tariff 
on intra EAC trade, as provided for in the EAC Treaty. 
d)  External Tariffs and CBI harmonisation 
In 1992, the number of  tariff  bands was 11 and maximum tariff  on finished products 
was 70%. In the budget speeches of 1994 to 1996, the maximum rate was reduced to 
35% and the number of  bands to 5. 
By 1999, maximum tariffhad been reduced to the CBI recommended level of25% 
and non zero tariff bands were 3, in line with CBI program's target. 
Kenya is working out modalities for harmonising its external tariff structure with 
those of  Uganda and Tanzania within the EAC framework of  co-operation. 
e)  Trade facilitation 
•  Kenya implemented COMESA harmonised transit charges in July 1994. 
•  Road Customs Transit Declaration (RCTD) document has been introduced 
and CO  MESA Customs Document to introduced in January 1999 will gradually 
replace the RCTD. 
•  Introduction of  COME  SA Bond Guarantee Scheme is under consideration. 
4.2 Pavments 
a)  Financial Sector Reform 
The Government has initiated a number of  policy measures in the capital and money 
market since the launch of  the financial sector reform programme in 1989. 
(i)  Capital Market 
The development of the capital market, which until  1990 was in the hands of 
stockbrokers, is now the responsibility of  Capital Markets Authority (CMA) established 
in 1990. 
1996 witnessed the introduction of  the first venture capital fund in Kenya, the Acacia 
Venture Capital Fund. 
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commercial papers, the CMA issued guideline on issuance of Corporate Bonds and 
Commercial Papers. 
The final Memorandum of  Understanding, which provides for the establishment of 
a co-ordination mechanism of  activities, under the "East African Securities Regulatory 
Authorities" (EACSRA), was executed on March 1997. 
As a policy measure to modernise and develop the capital market, the government 
has allowed foreign brokerage and funds management firms to participate in this market 
provided they do so through locally registered companies in which there is local beneficial 
ownership of  at least: 
•  30% in the case of  fund management firms. 
•  51% in the case of  brokerage firms. 
(ii)  Money Market 
Reforms in the money market date back to 1989, when the financial sector reform 
programme was launched. Since then a number of policy measures have been put in 
place aimed at ensuring a sound financial system. These policy measures include:-
(i)  Strengthening the capital base of  commercial banks and financial institutions. 
Paid up capital has been raised progressively since the 1989 level ofKShs15m:-
KShs7 .5million for a bank incorporated in Kenya and a financial institution or mortgage 
finance companies respectively, to KShs200m (effective December 2000) for banks and 
mortgage finance companies and to KShs 150m for financial institutions. According to 
the Finance Act of 1999, the capital base will be increased progressively so that by year 
2005 minimum core capital for banks and finance companies will be KShs500m and 
KShs375m for financial institutions. 
For Building societies, minimum core capital was raised from  KShs5m to 
Kshs50million (to be effective by December 2000). 
(ii)  Banks inspection 
The banking Act has been extensively revised with a view to enhancing the powers 
of the Central Bank to  supervise banks and also ensure compliance with prudential 
guidelines. The Central Bank is now empowered to levy monetary penalties to banks 
that do not comply with the laid down regulations. 
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Banking sector lending and deposit interest rates were decontrolled in 1991. Since 
then, they have been determined by market forces. 
(iv)  Exchange system 
The following reforms have been accomplished in the exchange system in Kenya. 
•  On 181h October 1993 inter-bank spot exchange market was fully liberalised. 
All restrictions on current account transactions were removed in 1994. Foreign 
Exchange Control Act was repealed in December 1995. East African currencies 
are fully convertible and foreign exchange dealers in the three countries are 
free to trade in these currencies. 
•  On foreign investment in the stock market shares, foreign companies can own 
up to 40% of  the floated Kenyan stocks and shares while individuals can own 
up to 5% of  companies traded in the Stock Market. 
•  There is no limit on the amount investors can repatriate. They must however, 
produce proof of payment of their tax obligations along side other legal 
obligations 
(ii)  Domestic Payments and Settlements 
Kenya has  already signed the IMF article VIII. Accordingly, therefore, Kenya 
guarantees to pay anyone holding Kenya currency in foreign currency of  their choice. 
4.3 Investment 
a)  Investment Approvals and licensing procedures 
By 1992, there were 35 types of  investment approvals (General and specific) which 
investors were required to obtain prior to their commencing investments. 
This has somewhat been addressed through the IPC Act, which has introduced a one 
stop office for investment approval. The Investment Promotion Centre Act has been amended 
to reduce the number of  days for processing an application for investment from 90 to 30 
days. Despite this development, there is need for rationalising licensing and approval systems. 
b) Investment code 
The Draft Investment code is ready and is due for publishing in the course of  year 
2000. The process, is however tied to the EAC programme ofharmonisation of  investment 
incentives, which began in March 2000. 
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Harmonisation of investment regimes is  contemplated in the context of EAC 
framework of regional co-operation. It is envisaged to be done as soon as the work on 
investment code in the three EAC countries is finalised. 
d)  Immigration, Residence and Employment 
Kenya has implemented the first phase of  the CO  MESA protocol on elimination of 
visas. Accordingly, therefore, all residents of  Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth 
COME  SA states, except Sudan and Somalia, do not need visas to visit Kenya. For residents 
of  Sudan and Somalia, however, visas are granted on application. 
Kenya is committed to removal of  the visa requirement for CO  MESA member states 
nationals by the year 2000, as stipulated by the CO  MESA protocol on free movement of 
persons, labour and service and the right of establishment and residence, which was 
adopted by the COMESA heads of states on 29 June, 1998. 
Meanwhile, Kenya has been granting work entry permits to nationals of Uganda 
and Tanzania for skilled and unskilled cadre oflabour at a fee ofKShs  10,000 and KShs500 
annually, respectively. 
In the three East African countries Inter State Pass are in use, while an East African 
Passport has already been launched. 
e)  Membership/Participation in investment protection agencies 
Kenya is a member ofMIGA and ICSID 
4.4 CBI Status 
a)  Status on Addendum to Letter ofCBI policy 
Kenya has circulated its Addendum to the letter of  CBI policy to the CBI participating 
countries, COMESA Secretariat and the Cosponsors 
b)  National Program on Road Map for Investment Facilitation 
Kenya completed the National program for investment facilitation on 30 March 
2000. The program has since been circulated to the CBI participating countries, CO  MESA 
Secretariat and the Co-sponsors. 
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1.  OVERVIEW OF THE CBI 
Madagascar has been involved in the CBI process since its inception participating 
in the first meeting in Mauritius in 1992 and the  subsequent ministerial meeting in 
Kampala. Madagascar was one of the first to initiate action in line with the Common 
Programme of  Action. 
The reason put forward by the authorities in Madagascar to join the CBI was to 
enhance efforts regarding the then regional integration process in the context of  CO  MESA, 
the IOC and SADC. This was also the point of  view of  the public and private sector at 
that time. Their expectation was to see Madagascar being positioned as a major regional 
player. The envisaged regional market was also seen as an opportunity for the development 
of the private sector in Madagascar. Following a reorientation of the general political 
climate in Madagascar it was felt that the private sector should play an important role in 
the development and thus participation in the regional integration process. It was also 
considered as a priority for the government to achieve economic development through 
regional development and involvement in the regionalisation process. 
However the present perception of  the CBI in the country is quite contradictory. The 
public sector feels that the Cross Border Initiative especially through actions carried out 
by the TWG has been somewhat influential in shaping the regional co-operation policy 
of  the country, though they admit that it is difficult to pin-point its direct contribution. 
They also consider that it has helped in the macro-economic restructure, more specifically 
in the trade liberalisation and customs tariff restructure. For the government the CBI 
process pioneered the idea of initiating a continued dialogue on regional co-operation 
issues, between the public and the private sector on the same platform. All previous 
attempts on that subject were more on an ad hoc basis. 
On the other hand the private sector feels that its benefits were quite negligible and 
there has not been enough communication regarding the regionalisation process through 
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the CBI and think that it is a duplication of other regional integration programmes or 
processes. The private sector also thinks that the TWG has not been very influential in 
proposing concrete solutions related to the macro-economic liberalisation policy reforms. 
The private sector feels that most of  these actions were already part of  recommendations 
under the structural adjustment programme (SAP) which began implementation in the 
90's. These measures coincided with the proposals made under the Cross Border Initiative 
and therefore the private sector also had the impression that the measures implemented 
under donor programmes overshadowed that of  CBI. The economic liberalisation process 
as proposed by the SAP in Madagascar concerned more the opening up of  Madagascar 
to the world market than the regional market. For the private sector, the implications of 
the CBI were not fully understood and the TWG was not a strong enough lobby group to 
influence policy decisions in the country. Even if there were any such decisions then, 
they were not really aware of  their existence, or they were not properly communicated to 
the business community. 
The specific elements of  the CBI that have been useful to the country according to 
the public sector is the setting up dialogue between public and private sector and also the 
opportunity given to  the latter to  be involved very actively.  This type of partnership 
existed previously, but for other aspects of  economic development. One of  the positive 
actions that representatives of the government in the TWG claim, is to  have made 
Madagascar become a member ofCOMESA. In addition The TWG also admits to have 
continuously supported Madagascar in the IOC (Indian Ocean Commission) projects. 
The Malagasy TWG also claim to have significantly contributed towards the tariff 
reduction which was made official in the "Loi des Finances 1995". The private sector 
feels that the TWG was only a discussion group on its own and no major decisions were 
taken further to political decision makers. 
Regarding the relationship between CBI and the regional institutions, the CBI has 
helped Madagascar to become a member of COMESA. According to the TWG it has 
also helped to adopt trade liberalisation and tariff reduction programmes under the IOC 
PRIDE programme. 
On the whole, from information gathered both from the public and the private sector, 
CBI has only been a process without much influence on the policy decisions regarding 
the regional co-operation issues. It was set up to enable dialogue between public and 
private sector on regional co-operation issues but it does not seem to have achieved its 
objectives. In fact as Madagascar was already in a process of liberalising its economy 
under SAP programmes and it was more a matter of coincidence that all liberalisation 
measures regarding trade, investment, payment and movement of  persons were undertaken 
alongside proposals from the CBI. 
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2.1 Overview ofthe TWG meetings 
The TWG in Madagascar was officially set up by a Decree No 96-73 7 in 1996. The 
TWG consisted of  representatives from Ministries ofEconomic Planning, Trade, Industry, 
Foreign Affairs, Central Bank, Home Affairs,  Customs Parastatals. Private sector 
representatives included the Manufacturers' Association, the Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry,  Syndicate of Malagasy Industries, Groupement des Entreprises and 
Agricultural and Commercial sector representatives. 
The TWG set up a secretariat in 1995 for 6 months and was further renewed for the 
same period. Due to irregular activities no further contract was given to run the secretariat. 
The Malagasy TWG since then has been operating without a secretariat. 
In fact the only period which the TWG claims to have been working with a coherent 
team on a regular basis is between 1996 and 1997. However since 1997 meetings were 
not conducted in a very formal and regular manner. Some members even indicated that 
they did not attend the meetings on a regular basis given the fact that there were other 
similar or related committees and there seemed to be duplication. This duplication is 
also perceived to be one of  the reasons for low private sector participation. In addition, 
Madagascar experienced a number of changes in government and this also influenced 
the composition of  the TWG team. 
Meetings have been held regularly except during a short period of  12 months. They 
were either organised monthly or more frequently depending on the urgency of  the matter. 
The main issues discussed at the level of the TWG was related to the same four 
proposed by CBI that is  Trade, Investment and Payment liberalisation and also free 
movement of  persons. 
The main problem encountered by the TWG was the various changes in government 
which resulted in changes in the members constituting the TWG.  They also had a 
secretariat for only 2 periods of  six months. The rest of  the time the co-ordination was 
carried out through the Chairman's office. The other problems that the TWG had to face 
was the fact that there was almost no follow up on CBI issues. 
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This situation also explains the lack of  sensitisation activities at the TWG level. No 
workshop, seminars or promotional activities were organised since the beginning of  the 
TWG. Similarly, no studies were commissioned by them. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN  POLICY  REFORM  AREAS 
3.1 Foreign Trade 
In the foreign trade area, Madagascar has made tremendous progress comparing 
1992 to the present situation. There has been a gradualliberalisation process since 1988 
in this area and in 1992 major changes led to the liberalisation of Imports with a few 
exceptions on wheat flour, luxury items, flora and fauna. This was further liberalised in 
1996 with the only exceptions on imports being flora and fauna. 
Similarly following reforms in export licensing since 1992 and also 1996, there are 
no  export restrictions and export licensing except for minerals, some flora and fauna 
items. Some products such as coffee, vanilla and seafood items still have to undergo a 
quality control. 
Non-Tariff  barriers 
Madagascar has eliminated almost all traditional NTB 's. However it still has some 
restrictions regarding certain norms on the import and export of products, and on the 
movement of  people. Foreigners still need a visa which is now automatically delivered 
on arrival at the airport. 
Intra - regional tariffs 
Madagascar has recently (1999) approved an 80% tariff reduction under the IOC 
PRIDE programme. In fact one of the conditions for Madagascar to benefit from this 
programme was to adopt the tariff reduction programme. It is expected to completely 
liberalise within the IOC region by the end of2000. 
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COMESA it has however not yet implemented it. In line with the CBI objectives the 
Malagasy government has decided to reduce customs duties by 90% and to reach a 100% 
reduction by October 2000. There are still some administrative issues to be sorted out 
between the Malagasy authorities and the COMESA Secretariat for this reduction to be 
fully operational. 
External Tariffs and CBI harmonisation 
Madagascar has been implementing a tariff reduction programme since  1995. 
Comparing the situation as from 1992 indicates that Madagascar has made significant 
progress during that period. Corning from a situation where the maximum tariff was 
50% in 1992, it has been reduced to a maximum of 30% with an objective of  reaching 
25% in the corning years. The number oftariffbands have also been reduced to only 6 
over the same period. The customs tariff is  divided into two categories  1.  "Droit de 
Douane" and 2.  Taxe a  !'Importation where both combined do not exceed 30%. The 
tariff  reduction process is illustrated in the following figures where the average tariff has 
been reduced from 21.7  4% in 1997 to 1  7% in 1999. 
In 2000 the tariff structure in Madagascar is as follows. 
Product Category  Rate 
Raw material  10% 
Intermediary Goods  20% 
Finished products  30% 
Specific Rates 
Maximum customs rate  30% 
IOC preferential rate  80% 
COMESA preferential rate  90% 
As far as CBI tariff structure is concerned, Madagascar is close to the .CBI agenda 
with three non zero tariffs and maximum tariffs of 20-25%. The maximum tariff for 
Madagascar is 30% and there are no zero tariffs. 
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In 1988 Madagascar adopted the ASYCUDA and the HS code (Harmonised System) 
for tariff classification. The customs however indicated that due to problems related to 
the equipment and lack of  trained staff, theASYCUDA was not operational. Madagascar 
has furthermore simplified its customs clearance and trade procedures by doing away 
with the multiplicity of  customs and foreign currency declaration documents. 
Regarding the introduction of single goods declaration document, the customs 
authorities indicated that this will not be implemented soon due to the large number of 
customs offices which would require vast stafftraining programmes. 
Customs Valuation 
Madagascar has not yet adopted the GATT Valuation Code which was expected to 
be due this year. 
Pre-shipment Inspection and Import Verification 
Madagascar hires the services of  Bureau Veritas for pre-shipment services regarding 
the customs valuation and import value verification purposes. However this applies only 
for imports exceeding US$ 3500. Both the private and public sector find this procedure 
inefficient and is seen as a hindrance to trade rather than a facilitator. 
3.2 Payments 
Financial Sector Reform 
As in the previous cases, all reforms in the financial sector cannot be attributed to 
the CBI but to already existing Structural Adjustment Programmes. In fact these reforms 
are again in line with the recommendations of  the CBI policy reforms. 
Between 1992 and 2000 the  financial  sector has been implementing important 
reforms. These mainly concern the elimination of  state monopoly on financial institutions, 
the redefinition of  the role of  the Central Bank with increased autonomy, liberalisation 
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Financial Institutions. 
Having started since 1988, these reforms have enabled foreign (mainly regional) 
financial institutions to set up in Madagascar. These allowed Banks such as the Mauritius 
Commercial Bank, Credit Lyonnais and BNP to start operations in the 1990's. In 1994 
new banking laws were put in place to give more autonomy to the Central Bank regarding 
the stabilisation of  the local currency. 
Under the same law a Banking and Financial Supervision Commission (Commission 
de Supervision Bancaire et Financiere-CSBF) was set up to ensure adequate supervision 
and the development of  a healthy financial sector. It  also ensures that financial institutions 
abide by prudential guidelines and directives as well as encouraging competition in the 
sector. 
In 1995, another law, No. 95-030, was passed which legalised the establishment of 
«Off-shore» banking operations and also new services such as leasing. 
Exchange Systems 
Following the abolition of  exchange controls, Madagascar introduced an inter-bank 
foreign exchange market since 1995 thus allowing the value ofthe Malagasy franc to be 
determined by market forces. The role of  the Central Bank is therefore only to stabilise 
the market. Traders can thus freely obtain foreign exchange and are also allowed to have 
foreign currency accounts while exporters are allowed to repatriate their export earnings. 
Bureau de change activities have also been authorised to operate under licence. 
Madagascar has also signed Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement in 
September 1996 facilitating the removal of  restrictions on current account transactions. 
Therefore, transactions involving foreign exchange such as repatriation of profits and 
dividends, foreign currency transfers for educational purposes and foreign exchange 
allocations for travel overseas have been liberalised. 
For more efficient transfers the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication) network is also operational in Madagascar. 
Regarding Capital Account Transactions, the Malagasy government has liberalised 
all inward investment flows.  However capital flow outside the country is  subject to 
administrative authorisation. 
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Investment Approval and licensing procedures 
In order to simplify investment procedures and deliver the relevant licenses the 
Malagasy government set up a one stop shop (Office de Guichet Unique-OGU) in 1992 
within the Ministry of Private sector Development and Privatisation. This OGU was 
mainly operational under the Investment Code and the Export Processing Zone Regime. 
However the Investment Code has now been repealed due to abuse of the investment 
incentives. As a result the OGU exists only for the Export Processing Scheme. 
On a parallel basis a  new service has been set up within the Ministry of 
Industrialisation and Craftsmanship called "Espace Promotion des Investissements (EPI)". 
It  also provides assistance by way oflegal services and documentation within that Ministry. 
Company Formation/Registration 
The government has established a 'Centre for the Facilitation of  Company Formation' 
(Centre de Facilitation de Creation d'Entreprise- CFCE). It is a free service has been 
established for business facilitation and company formation and falls  under the 
responsibility of  the Ministry ofPrivatisation and Private Sector Development. The delay 
for registration normally takes one week and is a sine qua non condition for incorporating 
a company in Madagascar. 
Export Processing Zones 
The only specific investment regime existing in Madagascar at present is the Export 
Processing Zones (EPZ). This regime was set up in 1989 to boost the export oriented 
enterprises. The Export Processing Zones are not specific to one area but scattered all 
over the island. As a result a number of  companies mainly in the textile sector have been 
set up in the last five years. On the regional front there are quite an increasing number of 
Mauritian companies who have started operation in Madagascar under this regime. 
There is no discrimination as far as investment procedures are concerned with both 
the local and foreign investor treated on an equal basis. Restrictions such as maximum 
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multinational enterprises are governed by the COMESA Multinational Industrial 
Enterprise Charter (CO MESA MIE Charter) to which Madagascar subscribes. Madagascar 
thus does not impose any protection restrictions on the operations of multinational 
industrial enterprises. 
In terms of investment protection Madagascar is a member of the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and has signed Double Taxation Agreements 
with Mauritius (1995) and the Reunion- through France- (1993). Madagascar has 
plans to sign more agreements with other countries-including none CBI participating 
members. 
Facilitation of  the Movement of  Persons 
Compared to the situation prior to 1996, obtaining a visa is no longer a problem in 
Madagascar.  Visas are now issued at the Airport upon arrival or in the Malagasy 
Diplomatic Missions abroad. Those employed on a permanent basis can also obtain their 
residence and employment permits easily through their relevant embassies. Usually for 
such permits 15 days should be enough but in practice such permits can take as long as 3 
months. They require to be scrutinised by the Interior Police, the Immigration Department, 
the Ministry of  Labour (for employment permits) and the Interior Ministry. 
It should be noted that Madagascar is also looking into the possibility of ratifying 
the CO  MESA Protocol on Relaxation and Eventually Elimination of  Visas as soon as 
negotiations and all prerequisites are ready. 
3.4 CBI Status 
The Letter of  CBI Policy 
Madagascar was one of  the first countries to prepare the draft Letter ofCBI Policy 
in 1994. After presenting a revised version in 1996 followed by a discussion with a 
team of IMF-WB, the CBI Policy letter was sent to the co-sponsors in July 1997. 
Comments from the co-sponsors were sent back to Madagascar towards the end of  the 
same year. 
The Malagasy letter of CBI policy has been supporting the measures proposed by 
the Concept Paper and was also in line with the Economic policy framework of the 
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Madagascar in the  area of regional co-operation which was  also  seen as  being 
complementary to macro-economic measures under the ongoing structural adjustment 
programme. One of  the positive actions resulted in the ratification of  the membership of 
Madagascar into COMESA. 
Regarding the CBI agenda, it must be pointed out that Madagascar was also part 
of a trade and investment liberalisation and exchange programme called PRIDE 
(Programme Regional Integre de Developpement des Echanges) under the Indian Ocean 
Commission. Some of the measures proposed under CBI were also similar to those 
conditions prior to the disbursement of funds for PRIDE. This therefore implies that 
the measures being implemented by Madagascar were not solely initiated by The Cross 
Border Initiative. 
The measures taken by Madagascar in the letter were therefore mainly related to 
those already proposed under the SAP which started before 1992. Regarding the LCBIP 
it was thus indicative ofthe actions already taken and the plans for future measures. The 
actions under CBI were therefore seen as an audit of existing constraints and also the 
proposed solutions within a defined timeframe. 
Status on the Addendum to the Letter of  CBI  policy 
The Addendum to the LCBIP is still under consideration. It has not yet been finalised 
given that the TWG is  not operating on a regular basis.  In Madagascar the Policy 
Implementation Committee was never formally set up but all work related to CBI is 
monitored by the Technical Working Group. It is expected to produce the addendum in 
the near future. 
4.  FUTURE OF THE TWG AND CBI 
Both the public and private sector representatives believe in economic development 
through regional cooperation. Madagascar is a fully-fledged member of  the Indian Ocean 
Commission, COMESA and the lOR and has been closely monitoring activities under 
these organisations. There is also a strong feeling from both political decision makers 
and the private sector that the SADC region also represents an economically viable regional 
groupmg. 
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scene but at the same time it had already been involved in a process of  economic reform 
with objectives similar to those under the CBI agenda.  As these reforms have been 
implemented at the same time as the CBI process it is difficult to measure the level of 
influence that the TWG has had in shaping Madagascar's regional policy. The private 
sector feels that Madagascar has not benefited fully from the CBI and also that information 
has not been properly circulated. They also indicated that the majority of  private sector 
operators have little knowledge of  the regional cooperation process and its implications 
for Madagascar. Malagasy companies have only recently started to be actively involved 
in the regional integration process. For a few years they were more preoccupied with 
local problems. 
Regarding the future of  the TWG and the CBI agenda, a new committee CODRA 
(Comite pour la Dimension Regionale de l'Ajustement has recently been set up  as  a 
think tank on regional cooperation issues. In fact, it is seen as an extension of  the TWG. 
The task of  this new committee is to look deeper into the regional cooperation aspects of 
the ongoing adjustment programme. The committee consists of  members who have been 
co-opted from the TWG. However though the administrative process in place they have 
not yet formally started discussions. 
Along the same lines, a World Bank study on the positioning of  Madagascar in the 
context of  regional cooperation will soon be launched by the CRC Consultative Committee 
on Competitiveness (Comite de Reflexion sur la Competitivite- CRC). The CRC is a 
representative organ of  the private sector which seeks to build the capacity of  its various 
constituent private institutions and organisations in policy formulation and analysis with 
particular reference to improving the competitiveness of the Malagasy economy. The 
CRC believes in the regional integration process and that it is a stepping stone for the 
development of  the private sector in Madagascar. 
The results expected from this study will be vital for defining the regional policy of 
Madagascar. As the CRC pointed out, Madagascar is at the cross roads and seems to be 
confused vis a  vis its membership in so many organisations in addition to potential ones 
like SADC. Is Madagascar ready to be involved in all of  them? Which ones would be the 
best? What are advantages for Madagascar? These are some of  the questions that probably 
should have been asked at the outset of the CBI but still remain unanswered. Through 
this new study and the actions undertaken under CODRA, Madagascar will probably 
make use of similar consultative process as the TWG to position itself on the regional 
market. 
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1.  OVERVIEW OF CBI  ACTIVITIES 
1.1. History ofCBI  Participation 
Following the  1992 Harare Workshop and in accordance with the Common 
Programme of  Action (CPA) for the Cross- Border Initiative (CBI), Malawi undertook 
more work to define and refine its country status in relation to the CBI agenda. Though 
the CPA was not extensively publicised, consultations were held with key government 
departments, parastatal organisations and the Chamber of  Commerce. During 1993, the 
Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) and the Technical Working Group (TWG) were 
established. The Malawi TWG produced a report for that was presented to the Harare 
workshop in December 1993. During this workshop the CPA was finalised and accepted 
by the donors. However, as civil agitation and the clamour for political change intensified 
in that year leading to the referendum (1993) and multi-party elections in 1994, the CBI 
agenda temporarily went out of  focus. No secretariat was appointed form October 1993 
to  the end of 1996.  CBI issues were discussed generally within the Ministry of 
Finance(MoF) with the occasional representation from other ministries, MIPA, MEPC 
and MCCI, The decisions taken during this time where generally those made in line with 
overall MoF policies and principles. 
From 1995-97, good economic policies contributed to a strong average annuafgrowth 
of9 percent. However, in 1997/98, the pace of  reforms decelerated and expenditure control 
weakened, leading to a lower GDP growth rate of  about 5 percent over that period. 
While economic integration has been faithfully pursued and the country has largely 
been on course in the regional integration under the broader CO  MESA agenda in areas 
of trade and general economic liberalisation, liberalisation of the payment system, 
investment deregulation and streamlining of  approval procedures, management and co-
ordination of  CBI has not been adequate. The main reasons for this may be attributed to 
p.374 shortage of  staff in the MoF, inadequate management by the respective TWG chairs and 
the political situation in the mid 1990's. 
The TWGs met erratically from 1996 to 1999, usually when there was pressure to 
meet donor obligations, brief the cabinet or when there was a need to attend CBI TWG 
and Ministerial meetings. A permanent secretariat was only appointed from July to 
December 1998 and from July 1999 to April 2000 
The Malawian economy is heavily dependent on external assistance from bilateral 
co-operating partners and multilateral institutions and agencies especially for major 
infrastuctural works and other capital projects. This allowed the donors to push the desired 
liberalisation processes and initiatives and achieve some desired liberalisation process 
under the CBI agenda even if  these changes were the result of  other initiatives. 
1.2 Perceotions of  the CBI  process 
Being an integration initiative, the CBI agenda is still largely unfulfilled. Should the 
Initiative be discontinued at this stage, the danger of policy reversals and nefariously 
competitive, nationalistic interests arising is very high. The government remains firmly 
committed to the CBI process and its successor the Regional Integration Forum. 
The private sector, however still has little knowledge of  the CBI process and requires 
nurturing, especially in matters of competition within the region. Many of the broad 
trade issues such as infant industry protection, anti-dumping and countervailing measures 
still require a lot of  clarification to the region's business community. However the effects 
of  the tariff lowering are keenly understood by the business community 
The aspect of  global integration did not overly effect Malawi's business community 
during this phase of  the Cross-Border Initiative. The main focus during this period was 
on national policy formulation, regionalism and regional trade integration via the various 
Multi and Bi-lateral trade agreements. Therefore, integration into the global economy 
was not given sufficient focus. The evolving rules-based trading system under the World 
Trade Organisation was only referred to in a cursory manner. It will, however, become 
increasingly important for Malawi to synchronise its WTO obligations with it's regional 
commitments and undertakings. This process begun in Malawi with a workshop for the 
private sector in November 1999 to focus on the WTO and the Seattle issues. DFID are 
funding a programme to build capacity in Malawi's institutions and within the private 
sector to deal with the various trade and investment initiatives that Malawi is party to 
both regionally and globally. 
p.375 Against this back drop of a heightening awareness of trade and globalisation, the 
desire of  the private sector to understand all the processes that effect the Malawian and 
regional economies is growing. The renamed Trade Policy National Working Group, it 
is hoped, will be the catalyst that will heighten the awareness and understanding of  the 
CBIIRIF process in Malawi. 
1.3. Relationship with SADC 
SADC continues to hold the highest profile in Malawi at present owing to the all the 
negotiations pertaining to the implementation of the SADC FTA in September 2000. 
Malawi has limited resources in the respect of trade negotiations and has, therefore, 
thrown all these resources at these SADC negotiations in an attempt to secure the best 
position for Malawi. The demand on these resources was further compounded by the 
crises that arose over the  South African/ Malawi Bi-Lateral trade agreement. This 
effectively sidelined the CBI as  a trade initiative. There is  a well focussed National 
Working Group on the SADC Protocol on Trade which is chaired by the private sector 
and meets regularly. It is fully representative of the private sector and the GoM. The 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry is receiving good support on the SADC trade 
protocols, which has allowed to produced a coherent offers to SADC that is fully supported 
by all of  the relevant stakeholders involved. The CBI falls under the Ministry of  Finance 
whose primary focus is not trade. Therefore the CBI is not benefiting from the donor 
support to the Ministry of  Commerce and Industry and is being side lined by other issues 
of  more core interest to the MoF. Because South Africa is Malawi's major trading partner, 
Malawi tends to focus more on SADC and its Bi-Lateral agreement with South Africa. 
The CBI has however progressed well in spite of  these restraints. As it is an voluntary 
initiative CBI has worked well with the SADC agreement. The main issue is  the 
competitive nature of  the different tariffs offered under the CBI, Comesa and the various 
Bi-laterals. 
1.4 Relationship with COMESA 
Malawi has done well in its implementation of  its commitments with respect to the 
COMESA treaty. However, there is very little consultation with the private sector on 
COMESA- the Ministry accepts that this is a problem that needs to be addressed. There 
is an inter-Ministerial Trade Agreement Working Committee (which the Malawi Chamber 
of  Commerce and Industry is invited to attend) that examines issues related to COMESA. 
The sectoral Ministries and the central bank are responsible for issues relating to their 
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Malawi should move on the liberalisation of imports of agricultural produce from the 
other COMESA members. There is  commonality of members between the CBI and 
Comesa which means that there is no competitiveness between the two in Malawi. The 
main problem is that Comesa is run by the MoCI and CBI is run via the MoF. There is the 
usual poor communication between the two ministries which causes a lack of  focus the 
common issues. 
Tariff  Preferences on Bilateral Agreements 
In addition to its regional obligations, Malawi accords and/or receives preferential 
market access for products from/to a number of countries with which the country has 
bilateral agreements. Malawi is also negotiating other agreements with some neighbouring 
countries such as Zambia and Tanzania. As these agreements are mostly duty-free 
arrangements, they are contributing to speeding up the integration of  Malawi in the region, 
even if  it is only in the field of  trade. It  is consequently, very easy for Malawi to implement 
regional trade preferences either under CO  MESA or the initial fast-track measures under 
the CBI. Existing bilateral agreements are: -
a)  Malawi - Botswana Trade Agreement 
b) Malawi - Mozambique Agreement 
c)  Malawi - Republic of  South Africa Bilateral Trade Agreement 
d)  Malawi - Zimbabwe Free Trade Agreement 
2.  ACTIVITIES OF THE TWG 
2.1 Overview ofTWG meetings 
With the SADCC concept still being developed in the early 1990's and the isolation 
of  South African meant that the PTA was the main vehicle for change in the region and 
Malawi. Therefore in the early stages ofthe CBI the process was accorded an appropriate 
level of importance. The TWG met regularly in 1993 and 1994 with the chair always 
being from the Ministry of Finance. The first Chairman was Dr.  Henry Ngombe (the 
present Director of  the National Economic Council). The TWG was good blend of  public 
p.377 and private sector with representation from the Ministry of  Commerce and Industry, the 
Ministry of  Economic Planning and Development, MIPA, MCCI, MEPC, Customs and 
excise, Press Corporation, Grain and Milling, Admarc, the Okhai Group of  Companies, 
National and Commercial Bank of  Malawi. The TWG from time to time invited members 
from other sectors and industries when these sectors were on the TWG meeting agendas. 
The TWG during this period was well managed by Dr. Ngombe and helped to make 
Malawi one of  the leading participants of  the CBI process. By early 1995 Malawi together 
with Zambia ahead of  the implementation requirements of  the CBI. 
From late  1994 till early 1997 there was no official TWG owing to the political 
environment mentioned earlier in the report. The TWG were revived under a series of 
chairs through to the present Chairman, Mr. Patrick Kumwendo who was appointed in 
late 1998. Prior to Mr. Kumwendo's appointment the TWG was poorly managed with 
the first chair person dying and his successor being away on study leave for over one 
year. The hand over procedures from one chair to the next was poor. No secretariat was 
appointed until mid 1998. The composition of the TWG during this period was more 
skewed towards the public sector as shown in Annex 1. The private sector was represented 
by MCCI and the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) National Working Group (NWG) 
Chairman. The SADC FTA NWG had representatives from all sectors of the Private 
Sector.  However their presence at the TWG meetings was sporadic leading to the 
membership being heavily skewed towards the Public sector.  During the period the 
meetings were not regular but rather were held in response to donor demand and the 
need to meet their conditionalities. 
The key areas covered during the CBI process were generally focused the fast track 
liberalisation process of  the CBI and the wider Comesa trade liberalisation agenda. This 
typical focused on such issues as 
t  The impacts that the lowering of  tariffs had on the various sectors of  the economy. 
t  Non tariff  barriers and how to remove them internally, and how to lobby for their 
removal externally 
t  The impact of  the export taxes and how to remove them 
t  The process of  accepting the GATT valuation codes 
t  The methodology of  narrowing the dispersions of  the tariff structure 
t  The effects of  the overlapping objectives of  other donor driven parallel initiatives 
to the CBI. ie 
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t  Enterprise Development and Drought Recover Process of 1992 to 1996 
t  The Fiscal Restructuring and Deregulation Programme 1996 tO  1999 
t  The ESAF's an SAF's 
t  The impact of  the various trade agreements that Malawi is signature to i.e. 
•  The SADC FTA 
•  Zimbabwe Bi lateral 
•  RSA a symmetrical Bi-lateral 
•  Lome 
t  The introduction of  the CBI road map for investment and its implications 
In summary Malawi has achieved most of  the goals as set out by the CBI Letter of 
Policy primarily via other parallel donor driven initiatives. The major problem faced 
were 
•  The continuity ofthe TWG chair and the regularity of  its meetings. 
•  The CBI was never well known by either the public or private sector as the 
sensitisation process never really happened. 
•  The junior level of  representative that attended TWG meetings. There was a 
distinct lack of  decision makers who really understood the issues in attendance. 
This meant that decisions were made by the ministry of  finance with minimal 
consultation and usually under time presshre. 
2.2 Overview o(Sensitisation Activities 
The sensitisation of  the different sectors of  Malawi to the CBI has been very poor. 
This is due largely to the erratic history of  the TWG and its lack of  consistency in both its 
meetings and representation and the junior level of  representatives who were assigned to 
attend the TWG meetings. No workshops, advertising or other sensitisation processes 
where actually carried out over the past six years. 
p.379 The formation ofThe SADC Trade Protocol National Working Group in 1997 has 
helped to sensitise the Malawian private sector to trade issues. This national working 
group is chaired by Neville Williamson, the Managing Director of  David Whitehead and 
Sons. It has good representation from all areas of the private and government sectors. 
The private sector has been fairly ignorant ofthe status and contents ofthe various trade 
agreements and initiatives that Malawi is signatory to. It has been the task of  this NWG 
to sensitise them to the issues and to provide a forum for debate and input. The regional 
negotiations on the implementation of  the SADC Free Trade Area has acted as a catalyst 
to bring the private sector openly into the debate. The NWG recently changed its name to 
the Trade Policy National Working Group and is now focused on all trade and investment 
related issues in Malawi. It is the desire of  the CBI TWG to be fully represented on the 
Trade Policy NWG. Mr Williamson the chairman of  the NWG is a working member of 
theCBITWG. 
It  is the intention of  the TWG to run a road show similar to the one run by the SADC 
secretariat and the Trade Policy in February 2000 to sensitise the Public to the CBI and 
other elated trade agreements and their inter-relationships. It  is believed that this approach 
would achieve more than just focusing on individual trade issues within Malawi. 
2.3 Overview o(Studies Undertaken 
Only two major studies were carried out directly under the umbrella of the CBI. 
Many other studies were conducted under other initiatives that had a direct bearing on 
the CBI. 
2.3.1  Study to Analyse Malawi's Non Traditional Exports and their Potential 
for Growth 
This study was commissioned in October 1997 and completed and accepted at the 
end of  September 1998 by Chulu and Associates. The reports main conclusions were 
Main sectors identified for development were:-
t  Hand Crafts 
t  Apparel Industry 
t  Biscuits and confectionery 
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t  Cut Flowers 
t  Ceramics 
t  Timber and timber based products 
t  Canned fruit juices 
The usual barriers to investment were highlighted, i.e. Utilities, TEP's (Temporary 
Employment Permits), road networks, telecommunications, NTB 's, Labour relations act, 
the investment climate etc. 
It was further suggested that the way Malawi markets itself and the research on 
foreign potential markets should be radically improved. It was requested the funds be 
made available to target studies on how to improve this situation. 
The report highlighted the positive developments by the introduction ofEPZ's, the 
introduction of  special tax concessions, the removal of  surtax on some domestic products 
and the liberalisation of  interest rates. 
The report was considered to be weak in the following areas:-
t  Identifying the relationship between the various acts in Malawi and their effect 
on investment. 
t  Did not address tourism at all 
t  Did not address the present perception of Malawi in both the regional and 
international markets. 
t  The difficulties in obtaining N  partners in the identified investment sectors was 
not analysed. 
t  The effects of all the regional trade agreements on the identified investment 
sectors. 
t  It did not do  a comparative study in the region of these identified sectors to 
assess the competitiveness of the industries and the synergy, if any of similar 
projects in the SADC/Comesa region 
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A study was undertaken on the Impact of the CBI on the Malawian economy by 
Professor Colin McCarthy of Stellenbosh University in South Africa and his associate 
under the context of'Economic Liberalisation in Sub-Sahara Africa with special reference 
to Malawi and Zambia' 
This study highlights the following conclusions on CBI's impact to the Malawian 
Economy: 
t  Malawi's initial post-independence economic strategy lead to large distortions 
and inefficiencies. These became increasingly obvious as exogenous shocks began 
to hit the economy. There is therefore little doubt that structural reforms were 
necessary for the economy to be put on an efficient growth path. What is more 
questionable is, whether the sequencing and pace of  the reforms was appropriate 
given the unique structure ofMalawi's economy. 
t  Malawi's liberalisation opened up firms to regional competition, causing a decline 
in manufacturing output. The desired goal of Malawi's firms to grow into the 
export markets has not been realised in any meaningful percentages. There has 
been a necessary expansion in the trading sector, which was formerly suppressed. 
This caused a shift in foreign exchange allocations towards imports of  consumer 
goods at much lower prices. Although this always provides competition for 
previously protected industries it can not be avoided in a global environment of 
growing liberalised trade regimes. The long-term benefits such as the anticipated 
upsurge of  non-traditional exports, it is hoped, will materialise over a more long-
term timeframe. 
t  Agriculture remains the dominant source of employment, growth and export 
earnings, with little shift of output to the other sectors. Malawi's comparative 
advantage still lies in labour intensive production. Provided that industries grow 
in response to larger regional markets, the net impact on employment is likely to 
be positive. 
t  CBI trade accounts for  a small proportion of Malawi's imports and exports, 
limiting the initiatives impact on domestic industry. The analysis has shown that 
there has been little significant change in the composition of  Malawi's imports 
for the years where data is available. On the export side, there is evidence that 
there has been some diversification towards non-traditional products since 1990, 
particularly for textiles. 
p.382 t  Exports to CBI countries have grown at a faster rate than exports to the rest ofthe 
world suggesting that lower tariff barriers in the region have assisted Malawi's 
exporters. 
t  Although intra-CBI trade is of small significance, CBI has supported Malawi's 
trade liberalisation strategy and has assisted in integrating Malawi's economy 
into global markets 
t  Liberalisation has not lead to any increase in investment levels in Malawi. This 
is partly due to the uncertainty that dramatic reforms create as potential investors 
often take a 'wait and see' attitude to the outcome of the changes that result. 
Investment is dependent on the overall economic climate and there are many 
other economic constraints to be addressed. 
t  Much of Malawi's industrial base and manufacturing sector is highly import 
dependent for their inputs due to little domestic vertical integration. Malawi is a 
long way from markets, has a poor infrastructure and cannot easily compete against 
producers in such countries as Zimbabwe whose operating costs are so much 
lower. This immediately puts Malawi's industry at a competitive disadvantage. 
The CBI has done little to rectify this imbalance. 
t  The study found that there are a  great number of structural and economic 
constraints that Malawi's domestic industries face.  It was recommended that 
liberalisation only be accompanied with infrastructural reforms and improved 
institutional support in areas such as marketing and technology transfer.  The 
opening up to regional and global markets is a dramatic conditional change for 
industry. No matter how much firms strive to make efficiency gains, and no matter 
how suited the industry may be to Malawi's conditions, this will be a shock. 
Under a  framework of dilapidated infrastructure, an unstable economic 
environment and inappropriate industrial policies, this shock may prove too much, 
and lead to the permanent collapse of  well established firms. 
t  Industrial development is a long-term process and until an established base is 
formed, it is desirable for Malawi to maintain some protective barriers, in order 
to enable its "infant industries" to grow up. In future negotiations concerning the 
CBI roadmap, emphasis should be put on the low level of  development of  Malawi's 
economy and on the fragility of  her industrial base. Due to the differing levels of 
development within the CBI region, integration has already resulted in an unequal 
distribution of  the costs and benefits, in favour of  more developed member states. 
p.383 t  Malawi's domestic markets are generally too small for investors to be attracted 
without fruitful export markets. Hence Malawi must remain committed to the 
CBI agenda, but emphasise that liberalisation must be uniform throughout the 
region, with provisions available for the least developed member states to hold 
back in the pace of  liberalisation for a temporary period. 
t  Although it is  explicitly catered for under the Uruguay round of the GATT 
agreement, CBI fails to provide for differential treatment for the least developed 
countries. The de-industrialisation of  weaker economies such as Malawi has been 
ignored, and there is no compensatory mechanism. Malawi should be very careful 
in considering further liberalisation, as its base is weak, as was demonstrated by 
the failure to  adjust to the devaluation of August 1998. These issues must be 
addressed, and Malawi's industrial base must be strengthened before further 
reforms are considered or agreed to. If  CBI is to be of  any benefit to Malawi, then 
the liberalisation undertaken in the programme should not be pursued in a 
multilateral context. Lesser developed member states should be given the option 
to  liberalise at a less rapid pace, as  adjustments to the inefficiencies accrued 
under heavy protection will take longer. 
SUMMARY 
Although it is appreciated that trade liberalisation is in Malawi's best interests in long 
run, care must be taken with sequencing, and with ensuring that reforms take place on a 
level playing ground. Special care should be taken in reducing the maximum tariff  rate and 
moving towards a Common External Tariff. Increased levels of import competition are 
initially taking place primarily on a regional basis. This is a necessary way of exposing 
domestic industry to some competition. However this competition is controlled as Malawi's 
trade barriers are relatively controlled to the rest of  the world. Such a structure should be 
retained for some time, allowing industries to develop and modernise. Only later, once 
industries have emerged domestically that have proven competitiveness on the regional 
markets should Malawi open fully to global market forces. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE CBI IN  POLICY  REFORM 
3.1 General Economic Overview 
The CBI being a fast track initiative was set against the back drop of a series of 
structural interventions in the Malawian economy since  1979.  These were further 
complicated by Malawi's membership and participation in various trading agreements. 
p.384 The following is a brief summary of  economic conditions of, and interventions in, the 
Malawian economy over the past twenty years to help set the CBI in the context of  the 
overall developments that have taken place. 
The initial adjustment effort began in late  1979 and took the form of a standby 
facility loan from the IMF. The components of  the adjustment programme were typical 
of  those instituted throughout the developing world at the time: diversification of  revenue 
sources; reduction of public expenditures; reduction in new credit; diversification of 
credit to the private sector; and rationalisation of  interest rates. However it was largely 
unsuccessful, largely due to the unanticipated impact of  the war in Mozambique, which 
became apparent in the midst of  the adjustment operation. Credit ceilings were exceeded 
and other targets were not achieved, a situation aggravated by the need to borrow to 
import maize during the drought emergency. 
Another standby loan was negotiated to last through to mid 1982, but again, was 
largely unsuccessful in stabilising the economy. The continued importation of  food, the 
lack of  success in generating new revenues, the high level of  interest payments, and the 
insolvency of parastatals and its impact on the viability of the commercial banks, all 
contributed to a continued crisis in the balance of  payments and fiscal deficits. 
Despite, or perhaps, in reaction to these failures, the government was successful in 
reaching agreement with the World Bank for the first tranche of  a structural adjustment 
loan (SAL 1  ).  Many of the objectives of the loan were similar to the suspended IMF 
standbys, including the restoration of equilibrium in the internal and external account 
balances. In addition, there was emphasis on restoring growth through improved resource 
management, institution building, and price policy and marketing arrangements. To 
improve the balance of  payments, increased exports of  smallholder crops were targeted, 
primarily through price-orientated adjustment. Efforts were also made towards improving 
the efficiency of  AD MARC. 
The pricing of  numerous other commodities and of  wages were also reviewed with 
a view to improving flexibility. Public utility rates were raised to address the growing 
dependence on imported fuels. The exchange rate and interest rates were also frequently 
reviewed. 
A second adjustment operation (SAL II) was signed in 1984, which was intended to 
continue the reforms initiated in the first phase. In addition, two further important issues 
were addressed. 
1.  Under the loan, government was committed to remove the entire fertiliser 
subsidy by 1985/86. 
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to contribute to the establishment of  a fertiliser revolving fund. Malawi also committed 
to rationalising ADMARC's operations, and increasing the role of  the private sector in 
agricultural marketing and distribution. 
Government's adherence to the guidelines realised the approval of  SAL III towards 
the end of 1985.  In this agreement, new commitments were made to complete the 
agricultural price liberalisation programme so as to serve the goals offood self-sufficiency, 
export promotion and crop diversification. As well as this, an active exchange rate policy 
continued and measures were taken to complete the development of  an export promotion 
policy. The government also committed itself to strategies for restructuring of the tax 
system and improving public sector management. 
During 1986, growth rates faltered, and the economy once again showed signs of 
weakness. Government failed to reach agreement with the IMF for the extension of  further 
facilities for 1986 and 1987. However, SAL III was extended with the World Bank in 
early 1987.  Several rectifying measures were taken by government and a new fiscal 
programme restraining expenditure and generating revenues was also designed. 
By mid-1988, government, working with the World Bank and IMF, adopted a shadow 
stabilisation programme designed to  reduce the fiscal deficit.  Meanwhile, the World 
Bank expressed an intention to move away from broad based SALs to a series of  policy 
based sectoral operations, designed to  address remaining structural constraints in the 
key productive sectors. An industrial and trade policy adjustment credit focussed on the 
liberalisation of  the foreign exchange allocation system, the promotion and establishment 
of  an appropriate exchange rate policy, and various measures designed to encourage the 
export sector. The removal of  restrictions to the entry of  new firms in industry was also 
committed to under this programme. 
An agriculture sector adjustment credit approved in 1990 included agreements to 
legalise the production of burley tobacco among smallholders and to discourage the 
transfer of land from smallholders to  the estate sector.  Malawi's adjustment strategy 
changed focus and began to put further emphasis on smallholder agriculture as the engine 
of  growth, largely through the liberalisation of  agricultural policies. Steps were made to 
promote the private sector and competitive markets to provide incentives for growth, 
and move away from the previous reliance on parastatals and private oligopolies. Efforts 
were also made to  re-orientate expenditure policy towards social services and other 
programmes which benefit the poor. 
A sequence of  shocks, including the two droughts in 1992 and 1994, as well as the 
suspension of non-humanitarian balance of  payments assistance from donors in 1992/ 
93, and a significant weakening in budgetary control ahead ofthe 1994 elections, led to 
a major deterioration in Malawi's economic conditions during 1994 and early 1995. 
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conditions Malawi remained firmly on track with its implementation of  the various polices 
especially in the area of  trade liberalisation. 
In early 1995, government adopted a medium-term economic programme supported 
by an arrangement under an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), with the 
objective of  laying a basis for a recovery of  economic activity. This objective was to be 
met through the re-establishment of  financial discipline and a reduction in domestic and 
external imbalances to attain a more sustainable balance of payments position and 
accommodate of pressing social needs within the overall fiscal constraints. To achieve 
this, the underlying strategy targeted a major fiscal adjustment, a tightening of  monetary 
policy, a deepening of  structural reform, especially in the agriculture sector and a reduction 
in the concentration of  ownership within the economy and the liberalisation of  trade. It 
was hoped that there would be a reversal of  the structural presence of  a highly dualistic 
agriculture sector, which was at the same time highly vulnerable to drought. The largely 
monopolistic industrial sector was strongly orientated toward the small internal market 
and uncompetitive in the wider regional and global markets. 
Under this programme, Malawi's economic performance strengthened considerably, 
with growth in real GDP of9.0 per cent in 1995 and 9.5 per cent in 1996. A cash budget 
system was introduced to strengthen expenditure control and the budget deficit was 
reduced.  Structural reforms included liberalisation of smallholder agriculture, 
liberalisation of  international trade and reforms to the civil service and public enterprises. 
The reforms to smallholder agriculture boosted smallholder production by 39.8 per cent 
in 1996. In the area of international trade, import and export taxes were lowered, and 
specific export and import licenses were removed. A legal and institutional framework 
for privatisation was set up, and substantial progress was made in restructuring some 
public enterprises and preparing them for privatisation. 
The second year ESAF arrangement was approved in December 1996, with the aim 
of  achieving a strong rate of  economic growth supported by the continued liberalisation 
and diversification in economic activity, further reductions in the budget deficit, lowering 
the rate of  inflation and strengthening further the balance of  payments position. As well 
as this, structural reforms in the programme emphasised civil service reform, privatisation, 
agricultural reform and trade liberalisation. 
Malawi's economic performance deteriorated somewhat in 1997. Economic growth 
slowed to 5.2 per cent in 1997, largely caused by the drought and floods experienced in 
some parts of  the country. The budget deficit also increased dramatically in the latter part 
of  the year due to fiscal mismanagement. Dwindling foreign reserves increased the cost 
of  imports and created inflationary pressures and necessitated depreciation ofthe Kwacha 
from around MK15/US$ to MK25/US$ by January 1998. 
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tobacco prices and the East Asian financial crisis which saw the value of the Kwacha 
depreciate further through the year to K44/US$ by September 1998. This saw a large 
increase in the rate of  inflation and a resultant fall in domestic demand. As well as this 
domestic industry suffered from rising costs of  inputs. During 1998, inflation averaged 
29.7 per cent, with the end of year rate as high as  53  per cent. Despite a 8.9 per cent 
growth in the smallholder agriculture sector, the growth in GDP is estimated at just 3.3 
per cent for 1998, with a 0.8 per cent fall in manufacturing value added. However fiscal 
discipline was regained during the year and the authorities managed to negotiate (after a 
one year suspension) for a third tranche from the IMF under the ESAF programme in 
November 1998, a sign that the international community was impressed by the progress 
of  government's economic management. 
Faced with these new economic pressures, the government has decided to 
substantially tighten its financial policies and accelerate the process of  structural reform. 
On the revenue side, there are ongoing plans to rationalise the tax structure, including 
efforts to further liberalise external trade and broaden the tax base, as well as to improve 
tax administration through the creation of  the autonomous 'Malawi Revenue Authority' 
(MRA). Such fiscal discipline is crucial to the country's development, in order to avoid 
crowding out of private investment. Large fiscal deficits have meant that the private 
sector has been a net lender to government for most of  the adjustment period. 
Overall, the reform programme undertaken by Malawi has dictated economic policy 
for an entire decade. Combining World Bank structural adjustment measures with IMF 
stabilisation prescriptions, the programme was structured to meet various ends. First, it 
sought to attain both internal and external balance. Second, by manipulating demand 
and restructuring supply, policy reform also targeted growth. Inter woven in this was the 
CBI. 
3.2 Liberalisation of(oreign trade 
Following the series of  external shocks to the Malawian economy in the mid-1980s, 
government introduced exchange controls on imports. From 1988, these were gradually 
removed and the final stage of the elimination of exchange controls was completed in 
January, 1991. All quantitative restrictions to trade have now been removed, and replaced 
with tariffs calculated on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis except for a short "negative 
list" for reasons of  security and health. 
The agreement of  the CBI called for the abolition of  remaining NTBs (such as import 
and export licensing), removal of tariffs on trade in goods and services among the 
reciprocating countries by end 1998 and, to minimise the risk of  trade diversion as well 
as to promote integration into the world economy, harmonisation of external tariffs by 
p.388 end 1998, with no more than 3 non-zero rates, an average weighted tariff rate of 15 per 
cent and a maximum of  20-25 per cent. 
As part of  its tax reform programme, government reduced protection in 1988/89 by 
merging part of the import tax with the domestic surtax and establishing a maximum 
tariff of 45 per cent. The next part of the trade liberalisation programme involved the 
completion of  the programme of  tariff and trade tax rationalisation, and a programme to 
reduce levels of domestic protection. When the programme was drawn out, its targets 
started with the 1992/93 budget, and ended with the 1995/96 budget. The programme 
aimed to achieve, by this time, a cascaded tariff structure with (I)  an average tariff 
collection rate of  no more than 15 per cent on non-government imports; (ii) a maximum 
import tariff  rate of  no more than 35 per cent; and (iii) a minimum import tariff  rate of 10 
per cent (except for a short list of tariff exempted goods, such as pharmaceutical and 
medical supplies). 
Tariff reduction has been a gradual process during the 1990s, with maximum tariff 
rates now at 30 per cent for imports from non-MFN countries, and at 25 per cent for 
MFN countries. Although government maintains that it is committed to reducing the 
maximum rate to 25 per cent for all goods from the rest of  the world by the beginning of 
the 1999/00 fiscal year, and zero for CBI countries in the long term, the original goal on 
the CBI Agenda had been to achieve a 25 per cent maximum rate, with a 15 per cent 
average rate by 1997. Although the maximum rate has now been reduced to these levels, 
with the average rate'  currently at around 11  per cent, a long way below the CBI 
requirement. 
As well as this, the CBI roadmap calls for a 90 per cent preference margin by October 
1997. Malawi's preference margin with COMESAmember states is currently 80 per cent. 
In order to simplify customs administration it was agreed that the number of  tariff bands 
would be reduced to not more than three non-zero tariff  rates. Malawi still has four. However 
this is a significant advancement from the original tariff structure of 11 rates. 
The CBI agenda calls for the removal of  tax exemptions. However such exemptions 
remain, particularly for NGOs and donor funded projects. The number of  discretionary 
exemptions issued by the Minister of Finance have been reduced, and the budget now 
imposes a limit on the value of  exemptions to be issued in any year. 
The liberalisation of exports began with Malawi's trade liberalisation programme 
which was conceived in 1988. However there was some relapse to this when 'temporary' 
export levies were applied to certain agricultural goods in 1994. These were finally 
removed in the Supplementary Budget of  March 1998. There are now few restrictions on 
exports in Malawi. Exceptions are maize, whose export is banned, and groundnuts and 
'Defined as total tariff revenues as a proportion of  total imports. This will tend to underestimate the average as it will include exempted goods 
in the calculations. However given the format of  tariff data available, an up-to-date trade weighted tariff rate could not be calculated easily. 
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ivory, relating to international conservation agreements. 
3.2.1  Foreign trade facilitation 
CBI agreements called for the harmonisation of transit charges and arrangements 
and customs documentation. A single goods declaration document which is in a similar 
format to that standard in the CO  MESA region has been fully developed by the Department 
of  Customs and Excise and carne into use in April2000. A bond guarantee scheme was 
put into place in 1993. Transit charges have been partly harmonised by Malawi, and the 
authorities are very keen for the harmonisation to become fully recognised due to the 
impact that regional variations have in deterring trade facilitation. CO  MESA prescribed 
charges have been implemented, but in the case where regional partners charge higher 
rates, Malawian authorities reciprocate. Concerning insurance, Malawi currently imposes 
a compulsory third party requirement for externally registered transporters. A CO  MESA 
yellow card insurance scheme which will offer proof  of  insurance and remove bureaucratic 
border delays, is nearing completion. It  will be implemented in the near future when the 
scheme is fully understood and accepted by domestic insurance companies. 
3.3 Payments and exchange Systems 
3.3.1. Deepening of  Financial Markets 
In an effort to  promote domestic investment, a new regulatory framework was 
implemented in the revised Banking Act of 1989, to improve competition in the highly 
concentrated financial market. Prior to the review of  the act, there were two commercial 
banks, two finance houses, a building society, three development finance houses, a post 
office savings bank and a number of insurance companies. Since the act was revised, 
there has been significant liberalisation and diversification of the domestic financial 
market, with several new institutions entering the market. These include Finance Bank 
of  Malawi, First Merchant Bank, Loitas, Continental Discount House and investments 
by both Nedbank and Standard Bank in existing financial institutions. 
The financial market is however, still dominated by Commercial Bank and National 
Bank in which government has significant (though declining) share holding. Ownership 
of  the two dominant banks is being privatised in order to increase the efficiency of  the 
financial sector, which is presently characterised by a duopolistic market structure and 
high interest spreads. For these reforms to run smoothly, there is a need to ensure that 
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financial sector. There has been a proliferation of foreign exchange bureaux offering 
competitive foreign exchange services with the banks. 
Services within the financial sector are broadening with the introduction of such 
services as SWIFT transfers, limited provision of  forward forex cover, credit/debit cards, 
automated tellers etc. 
3.3.2  Exchange Controls 
CBI legislation calls for the elimination of  restrictions on current account transactions 
and the attainment of  current account convertibility, relaxation of  restrictions on capital 
account transactions associated with the liberalisation of  direct investment and investment 
in regional equity markets, and the establishment of  unified spot exchange markets. 
From 1992 to 1994 there was no meaningful change in Malawi's exchange controls. 
In 1994, efforts were made to begin the liberalisation of exchange controls.  Foreign 
exchange for the importation of  essential inputs used by productive sectors of  the economy 
was liberalised.  This included the liberalisation if import payments, the uplifting of 
exchange controls and the floatation of  the Kwacha. These reforms meant that nearly all 
merchandise imports could be imported and paid for without prior approval from RBM, 
while profits, dividends and selected service payments also remained freely remissible. 
All restrictions on current account transactions have been removed, and current 
account convertibility was achieved in 1995. As well as this, there has been an achievement 
in the licensing of  non-bank foreign exchange bureaus. Impediments to entry by foreign 
financial institutions have been removed. Malawi has eliminated all restrictions on the 
flow of inward direct foreign investment-related transactions, as  well as  on interest, 
dividends, freight, insurance, principal, profit and the remission of  capital accounts. There 
is a general framework to liberalise further the capital account transactions. 
However some controls on the use of  foreign exchange earnings remain, with RBM 
requiring that exporters remit 40 per cent of  the forex earned to RBM, in exchange for 
the Kwacha counterpart. 
Monetary Control and Interest Rate Management 
The Reserve Bank Act of 1989 committed the monetary authorities to movement 
towards more indirect, market-orientated monetary control. Direct regulations of  commercial 
bank credit were discounted. Malawi also liberalised the money markets by abolishing 
credit ceilings and allocations and the direct setting of  interest rates by government. 
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The inconvertibility between currencies in the CBI region acts as a major impediment 
to cross-border trade. Although exchange controls have been abolished, there remains a 
lack of  foreign exchange availability for intra-regional trade. The US dollar remains the 
dominant form of  payment for trade within the region. In order to alleviate this problem 
a PTA Clearing House was established to facilitate settlements of payments for intra-
regional trade in goods and services. Payments are effected through the clearing house 
mechanism in national currency. Every two months, the balances outstanding must be 
cleared in hard currency. 
At first, Malawi was one of  the main users ofthe PTA Clearing House, but after the 
floatation of the Kwacha, the need to use it was reduced. Utilisation of the clearing 
house has been hampered by reported delays in payment by the private sector. As well as 
this, there is  a lack of knowledge of the mechanisms of the clearing house.  Malawi 
continues to have a reliance on the US dollar as the medium of exchange remains, this 
has hindered the growth in Malawi's trade, particularly with those countries which have 
foreign currency shortages. There must therefore be increased education concerning the 
benefits ofthe system, as well as efforts to enhance the efficiency of  the mechanism. 
3.3.4.  Capital Markets 
Significant progress has been made in developing capital markets following the 
introduction of the Capital Market Development Act in 1991, and the establishment of 
the Malawi Stock Exchange, where eight shares are currently listed. Under the Capital 
Market Development Act, there are no restrictions on issues of securities to the public 
and no restrictions on private placement of  securities to Malawi residents although the 
transfer of securities to non-residents must be registered with the RBM. 
3.3.5.  Membership of  MIGA, Double Taxation Agreements 
Malawi is a member of the MIGA, and has signed Double Taxation Agreements 
with RSA and the United Kingdom number of  countries within and beyond the region. 
3.4 Investment 
CBI agreements included commitments to  the adoption of simple and liberal 
investment approval procedures, investment applications to be handled by a single agency, 
a maximum of  45 days for approval of  investment applications. 
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The legislative framework for investment promotion was established through the 
Investment Promotion Act, 1991, and was an important condition from the World Bank 
for the provision of US$21 0 million under the Enterprise Development and Drought 
Recovery Programme (EDDRP). Schedules to this act include the Investment Policy 
Statement and its supplement, the Investors Guide which outlines the specific laws and 
regulations conducive to investment. The Malawi Investment Promotion Agency (MIPA) 
was established under the Investment Promotion Act in 1993. Under the act, efforts were 
made to simplify and speed up investment approval procedures to a single step with the 
Registrar of Companies. As well as this, industrial licences had been eliminated (with 
the exception of  a short list of  environmentally hazardous activities) in 1991 through the 
repeal of  the Industrial Development Act and its replacement with the Industrial Licensing 
Act, 1991. 
3.4.2.  Land Policy 
Land policy was strengthened by 1994, when government streamlined procedures 
for the issuance of  land leases and implemented a requirement for the Commissioner of 
Lands to issue leases and consent to lease transfers and subleases so as to reduce the time 
between the date of  application and the offer of  consent to 90 days. By this stage, MIPA 
had also produced an Investment Approval Roadmap which is aimed at providing investors 
with information on the steps necessary to bring a project from the enquiry stage to 
implementation. The approval time for investment proposals has been reduced and the 
45 day maximum period pledged under CBI is now generally adhered to. This has recently 
extended to a somewhat unofficial60 days. 
3. 4.3.  Incentives to Invest 
The following investment incentives have been implemented: 
t·  40 per cent investment allowance on qualifying expenditures for new buildings 
and machinery. 
t  Up to 20 per cent investment allowance on qualifying expenditures for buildings 
and machinery. This allows manufacturing companies to deduct 20 per cent from 
all operating expenses incurred up to two years prior to the start of  operations. 
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~  Duty free importation of  heavy commercial vehicles with capacity of  at least ten 
tonnes. 
~  No withholding tax on dividends. 
~  Duty free importation of  raw materials for manufacturing industries. 
~  No licensing requirements for importing foreign exchange. 
~  Full repatriation of  profits, dividends, investment capital and principal payments 
for international loans. 
~  Local and foreign investors have unrestricted access to local financing facilities. 
3.4.4.  Special Incentives: 
3.4.4.1 Pioneer Status: 
Pioneer status is offered for producers of  products with either heavy capital investment 
or high technology or labour intensive industries which can generate extensive linkages 
and have a significant impact on employment and foreign exchange generation. A 
company given pioneer status will be granted exemption from payment of  income tax. It 
will only have to pay corporate tax at the rate of20 per cent, instead of  the standard 38 
per cent.  The period of tax exemption is  10  years from the initial production date. 
Companies located in EPZs will only have to pay income tax at the rate of  15 per cent for 
10 years. Government will grant zero rated corporate tax for a period up to 20 years for 
strategic projects of  national importance. 
3.4.4.2 Export Processing Zones 
Business can registered as an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) if  at least 80 per cent 
of  its production is exported. The EPZs are not in a designated area of  the country. Each 
approved factory constitutes its own zones, and therefore a company can operate in more 
than one zone. The first EPZ licence was approved in 1995. 
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withholding tax is charged on dividends, no duty is charged on capital equipment and 
raw materials, no excise taxes are charged on purchases of  raw materials and packaging 
made in Malawi, no surtax is charged, and there is an additional transport tax allowance 
to the amount of 15 per cent of  international transport costs. 
There are 17 EPZ companies operating in Malawi. Most of  the industries manufacture 
textiles, furniture or grow flowers. 
3.4.4.3Additional Incentives for Export: 
For all exporters, there is a transport tax allowance of 25 per cent of international 
transport costs, no duties on imports of  capital equipment used mainly in the manufacture 
of  exports, no excise duties on purchases of  raw materials and packaging made in Malawi, 
timely refund of  duties (duty draw-back) on imports used in the production of exports, 
and no duties on capital imports and raw materials. An export allowance enables a 
company which exports non-traditional goods to deduct from its taxable income 12 per 
cent of  export revenues. The Malawi Export Promotion Council (MEPC) determines if  a 
company qualifies for this.  An additional 25  per cent is deducted from international 
transport costs for non-traditional exports. 
3. 4. 4. 4.  Other Incentives for the Promotion of  Industry: 
t  Investment Allowance:  A company given Investment Tax Allowance will 
be granted a 40 per cent reprieve in respect of qualifying capital expenditure. 
Qualifying expenditure would be for the expansion of productive capacity, 
modernisation and upgrading of production facilities, and diversification into 
related products. 
t  Incentives for Research and Development:  Expenses incurred on research 
related to a firm's business are tax deductable. All capital expenditure is claimable 
under investment allowances and industrial buildings allowances. 
t  Incentives for Training:  To encourage the upgrading of  skills and improving 
the productivity oflabour,. Several incentives are available: a 50 per cent deduction 
for expenses incurred on approved training is given. This is automatic if  training 
takes place at approved training institutions. 
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machinery and engineering industries will be given four years to restructure and 
will be eligible for certain incentives when undertaking or participating in 
approved industrial adjustment programmes.  'Industrial adjustment' has been 
defined as  any activity in the manufacturing industry which is  intended to 
restructure, by way of  reorganisation, reconstruction or amalgamation within that 
particular sector, with a view to strengthening the base for industrial self-
sufficiency, improving industrial technology, increasing productivity, enhancing 
the efficient use of  natural resources and the efficient management of  manpower. 
Companies that qualify are eligible for the Industrial Adjustment Allowance (IAA). 
This provides for an allowance of up to  100 per cent in respect of qualifying capital 
expenditure incurred by a manufacturing company in its efforts at undertaking 'industrial 
adjustment' 
t  Incentives for Small-Scale Businesses:  These incentives are restricted to 
small-scale manufacturing companies whose total investment does not exceed 
the equivalent ofUS$30,000 and have a Malawian equity of  at least 51 per cent. 
Small scale companies which meet these criteria will be granted pioneer status 
"automatically if  they propose to manufacture products or participate in activities 
listed as  promoted products/activities. As well as  this, they will receive full 
exemption from duty on raw materials, components, machinery and equipment 
which are not available locally. 
t  Incentives for Storage, Treatment and Disposal of  Wastes:  C o m p a n i e s 
directly involved in the storage, treatment and disposal of  wastes in an integrated 
manner, are entitled to the Pioneer Status incentive for five years. As well as this, 
companies which generate waste and wish to establish facilities to store, treat 
and dispose of  wastes are eligible for special allowance of  40 per cent initially 
and an annual rate of20 per cent for all capital expenditure. Further, government 
also extends the import duty exemption scheme for machinery, equipment, raw 
materials and parts to them for the storage, treatment and disposal of  wastes. 
t  Manufacture of  Goods for Export:  Exemption from import duty on raw 
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materials and parts can be considered for any manufacturing company given 
pioneer status if  it complies with the equity condition of  51 per cent local share 
holding. Where the raw materials/ components are not manufactured locally, full 
exemption from import duty is normally given if  the finished product made from 
dutiable raw materials/parts is not subject to any import duty. Full import duty 
exemption will be given to local companies located in Enterprise Zones for a 
period of  five years on raw materials, components and parts which are not available 
locally. 3.4.4.5. Priority Industries: 
For firms making investments ofUS$5-10 million, either a 15 per cent income tax 
rate is charged indefinitely or 0 per cent for 5 years and then normal income tax rates are 
charged. For investments in excess of US$1 0 million, either a 15 per cent income tax 
rate is charged indefinitely, or 0 per cent for ten years, and then normal income tax rates 
are charged. For companies not incorporated in Malawi, an additional 5 per cent tax is 
imposed. 
COMMENT 
t  One important drawback of  the incentives outlined above is that they discriminate 
against small scale producers who are not registered and don't have capacity to 
make the necessary claims. 
t  With regard to the transport allowance, it is difficult to determine whether imported 
inputs are to be used for exports or for domestic sales as very few firms sell their 
products in foreign markets. 
t  A tax subsidy for the transportation cost of  imported materials often inhibits the 
development of  domestically produced import competing inputs. 
It is questioned whether these type of  investment and export promotion initiatives 
are in the spirit of  the CBI and are a cost effective intervention. Many of  these incentives 
will not fit the new CBI investment road map. The problem with such schemes is that 
many of the investments made under some of the above tax holidays may have taken 
place in the absence of incentives loosing much needed tax revenues. An alternative 
would be to reduce tax rates on all companies in a non-discriminatory fashion which 
would have increased investment and production incentives in all areas of  the economy. 
IMF regional policy is  increasingly scathing of discriminatory incentives. It is 
believed that tax holidays given for an initial period are particularly inefficient. A tax 
holiday is of  little use to companies that incur losses in the start-up phase of  production. 
If  the losses incurred during the tax holiday period cannot be carried forward to a period 
when there is a positive tax, then the holiday is of  no benefit. Hence tax holidays tend to 
benefit companies which are initially profitable, but such investments do not require 
additional incentives. Tax incentives provided to foreign-owned firms simply reduce the 
tax credits that the parent companies can claim against taxes payable in their country. 
Hence the burden of  tax is simply transferred, and foreign governments reap the revenue 
benefits of  economic activity taking place domestically. 
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comparisons. However a number of factors have impeded the effectiveness of these 
incentives in attracting investment: 
a)  The tax regulations in the country are complex, distortionary, and often negate 
any incentives offered to potential investors. These regulations must be carefully 
reconsidered. 
b) Although tax holidays and incentives offer some attraction to potential investors, 
infrastructural facilities and macroeconomic stability are of  far greater importance. 
The constraints created by  these two factors negate incentives to domestic industry. 
3.4.5  Employment Permits and movement of  persons 
Securing Temporary Employment Permits (TEPs) for key and necessary expatriate 
personnel was for a long time a major concern and significant burden for investors in 
Malawi with applications taking not less than six months to be processed. Such concerns 
have been raised by MIPA, MCCI and the Employers Association of  Malawi. The main 
problem associated with the issuance ofTEPs was that it was a highly cumbersome and 
time consuming process with uncertain prospects, with the appearance that decisions for 
or against a decision were made on an ad hoc basis. 
In 1998, there were only about 50 TEPs issued for the manufacturing sector. Yet in 
the sector, investors often require personnel that will have to apply for TEPs because of 
the lack of  skilled and experienced person.1el in Malawi. 
A reformed TEP policy was implemented in late 1998 which was intended to ensure 
that for all  investors, both existing and prospective, obtaining TEPs for their key and 
necessary personnel will be an easy and straightforward process. A maximum application 
period of 40 working days has been gazetted, which applies to both local and foreign 
investments, without discrimination. The provision ofTEPs for "key  posts" (whose number 
is determined by both the size of the investment and the nature of the industry that the 
investment is linked to) is now automatic. Similar legislation has not, however been put in 
place for Business Residence Permits. Signs suggest that delays with the processing of 
BRPs remain. It is therefore necessary for such reforms to be extended to BRPs. 
Visa requirements 
Malawi has ratified the CO  MESA Protocol on Relaxation and Eventual Elimination 
of Visas. Nationals of 8 COMESA (CBI) countries do not ordinarily require visas to 
enter Malawi and the others that require visas can get them at the point of  entry. Citizens 
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entering Malawi. 
To facilitate movement ofbusiness-persons, Malawi is ready to issue 5-year multiple 
entry visas to business-persons on the basis of  reciprocity with other COMES  A countries. 
Malawi also issues short-term (24-72 hour) entry permits for border residents on 
presentation of  proper identification, again on the basis of  reciprocity with neighbouring 
COMESA countries. 
3. 5. CBI Status 
3.5.1.  Harmonisation of  investment regime 
The CBI investment road map seeks to harmonise the member countries investment 
codes. Malawi needs to speed up this agenda and remove certain investment incentives 
such as exemptions and tax holidays, in favour of less distortionary, less targeted and 
more across-the board fiscal incentives. Such an initiative will also act as less of  a drain 
on government resources.  The removal of such exemptions would likewise assist in 
offsetting the revenue losses from tariff reduction. 
In general, although numerous attempts have been made to improve the investment 
climate in Malawi, it is clear that the large number and variety of  incentives available are 
highly confusing. As well as this, distortionary tax regulations often negate the positive 
financial benefits of  investment incentives. Also incentives are normally accorded on a 
discretionary basis (for example in the decision of  whether a project is deemed to be of 
strategic national importance), and a great deal of  market uncertainty results. No matter 
how generous investment incentives are, for a potential investor, they will never override 
costs associated with infrastructural and other impediments present in the country. It is 
these obstacles that must be targeted by Malawi as it seeks to harmonise with the CBI 
regional investment road map, if  government is to make Malawi an attractive destination 
for international investment. 
Malawi has not prepared or circulated its draft investment facilitation programme 
3.5.2  Addendum to the Letter of  CBI Policy 
Owing to the lack ofTWG activities in since December 1999 the addendum to the 
letter of  CBI policy is still being finalised. The process is being managed by the Deputy 
manager of MIPA who was the head of delegation at the 4
1h  Ministerial meeting in 
Mauritius. 
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Recommendations for Malawi within the CBI  policy 
To be successful in contributing to growth and poverty alleviation, trade liberalisation 
must be pursued within a stable macroeconomic framework,  conducive incentive 
environment for investment and development programmes to address capacity, as well 
as financial and infrastructural constraints. The structural reforms that have been instituted 
are a necessary, though not sufficient condition for economic development and a structural 
in production. There is also a large array of  constraints that must be removed. The presence 
of these constraints is  the most important reason why Malawi's industries have been 
generally unable to adapt to increased levels of  international competition. 
Imports of  intermediate goods and raw materials currently attract a duty rate of  10 
per cent.  This duty rate must be paid by companies that are not registered as 
manufacturers and hence discriminates against small scale producers who must pay 
duty on imported imports, yet compete against finished products that enter the country 
duty free.  For those entitled to  rebates,  there have been complaints that the duty 
drawback scheme is inefficient, resulting in delays in repayment by Government. As 
well as this, the classification of  raw materials and intermediate products is imperfect, 
meaning that companies must pay duty on goods that should be eligible to the scheme. 
The solution to this problem is for all imports of  goods classified as raw materials and 
intermediate products to be charged at a zero rate of  duty, and for the list of  products 
eligible to be reviewed. 
Although a vast array of investment incentives is in place in Malawi, current tax 
regulations distort these incentives and create uncertainty and confusion for potential 
investors. The incentives in place have been of very limited success and it would be 
preferable to have such targeted incentives removed in favour ofless distortionary, across-
the-board fiscal incentives. The tax regime must be rationalised and simplified in order 
to remove discrimination against foreign companies and remove structures that cancel 
out benefits offered to attract investors. 
In order to maintain the real exchange rate at competitive levels, further devaluations 
of  the Kwacha will be necessary. However these must be managed with care, so that the 
timing is appropriate and to  ensure that shocks to the domestic economy are not too 
severe. In the long run, only a structural shift away from dependence on primary products 
with declining terms of  trade and sensitivity to shocks will ensure stability of  the nominal 
exchange rate.  Problems linked to a lack of currency convertibility between trading 
partners in the region have hindered regional integration. Further steps must therefore be 
taken in to increase the profile of  the PTA Clearing House. 
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and using new technologies and on the quality and level of  human capital. Interaction in 
global markets is a necessary condition for obtaining these requirements. Competition is 
becoming increasingly dynamic, and to gain a competitive advantage equally important 
to relative prices and resource costs is established linkages with customers and suppliers. 
At the same time, under a liberal trade regime, certain barriers to entry in countries such 
as Malawi are increasing. These barriers include the acquisition of new technologies, 
training, and the formation of all-important marketing networks. Large investments in 
skill development and up-grading will be a key requirement for ensuring success and 
minimising the costs of  adjustment. Realising the benefits of  such investments will take 
some time.  This puts a strong argument against increasing competition for domestic 
industry at too rapid a pace, as once firms have left the market, it is often highly costly 
for new firms to appear and establish themselves amidst strong regional competition. In 
the increasingly globalised environment market information, international quality 
standards and technological know-how are becoming more and more important. MEPC 
and the Malawi Bureau of Standards should be provided with additional resources to 
assist domestic industry in these areas. 
In instituting reforms, a greater level of  consultation with the private sector must be 
made to ensure that the constraints being faced by domestic industry are addressed. The 
complexity of the various reform programmes Malawi is  undertaking has proved 
overwhelming for Government officials. It is therefore desirable that there is a greater 
level of co-ordination between the various donor sponsored reform programmes and 
regional initiatives so that reforms can be monitored and instituted in a controlled and 
thoughtful manner. 
Malawi's infrastructure is in a poor state and this has resulted in uncertainty and 
high costs for domestic industry. High levels of investment in the country's roads are 
necessary. As well as this, the commercialisation and privatisation of  the country's utility 
providers must be accelerated in order to  ensure high quality and reliable supplies. 
Government must also encourage investment in industrial land sites, either by offering 
concessionalloans for their construction, or by considering direct involvement in their 
development. Given the serious shortage and high price of sites for potential industrial 
investors, this may be justified, although serious assessments will be necessary before 
such a venture is initiated. 
The land locked position of the country acts as  another major constraint to the 
competitiveness of  domestic industry, by both inflating the c.i.f. cost of  imported inputs 
and by raising the c.i.f. price of  the country's generally bulky exports. There are ongoing 
efforts to develop rail routes through Mozambique reduce this problem, but there is 
clearly a need to publicise the various transport routes so that trading companies are 
fully aware of  the options available. These problems are accentuated by the excessive 
regulation in customs and transport authorities that is costly, both in terms of  time and 
finance. The SGS inspection procedure must be simplified and made more efficient. 
p.401 Relevance and Impact of  CBI 
The government have commended the nature of CBI's implementation processes 
and time frames and expressed a desire to remain committed to the whole process. 
The comments on the actual impact of the CBI are as per the recommendations 
under the summary of  the CBI impact report by Professor Colin McCarthy 
t  It is  felt that the  CBI blends well with the other Bretton Wood institutions 
initiatives, such as 
t  The COMESA integration agenda 
t  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
Policy Framework Paper, 1998/99-2000/01 (PFP) 
t  Article VII consultations. 
t  The World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) discussions. 
t  The European Union Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) negotiations 
Bilateral and multilateral agreements are now being seen and addressed in a more 
coherent manner. Though there is room for further improvement, there is appreciably 
better co-ordination between various government ministries and departments on maters 
of  integration and in cross-cutting policy issues and themes. 
Further, the CBI agenda fits  in well with the country's development and 
industrialisation programmes. CBI further supports the development of the country's 
small and fragile private sector. But additional interventions are still needed in the areas 
of  private sector development and public-private sector interaction. 
Over the last eight years, the Initiative has significantly contributed to setting the 
appropriate policy framework for the country's development. The impact of CBI has, 
nevertheless, been more in policy formulation and refining than in actual economic 
development. No meaningful investment has come into the country. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) is a framework for the implementation of  jointly 
agreed policies taken up by a voluntary group of  countries in eastern and southern Africa 
and the Indian Ocean. It aims at achieving greater economic integration through the 
promotion of  competition and the reduction of  cost of  moving productive resources and 
goods and services across boundaries, while maintaining openness towards the rest of 
the world. The co-sponsors of  the initiative are the African Development Bank (ADB), 
the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). Technical Working Groups (TWGs), involving public and private sectors, have 
been set up to  identify constraints to  cross-border activity and propose measures to 
overcome them. 
2.  OVERVIEW  OF THE CBI IN  MAURITIUS 
2.1 First involvement in  CBI hv Mauritius 
Following the  1992 Harare workshop and in accordance with the Common 
Programme of  Action (CPA) for the CBI, Mauritius defined its status in relation to the 
CBI agenda. Mauritius is one of  the pioneers and ardent participants in the CBI, having 
attended the inaugural meeting of  Ministers of  1993 in Kampala, Uganda, and the technical 
meeting held in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1992 and the meeting of  senior officials in Brussels, 
Belgium in 1993. 
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Both public and private sector representatives are satisfied with the overall concept 
and programme of the CBI.  The free,  flexible and unbinding nature - no treaties or 
agreements to sign - is appreciated. The Initiative was described as having contributed 
to the development of  regional integration and as having enhanced public-private sector 
interaction both within the country and across the region. 
It is agreed that Mauritius has performed quite a significant amount of  work in the 
context of  the CBI process and that the Initiative should continue as a fast track approach. 
The regularity of  meetings of  the Technical Working Group and the ongoing presence of 
TWG members from both public and private sectors during TWG meetings are clear 
indications of  the interest of  the CBI process within Mauritius. 
Yet many members complained about the lack of  reciprocity from other countries as 
far as the CBI process is concerned. It is widely felt that with regard to regional co-
operation, Mauritius has been giving more to COMESA than COMESA members have 
been giving to Mauritius. More reciprocity would accelerate the implementation of  the 
Initiative. Mauritius has moved forward on many points but cannot stay in isolation. 
Mauritius is playing a role in the integration process but not all countries are moving at 
the same pace. Questions remain about the number of  countries in the fast track. Mauritius 
is giving a tariff-preference margin of90% on imports from COMESAcountries and is 
moving to the Free Trade Area by October 2000 but many other CO  MESA countries are 
not at the same level. It is suggested that Mauritius should explore the way on how to 
move forward on this issue. Yet it was agreed that Mauritius had much responsibility, 
being the Chairman of the Ministerial working group, in paving the way towards 
reciprocity. 
Moreover, the role of  co-sponsors has been described as not meeting expectations: 
the requested support to meet transitional costs did not materialise. Mauritius accepted 
to play an active role in the Initiative but was mindful of  the short-term transitional costs 
that would arise from  implementing CBI measures.  To  this end, the  Government 
anticipated support from co-sponsors to meet these costs. The World Bank support under 
the Technology Diffusion Scheme was seen in this light. The  "Programme Integre de 
Developpement Des Echanges" (PRIDE) project, funded by the European Union, is 
addressing the needs of  the private sector in repositioning itself  to take advantage of  the 
prospects presented by the CBI reforms. 
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Mauritius and benefits ofhaving had a TWG 
Mauritius submitted its Letter ofCBI Policy to the co-sponsors of  the Cross-Border 
Initiative on the 6th of  April1995. The purpose of  the letter was to outline the progress 
Mauritius had made in implementing the various measures agreed under the CBI 
framework and the planned measures and policies to further achieve CBI objectives. 
Several reforms have been undertaken in the following areas, as outlined in the Addendum 
to the Letter of  CBI Policy, which is presently being finalised: 
t  Trade liberalisation 
t  Payment and exchange systems improvement 
t  Regulatory environment and investment incentives and 
t  Institutional development 
It is pointed out that the TWG can only highlight the proposed programme of  regional 
integration but cannot implement actions. It is agreed that each institution has to play its 
role and that the TWG acts as a co-ordinator. 
2.4 Relationship in Mauritius between CBI and the regional integration 
institutions 
Regional organisations should be more involved in driving the CBI process and 
increasing African ownership of  the Initiative. It was highlighted that the voluntary nature 
of  the CBI should be maintained. It is suggested that the management and the mode of 
implementation of  the CBI should be modified to provide for the involvement of  regional 
organisations. 
Mauritius belongs to the COMESA, the SADC, the IOC and the lOR-ARC. Meetings 
were held at the level of the IOC and SADC to co-ordinate various initiatives being 
undertaken under the CBI, in particular as regards trade. The PRIDE is implemented at 
the level of the IOC. The PRIDE objectives are to reinforce the regional integration 
process and the coherence of  trade and investment policies. 
Members of  the TWG are also closely involved in reforms undertaken in the context 
of  regional integration institutions such as SADC, CO  MESA and IOC. 
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institutions as  other regional organisations. This is  how it is  thanks to the CBI that 
Mauritius has been able to obtain finance for the Technology Improvement Scheme (TIS), 
as a result of  the CBI. 
There is reason to believe that the launching of  CBI has been brought about by a 
desire of certain member countries of COMESA and SADC, to adopt a fast track for 
economic development and liberalisation. 
3.  ACTIVITIES OF THE TWG 
3.1 Overview ofTWG meetings since the beginning 
3.1.1  Regularity ofTWG meetings 
The Technical Working Group (TWG) was set up in  1995  and comprised 
representatives of  both the private sector and Government. The TWG was to be assisted 
by a private consultant who would serve as secretariat to the group. The TWG carried 
out various assignments and drafted several reports, the most important ones being: 
t  The National Country Report, Volume 1 and 2 
t  Letter of  CBI Policy 1995 
t  The road map for trade facilitation 
t  The concept paper 
Following changes and portfolio transfers of  personnel, the TWG went into limbo 
between 1995 and 1997. Secretariat services were also negatively impacted upon for the 
contract was not renewed. 
In  1998 the  secretariat was reconstituted and a new secretariat was established 
following an open and competitive bidding system in mid 1998. As a result the TWG 
proved to be very active for between July and December 1998 with four TWG meetings 
being held, while four others were held in 1999, and one so far in 2000. 
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members the new secretariat to the TWG, which had been entrusted to De Chazal Du 
Mee (DCDM), a local consultancy firm. 
The following are the basic assignments that were to be carried out, as per the 
contractual agreements: 
t  Organisation ofTWG meetings and information dissemination; 
t  Preparation of agendas for TWG meetings in consultation with the TWG 
Chairperson; 
t  Preparation of minutes on the TWG meetings for transmission to  the lead 
consultant; 
t  Preparation of  the TWG National Report; 
t  Regular updates of  the CBI Implementation Matrix; 
t  Preparation of  presentation for TWG regional meeting in 1998; 
t  Preparation of  an Addendum to the Letter of  CBI Policy (LCBIP); 
t  Assistance in the preparation of  a report on the estimates of  transition costs; and 
t  Preparation a Draft Action Plan for the Investment Facilitation Program agreed 
at the Fourth Ministerial Meeting. 
DCDM organised TWG meetings, prepared agendas as required by the chairman 
and ensured that TWG members were informed about matters relating to the TWG. The 
minutes of  proceedings with regard to the TWG meetings are available in Appendix II. 
TWG meetings held since 1998 were as follows:  February 16,  1998, March 11, 
1998, August 17, 1998, October 6, 1998, October 30, 1998, November 12, 1998, January 
27, 1999, March 19, 1999, July 12, 1999, September 28, 1999, November 9, 1999, and 
March 31,2000. 
The available agendas and the minutes of  the meetings mentioned are attached as 
Appendix I and Appendix II respectively. 
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The usual composition of members attending the Mauritian TWG meetings was 
from both the public and private sectors in Mauritius such as representatives from the: 
•  Ministry of  Economic Development, Productivity & Regional Development; 
•  Ministry of  Finance; 
•  Customs Department, Ministry of  Finance; 
•  Attorney General's office; 
•  Prime Minister's Office; 
•  Ministry oflndustry & Commerce; 
•  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and International Trade; 
•  Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA); 
•  Mauritius Chamber of  Commerce and Industry (MCCI); 
•  Joint Economic Council (JEC) ; and 
•  Bank of  Mauritius (The Central Bank). 
A detailed list of  all TWG members is provided in Appendix III to the report. 
3.1.3  Summary of  main issues discussed over the period 
•  Reports and Papers Drafted: 
•  Addendum to the Letter ofCBI Policy 
•  Estimates of  Transition Costs regarding Government Revenue foregone as a 
result of  the CBI implementation 
•  Priority actions that could form the elements of a Proposed Road Map for 
Investment Facilitation which would complement existing national initiatives 
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t  TWG Concerns 
•  Operational arrangements for the TWGs and the PICs (or equal bodies) to 
strengthen their capacity to meet future challenges 
•  Agreement upon the terms of  reference for background studies to be conducted 
bytheTWG 
•  The impact of  the TWGs in the policy-making process 
t  CBI Implementation and Activities 
p.412 
•  Future modalities for strengthening regional co-operation and for harmonising 
the various efforts among the CBI countries 
•  CBI Internet website 
•  Desire of  the participating countries to broaden the CBI 
•  Overall financing requirements of the economic reform programmes of the 
participating countries by the co-sponsors 
•  Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) at ministerial level, headed by the 
Minister of Finance and involving input from private sector representatives 
through the TWGs 
•  PTA Clearing House 
•  PTA MIE Charter 
•  Guidelines on implementation of  reciprocal actions 
•  Hamonisation of  trade policies towards third countries 
•  Common External Tariff (CET) 
•  Technology Diffusion Scheme Project 
•  Setting up of a Regional Export Services Agency (RESA) by the CO  MESA 
Clearing House 3.2 Overview ofsensitisation activities since beginning 
3.2.1  Workshop on Industrial Development and Regional Integration 
The Ministry oflndustry and Industrial Technology in collaboration with the Ministry 
of  Economic Planning and Development organised a workshop between the 16th and 19th 
August 1993. The meeting ended after a half-day devoted to Industrial Development and 
Regional Integration. The objective of the meeting was to disseminate information on 
the CHI among leaders and decision-makers both in the private and public sectors. The 
meeting was conducted by the TWG with input from the CHI lead consultants, IMANI 
Development International. 
3.2.2  Brief  details of  regional workshops or seminars held since 1992 
As an active member of  the CHI, Mauritius hosted quite a few regional TWGs and 
Ministerial meetings. These meetings were organised by IMANI Consultants. 
Mauritius hosted the following meetings: 
t  The first regional technical meeting of  the participating countries' TWGs in June 
1992; 
t  The fourth regional technical meeting of the participating countries' TWGs in 
November 1998; 
t  The second Ministerial Meeting in March 1995; and 
t  The fourth Ministerial Meeting in November 1999. 
• Regional technical meetings of participating countries' TWGs 
In June  1992 a workshop for the TWGs was held in Mauritius and the IMANI 
Consultant's desk study served as a basis for discussions. The workshop laid down terms 
of  reference to be followed by the TWGs. 
The fourth CHI Technical Working Group Meeting was held in Mauritius on the 
16th and 17th ofNovember 1998. The meeting was held mainly to discuss progress in 
implementation of  the CHI-supported reform agenda since the Third Ministerial Meeting 
held in Harare in February 1998. The meeting concluded that most of  the participating 
countries had made good progress in implementing the CHI-supported reform measures. 
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The Second Ministerial Meeting took place in Mauritius in March 1995. During the 
meeting there was a thorough debate on trade liberalisation and agreement was reached 
on the Road Map towards eliminating intra-regional tariffs and achieving a Harmonised 
External Tariff. 
The fourth Ministerial Meeting was held in Mauritius on the 18th and 19th of  October 
1999.  12 countries were represented together with regional groupings such as SADC, 
CO  MESA, IOC, the co-sponsors and representatives from South African organisations. 
Following the meeting, Mauritius chaired a ministerial level working group to develop a 
high level forum to promote regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa. During 
the Meeting a draft of  the Mauritian Addendum to the Letter of  CBI Policy was circulated 
among the other member states and co-sponsors. The participating countries also agreed 
to prepare their draft individual Investment Facilitation Programs and to circulate these 
to the other countries. 
• Others 
In addition, the Bank of Mauritius contributes positively to the development of 
regional initiatives, through its active participation and presence in different fora on the 
regional front. The Finance and Investment sector of  the SADC operates at two levels, 
namely at the level of  Committee of  Treasury Officials and at the level of  the Committee 
of  Central Bank Governors. The Bank ofMauritius participates regularly in the activities 
of the Committee of Governors and has on various occasions organised meetings in 
connection with the projects presently on the agenda. 
3.2.3  Other sensitisation activities 
In 1993, the TWG produced a leaflet on the CBI, which was widely distributed 
among Mauritian businesspersons and Government officials. The Mauritius Export 
Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA) then organised a seminar on Preferential 
Trade Area (PTA) from 23rd to 251 h August 1993, where the Mauritian TWG disseminated 
additional information on the CBI and the measures elaborated in the Common Programme 
of  Action (CPA) and the Concept Paper. In 1995, the Government ofMauritius re-stated 
the status of  the various measures it had been implementing and further listed the planned 
measures and indicative time  frame for implementation of  integration reforms in its Letter 
of  CBI Policy. 
p.414 3.3 Overview ofstudies undertaken since be:innin: 
3.3.1  Brief  details of  studies commissioned by the TWG and the related results 
• Letter of CBI Policy 
The purpose ofthe Letter ofCBI Policy 1995 was to outline the progress Mauritius 
made in implementing the various measures agreed at the ministerial meeting in Kampala. 
The planned measures and policies to further achieve CBI objectives were also examined. 
It  was agreed that Mauritius had already made significant progress in the four main 
areas: 
t  Trade liberalisation; 
t  Improvement of  the functioning of  intra-regional payments and exchange systems; 
t  Reform of the regulatory environment and progressive harmonisation of 
investment incentives; and 
t  Institutional development 
The liberalisation of external trade was considered to  be well under way and 
government committed to continue further in the process of  tariff  reduction programme 
as well as the rationalisation and harmonisation of  the tariff  structure. Mauritius introduced 
over the years a series of  measures to liberalise the financial sector: exchange controls 
were completely abolished and the interbank market in foreign exchange was developed. 
Mauritius had already harmonised and simplified its different investment incentives 
through the Industrial Expansion Act promulgated in 1993. The Government intended to 
adopt measures commensurate with the objective of  establishing statutory time limits on 
investment decisions and the processing of  work and residence permit requests. 
• TWG National Report 
Tlie TWG National Report was planned to review what had taken place in Mauritius 
in terms of liberalisation and regionalisation since the start of the CBI in 1992. The 
following issues were dealt with: 
t  Trade liberalisation and facilitation 
t  Trade in services 
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~  Immigration, residence and employment 
~  Financial sector reforms 
~  Payments system 
~  Exchange systems 
~  Foreign exchange markets 
~  Offshore and Freeport 
~  Stock exchange 
~  Co-ordination within regional and sub-regional organisations 
~  Private sector involvement 
~  Support of  co-sponsors (EU, African Development Bank, IMF, World Bank) 
~  Investment Facilitation Survey 
It  was proposed to develop a questionnaire and meet TWG members and other key-
persons ofthe private sector to identify constraints, proposal for solutions and Government 
engagement in relation to the development of  a Road Map for Investment Facilitation. 
This survey was carried out in October and November 1998. 
To  assist the TWG, De Chazal Du Mee, as  Secretary to the TWG, designed a 
questionnaire to identify constraints and elaborate solutions to remove these constraints 
in relation to investment. A qualitative survey was carried out among key representatives 
of the public sector (members of TWG) and the private sector to highlight measures, 
which would be appropriate to promote investment, both domestic and foreign,  in 
Mauritius. 
The response ofTWG members to the survey was rather low and results from the 
exercise highlighted that the main impediments to investment were the long processing 
and replying procedures, the lack of information and awareness on investment 
opportunities both in Mauritius and in the region. Moreover, the marketing of these 
opportunities was considered to be very poor. In order to remove these constraints, it was 
suggested that the information service should be improved, certain tasks could even be 
subcontracted to specialised agencies to act as advisers on investment promotion activities. 
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residence permit applications together. 
The lack of infrastructure, technology and communication network as  well as 
illiterate, unskilled and unqualified labour are characteristics which are unfavourable to 
investment flows in the region. The overly bureaucratic regulatory framework and the 
political unstability were also mentionned. 
• Presentation for Regional Meeting 
De Chazal Du Mee prepared a presentation about the achievement of  Mauritius in 
terms of implementation of CBI measures for the regional meeting of TWGs held in 
Mauritius in November 1998. As Secretary to the Mauritian TWG, DCDM provided due 
assistance to the Chairman and other Mauritian representatives of  the TWG during the 
regional meeting. 
• CBI Implementation Matrix 
The CBI Implementation Matrix is designed to summarise the state of  progress on 
the implementation of  measures identified under the CBI. With regards to policy measures, 
it presents the current status and the planned measures to achieve the objectives of  the 
CBI. The policy measures considered are the core measures developed from the CBI 
concept paper in the areas of Trade, Payments and Exchange Systems, Investment 
and Institutional Development. The degree of implementation of these measures is 
presented with respect to the objectives of  promoting Cross-Border Trade, Investment 
and Payments at regional level. 
The CBI Implementation Matrix, which was presented in October 1998, has been 
regularly updated in November 1998, June 1999, December 1999 and April2000. 
• Addendum to the Letter of CBI Policy 
DCDM was actively involved in the finalisation of  the Addendum to the Letter of 
CBI Policy (LCBIP).  The Addendum to  the LCBIP took into account the progress 
regarding the implementation of the Letter as well as  the Road Map for Investment 
Facilitation. A first draft of  the LCBIP was submitted in September 1999, a second draft, 
in October 1999, a third draft, in November 1999, a fourth draft in December 1999 and 
a final report in April2000. 
The Addendum to the LCBIP, which was based on an outline of  prototype Addendum 
to the Letter of  CBI Policy, comprises three parts as follows: 
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under the CBI framework and exposes forthcoming ones. 
t  The second part deals with the Road Map for Investment Facilitation, describing 
the essential conditions for attracting investment. 
t  The third part deals with the relevant institutions involved in implementation. 
Following recommendations ofTWG members, the paper was regularly reviewed 
and amended to take into account the latest measures taken by Mauritius to achieve the 
objectives of  the CBI. Figures were also updated to the latest official sources available. 
The Addendum to the LCBIP is now ready to be submitted to the Government of 
Mauritius for approval. 
• Estimates of  Transition Costs 
DCDM prepared a report on the estimates of transition costs regarding the 
implementation ofthe reforms within the CBI framework. The report is divided into two 
distinct parts. The first part discusses the methodology adopted to estimate the impact of 
tariff reductions on Government revenue for the past five years and the projected loss in 
Government revenue for the coming five years. The second part is the presentation of 
results, which is an analysis of the evolution in Government revenue. The report also 
provides appendices containing statistical tables to justify the calculations made. A first 
draft of  the report was produced and circulated among the TWG members. 
The Estimates of  Transition Costs were circulated to TWG members and, following 
their feedback, figures were updated to include actual figures for the year 1999. Projections 
were thus extended to the year 2005. Following comments from many TWG members, it 
was agreed to include the computation of  other expected shortfalls of  Government revenue: 
(i)  Projections for CIF imports and customs duties from Madagascar were 
calculated separately because trade with Madagascar has been liberalised since 1999 
only unlike with other COMESA member countries. A final updated report with the 
latest figures available was produced and circulated among the TWG members and is 
ready to be submitted to the Government of  Mauritius for approval. 
(ii)  Commitments made at WTO to reduce duty on IT products were also taken 
into account. 
(iii)  The positive effect of  the introduction of  Value Added Tax (VAT) regarding 
additional Government revenue was computed. 
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latest sources available. The Estimates of  Transition Costs is ready to be submitted to the 
Government of Mauritius for approval. However, before figures are communicated to 
the other CBI members and to the co-sponsors, the estimates need to be approved by the 
Government of  Mauritius. 
• Draft Investment Facilitation Programme 
During the Fourth Ministerial Meeting held in Mauritius in October 1999, the 
participating countries agreed to  complete the preparation of their draft individual 
investment facilitation programs and to circulate these to the other countries. The TWGs 
were to identify their requirements for technical and financial assistance to implement 
their individual investment facilitation programs and submit these to the co-sponsors. 
The TWG elaborated a Draft Investment Facilitation Programme, which includes 
the most important measures that Mauritius has taken in terms of  investment facilitation 
and those which are presently in process.  The contribution of major ministries and 
institutions, having a representative in the TWG, has been requested in this exercise. 
However, the participation of  only one member has been obtained up to now. The main 
measures to be taken by the Ministry of Commerce, Commerce, Corporate Affairs and 
Financial Services are a new Companies Bill aiming at helping businesses in their 
implementation process, the funding of  an SME project by the European Union to help 
small and medium enterprises and the setting up of  a Board of  Investment. 
4.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN  POLICY  REFORM  AREAS 
4.1 Foreign Trade 
• Import/Export Licensing 
Import licenses have been abolished. Yet, any person who imports any controlled 
goods on items such as health, sanitary, environmental and strategic reasons shall apply 
for an import permit from the Permanent Secretary. Export licences have been abolished, 
except for a few products for reasons of health and safety and there are also seasonal 
restrictions in order to meet critical shortages. 
•NTBs 
Quantitative restrictions still exist on a few items. 
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Customs duties on imports from CO MESA countries benefit from a 90% reduction 
on normal tariff. They are expected to reach 100% by 31st October 2000. 
• External Tariffs and CBI Harmonisation 
The number of  tariff bands has been reduced from 60 to 9. Imports from countries 
presently under the General tariff attract additional duty of20% regarding two rate bands, 
the 55% and the 80%. Tariff  has been previously reduced on a range of  products from the 
30 to 80% bands to the 10 and 15% bands. 
Tariffs on imports from Madagascar, of  the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), have 
been abolished. Furthermore, Mauritius has made its WTO commitments in the areas of 
tourism, basic telecommunications and trade in financial services. 
• Trade Facilitation 
Single goods declaration documents have been introduced, accompanying the 
complete implementation of  a system of  electronic declaration of  Bills of  Entry to Customs 
through Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). 
4.2 Pavments 
• Financial Sector Reform 
The financial system has been developed into a market-based one.  The Bank of 
Mauritius has set up its own in-house Monetary Policy Committee. Interest rates have 
been fully liberalised and the bank rate is market-determined. The non-cash liquid assets 
ratio has been reduced to zero. 
Capital adequacy ratio has been raised to limit risk. Measures introduced on 15 
December 1999 to develop an active market of  Government securities and to enhance 
liquidity management in the system are among others the: 
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• Regular short-term repurchase transactions (repos) and reverse repurchase 
transactions (reverse repos) and the 
•  A standing facility, the Lombard Facility, to provide for overnight collateralised 
advances to commercial banks. The Bank ofMauritius will implement a Real Time Gross Settlement system (RTGS) 
for large value transactions by the end of year 2000. The Government of Mauritius is 
planning to set up a Financial Services Authority to oversee the operations of all non-
bank financial institutions and ensure a more integrated approach to the development of 
that sector. Stockbrokers will be allowed to register with the Bank of  Mauritius to provide 
brokerage services on the Treasury Bills market. 
• Foreign Trade Instruments 
Traditional documents of international trade are still being used. Impediments to 
entry of foreign financial institutions have been removeq. There are no restrictions on 
foreign banks and no limits on the amount of  foreign ownership. 
• Exchange Controls 
All restrictions on current account transactions have been removed as per the Article 
VIII of  the Articles of  Agreement of  the International Monetary Fund. Capital account 
restrictions were eliminated by mid 1994, which resulted in the suspension of  exchange 
control. 
• Exchange Rate 
The exchange rate of the rupee is determined by market forces as Mauritius has 
adopted a managed-floating regime. 
4.3 Investment 
• Investment Approval and Licensing Procedures 
A One Stop Shop was set up in July 1990 to assist industrialists in their dealings 
with ministries for all necessary clearances and permits required for the setting up of 
their enterprise. A Board oflnvestment (BOI) will be established for investment promotion 
and facilitation. The BOI will be the sole authority responsible for investment approval 
in a New Business Park to be developed. 
• Investment Code and Regulations 
Investment schemes have been harmonised and simplified through the Industrial 
Expansion Act promulgated in 1993. 
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The investment regime in Mauritius is to a considerable extent compatible with the 
OECD negotiating text on Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl). A sub-committee 
on Trade and Investment has been set up to elaborate the stand ofMauritius on Multilateral 
Framework on Investment. 
• Movement of  Persons and Employment Permits 
Mauritius has not ratified the COMESA visa protocol but residents from a certain 
number ofCBI countries are not subject to visa requirements prior to entering Mauritius. 
The Government has introduced multiple-entry visas for bona fide businessmen on a 
case to  case basis. Moreover, a draft protocol is being worked out at SADC level 
concerning facilitation of  movements of  persons including labour and businessmen. 
Work permit requests are processed within 4 to 6 weeks if  the requesting company 
provides all required documents promptly. Applications for visa and residence permits 
from expatriates in companies registered with the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities 
Authority (MOBAA) and the Mauritius Freeport Authority (MFA) are processed as fast 
track and finalised within 2 or 3 days. Work permits for professionals will go through a 
fast track as well. As per the Immigration Act amended in 1999, foreigners investing not 
less than US$500,000 in a qualifying business activity are granted the permanent resident 
status. 
• Membership/participation in investment protection agencies 
Mauritius is  a member of MIGA and is  signatory to Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreements with China, Madagascar, Mozambique and South Africa. Double 
Tax Agreements have been concluded with Botswana, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Measures have been implemented to internationalise 
the Stock Exchange of  Mauritius, allowing listing of  foreign funds. 
Mauritius has come to an agreement with other SADC countries to harmonise listing 
requirements for the development of  Cross Listings on Regional Stock Exchanges. 
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I.  OVERVIEW  OF THE CBI IN  NAMIBIA 
1.1 Namibia's Involvement 
Namibia has participated in the Cross Border Initiative since its inception in 1992. 
At the ministerial meeting in Kampala, Uganda, in August 1992, the Namibian 
Government stated its willingness to participate in a programme to facilitate cross-border 
investment, trade and payments in Eastern and Southern Africa. Preparatory arrangements 
for the CBI were started by two workshops held in Harare and Mauritius in 1992, out of 
which a Common Programme of  Action (CPA) was developed. Further technical meetings 
were held in Brussels, in June 1993, to develop a Concept Paper on CBI. The Concept 
Paper was subsequently approved at the Ministerial meeting in August 2  7, 1993. Namibia, 
together with the other participants at this meeting re-affirmed their commitment to 
liberalisation of cross-border activities in accordance with the objectives of the Ahuja 
Treaty on Pan-African Economic Community and those of regional organisation. The 
co-sponsors of  the Kampala meeting (European Union, World Bank, African Development 
Bank, and International Monetary Fund) also confirmed their willingness to support and 
provide assistance in conformity with the CBI Concept Paper and take into consideration 
the transition costs associated with the Initiative. 
Namibia continued to attend the CBI meetings and a Namibian Technical Working 
Group was established in 1996. It  was, however, not until August 1997 that the Minister 
of  Trade and Industry, Hidipo Hamutenya, signed and submitted the Namibian Letter of 
CBI Policy to the co-sponsors. In the meantime, the co-sponsors - in anticipation of  the 
Letter - had committed themselves to finance  a Transitional Trade and Investment 
Development Programme (TTIDP). This programme started in April1997 with the main 
aim to strengthen the Government's capacity to deliver professional services to the private 
sector in the areas of investment and trade. Capacity building in the private sector was 
also covered by the TTIDP. 
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CBI in that its membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) would guide its commitments to the CBI Agenda in 
the areas of  trade and payment systems liberalization. As such Namibia's commitment 
to the CBI Agenda has never been unreserved. 
1.2 CBI Benefits 
Namibia has benefited from the CBI largely through the contribution of  the TTIDP 
to the capacity of  the Ministry ofTrade and Industry (MTI) and the Namibia Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (NCCI) to deliver a better service to and design an improved 
policy environment for private sector operators.  The EU funded "Support for the 
Implementation of the Cross Border Initiative" for Namibia is  now completed.  The 
Programme consisted of  the following key components: 
t  Capacity Building in the Ministry of  Trade and Industry (MTI); 
t  Acquisition oflnformation Technology and software for MTI; 
t  Annual Work Programme for MTI and the NCCI; 
t  Direct Agreement with MTIIODC in support of the EPZ Development 
Programme. 
The TTIDP also set in motion the development of  a three-year follow-up programme 
to support the trade, investment and industry sectors in Namibia. Again financed by the 
European Union.  The tender for this EURO 3.2 million Trade and Investment 
Development Programme (TIDP) will be called for shortly. Eight European firms have 
been short-listed to submit a bid. 
The TIDP will address the following key areas of  concern: 
1)  On-going institutional support to MTI's Industrial Development Directorate, 
the Namibia Investment Centre and the International Trade Directorate for improving 
and tailoring its services to the private sector in industrial development and the promotion 
of investments and exports. This component includes capacity building in MTI to 
strengthen its internal coordination and planning system; 
2)  Strengthening the in-house capacity of  the NCCI to provide information and 
business/technical services to its members while simultaneously enhancing the chamber's 
financial sustainability; 
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facilitate the lending by commercial financial institutions to SME clients. 
While the transitional programme was financed from both regional CBI funds (EUR 
4 million) and theN  ational Indicative Programme (NIP) for N arnibia (EUR 1.3 7 million), 
the TIDP will be financed in full from the Namibian NIP allocation. 
1.3 Perceptions of  CBI 
From interviews with the key stakeholders in the CBI and TWG held by an 
independent consultant, Ms Flora Musonda, as part of  the CBI Evaluation undertaken in 
1999, it can be concluded that both CBI and the TWG have been and are still appreciated 
in N  arnibia. 
There appears to be consensus that the TWG has provided an important function in 
monitoring the trade and foreign exchange liberalization and investment promotion efforts 
ofNarnibia. The CBI Policy Matrix provided a central reference point on progress made 
in the various policy areas. It was used at various policy fora and discussions, inter alia 
at the IMF Article IV Consultations. The TWG is the only active forum in Namibia with 
private and public sector participation where trade and investment related policy issues 
are discussed. 1 
The CBI and TWG meetings have provided a forum for discussion on economic 
integration in the region beyond the confines of the existing trade blocks (SADC, 
COMESA and SACU). Namibia has participated in all these meetings and recently 
sent a strong delegation to the 4th CBI Ministerial Meeting (October '99), led by the 
Deputy Minister of  Trade and Industry, Mr Bernard Esau. Minister Esau is a member 
of  the Ministerial Level Working Group, chaired by Mauritius, that was established at 
the 4th CBI Ministerial Meeting. The Group is to develop further the concept of  a high 
level forum to promote regional integration in Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian 
Ocean while avoiding duplication of initiatives and to involve additional countries in 
the region. 
The important role of the CBI in the corning about of the TIDP is  also being 
acknowledged by all stakeholders. Without the TTIDP- funded by CBI -there would 
have been no follow-up TIDP. 
1The Presidential Connnittee on Trade and Industry has not been active for some time now. 
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There has been little direct impact ofCBI on the participation ofNamibia in SACU, 
COMESA, SADC and the CMA. As was pointed out earlier, Namibia's foreign trade 
policy is largely guided by its membership of  SACU and so foreign exchange control by 
its membership of  the CMA. Namibia and Swaziland are the only two members ofSACU 
and the CMA that participate in the CBI. The SACU time-table for trade liberalization 
and the CMA time-table for the liberalization of  foreign exchange control have as such 
been dominant over the CBI agenda. 
The derogation extended to Namibia under CO  MESA in terms of  the tariff  reduction 
schedule on which the CBI commitments are modeled - based on the same argument 
that Namibia is a member of a customs union and can not unilaterally lower tariff on 
trade with third countries - has to  some extent slowed down the trade liberalization 
process. While Namibia is under SACU liberalizing its trade regime on the basis of 
commitments to the WTO at a developed country pace, the COMESA phasing down 
schedule is more progressive. It  should however be noted, that not all CO  MESA member 
countries have kept to  the COMESA time-table, in full,  for tariff reductions. The 
derogation for Namibia under COMESA will again be discussed in 2000. 
1.5 Status ofCBI 
At the end of  1997 the TWG Secretariat had already expressed its concern about the 
legal status of  the CBI Letter ofPolicy. The TWG operates in a rather open environment. 
Though endorsed by the Government of  Namibia and signed by the Minister of Trade 
and Industry, the formal, legal status of  the CBI Letter ofPolicy is unclear. The question 
was raised, that should any of  the participating ministries or institutions fail to comply 
with the commitments expressed in the Letter, would there be any enforcement 
mechanism? The formalization of  the TWG into a national reference group on trade and 
investment policy was suggested as  an option for  consideration. Again in  1999, in 
anticipation of  the then foreseen closure of  the CBI, the institutionalization of  the TWG 
was suggested. This proposal has, to date not been acted upon. The continued support to 
TWG's now foreseen under the new CBI programme of  support with CO  MESA taking 
over the regional secretariat support function could possibly contribute to such 
formalization of  the role of  the TWG in the Namibian policy decision making process on 
trade and investment related issues. 
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2.1 Overview ofTWG Meetings since 1997 
Meetings of  the TWG have been called on an ad hoc basis to discuss CBI related 
matters only. No regular meeting schedule was kept. 
The TWG meetings were, over the years, regularly attended by the following persons 
representing the Bank of Namibia, Namibia Investment Centre, Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Namibia Chamber of  Commerce and Industry and 
the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit. All meetings were attended by the TWG 
Secretariat. 
Bank ofNamibia: International Economics I Research Department 
Mr F.M Hengari, Senior Researcher 
Mr Abed Jyambo, Researcher 
Namibia Investment Centre (NIC) 
Mr F.  Gaoseb, Deputy Director 
Ministry of  Finance 
Mr Paul W Hartmann, Director Economic Policy Advisory Service 
Mr Frikkie van der Merwe, Deputy Director Customs & Excise 
Ministry of  Trade and Industry: Directorate of  International Trade 
Alternatively:  Ms Paulina Elago, Director 
Ms Annascy Mwanyangapo, Deputy Director 
Mr Noko Murangi, Deputy Director 
Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) 
Dr. Dirk Hansohm, Senior Researcher 
Namibian Chamber of  Commerce and IndustJ::y (NCCI) 
Mr Sam Geiseb, CEO 
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following: 
~  non-regularity in TWG meeting schedule; 
~  unknown status of  the TWG and its role in the Namibian decision-making process; 
~  related to above, rather re-active approach by the TWG focusing on CBI matters 
only; 
~  slow decision-making on study/research proposals; 
~  the non-existence of  a full-time deputy TWG Chairperson. 
During 1997 only one full meeting of  the TWG was held, namely in August 1997. 
An ad hoc meeting was called in November 1997 to discuss the draft synthesis paper on 
the CBI Implementation and Evolving Agenda, prepared by the co-sponsors, with Mr. 
Walter Kennes of  the EC. 
During 1998 two TWG meetings took place. The first meeting was held to put back 
on track the work of  the TWG in support of  the CBI agenda. The second meeting was 
called to prepare for the 41h Regional TWG Meeting which was held in Mauritius from 
16 to 17 November 1998. 
At the general TWG meeting, which took place on 1 September 1998 (a) a report-
back on the CBI Ministerial Meeting held in February '98 was given by the TWG 
Chairperson, Ms Paulina Elago, (b) the CBI Policy Matrix was discussed, and the need 
for regular updates to the TWG Secretariat re-iterated, (c) a status report was given on 
the CMA Review study and a commitment made by the TWG Chairperson to follow-up 
on the study with the relevant stakeholders, (c) a proposal by the TWG Secretariat to 
organise two Business-to-Business Information Meetings in Oshakati and Windhoek 
discussed and accepted, (d) two research proposals to 1) study Namibia's Foreign Trade 
Structure and the Effects of  Trade Liberalisation on Fiscal Revenue and the Balance of 
Payments and 2) study the Obstacles to Labour Mobility in the Southern African region 
were discussed and the decision taken to further elaborate the Terms of Reference for 
these studies, to include a detailed cost plan. 
At the second meeting in preparation for the Regional TWG Meeting, which was 
held <?n  11 November 1998, the draft discussion paper prepared by the co-sponsors and 
titled 'Cross Border Initiative Road Map for Investment Facilitation' was discussed. 
Key points raised, which were relayed by the TWG Secretariat at the Regional TWG 
Meeting (also held in November 1998), included: 
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regionally coordinated and harmonized approach will be beneficial for the 
promotion of  Foreign Direct Investments into Namibia. In particular, in relation 
to the image and perceptions of  the Southern African Region (SAR) as an attractive 
investment location in terms of political stability and peace, there is  definite 
scope for an individualistic approach exploiting the comparative and competitive 
advantages ofNamibia as an investment location. That is, a regional approach to 
investment facilitation is not a given policy priority, especially in view of the 
heterogeneous nature of  the countries participating in the Cross Border Initiative. 
Namibia has already made considerable progress in the implementation of its 
Investment Road Map, which was developed in cooperation with the Foreign 
Investment Advisory Services (FIAS) of  The World Banlc Assistance with the 
implementation of this Road Map was provided under the EU/CBI funded 
Transitional Trade and Investment Development Programme; 
t  In measuring the competitiveness of the CBI countries, the perceptions of the 
local business community should be taken into account as an important component 
of  the competitiveness index. It  was not clear why the Euromoney Ranking was 
used and no reference made to the Africa and World Competitiveness Reports. 
The anti-corruption campaign launched in 1998 by the Prime Minister ofNamibia 
was highlighted as a relevant measure to reduce corruptive practices in the country; 
t  No mention was made ofthe DRC conflict which would appear to be an important 
factor in the analysis of  political stability and peace prospects for the SAR; 
t  The TWG did not perceive the development oflnter-Bank Spot Exchange Markets 
as a priority at this point in time; 
t  The report would benefit from the inclusion of data on cross linkages between 
African stock-exchanges; 
t  The fact that in Namibia there is no mechanism/procedure to  "approve" 
investments was re-iterated. The investment procedures in the country do not 
include a formal approval for foreign investments as practiced in most other CBI 
countries; 
t  Regarding the analysis of  the various data sets presented in the report, a cautious 
note was made in that the countries that are participating in the CBI are not a 
homogeneous group of countries and that, subsequently the averaging of data 
becomes artificial. It was recommended that the analysis should distinguish the 
low, medium and high performing CBI countries. It was further noted that no 
direct relationship between the participation in the CBI and performance in the 
attraction of Foreign Direct Investment and other indicators used in the report 
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performance of  the CBI participating countries if  they were not partaking in the 
CBI. And finally, the need for data on the source, direction, location and sectoral 
focus of FDI was identified. In Namibia, an investor tracking system is being 
developed for implementation as from early 1999. 
In total three TWG meetings were held during 1999, namely on 28 September 1999, 
8 October 1999 and 18 November 1999. The objectives of  each of  these meetings are set 
out below. 
28 September '99 
t  To discuss the TWG mid-year report 
t  To identify the TWG activities for remainder of 1999 
t  Secretariat's &  TWG Members' to provide feed-back on the CBI Evaluation 
Mission by Ms Flora Musonda 
t  To discuss the preparations for the CBI Ministerial Meeting ( 18-19 October 1999) 
8 October '99 
t  To develop a TWG position paper on the proposed "CBI Road Map for Investment 
Facilitation" to guide the Namibian Delegation to the Mauritius CBI Ministerial 
Meeting. 
18 November '99 
t  To adopt the Meeting Notes ofTWG Meetings held on 28/9 and 8/10 (and matters 
arising) 
t  Secretariat and TWG Members to report-back on Mauritius CBI Ministerial 
Meeting 
t  To  discuss a Namibian Commitment to the CBI Investment Facilitation Road 
Map 
t  To consider the Namibia Chapter in the CBI Evaluation Report 
t  To  identify remaining TWG Activities for  1999 and early 2000 (research & 
sensitization efforts) 
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Meeting which took place on 18-19 October 1999. The TWG members present at the 
Ministerial meeting highlighted the following areas in their report-back: 
•  Namibia's point of view was that only certain areas of investment facilitation 
and promotion will benefit from a regional, CBI approach; 
•  Namibia has already made considerable progress in the implementation of its 
"Investor Road Map"; 
•  The Meeting did not express itself explicitly on the future of the CBI and the 
future role and existence of the TWO's. Outside the official meeting mention 
was made ofthe possible take over by CO  MESA of  the CBI regional coordination 
role, but these issues were not addressed in the meeting. The future funding of 
TWO's was also not discussed; 
•  The on-going CBI Evaluation was merely mentioned. No detailed feed-back on 
the process and the expected outcomes/initial findings was given at the meeting 
- against expectations; 
•  Namibia's Deputy Minister of  Trade and Industry was elected on the Ministerial 
Level Working Group chaired by Mauritius. Minister Beenick will call the first 
meeting; 
•  The focus  on regional, CBI countries' "ownership" of the CBI process 
demonstrated (CBI countries to become the driving force behind the initiative) 
by: 
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•  the establishment of  the ministerial task group (see above); 
•  the circulation ofthe national-level investment facilitation programme (to feed 
into the CBI regional Investment Facilitation Road Map) among the member 
countries with copies to the co-sponsors; 
•  the possible closer involvement ofCOMESA in the daily management ofthe 
programme by taking on the role of  coordinator (to be confirmed); 
•  the need to draft a Namibian commitment to the CBI Investment Facilitation 
Road Map before 31  March 1999. It was decided that the TWG Secretariat 
would prepare a draft Terms ofReference for the compilation of  the Namibian 
Commitment by a consultant. Only one ad hoc meeting was held this year, on 10  March 2000, to discuss the 
consultancy to draft the Addendum to the CBI Letter of Policy. At the meeting it was 
agreed that this assignment be advertised. No proposals were received. See further below. 
2.2 Overview o(Sensitization Activities since 1997 
The TWG Secretariat organized a "Consultative Forum on Competition Policy" 
on 14 May 1997. The Forum was intended to be a first step towards the formulation of  an 
effective Competition Policy Act for Namibia. In the context ofthe CBI sponsored TTDIP 
a consultancy had been commissioned from mid 1997 to  identify the issues to be 
accommodated in a Namibian competition policy and prepare the layman's draft for 
such legislation. In anticipation, the TWG organized the forum to sensitize and consult 
Namibian businesses with the objective of  obtaining clarity on the issues at stake. The 
following two broad aspects were to be discussed (1) Concepts and principles to be 
accommodated in a  Namibian Competition Policy, and (2) Implementation and 
enforcement of competition policy legislation. The Forum brought together expertise 
from the region and abroad in the field of  competition policy both in terms ofthe legislation 
and enforcement thereof. Experts from South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and the 
European Union were invited to give presentations at the Forum and participate in the 
panel discussion. The consultant's layman's draft was submitted to Cabinet by  the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry later that year without, as was envisaged, further consultations 
with the private sector. A second consultative forum was planned for September 1997 to 
discuss the findings and recommendations of  the consultants. However, the Ministry felt 
that the extensive consultations with the business community by the TTIDP consultants 
did not necessitate another plenary session. The Competition Bill has ever since not 
been presented to Parliament. Once the bill is tabled, the TWG may want take the initiative 
to organise another consultative forum. 
In 1998 two "Business-to-Business Info Meetings" were organised by the TWG. 
The Oshakati (on 20 November '98) and Windhoek (25 November '98) meetings were 
attended by,  in total 70 members from the business community and various public 
institutions involved in economic development such as the Ministries ofTrade and Industry 
and Finance, the Bank ofNamibia, the Namibia Development Corporation, the Windhoek 
Municipality, etc. While the turnout was somewhat disappointing, the lively discussions 
and active participation of those present compensated for this. The TWG Chairperson 
chaired .the Windhoek meeting while the Oshakati meeting was chaired by the TWG 
Secretary. Speakers from the Ministry of  Trade and Industry, the Offshore Development 
Company, the Namibia Chamber of  Commerce and Industry and various private sector 
companies located in Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Outjo, Tsumeb, Oshakati, Oshikango were 
invited to make a presentation in support of  a well informed discussion. 
p.433 Presentations were given on the following subjects: 
t  Policy Support and Services offered by the Ministry of  Trade and Industry 
t  Support and Services offered by the Offshore Development Company 
t  Support and Services offered by the Namibia Chamber of  Commerce and Industry 
t  Manufacturing and Other Incentives 
t  Bonded Warehousing 
t  Exporting under the Namibia-Zimbabwe Preferential Trade Agreement 
t  Transport via the Trans-Kalahari and Trans-Caprivi Highways 
t  Export Processing Zone Operations 
t  Facilities available at the Prosperita Industrial Park in Windhoek 
The Cross Border Initiative (CBI) and its objectives were briefly introduced at both 
meetings highlighting the role of  the CBI as a temporary and non-institutionalized catalyst 
for trade liberalization and investment promotion in 14 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
Furthermore, the active participation of  the private sector in the CBI was mentioned and 
so the donor support provided by the European Union, The World Bank, The International 
Monetary Fund and the African Developnent Bank. Furthermore, the composition of 
the Technical Working Group in Namibia and its role in overseeing the implementation 
of  Namibia's commitments to the CBI Agenda were presented. A short report-back on 
the TWG Meeting in Mauritius with particular reference to the Investment Road Map 
was provided. Namibia's position was clarified in that in some areas the harmonization 
of investment related procedures will be beneficial, while in other areas a more 
individualist approach needs to be taken in support of  the creation of  a policy induced 
competitive advantage to become most attractive as  an investment location.  The 
participants were further informed on the TTIDP and TIDP. 
In 1999 and 2000 no public meetings were organised by the TWG. 
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The TWG initiated a number of  research projects which for one or another reason 
were not implemented. Terms of  References were prepared but no consultants appointed. 
A study on the costs and benefits ofNamibia  's membership to the Common Monetary 
Area was initiated in  1997, but subsequently abandoned in  1998, when the Bank of 
Namibia decided to have the study conducted in-house. To date such a study was not 
undertaken by the Bank. 
Other studies and projects for which Terms ofReferences were developed but which 
did not materialize are: 
•  NEPRU in 1998 proposed to undertake an analysis ofNamibia's foreign trade 
structure through a compilation of  available foreign trade figures and analysis of 
trade flows in terms of  commodities and trading partners. This study would include 
an assessment of the effects of trade liberalisation on fiscal  revenue and the 
Balance ofPayments; 
•  A study to identify obstacles to labour mobility in Southern Africa, with a view 
to  recommend practical measures to enhance such mobility was proposed by 
NEPRU in  1998. The progress in this area of regional development has been 
slow. There are also complaints from investors in Namibia regarding work permits. 
Many countries in the region experience high levels of unemployment and an 
assessment of  the potential impact of  liberalisation of  foreign labour may prove 
useful in support of  a realistic regional policy framework; 
•  Despite numerous efforts by the Government, the  level of Foreign Direct 
Investments remains low. A summary of  the views and opinions of  these business 
people to refine and possibly redirect the investment promotion and facilitation 
efforts of  the Government was proposed by NEPRU in 1998; and more recently 
•  The drafting of the Namibian commitment to the CBI Investment Facilitation 
Road Map (2000). 
Interestingly, eventhough they were mostly conceived some time ago each of  these 
research projects I consultancies still bear relevance to the economic integration process 
and the development of  trade and investments in Namibia. The TWG should under the 
new contract expedite the implementation of  these projects. 
A request for financial assistance was recently submitted to the TWG by the Ministry 
of  Finance in support of  the public awareness campaign for the introduction of  the VAT 
system later in 2000. Advice has been sought from Imani Development as to how such a 
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the proposed tax reforms in the CBI Investment Facilitation Road Map and could as such 
be considered for funding by the co-sponsors. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN  POLICY  REFORM  AREAS 
3.1 Foreign Trade 
The general system of import and export licensing is still in place.  The 
recommendations of  a 1998 study into the import and export management to streamline 
and simplify the  existing permit and licensing requirements have to  date not been 
implemented. This study was commissioned under the TTIDP. 
To reduce non-tariffbarriers to trade has been an on-going effort. 
t  A new Road Traffic and Transport Act has been prepared and a new road user 
charges system which is guided by the principle of  non-discrimination between 
local and foreign road users has been developed. The institutional framework for 
implementation is currently being set up (a Road Fund Administration, Roads 
Authority and Roads Contractor Company). 
t  The Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) has been operational in 
Namibia since 1996. Direct interfacing with the private sector is provided for in 
the system. A single goods customs declaration form has been in use since April 
1995. 
t  The envisaged streamlining of  the existing incentives for traders and investors 
(in particularly in manufacturing) which was recommended in the 1996 FIAS 
Road Map Study has to date not been undertaken; 
t  A Namibian Competition Bill was drafted in 1997/98 but was not yet tabled 
before Parliament; 
t  Market deregulation has taken place with no more direct market interventions by 
the Meat Board since 1992 and a deregulation of  sunflower seed and its products 
in 1996; 
t  A Namibian Standards Desk has been established to facilitate information on 
and compliance with the SABS standards regulations. A fully fledged Namibian 
Standards Authority may be established in the near future. 
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which extends tariff preferences on imports from Zimbabwe, Namibia has not extended 
any tariff preferences to countries outside of  the SACU area. SACU has no preferential 
trade agreements in force with third countries. Negotiations on a PTA with Zambia since 
1996 have not concluded into an agreement. Namibia continues to enjoy a derogation on 
the extension of tariff preferences from CO  MESA although this arrangement will be 
reviewed in October 2000. Even though Namibia has ratified the SADC Trade Protocol, 
tariff reforms have not advanced as participated. No progress on intra-regional tariff 
reductions towards a SADC Free Trade Area has been made to date. 
Namibia, together with the other SACU countries, is implementing a tariff phasing 
down schedule under the WTO Marrakesh Agreement. This schedule is  guided by 
commitments as ifNamibia were a developed country (due to South Africa's developed 
country status and dominant position in SACU). A SACU Common External Tariff  applies 
to third country imports, including those from the region. 
Trade facilitation is also an on-going activity carried out by MTI and the NCCI. 
Inward and outward trade promotion missions are organised, companies are supported 
in trade fair participation, information brochures and videos are produced, etc. Much has 
been done in this area since 1992. 
Namibia has further made a commitment to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)  emphasizing non-discrimination among foreign and local service 
providers. Special reference is made in the offer to scientific and technical consulting 
services, tourism, telecommunications, financial services and energy. The offer will be 
detailed during the 2000 GATS negotiations. 
3.2 Pavments  . 
Namibia has a well developed banking system which is supervised by the Bank of 
Namibia. The Banking Institutions Acts provides for a relatively open legal framework 
for banking operations and aims to raise the standard ofbanking in Namibia to international 
levels. An Offshore Banking Act has been on the cards for some time now but should be 
presented to Parliament in 2000. All 5 commercial banks operating in Namibia have 
access to an extensive network of  correspondent banking relations, including a number 
of  countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. 
Export financing is a service provided by the commercial banks. Earlier plans to 
establish an Export Financing Scheme have as yet not materialized. Limited or no access 
to export financing for intra-regional trade transactions continues to be an obstacle to 
such trade. 
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current and capital accounts) has been achieved since 1992, foreign exchange transactions 
are still subject to Bank ofNamibia approval. Limits on foreign currency transactions 
have increased considerably though over the past 3-4 years. Namibia is a member ofthe 
CMA and its monetary policy is largely guided by this membership. The Namibian Dollar 
is at par with the South African Rand and freely convertible. Bureaux de changes operate 
legally and foreign currency accounts can be held by individual and companies. 
The exchange rate is determined by the market with interventions by the central 
banks of  the CMA only to stabilise the market. 
3.3 Investment 
In  1996, the Foreign Investment Services Agency (FIAS) assisted the Namibia 
Investment Centre with the design of  an Investor Road Map. This initiative was carried 
forward during the EU sponsored Transitional Trade and Investment Programme (TTIDP) 
in 1997 and 1998. A key achievement in the implementation of  the Investor Road Map 
in Namibia has been the establishment of  various committees in Government to monitor 
and effect the implementation of  the proposed measures. Progress has not been good in 
all areas, but the relevant structures have been put in place to oversee the process. 
Important areas of  progress include: 
t  on-going, extensive liberalization of  capital and current account transactions; 
t  increasingly successful interventions by the NIC at the Immigration Board in 
support of  residence/employment permit applications by foreign investors; 
t  establishment of  two EPZ parks along the Angola border and at the Walvis Bay 
harbour; 
t  double tax agreements with a number of  countries including Sweden, Mauritius, 
Malaysia, Germany, India, France, Romania, Russia, South Africa and the U.K. 
t  inter-ministerial liaison at regional level (within Namibia) to address obstacles 
to investment at regional and municipal level (this approach is being piloted in 
the Ohangwena and Erongo regions, where the EPZ parks are located); 
t  improved access to industrial zoned and serviced land with industrial and SME 
parks established throughout Namibia. 
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number of  measures called for in the area of  investment facilitation had already been met 
by Namibia. Examples thereof are the publication of the Foreign Investment Act and 
related information brochures, the non-existence of  investment approval procedures per 
se (foreign investment proposals are not vetted by the NIC, the NIC merely assists investors 
on request) and its membership ofMIGA (to ensure investment protection). 
Namibia is following the SADC time-table on relaxation of  immigration procedures. 
The studies proposed by NEPRU to the TWG to look into the obstacles to human 
movement and a survey-based assessment of the impact of investment facilitation 
measures, (see above) would produce valuable results for an evaluation of  the efforts by 
Namibia in the area of  investment facilitation. 
3.4 CBI Status 
Terms of Reference for a short term consultancy assignment to draft a Namibian 
commitment to the CBI Investment Facilitation Road Map were drawn up and an 
advertisement placed in a local daily to source the services of  a consultant. No proposals 
were received. In the absence of  any available consultant and the non-availability of  the 
TWG Secretariat to undertake this assignment, the Addendum could not be completed 
within the current contract period (April2000). 
As a consequence Namibia has also not yet made any concrete commitments to the 
CBI Road Map on Investment Facilitation. At the national level numerous measures 
have already been effected in an on-going process of  investment facilitation and promotion 
(and as part of  the original commitments to the CBI Letter of  Policy). They are briefly 
referenced above. 
The finalization ofboth the Addendum and the Namibian Road Map on Investment 
Facilitation should be made a priority activity under the new CBI/TWG contract. 
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The Namibian TWG Secretariat has identified the following issues for consideration 
and possible action during the second phase of CBI and TWGs under the COMESA 
guidance. Kindly note that these are mere recommendations and an expression of the 
Secretariat's concerns only: 
t  the status of  the TWG as the Namibian reference group for trade and investment 
policy formulation should be recognized and its mandate should include a wider 
range of  policy issues, including but also beyond the CBI Agenda and Addendum; 
t  this new status of  the TWG will justify a fixed and regular meeting schedule and 
a subsequent expedition of  research projects, public meetings and other activities; 
t  this new status of the TWG will also encourage a more frequent and effective 
interaction between the TWG and PIC to ensure that the recommendations by 
the TWG are considered at key policy level; 
t  the TWG should be chaired by two persons, alternating based on availability, 
with one chairperson representing the public and the other the private sector; 
t  membership of the TWG should be extended to  include more private sector 
institutions, especially representing the financial sector, and possibly some 
parastatals. The active involvement of  the National Planning Commission should 
also be considered; 
t  a yearly work plan should be drawn up by the TWG and an application for funding 
made to COMESA and the co-sponsors to cover the costs of  this work plan. This 
will facilitate a more organised implementation of  activities; 
t  the initiative taken at the  4th CBI Ministerial Meeting to  establish a regional 
Ministerial Level Working Group is  very much supported and is  expected to 
strengthen the ownership of CBI by the participating countries. This Working 
Group should be tasked to set the agenda for the various regional CBI meetings 
and ensure active participation of the CBI members in the development of the 
evolving agenda. 
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1.  THE INITIATIVE 
Rwanda was an original participant in the CBI, having participated in the  1992 
meetings. However due to the civil disturbances of  the early-mid 1990, which culminated 
in the genocide of 1994, it was unable to continue its participation. It did not therefore 
prepare a Letter ·Of CBI Policy when the other countries did. Since that time, however, 
Rwanda has participated in the Third CBI Ministerial meeting in February 1998 which 
took place in Harare and has implemented CBI-type reforms in the areas of trade 
liberalisation and liberalisation of  the payments system, and efforts have been made to 
streamline the investment regime. 
Towards the end of 1999, having realised the significant progress the country had 
made under IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAF) and the 
complementary EU Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF I) to reform the economy, the 
Government of  Rwanda (GoR) expressed its desire to formally participate in the CBI by 
preparing and submitting a Letter ofCBI Policy and establishing the institutional set-up 
for the CBI, namely the Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) and Technical Working 
Group (TWG). 
In order to prepare the Letter and its addendum, the Government ofR  wanda requested 
assistance from the European Commission to help them prepare the necessary 
documentation. A Consultant, Mr Mwansa James Musonda, was appointed by the lead 
consultants to  undertake this mission which took place in February, 2000. Resulting 
from this mission, a draft LCBIP was prepared. 
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FRAMEWORK 
Since the restoration of  political stability and security across the country following 
the civil strife of  1990- 1994, the economy of  Rwanda has experienced significant growth 
over the last six years. The government's principal aim was to restore the country's 
productive capacity to its pre-1994 level and build on it to raise the living standards of 
the people. 
2.1 Macro-economic framework and long-term vision 
Rwanda seeks to maintain macro-economic stability and sustainable growth. In this 
respect, the Government is pursuing prudent macroeconomics policies including 
liberalising economic activities. This has contributed to stabilising the economy and 
sustaining its rapid recovery. Economic growth over the last 5 years has been impressive 
with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates of 34% in 1995 from a decline of 
close to 50% in 1994, growth of 16% in 1996, 12.8% in 1997 and 9.5% in 1998. 
This growth can be attributed to the Government's sustained efforts at restoring the 
productive capacity in the whole economy but most especially in the agricultural sector. 
As the productive capacity is restored to its pre-1994level, growth has slackened. Hence, 
further growth in the economy can only come from fresh investment and increasing 
productivity by acquiring superior technology and improving human productivity. 
Fiscal and monetary policy is aimed at ensuring that inflation is contained at a single 
digit level while providing sufficient impetus for economic growth. The exchange rate, 
though liberalised, is well managed through prudent monetary policy, central bank spot 
market interventions and responsible commercial operations. 
At the institutional level, Government is raising the capacity of the public sector, 
both at central and local government levels, to deliver essential services particularly in 
education, health, water supply and sanitation and law enforcement. 
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The Government has made significant progress in structural reforms and is currently 
pursuing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) programme from June 1998 through 2002 under which resources are being made 
available to Rwanda for its reform process. Rwanda has also benefited from support 
from the European Union under the First Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF 1). 
In order to lessen the dominance of  the public sector in the economy and to improve 
economic performance, the Government has embarked on an ambitious privatisation 
programme and the  liquidation of insolvent public enterprises.  The Government's 
privatisation process (through extensive advertising of  enterprises for sale, public opening 
of bids, and intensive media campaigns to  inform the public about the privatisation 
process) has received World Bank technical support and has also drawn lessons from 
experiences with public enterprise reform elsewhere. Performance has been impressive. 
As of  the end of 1999, 20 enterprises had been privatised, 3 were under liquidation, and 
another 14 had been offered for sale. During the year 2000, the Government intends to 
bring to the point of  sale, liquidate, sell wholly, or sell its minority shares in a cumulative 
total of  46 enterprises out of  a total of  69 enterprises. 
2.3 Trade liberalisation 
Rwanda is a member of  the WTO under which the country is required to bind its 
tariffs. Since 1995, Rwanda has implemented tariff reforms, which have included: 
t  lowering the maximum tariffs on imported products; 
t  narrowing the dispersion of tariffs; 
t  abolishing the export tax; 
t  streamlining import and export procedures and 
t  eliminating Non-tariff barriers to trade. 
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Pre-1995  1995  1998  1999 
Tariffs bands  6  5  4  4 
Maximum tariff  >100%  60%  40%  25% 
Maximum tariff  >100%  60%  40%  25% 
Surtax on locally produced goods  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil 
Surtax on imported goods  Nil  Nil  Nil  10% 
Export Tax  5%  3%  3%  Nil 
On the regional front,  the Government of Rwanda is studying proposals for the 
implementation of  further tariff  reductions in line with the CO  MESA trade liberalisation 
programme. The relevant agency of  government has already submitted proposals to effect 
preferential tariffs for intra-regional trade and these are receiving government attention 
within the overall context of  Government's development strategy and long-term vision 
which seeks to reduce the country's dependence on external resources. The proposals 
are also being reviewed in the light of  possible further loss of  revenue. 
In a bid to  stem the decline in revenue from taxes, especially trade taxes, the 
Government introduced, as  a stopgap measure, a surcharge on imports at the rate of 
10%.  Some basic products are exempt from this surcharge while the rate is  15% for 
some luxury items. There is also an additional import tax of  3% called Magerwa, which 
will soon be transformed into a statistical tax. The import surcharge is being phased out 
gradually by reducing it from 10% to 5% in 2000 and eventually to 0%. This resolve on 
the part of  the Government of  Rwanda is intended to show its commitment to the ideals 
of regional integration and the CBI process and to level the trading environment for 
economic operators in the region although the short-fall in revenue arising from tariff 
reduction is still a major concern to government. 
2.4 Tarif]ication o(Non-Tarif!Barriers 
All conventional non-tariff barriers (NTBs) except the obvious and accepted 
regulations and restrictions relating to arms, health, security and environmental products 
have been removed. There are no import or export quotas and only tariffs are used as 
trade policy instruments. Export and import licensing, other than the normal commercial 
banking documentation associated with international trade, are no longer required. 
Rwanda used to levy an export tax on coffee, but it has been abolished since 1999. 
No taxes currently exist on exports. 
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In line with the CBI agenda, Rwanda has streamlined its customs clearance and 
trade procedures by doing away with the multiplicity of  customs and foreign currency 
declaration documents. Rwanda has adopted the single customs document and is also 
using the ASYCUDA computerised system for external trade for exports, imports and 
transit trade. 
Rwanda has not implemented the Harmonised Road Transit Charges because of  the 
likely loss of revenue and the absence of immediate alternative sources of revenue to 
continue financing the development and social needs of  the country. 
2.5 Liberalisation ofthe Payment Systems 
The payments system was formally liberalised in Rwanda in December 1998 when 
the country accepted the obligations under Article VIII sections 2, 3 and 4 of the IMF 
Articles of  Association. This means that current account transactions are fully liberalised. 
Companies and natural persons can maintain hard currency accounts and exporters can 
retain their earnings in hard currency commercial bank accounts. 
Foreign trade financing instruments are not readily available in the country but 
economic operators are free to borrow on the international market for their operations. 
The exchange rate is determined by the market, with the central bank only intervening 
to stabilise the market. 
Restrictions on capital inflows, especially for investors and businesspersons in 
general, have been eased requiring only that they be recorded, by way of a voluntary 
declaration, by the central bank at entry into the country. Similarly, restrictions on the 
repatriation of  profits and dividends have been significantly eased except that the remitter 
must comply with capital account and domestic taxation requirements. 
Rwanda does not yet have a stock exchange and the capital market is  relatively 
weak. The financial sector, under the guidance of  the central bank, is in the process of 
establishing venture capital funds as a first step towards establishing a capital market in 
Rwanda. 
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To  enhance effectiveness and ensure a  focused and professional investment 
promotional campaign and strategy, the Government has established an autonomous 
Rwanda Investment Promotion Agency (RIPA). RIPA will act as a one-stop centre and 
will be responsible for the promotion of private investment, exports, and enterprise 
development in Rwanda. The Agency shall also be responsible for simplifying investment 
approval procedures and handling all investment-related issues. In order to promote cross-
border regional investment, the Act does not discriminate between national investors 
and those from other COMESA countries. The Act does not treat an investor from a 
CO  MESA (CBI) country as a foreign investor. 
The law gives a maximum period of 10 working days of lodging for investment 
licence approval and once the certificate of registration is granted, foreign companies 
are treated on the same terms as local ones. If it is not granted, a time-limited appeals 
process is provided for. 
2. 7 Facilitation o(the Movement o(Persons 
Rwanda maintains an open policy regarding the entry of  visitors into the country. 
Short-term visas are issued on entry at the airport and border points. Residence and 
employment permits are subject to the usual justification requirements before they are 
granted. 
2.8 Capacity Building among the Public and Private Sector 
The CBI agenda in this area seeks to raise the capacity ofboth the private and public 
sectors in policy formulation, analysis and general macro-economic management. It  also 
seeks to  cede a greater economic role and participation to the private sector in the 
participating countries. Rwanda is this regard is promoting the development of  a genuine 
private sector by repealing the law establishing the Rwanda Chamber of  Commerce and 
Industry. The private sector has established their own independent associations and an 
umbrella federation of Rwandese industry- the Federation rwandaise du sector prive 
(FRSP).  The federation has brought together some  14  sectoral or product-specific 
associations and will act as a rallying point for industry-government interaction. 
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been operational since early February 2000. It  is the intention of  Government to collaborate 
with these private sector organisations through the Federation in the implementation of 
the country's structural reforms. A framework for a structured dialogue between the 
private sector and the Government is also being developed with the goals to promoting 
private-public sector interaction, mutual confidence, trust and collaboration. 
3.  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CBI 
Rwanda is planning to establish a Policy Implementation Committee at mipisterial 
level.  Government has already taken steps to transform the existing committee on 
structural adjustment into the CBI Technical Working Group. The TWG will incorporate 
representatives from the private sector- industry, the banking and the agricultural sectors 
-and a secretariat for the TWG will be appointed from the private sector. The TWG will 
incorporate the CO  MESA Multi-disciplinary Technical Committee and shall handle all 
matters of  integration at the regional and multilateral levels as well as structural adjustment 
Issues. 
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Seychelles SEYCHELLES 
1.  OVERVIEW  OF THE CBI IN  SEYCHELLES 
1.1 First involvement in the CBI and original reasons for participation 
Seychelles has been participating in the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) since the 
August 1993 Ministerial Meeting in Kampala, Uganda, where the Concept Paper was 
endorsed by participating countries. 
Seychelles' decision to participate in the Initiative took place against the background 
of  political reform then taking place in Seychelles, with the transition from a one-party 
state to a multi-party system of  government. This process of  reform in the political arena 
was matched by a process of  economic reform and liberalisation, aimed at reducing the 
direct involvement of  the public sector in the economy and stimulating the growth of  the 
private sector. 
Seychelles' participation in the CBI was thus seen as complementary to the overall 
reform process. Participation in the CBI was also seen as a means for obtaining the 
support of the co-sponsors to assist in Seychelles' gradual efforts at closer integration 
within the Eastern and Southern African region, as from around 1993 the Government of 
Seychelles started to give serious consideration to formalising its links with the region 
by joining ongoing regional economic groupings, such as the PTA (later CO  MESA) and 
SADC. 
1.2 Ongoing perceptions ofthe CBI  process in Sevchelles 
Although Government has not entirely embraced the CBI policy agenda, the CBI 
process is generally perceived as useful, and for this reason, Government has been 
represented at every major meeting of  the CBI since 1993. 
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available under the CBI to meet the transitional costs of implementing CBI reforms. 
This is seen as contrary to the initial expectations that Government held regarding the 
support that would be available from the co-sponsors. 
The perception of  the private sector towards the CBI process is generally positive. 
The private sector has participated regularly in all CBI activities organised at the national 
and regional level. 
1.3 Specific elements o(the CBI that have been particularly useful and benefits 
ofhaving had a TWG 
At the general level, the most beneficial element of  the CBI in Seychelles has been 
its role in facilitating a national dialogue on the regional economic integration, including 
its advantages and disadvantages, and the policy measures that would be required to 
meet Seychelles obligations to regional organisations, and particularly COMESA. 
The TWG has thus been particularly effective in raising awareness of issues 
associated with trade liberalisation and investment promotion, and in promoting dialogue 
between Government and the private sector. 
Although a Project Implementation Committee (PIC) was established early on in 
Seychelles' participation in the CBI, it has only met formally on one occasion. Given the 
small size of Seychelles it was inevitable that membership of  the PIC would comprise 
more or less the same individuals as the TWG. The PIC was thus seen as an unnecessary 
duplication of  the TWG. 
1.3 Relationship between the CBI and regional integration institutions 
(COMESA. EAC. IOC. SADC) and how the CBI has helped in this regard? 
The CBI process in Seychelles has had a direct impact on Government's move 
towards participation in regional integration organisations, since the TWG played a 
significant role in the Government's decision to join CO  MESA and SADC 
While  Seychelles is  a founder member of the Indian Ocean Commission, the 
Government had previously been very cautious in its approach towards membership of 
other regional economic integration organisations, notably COMESA and SADC. This 
was largely because Government was still assessing the costs and benefits of  joining 
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that can currently be exported to these markets. The high cost of  membership contributions 
has also been an important consideration, especially in view of the small Government 
recurrent budget. 
Nonetheless, during 1997 Government took the decision to join COMESA and to 
apply for membership of SADC. In September 1997, Seychelles signed the COMESA 
Treaty, and shortly after the SADC Council of  Ministers approved Seychelles' application 
to accede to SADC. 
As a result of  the decision to join CO  MESA, Seychelles now has an obligation to 
implement many of recommendations of the CBI, most notably with respect to the 
elimination oftariff  and non-tariffbarriers for intra-COMESA trade. In response to these 
obligations, Government has been undertaking an extensive review of the policy 
implications within the broader context of the need for macro-economic policy 
adjustments. 
1.4 General conclusions and comments on the CBI and TWG not covered 
elsewhere in the Report 
To  date,  support from the co-sponsors has focused mainly on the provision of 
secretariat support to the TWG, under the Framework  Contract with IMANI Development. 
Besides providing direct assistance towards the drafting of  Seychelles letter of  CBI Policy, 
this support has also enabled the TWG to commission a number of studies on various 
issues related to  the implementation of CBI recommendations, and particularly with 
regards to the revenue and other implications of  tariff reform in Seychelles. 
The co-sponsors have also provided support for two major studies: -
It  The June  1998 study by Mr.  John Short entitled  "Seychelles:  Study on 
Implementation of COMESA  Tariff Reductions and Alternative Revenue 
Collection ". 
It  The study of  Seychelles' Macro-Economy, currently being undertaken by Maxwell 
Stamp PLC. 
Finally, the co-sponsors also provided support for Seychelles to participate in a 
preliminary study on the Harmonised External Tariff. 
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2.1 Overview ofTWG meetings since 1993 
2.1.1  Regularity ofTWG meetings 
The TWG has generally formally met at least on a quarterly basis since the beginning 
of 1994, although there have been additional meetings organised in order to coincide 
with particular technical missions visiting Seychelles and/or to discuss particular ongoing 
Issues. 
2.1.2  Usual composition of  members attending TWG meetings 
Since the beginning, the TWG has been chaired by a representative from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (which until September 1997 was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Planning &  Environment).  Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the most active 
participants have been from the Ministry ofFinance (MF), the Customs Division of  the 
Ministry ofFinance, the Ministry ofEconomic Planning, the Ministry of  Industries and 
International Business (MIIB), the Seychelles International Business Authority (SIBA), 
the Seychelles Chamber of Commerce (SCCI) and Industry and the Association of 
Employers Associations of  Seychelles (FEAS). 
2.1.3  Summary of  main issues discussed over the period 
From its initial establishment in 1993, the TWG has been the main forum at the 
national level to address issues associated with regional integration in general. Thus, in 
addition to the CBI policy agenda, the TWG has also been a forum bringing together 
representatives of  Government and the Private Sector to discuss the broad issues associated 
with Seychelles' eventual decision to seek membership ofCOMESA and SADC. 
The main focus has always been on the development of  a national policy on regional 
trade. In particular, the TWG has largely been responsible for initiating a national debate 
on the impact on Government revenue of  trade liberalisation, and the need for associated 
tax reform. 
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The main problems encountered by the TWG in advocating the CBI policy agenda 
has been related to the dilemmas faced by the country as a small island developing state. 
Given the very limited export potential of  Seychelles, and the Government's dependence 
on import tariffs (in the form of Trade Tax) for around 40% of revenue, it has been 
difficult to achieve a policy consensus on key elements of  the CBI agenda. The potential 
impact of  tariff  reform on the few local industries has also been an important consideration. 
The difficulties are explained in more detail in 2.1.5. below. 
2.1.5  Other activities or comments, not covered elsewhere 
Although Seychelles' has been an active participant in the CBI process, few policy 
measures have been implemented as a direct result of  this participation. The difficulties 
faced by Seychelles in completing the CBI policy agenda were broadly summarised in a 
submission made to the COMESA Secretariat in February 1999. In this submission, it 
was explained that the decision to join COMESA had been made bearing in mind the 
ongoing process of  globalisation of  the world economy, and the need for Seychelles to 
re-appraise its existing international trade relationships, both at the global and regional 
levels.  The decision also represented a desire of the Government of Seychelles to 
strengthen its political and economic ties within the region. 
The submission went on to explain  that in view of the structural nature of the 
Seychelles economy, Government had since undertaken a thorough evaluation of the 
implications of  implementing the measures necessary to meet its obligations, under the 
CO  MESA Treaty, and that it had been concluded that Seychelles economic circumstances 
were such that at that time it was not possible to implement many, if not most, of its 
obligations under the COMESA Treaty. The submission also pointed to the uniqueness 
of  Seychelles' socio-economic structures as illustrated by: -
t  a small population base of  just over 79,000; 
t  a workforce ofunder 29,000, of  which the majority are employed in the service 
and tourism-related sectors; 
t  a gross domestic product ofless than US$ 0.5 billion, compared to an average of 
US$ 4.0 billion in the COMESA region; 
t  a small tax base resulting in a total Government revenue of less than US$ 215 
million; 
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around US$ 311 million-representing a negative balance of  trade amounting to 
approximately US$ 250 million; 
t  dependence on just two main industries, namely tourism and fisheries, which 
account for over 80% of  foreign exchange earnings; 
t  very limited export opportunities, under circumstances where the value of  trade 
is only 13% ofGDP. 
In addition, it was pointed out that Seychelles shares the general structural specificities 
and vulnerabilities of  other small island developing states including: -
t  limited human and natural resources; 
t  lack of  economies of  scale; 
t  geographic isolation, and consequent high transportation costs and high cost of 
imports; 
t  dispersed populations, spread over large expanses of  seas; 
t  environmental fragility; 
t  susceptibility to natural disasters; 
t  Susceptibility of  small economies to outside shocks - for example; Seychelles' 
tourism industry can easily be affected by recession in its major European markets. 
The submission concluded by stating that in view of these structural economic 
features  Seychelles was compelled to undertake a thorough re-evaluation of the full 
implications to  the economy, of implementing the measures necessary to  meet its 
obligations under the COMESA Treaty. Among the major concerns highlighted were: -
a)  The impact of  the COMESA Free Trade Area and the eventual implementation 
of a Common External Tariff (CET) on Government revenue, particularly in 
view of  the fact that around 40% of  the national budget is derived from customs 
(trade tax) revenues; 
b) Seychelles' limited Export potential within the region (Seychelles' only significant 
exports are fish products (canned tuna, fresh  and frozen fish,  frozen prawns, 
which are marketed almost exclusively in Europe (over 81% of total exports) 
and the Far East. 
c)  Structural Impediments to tax reform, as the size and nature of the Seychelles 
economy would make it difficult to compensate for lost customs revenues with 
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unable to consider any reduction in tariffs and duties in the foreseeable future, as 
the budgetary implications would endanger Government's strong commitment 
to maintaining and improving the social welfare of  its people; 
d) "De-industrialisation" poses a threat to the economy as  Seychelles has a very 
limited industrial base. The few industries that exist in Seychelles are of great 
social importance in terms of  employment, and also of  some significance in saving 
foreign exchange (import substitution). It was concluded that in the absence of 
protection, a number of  key industries would be unable to survive, with consequent 
implications for employment, and could result in a reduction of  up 35% of  the 
labour force currently engaged in manufacturing. 
e) The impact of the implementation of the Protocol on  the Free Movement of 
Persons,  Labour and Services and Right of  Establishment and Residence, 
particularly the Articles related to Free Movement of  Skilled Labour, Residence 
and Establishment, was of serious concern due to the small population of 
Seychelles, and the significant impact that even an influx of relatively small 
numbers of  people would have on employment and social infrastructure, as well 
as the environment. 
f)  The high cost of  effective participation in COMES  A, and the growing recognition 
that Seychelles does not have the human or financial resources to participate 
fully in all areas of  activity of  CO  MESA. 
g)  The direct financial burden of  membership. Although Seychelles contributes only 
1% to the CO  MESA Budget, this still represents a considerable contribution per 
head of  population. 
Under such circumstances, Seychelles full implementation of  the CBI policy agenda 
has been delayed, subjectto a thorough assessment of  its macro-economy, and the impacts 
of  trade liberalization and other policy reforms. This process of  review is still ongoing. 
2.2 Overview ofsensitisation activities undertaken by the TWG 
2.2.1  Brief  details of  workshops, seminars or other promotional activities held 
since 1992 
Seychelles' TWG was not established unti11993. Since then, the TWG has initiated 
(either directly or indirectly) a number of  sensitisation activities, including:-
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t  Preparation of  a number of  studies related to aspects of  the CBI policy agenda 
(see 2.3.1 below); 
t  Co-ordinating visiting technical missions from representatives of  the co-sponsors, 
including those from IMANI Development, the European Union, World Bank, 
COMESA, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, etc.; 
t  Organisation of  workshops I seminars on regional integration (CBI, COMESA, 
SADC) I 
t  Organisation of  a Press briefing on regional integration (CBI, CO  MESA, SADC, 
etc) 
2.2.2  Main results of  the TWG's activities 
These activities have served to create a greater awareness at the national level of  the 
process of  regional economic integration in Eastern and Southern Africa, and the advantages 
and disadvantages of Seychelles' membership of such organizations. In addition, the 
activities have contributed to the development of  a dialogue between Government and the 
Private Sector on the broad issues associated with regional integration. Indeed, the recent 
decision of Government to the establishment of a Joint Economic Council, comprising 
representatives of Government, employee's representatives and the private sector is  a 
measure that had long been advocated by the TWG. 
2.3 Overview o(studies undertaken by the TWG 
2.3.1  Brief  details of  studies commissioned by the TWG 
Since 1993, the TWG has been responsible for the preparation of  a number of  studies 
on aspects of  the CBI Agenda, including the following: -
a)  Study Analysing and Quantifying Tax Reform Required in Connection with the 
Implementation of  the CBI in Seychelles (J. Rankin, 1995); 
'Apart from a National Workshop organised at the Reef Hotel in November 1993, the TWG also organised a number of  informal meetings on 
specific issues related to  regional integration (i.e. ASYCUDA, Tax Reform,  Regional Integration, etc).  In some cases such meetings were 
organised in conjunction with visiting missions from, inter alia, the European Union, UN-ECA, World Bank, etc. These meetings were attended 
by members of the TWG and invited participants. 
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revenue from trade taxes (customs duties) through the introduction of  alternative 
forms of taxation (i.e. sales tax, VAT,  excise taxes, etc). It also considered the 
administrative aspects of introducing alternative forms of revenue collection. 
This was the first study attempting to address such issues. 
b) UN-ECA: Mission Report on the Initiatives of the Republic of Seychelles on 
Economic Integration: Determining Factors and the Way Forward (Prof. S.K.B. 
Asante & Prof. W. Ndongko, 1995); 
The main conclusion of the Report was that, apart from the TWG, there was no 
appropriate institutionalised national forum to address the range of issues associated 
with the process of regional economic integration and its implications to Seychelles. 
This was seen as a major impediment to policy development in this regard. 
c)  Presentation on ASYCUDA (Jeff Rankin, May 1996) 
The main objective of  the presentation was to outline the ASYCUDA System, and 
to consider whether it could be implemented in Seychelles. From a technical point of 
view the advantages I benefits of  the System were acknowledged. However, it was noted 
that Seychelles was in the process of  developing, through the Management Information 
Systems Division (MISD) it own system for customs purposes. 
d)  Study to Identify Proposals/Projects for Eventual Submission to the Co-Sponsors 
(B.Rassool, January 1997) 
The study focused on identifying projects that would assist in developing a regional 
trade and investment center in Seychelles, and consisted of  6 outline project proposals: -
t  Development of  a vision and policy framework for the Seychelles International 
Trade Zone (ECU 5,000) 
t  Implementation of a  harmonized institutional framework for the future 
development of  the SITZ (ECU lO,OOO);capacity building within the Seychelles 
International Business Authority (SIBA) (ECU 200,000); 
t  Identification of  niche sectors and activities for the SITZ(ECU 175,000); 
t  Marketing the SITZ vis-a-vis potential investors (ECU 225,000); 
t  Development of  modern infrastructure in and around the SITZ (ECU 35,000). 
It  had been envisaged that the co-sponsors might consider supporting some of  these 
project proposals. 
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Component of  regional study prepared by the PTA Clearing House in Harare. 
f)  Completion of  the Questionnaire on the CET Administrative Study (January 1999) 
Component of  regional study prepared for the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). 
g)  Study on Ways and Means of Increasing Investment in CBI Countries by 
Seychellois Residents (B. Soundy & B. Rassool, January 1999) 
The study attempted to explore specific avenues for mobilizing funds held abroad 
by Seychellois, for the purposes of  investing in the region, which would otherwise 
be a major obstacle given the persisting balance of  payments difficulties prevailing 
in Seychelles. It was recommended that Government could offer tax incentives 
and guarantees in relation to dividends that would be generated from such 
investments under double taxation avoidance agreements with each member country. 
In addition to these studies that were undertaken at the national level, the TWG has 
also been involved in the Indian Ocean Commission (COl) Study on the Common External 
Tariff (CET). 
The TWG also co-ordinated the major study undertaken by John Short ("Seychelles 
: Study on Implementation of COMESA  Tariff Reductions and Alternative Revenue 
Collection " -June 1998), which was funded by the European Union. 
This Report concluded that regardless of  membership of  COMES  A Seychelles would, 
in any case need to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, in line with WTO 
requirements. It was noted that it was already the policy of Government to gradually 
reduce tariffs on imports from all sources. At the same time, it was also noted that the 
current Trades Tax was the only tax collected on imports, whereas other countries impose 
separate import tariffs, excise duties and VAT. The Report concluded that if such taxes 
were to be introduced in Seychelles, the implementation of the CO  MESA CET would 
not necessarily result in lower tax revenue. This was illustrated by various projections. 
Finally, the TWG has also been directly involved in the preparation of  various internal 
briefing papers for the Government of  Seychelles. 
2.3.2  Summary of  Results of  studies undertaken by the TWG 
While it is difficult to assess the impact of  these studies in terms of  their contribution 
to the development of national policy, it is certain that they have had some influence, 
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have been considered by Government. Thus, although the impact of  these studies may 
not have been immediately apparent, insofar as they did not generally result in policy 
changes, the long-term impact may be greater. In particular, the study by John Short has 
made an important contribution in this regard, and is .still under review by Government. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN POLICY REFORM  AREAS 
At the beginning of Seychelles' participation in the CBI, the country was in the 
process of  transition from a single party state to a multi-party system. During the preceding 
17 years (from 1977-1993) the Seychelles' economy was characterised by a high degree 
of centralisation and the dominance of the public and parastatal sectors.  Since 1993, 
Government has been pursuing a policy of gradual disengagement from economic 
activities, while promoting the growth of  the private sector. 
The Government of Seychelles remains committed to the requirements of 
membership of  regional economic organisations, namely the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (CO  MESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), as well as the World Trade Organisation. As 
such, the Government is committed to the implementation of  measures to fully integrate 
Seychelles in to the world economy and the multilateral trading system. However, it also 
recognised that such liberalisation can only be effectively implemented if it is  done 
gradually, and in tandem with more general macro-economic adjustments and reforms to 
the system of  taxation. 
To  this end,  Government has undertaken a review of required policy measures 
consistent with its membership of  regional economic organisations, including CO  MESA, 
SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission. In addition, two major studies have been 
undertaken financed by the European Union (John Short, date)  and the African 
Development Bank (Bhatia, date). A further study is to commence shortly, funded by the 
European Union. 
Meanwhile, Government has commenced a review of  pricing policy and the role 
and effectiveness of  the Seychelles Marketing Board. 
3.1 Foreign Trade 
Although Seychelles has not yet implemented any regional preferential tariffs (except 
for  a 5% preference for  goods originating from member States of the Indian Ocean 
Commission), some progress has been made in reforming and reducing the overall level 
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eventual target of 15%, and Seychelles is  in the process of joining the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
Trades taxes (import duties) are levied on the c.i.f. value of  imports into Seychelles. 
The ad valorem tariffs range from 0% to 200%. There are 11 nominal rates (0, 5, 10, 15, 
25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200), with a mean of28%, a mode of25% and a median of 
25%. 
3.1.1  Import I Export Licensing 
Export licensing was abolished very early in the transition to a multi-party system. 
Previously, there had been a state monopoly on the export of  the major agricultural crops 
and fish products. The only existing prohibitions on exports are related to international 
agreements (such as CITES). 
Import Licenses are issued automatically, except for  a number of "essential 
commodities", that are  a monopoly of the Seychelles Marketing Board (SMB). 
Government considers the issue of Import Licenses as a revenue generating measure, 
rather than an impediment to trade. 
However, in order to address persistent foreign exchange shortages, Government 
has imposed a system, of  import quotas. Under this system, licensed importers are provided 
with an annual quota (in value) that may be used to import non-essential commodities 
(i.e. not on the list of  commodities that are the exclusive monopoly of  SMB). After the 
quota is granted, an importer must submit an application for an import permit. This is 
then verified and a permit issued, provided the annual quota has not been exceeded. 
This is considered as a temporary measure that will be removed once existing balance 
of  payments problems are resolved. 
3.1.2  Non-Tariff  Barriers 
Apart from the system of  import quotas (as described above), the only other remaining 
Non-Tariff  Barrier is the SMB monopoly on importation of  a limited number of  essential 
commodities. This measure is considered as a "food security" measure and is designed to 
ensure a reliable supply of  essential commodities. 
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undertake a thorough review ofthe role and functioning ofSMB during 2000. 
3.1.3  Intra-Regional Tariffs 
Government has yet to implement any reductions in tariffs on intra-regional trade, 
other than the 5% preference for goods emanating from Member States of the Indian 
Ocean Commission (IOC).  A temporary derogation on the implementation of the 
CO  MESA tariff regime has been granted, pending the outcome of  a thorough review of 
Seychelles' macro-economy. 
Government is  currently undertaking an extensive review of the implications of 
membership of  CO  MESA and SADC with respect to tariff and tax reform. This review 
process commenced in the first half of  1998, with a study undertaken by Mr. John Short 
on The Implementation ofCOMESA Tariff  Reductions and  Alternative Revenue Collection 
(funded by the European Union under the CBI), and was continued by the ADB-funded 
study undertaken by Mr. Bhatia, which was presented to Government in July 1999. A 
further in-depth study on the Seychelles' macro-economy has recently commenced. This 
is being funded by the European Union. 
Thus, while Seychelles has not implemented any significant tariff reductions to 
date, nor has it implemented any regional preferential tariffs, a timetable for tariff  reform 
could be announced by the end of  2000. 
3.1.4.  External Tariffs and CBI  Harmonisation 
For the reasons already stated above, no action has yet been taken to harmonise 
external tariffs.  However,  Government is  currently reviewing its  obligations under 
CO  MESA and other regional organizations (SADC and the Indian Ocean Commission). 
Seychelles did participate in the Study on the Administrative Structure for the 
CO  MESA Common External Tariff (CET) 
Seychelles is using the Harmonised System (HS), and has implemented the 1996 
Amendments. 
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The following CBI policy measures under Trade Facilitation are largely not applicable 
to Seychelles, due to its geographic location as an island state. 
~  Harmonised transit charges 
~  Single goods customs declaration 
~  Customs Bond guarantee scheme 
3.2 Payments 
3.2.1  Financial Sector Reform 
Financial sector in Seychelles has been extensively reformed and liberalised. 
Seychelles has traditionally enjoyed a well developed financial and monetary system, 
having been a member of  the IMF since 1976, shortly after becoming a sovereign state, 
and having always fully  conformed with the provisions of the IMF Article IV of 
Association. 
3.2.2  Foreign Trade Instruments 
Typical foreign trade financing instruments (i.e. Letters of  Credit, Sight Bills and 
Export Re-Finance Schemes) exist within the financial sector. There are no export credit 
guarantee schemes in place. 
3.2.3  Exchange Controls 
No formal exchange controls exist, although access to foreign exchange is limited 
by short supply. However, since the early 1990's there have been protracted balance of 
payments difficulties resulting in the drawing down of  the country's foreign exchange 
reserves, with the Central Bank being unable to fully provide foreign exchange cover to 
the commercial banks. As a result there have been payment arrears especially with regards 
to imports, with a significant backlog, which peaked in early 1997. Since then the foreign 
exchange liquidity has remained a persistent problem. 
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requests for foreign exchange. This involved the depositing of  Seychelles Rupees in an 
interest-bearing pipeline at commercial banks with a request for the equivalent in foreign 
currency on maturity. Allocations for foreign exchange were made on a first-come first 
serve basis. The aim of the scheme was to "mop up" rupees in the economy and thus 
reduce the demand for foreign exchange. The scheme was ineffective for two main reasons. 
First of  all, because there was no priority for payments, essential items were competing 
with non-essential items. Secondly, a number of  unscrupulous operators were running a 
parallel market for  foreign exchange and using the pipeline scheme to  fund their 
transactions.  Despite measures introduced in  1995, which divided the scheme into 
categories of  goods, the Central Bank decided to freeze the pipeline scheme the following 
year, with the eventual aim of its complete abolition. At the end of 1996, all existing 
deposits under the scheme were frozen and commercial banks no longer accepted new 
deposits under the scheme, except for capital payments arrears. At the same time, 
commercial banks were permitted to allocate their foreign exchange at their discretion 
from their retained foreign inflows, and instructed to assign 20% of  their foreign earnings 
towards liquidating existing external arrears. Despite these measures, demand for foreign 
exchange continued to be strong. 
In an effort to curb the growing parallel market and to boost earnings through the 
banks, Government introduced the Foreign Earnings (Regulation) Act 1996, which made 
it mandatory for all earnings from trade, business or other transactions with non-residents 
to be channelled through a commercial bank in Seychelles. The bank in tum credited the 
resident's account with the rupee equivalent. Under the law, a resident has to invoice a 
non-resident within 90 days of  selling the goods or providing the service and the foreign 
exchange has to be remitted to the resident's account within 21 days, which is even less. 
To monitor and ensure compliance with the new measures, a separate division was 
established within the Central Bank. 
In May 1999, the Central Bank of  Seychelles introduced amendments to the foreign 
exchange laws targeted at those profiteering illegally from foreign currency shortages 
(i.e. the parallel market). Two new pieces oflegislation were introduced with effect from 
1st May 1999:-
t  The Foreign Earnings (Regulation) Amendment Act, which requires all visitors 
to settle their hotel bills in foreign currency, either cash, travellers' cheque or 
credit card. 
t  The Exchange Control (Amendment) Act,  which makes it an offence to be in 
possession offoreign exchange, ifthere is no proof  of  where it has been obtained. 
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Monetary policy in Seychelles is  directed towards ensuring the stability of the 
exchange rate. In 1979, the Seychelles Rupee was pegged to the Special Drawing Rate 
(SDR), which for a number of  years served the currency well in cushioning it against the 
impacts of  external shocks and hence excessive fluctuations. However, as the trade and 
tourism patterns of  Seychelles changed, it was decided to replace the SDR in May 1996 
with a trade and tourism related basket of  currencies
1representing the most important 
trading and tourism partners of  Seychelles (USA, UK, France, Singapore, South Africa, 
Germany, Italy and Japan). This move was designed to prevent the excessive appreciation 
of  the Rupee, which was affecting Seychelles competitiveness. 
As a result, the Seychelles rupee has appreciated by only 1.6% against its main 
trading and tourism partners in the period mid 1994 to February 1999. However, at the 
same time, there has been a growth in the parallel market, where the rate appreciated by 
an estimated 12% during the same period. 
3.3 Investment 
Until1993, the public sector had been the major investor in the Seychelles economy. 
Since then Government policy has been to promote the private sector, whereby the 
Government becomes the facilitator and catalyst and the private sector takes the lead in 
development. Government is especially keen to promote private sector investment in the 
tourism and fisheries industries, including foreign direct investment. At the same time, 
Government has •;ontinued to invest heavily in infrastructure, notably in relation to the 
recently established Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ). Government has also 
started to explore the possibilities of  partnerships with the private sector through "build, 
own, operate, transfer" (BOOT) schemes. 
In order to facilitate foreign direct investment, Government's policy is to conclude 
double  taxation avoidance agreements (DTAs)  with as many countries as  possible. 
Agreements have already been reached with a number of countries from the region 
(Zimbabwe and South Africa) and from outside the region (Czech Republic, Thailand, 
China, and Indonesia). Negotiations are currently ongoing with the following countries: 
-Tunisia, Philippines, Cuba, Cote d'voire, Cyprus, Morocco, Mauritius, Vietnam, Egypt, 
and Canada. Government is especially keen to conclude agreements with all COMESA 
I  SADC member states, and to this end has made formal requests to  commence 
negotiations with all COMESA I SADC member states. 
The Government is exploring the feasibility of developing cross lists on regional 
stock markets. The Ministry of  Finance is also developing a project for the establishment 
of  a stock exchange in Seychelles. 
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The investment regime in Seychelles is governed by 2 pieces of  legislation: -
a)  The Seychelles Investment Promotion Act (IPA) 1994; 
b) The International Trade Zone Act ( 1995) 
The procedures under this legislation are simplified and are largely in line with CBI 
recommendations. Investment licenses are issued on a case-by case basis depending on 
economic and commercial merit. 
The Investment Promotion Act (IPA) took effect on 1st January 1995, and is aimed 
at developing the economy through new types of  economic activity and the upgrading of 
existing activities. Under the Act investments are classified into sectors (i.e. agriculture 
&  marine resources, industrial and manufacturing, professional services, small-scale 
industries, tourism development).  Concessions are prescribed for the various sectors 
under the categories of  (i) Export Orientated Units; (ii) Special Growth Areas; (iii) General 
Category. Investments that qualify are issued with a Certificate of  Approval for a fixed 
period. This certificate lists the concessions and incentives, which are automatic and 
guaranteed during its validity and cannot be changed to the detriment of the investor. 
The incentives range from concessionary rates to complete exemption from tax. 
In an effort to further promote private sector investment in the economy, Government 
is currently in the process of  reviewing this existing legislation, with a view to introducing 
further reform. Also under consideration is the establishment of  a one-stop investment 
centre in the Ministry of  Finance. 
The Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ) is administered by the Seychelles 
International Business Authority (SIBA). Applications for licenses are submitted with a 
project memorandum to  SIBA, which evaluates and approves all new proposals. The 
zone offers major tax concessions, particularly to companies engaged in manufacturing, 
reprocessing, redistribution and a range ofhigh-tech related businesses. Operators within 
the ITZ pay no corporation tax, customs duty on capital equipment or consumables used 
within the zone. Nor are such operators liable to social security contributions, capital 
gains tax, withholding tax or taxes on dividends.  These and other concessions are 
safeguarded within the law, and license fees are fixed for life. 
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No investment code has been introduced to date, although this is currently under 
consideration by Government.  The Government has instead opted for considering 
applications for investment licenses under the Investment Promotion Act (1995) under 
which investors may become eligible for highly competitive incentives and concessions 
on a "case-by-case" basis 
3.3.3  Harmonise of  Investment Regime 
Government has to date, made no effort to harmonise its investment regime with 
other countries of  the region, though the issue is under review. 
3.3.4  Movement of  Persons and Employment Permits 
Concerning the removal ofVisa Requirements at the regional level, Seychelles is in 
conformity with the CBI as there are no visa requirements. All Visitors to Seychelles are 
issued with a visa on arrival, subject to being in possession of a valid return ticket and 
sufficient funds. 
The processing of residence and employment permits are provided for under the 
Investment Promotion Act (1995) and International Trade Zone Act (1995). 
3.3.5  Membership I Participation in Investment Protection Agencies 
Seychelles has been a member of MIGA since 1993.  Seychelles is  also keen to 
conclude bilateral investment protection agreements. 
3.4 CBI Status 
3.4.1  Status of  Addendum to Letter of  CBI  Policy 
The Technical Working Group (TWG) first completed a draft Letter of  CBI Policy 
in January 1995. This was submitted to the Ministry ofFinance & Communications for 
comment and eventual approval. A revised draft was prepared in September 1995, and it 
was this draft, with minor modifications, that was finally approved by Government in 
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comments received from the co-sponsors, a further revised draft was prepared and 
submitted by the Government of  Seychelles to the co-sponsors in July 1997. This draft 
was subsequently approved by the co-sponsors, though the latter indicated certain 
reservations, in particular concerning the trade monopolies enjoyed by the Seychelles 
Marketing Board (SMB). 
The Letter of CBI Policy addressed a number of key issues under the following 
headings:-
~  Trade Liberalisation 
~  Financial Sector 
~  Cross Border Investment Liberalisation 
~  Cross Border Movement of  Persons 
~  Institutional Development 
~  Technical Assistance 
Following the decision of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the CBI in October 
1999, the TWG started to address the issue of drafting an Addendum to Letter ofCBI 
Policy, with the aim of  submitting this to Government for formal approval. However, in 
view of  the ongoing nature of  the review of  macroeconomic policy, as well as the review 
of Seychelles' trade policy in the light of its commitments to regional economic 
organizations, it was decided that this exercise could not be completed at this point in 
time. The co-sponsors have been informed accordingly, through IMANI Development. 
3.4.2  Status of  Preparation of  National Investment Road Map 
In view of the constraints outlined above in relation to  the preparation of the 
Addendum to Letter of  CBI Policy, it has likewise been concluded that it would not be 
possible to prepare the national Investment Road Map at this point in time, since it is 
anticipated that significant changes to the investment regime may be implemented in the 
near future. 
p.468 4.  OTHER ISSUES 
Seychelles has already made considerable progress in implementing many of the 
recommendations of  the CBI. For example, while Seychelles has not implemented the 
CO  MESA tariff reduction programme, significant progress has been made in reforming 
and reducing tariffs, in a manner consistent with the CBI.  Concerning investment 
promotion, the measures that have been taken by Government under the Seychelles 
International Trade Zone Act 1995 and Investment Promotion Act 1995 are also generally 
consistent with the CBI. Concerning the requirement to eliminate non-tariff barriers to 
trade, a gradualliberalisation is taking place, and the "negative list" of  goods under the 
SMB monopoly has been reduced. Seychelles is also making efforts to conclude double 
taxation avoidance agreements with key countries, and is willing to conclude similar 
agreements with CBI participating countries. On the question of visa requirements for 
businessmen, Seychelles already conforms to the CBI. The recent announcement that 
Government was to set up a Joint Economic Council is also an important step towards 
implementing the CBI agenda. 
At the national level, the major outstanding issue concerns the remaining trade 
monopolies enjoyed by the SMB. However, it is the view of  the Government that due to 
the specificities of the "micro-economy" of Seychelles, there is the danger of private 
monopolies replacing public ones and that consequently Government should continue to 
play a regulatory role especially with regards to supplies of  essential commodities. 
In summary, Seychelles has already introduced many of  the reforms required under 
the CBI, particularly with regards to the reduction of tariffs, and the introduction of 
measures to promote investment. It  is also evident that there is considerable convergence 
between the measures recommended under the CBI, and the measures that Seychelles 
must adopt in order to conform to the WTO, and with membership of CO  MESA. It is 
expected that the current ongoing review of  Seychelles' macro-economy and trade policies 
will result in new measures that are in line with the CBI. 
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I.  OVERVIEW OF THE CBI 
1.1 First Involvement 
(There is only limited information available regarding the early history of  Swaziland's 
involvement in the CBI.) 
Swaziland attended a workshop held in Mauritius in June 1992 at which the second 
phase of the CBI was launched. Thereafter, the Swaziland Technical Working Group 
was formed under the Chairmanship of the Chairman of the Swaziland Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry, whilst secretariat services were provided by a representative from 
the University of  Swaziland. Subsequently Swaziland attended the formal establishment 
of  the CBI at the Ministerial meeting in Kampala, Uganda, in August 1993. 
Swaziland understood from the outset that it could not participate in all the aspects 
of  CBI core policy because of its membership of  the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) and the Common Monetary Authority (CMA). Both these institutions are led 
by South Africa which has not participated in CBI. Swaziland's objectives, therefore, 
were to remove all non-tariffbarriers that constrain investment in the country. Specifically 
Swaziland was seeking to encourage direct foreign investment through the development 
of  an attractive incentive package, the removal of  administrative hurdles and the creation 
of  an investment promotion centre to market the country as an investment location. 
The TWG was revived in 1994, under the Chairmanship of  the Principal Secretary 
in the Ministry of Commerce &  Industry,  and the Minister for Finance assumed 
responsibility for formulating the Letter of CBI Policy.  Swaziland first submitted an 
LCP in June 1995. Various comments were made on this by the co-sponsors and a revised 
letter was submitted a year later. The co-sponsors accepted Swaziland's Letter of CBI 
Policy in December 1996. 
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As noted above Swaziland has had, of  necessity, only limited involvement and interest 
in the CBI process- it could not participate in the harmonisation of  tariffs (SACU), or in 
any issues related to exchange control (CMA) and Government preferred to leave matters 
related to the regional movement of  goods to SADC and CO  MESA.. This has restricted 
the scope of  the TWG and its inability to make significant contributions in most areas of 
CBI policy resulted in the TWG losing its potential status as a joint Government I private 
sector policy formulating body. As a consequence of  this and because the CBI could not 
offer any direct trade benefits, the main private sector participants (the Swaziland Chamber 
of  Commerce & Industry, the Swaziland Industrial Development Company, the Sibakho 
Chamber of Commerce and the Swaziland Commercial Amadoda) have become 
occasional participants. 
Similarly, Government's involvement has been scaled down so that TWG meetings 
are now attended by junior members the various participating ministries -a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Compounding the problem of  a lack of a meaningful role, the TWG has also been 
impeded by a regular change of  personnel in influential positions -changes in Government 
Ministers, Principal Secretaries, the Chairman of  the TWG and the chief executives of 
the principal private sector organisations. Early in 1997 ministerial portfolios were changed 
and it was some months before a Ministry accepted responsibility for CBI. 
Swaziland achieved its main objective under the programme, however, when the 
Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority was established in 1998. 
In summary, the country has lost touch with CBI: neither current Ministers, relevant 
sections of  the civil service, nor the private sector are aware of  CBI. 
1.3 Benefits 
Swaziland's major benefit from the CBI has been the establishment, in April 1998, 
of the  Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority (SIPA).  The capital, training and 
promotional programme (travel, workshops, seminars etc) have been funded, under the 
auspices of  the CBI, by the co-sponsors whilst the Government has been responsible for 
recurrent expenditure. Following from this, the incentive package for new investors has 
been improved: corporate tax rates are reduced, according to the scale of  the project, and 
permanent residence status is available for the investor and the top employees. 
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The TWG has not been involved with Swaziland's membership of  either SADC or 
CO  MESA. Indeed, membership of these bodies has limited the activities of the TWG 
because issues have been left to the regional organisations to resolve. 
2.  ACTIVITIES OF THE TWG 
2.1 Overview ofTWG meetinKs 
TWG meetings have been held irregularly and infrequently since the secretariat was 
established in 1996. Little was achieved in the meetings because, once the TWG had lost 
its status (as discussed above), the participating bodies did not assign responsibility for 
CBI to any one person or to a high-ranking official. Consequently different representatives 
would appear at each meeting, with the result that there was no continuity from one 
meeting to the next, nor any possibility of  on-going development. 
Government ministries and departments which attended TWG meetings at various 
times included: 
•  Ministry of  Enterprise & Employment 
•  Ministry ofFinance 
•  Ministry of  Economic Planning & Development 
•  Ministry ofForeignAffars & Trade 
• 
Department of  Transport 
•  Department of  Customs 
•  Department of  Immigration 
•  Department of  Labour 
•  Central Bank 
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t  The Swaziland Chamber of  Commerce & Industry 
t  The Swaziland Industrial Development Company 
t  The Sibakho Chamber of  Commerce 
t  The Swaziland Commercial Amadoda 
A sub-committee of  the TWG was convened, with regard to the proposed Tax Bill, 
to prepare a submission to the Minister for Finance on tax reform, from the perspective 
of encouraging new investment. The sub-committee was comprised of representatives 
from the Ministry of  Finance, Central Bank, Swaziland Chamber of  Commerce & Industry 
and the Ministry of  Economic Planning & Development. 
2.2 Overview o(Sensitisation Activities 
There have been no sensitisation activities. 
2.3 Overview o(Studies 
Several attempts were made to set up studies under the auspices of CBI. None of 
these efforts ever reached sufficient maturity for a request to be made to the co-sponsors 
for funding. Studies considered were: 
t  Harmonised External Tariffs (HET); 
t  The implementation of  ASYCUDA 
2.4 Sub-Committee 
A sub-committee of  the TWG has met on a regular 6-monthly basis to review the 
progress reports and work plan I budgets of the Swaziland Investment Promotion 
Authority. This was in terms of  the requirement that the TWG should monitor the use of 
resources provided by the co-sponsors. 
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of  reports on studies commissioned by SIPA, particularly: 
t  Forest Products; 
t  Sugar Sector; 
t  SME Support Programme Identification. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI 
3.1 Foreign Trade 
Swaziland did not participate in this aspect of  the CBI and no change has occured. 
3.2 Pavments 
As above. A frame work and timetable exist and are contained in the World Bank 
report on the Swaziland Financial Sector Study (1995). The TWG was not provided with 
a copy of  the report or a detailed review of  the recommendations contained therein. The 
representative from Central Bank advised that some of  the recommendations were being 
implemeted, in particular: 
t  The local asset requirements of  commercial banks had been abolished. 
t  No interest paid on banks' asset reserves, in anticipation of developments in 
monetary and capital markets. 
t  Central Bank had stopped taking term deposits. 
t  Central Bank was issuing Bills, since Treasury Bills were insufficient to create a 
market. 
t  The Securities, Pensions and Insurance Bills should be in place during 1997 
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As noted above, the Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority has been established. 
The TWG has been charged with monitoring the activities and expenditure of  SIPA, on 
behalf  of  the co-sponsors. For this purpose a sub-committee of  the TWG was established, 
consisting of  the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, EU Representative and the representative 
of  the National Authorising Officer from the Ministry of  Economic Planning. The sub-
committe has been supported by the secretariat. 
Investment approval and licensing procedures: this has never been a problem in 
Swaziland. SIPA does provide a facilitation service. 
The Investment Code has not been formalised. 
Harmonisation of  investment regime: no discrimination has existed between internal 
or external investors, or between various sources of  investment. 
No change has occured on the borders of Swaziland to facilitate the movement of 
persons, but this has not been a problem. 
Efforts have been made to expedite the issue of  work I residence permits and new 
investors may be given permanent residence status. The latter has been re-activated by 
the efforts of  SIPA, having been a dormant option for many years. 
Swaziland continues to be a member ofMIGA. 
Continuing efforts are being made to reform Swaziland's tax legislation. A draft 
Bill has been in preparation for a number of years and, as  an interim measure, a Tax 
Amendment is currently before Parliament. SIPA has succeeded in negotiating special 
concessions for  new investors in Swaziland; these concessions range from reduced 
corporate tax (down to 30% or below) to tax holidays. 
3.4 CBI Status 
Neither the Addendum to the Letter of CBI Policy nor the National Road Map on 
Investment Facilitation have been submitted to the co-sponsors; neither document has 
been prepared. 
p.476 ANNEXJ:  TWGMEMBERS 
There has not been a consistent group of  representatives. The following list of  names 
refers to the main contact points, i.e. the Principal Secretary, Chief  Executive or, in a few 
cases, the regular participant from an organisation. 
Z Lukhele (TWG 
Deputy Chairman) 
E. Hillary 
S.  Sibandze 
Dr Gina 
Central Bank of  Swaziland  404 3222  404 0063  PO Box 546 Mbabane 
Swaziland Chamber of  404 5442 
Commerce & Industry 
Swaziland Industrial 
Development Co. 
404 3391  404 5619  PO Box 866 Mbabane 
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1.  OVERVIEW OF THE CBI IN TANZANIA 
1.1 Background to the CBI 
Since the Maastrich Conference on Africa, held in July 1990, developed countries 
have revived their interest in economic integration for  Sub-Saharan Africa. At that 
conference, they had welcomed more regional integration and co-operation in the Sub-
Saharan region but, at the same time took note of  the fact that previous integration schemes, 
launched in the pre-adjustement era, had achieved limited progress in promoting cross 
border trade and investment. They further recognised the potential value of regional 
integration in strenghthening the basis for sustainable growth, hence the need to look for 
a new practical approach to promoting economic integration that is anchored in outward 
strategies oriented to development. 
Following the Maastricht Conference, the World Bank (WB), the IMF, the European 
Union (EU), the African Development Bank (ADB) Coalition for Africa known as the 
co-sponsors of  the CBI began collaborating on developing a new pragmatic approach to 
promote regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa. These efforts culminated in an 
initiative-the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) in the COMESA/SADC/IOC (Indian Ocean 
Countries) where, as a result of  past reforms, there was progress towards creating outward 
oriented economic regimes as well as a particularly strong resolve to strengthen financial 
and economic linkages among the member countries. 
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The CBI has evolved over the past eight years in several phases of  dialogue between 
the co-sponsors, the regional institutions and the representatives of the Eastern and 
Southern African Countries. 
a.  The first phases led to the formulation of  a Concept Paper (CP) which proposed 
a framework for action by interested governments. 
b.  At a ministerial meeting held in Kampala in August 1993, representatives of 
thirteen countries and several regional institutions endorsed the CP. 
c.  The co-sponsors indicated their commitment to  support CBI implementation 
process. 
The overall reform agenda under CBI provides for an acceleration of  the pace and 
deepening of  the scope of  adjustment effort in the participating countries in the following 
areas: 
a)  Trade liberalisation 
b) Liberalisation of  the exchange system 
c)  Deregulation of  investment 
d)  Strengthening of  financial intermediation 
e)  Facilitation of  factor movement -labour and capital. 
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•  Specific measures, their sequencing and implementation timetable under CBI 
were foresceen to vary from country by country, since progress on policy reform 
is highly variable between countries. 
•  The CBI is based on the principle of  the faster reformers setting the pace of 
integration. 1.3 Tanzania's Participation 
Tanzania has been participating in the initiative since CBI's inception and was also 
among the thirteen countries which gave approval to, and also committed themselves to 
the implementation of all that was contained in the concept paper. Furthermore at all 
CBI meetings the Ministry of  Finance has been leading the Tanzania Delegations. 
1.4 Organisational Set-Up 
As contained in the Concept Paper, the organisation of  all CBI activities in Tanzania 
is similar to those in other participating countries and is set up as follows: 
1.  Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) 
This is the highest policy making body in Tanzania and is at Ministerial level. The 
composition is as follows:-
a)  Minister for Finance  Chairman 
b) Minister for Industries and Trade  Member 
c)  Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation  Member 
d)  Minister of  State (Planning)  Member 
e)  Governor of  Bank of  Tanzania  Member 
In practice, the PIC in Tanzania has not met since the start of  the CBI. Nevertheless, 
the Minister for Finance has been making consultations with members of  the cabinet and 
members of  CBI, particularly when there is a CBI Ministerial Meeting. Unlike in some 
of  the CBI participating countries, the PIC in Tanzania cannot be the final authority in 
deciding on major regional integration issues, but as  a team they can make strong 
recommendations for final approval by the Cabinet. 
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This comprises experts from institutions relevant to the CBI and it is to-date under 
the Chairmanship of  the Ministry of Finance. At the moment it has members from the 
following institutions: 
a)  Ministry ofFinance 
b) Planning Commission 
c)  Ministry ofindustry and Commerce 
d)  Ministry of  Foreign Affairs and International 
Co-operation East African Co-operation Desk) 
e)  Bank ofTanzania 
f)  Tanzania Chamber of  Commerce, Industry and Agriculture 
g)  Tanzania Exporters Association 
h)  Confederation ofTanzania Industries 
i)  Tanzania Investment Centre 
Chairman 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Secretary:  Iramba Management and Industrial Services Limited (Private Sector) 
The TWG has been the most active organ in keeping CBI in Tanzania alive. 
a)  The first TWG originally (1992) had 9 members with an independent consultant 
from the University of Dar es Salaam as Secretariat and was charged with the 
task of  undertaking technical studies necessary for the initiative. Basically, the 
TWG observed that inspite of  the interest shown by a number of  donor countries 
towards the sub-regions efforts to accelerate regional integration among member 
states, and efforts made, investments have, from the time of the formation of 
these organs, remained low. A host of  trade, investment, financial and, at times, 
institutional, constraints have often been cited as impeding increased economic 
co-operation among member states. 
The TWG went onto identify, analyse and recommend viable means of  dealing with 
the constraints identified as they apply to Tanzania. The outcome was a report which 
dwelt on intra COMESA/SADC constraints and then on recommendations on how to go 
about removing them. 
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•  Intra COMESA/SADC Investment 
•  Intra COMESA/SADC Trade 
•  Finance and payments 
•  Institutions. 
b) The "Second" TWG 
The very excellent work of  the first TWG and its continuity was seriously affected 
by:-
•  Administrative and institutional changes made in the government machinery 
which affected almost all members of the TWG. The Chairmanship within the 
Ministry of  Finance remained the same. 
•  Inadequate and weak secretarial support further exacerbated the disintegration 
of  the TWG activities. 
For the whole period between December 1992 and October 1993, CBI activities 
were dormant until November 1993, when the EEC Desk in the External Finance 
Department of  the Ministry ofFinance took the initiative to revive the activities with the 
active support of  the EEC. Activities included were: 
•  To establish new/revised terms of  reference for the TWG 
•  To identify relevant institutions and pinpoint new members who would be keen 
in the CBI activities. 
•  To establish a temporary secretariat to the TWG 
•  To call the first meeting of  the newly set up TWG. 
The first meeting was held at the end of February 1994 (14 months after the last 
work of  the TWG) and had only three (3) members. 
111.  TWG Secretariat: 
As mentioned above, and from the experience of  other CBI participating countries 
the Secretariat is critical to the success of  all CBI activities. 
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on a sub-contract basis and answerable to the TWG under the overall CBI consultancy 
contract supervisd by Imani Development International Ltd of Zimbabwe as  lead 
Consultants. 
1.2 On going Perceptions o(the CBI  Process within Tanzania bv Government 
and Private Sector 
Perceptions by Government 
Tanzania has all along supported the CBI process. The Concept Paper (CP) which 
proposed a framework for action was endorsed in Kampala in August, 1993 by Tanzania. 
The overall reform agenda under CBI called for liberalisation of  the trade regime, 
exchange system, deregulation of  investment, strengthening of  financial intermediation 
and facilitation of factor movement, labour and capital. Tanzania under the CBI Trade 
Road-Map has achieved the following:-
t  a tariff structure of  four non-zero rate with a maximum of  25%, 
t  lowered trade-weighted average of  tariffs vis-a-vis third parties to no more than 
15%, 
t  acceleration of schedule of preferential tariffs on intra-regional trade to  80% 
with a view of  complete elimination of  all tariffs on intra-regional trade, provided 
Tanzania does not withdraw from COMESA, 
t  application of  the lowest customs duty rate to raw materials and capital goods, a 
middle rate for intermediate goods and a higher rate for finished goods (based on 
a 6-digit harmonised system tariff code) 
t  elimination of all tariff barriers except those justified for health security and 
environmental reasons, 
t  reduction of  customs duty exemptions to a minimum consistent with international 
treaty obligations. 
Other trade issues which have been done away with are in relation to import and 
export licensing and surrender requirements. Tanzania applies Road Transit Charges as 
approved by COMESA, although they are not the harmonised rates, and introduced 
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exchange system include liberalisation of current account, permission of operation of 
private banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
By putting all the above reforms in place and many other related measures the 
Government perceives this as a way to stimulate economic development. 
Perceptions by the Private Sector 
Similarly, the private sector now, regarded as the engine of economic growth, is 
developing a stronger relationship with the Government and is consulted from time to 
time through the Private Sector Foundation and the National Business Council before 
decisions which impact on the private sector and the civil society are made. 
1.3 Specific Elements ofthe CBI that have been Particularlv Useful in the 
Country and Benefits ofhaving had a TWG 
1.3.1  Balance of  Payment Support 
The CBI Letter ofPolicy was accepted by the co-sponsors in May, 1997. In so doing 
Tanzania qualified for a grant ofECU 9.3 million from the co-sponsors in the form of 
balance of  payment support. This came from the European Union structural adjustment 
agreement (SAF JV), total value ECU 61.9 million containing a CBI floating tranche of 
ECU 9.3 million. The co-sponsors have continued supporting Tanzania in this respect. 
TWG prepared the draft CBI Letter ofPolicy and followed it until it was accepted by the 
co-sponsors. 
1.3.2  Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) 
A Single Goods Customs Declaration Document was introduced in 1996 to improve 
and streamline the administration of customs data.  The support on the ASYCUDA 
Customs system has been implemented at the Dar es Salaam Airport and at the Dar es 
Salaam Longroom (Seaport). This has enhanced availability of  customs data in terms of 
time and accuracy. Its installation is planned for Zanzibar. TWG has been closely following 
up the installation of  the ASYCUDA system. 
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A study on "Customs Tariff Harmonisation in East Africa -·case of  Tanzania" was 
completed in April,  1998. The studies for Kenya and Uganda were completed at the 
same time. Consolidation of  the three reports has already been done and experts of  the 
three East African states are working on the implementation of the recommendation. 
The study was financed by one of  the co-sponsors of  CBI namely, the World Bank. The 
TWG followed up payment to the Consultants as  at one stage, this was becoming a 
bottleneck. 
1.3.4  Analytical Study on Amendments to the Tanzania Legal Codes and 
Proposal for an enabling Legal Framework in conformity with the agreed 
Concept Paper for Cross Border Initiative (CBI) 
Consultancy services for review, consolidation and amendment of  legislation and/ 
or investment regulations and practices affecting Cross Border Trade and Investment 
within the Eastern and Southern African Countries and proposals for the establishment 
of  an enabling legal framework for the improvement of  intra-regional trade and investment 
were offered in April, 1998. The study, which was financed by the World Bank through 
the Ministry ofFinance was completed in 1999. Recommendations thereto were submitted 
to the Minister for Finance to be worked upon by the relevant legislative machinery. 
TWG drew up the terms of  reference, participated in the selection of  the consultant and 
followed the study to its completion. 
1.3.5  CBI Sensitisation Seminars/Workshop 
Between January and December, 1998 and November, 1999, 7 seminars to sensitise/ 
train the public on the activities of  Cross Border Initiative and the East African Cooperation 
Treaty were held. At these meetings papers were presented for discussion and from the 
discussions resolutions emerged. To all these meetings the co-sponsors ofCBI were able 
to attend the meeting held at Dares Salaam on 6th February, 1998. As for the others, they 
were unable to,  because of other important commitments. The resolutions of these 
seminars/workshops have been forwarded to the relevant Ministries, Government and 
non-Government Institutions for implementation. TWG organised these seminars. 
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The EATWGs meetings which bring together the Technical Working Groups of  the 
3 East African States once a year, alternating between members states focus an issues 
such as  examining CBI progress, studying non-Tariff Barriers, tariff harmonisation, 
improvements to  customs administration, transport and other sector studied and 
developing Cross-border legal and economic elements of the E.A.C Treaty and its 
Protocols. EATWGs meetings have all along been financed by the Co-sponsors through 
the Lead Consultant. TWG facilitates such meetings and follow up the implementations 
of  the resolutions. 
1.4 Relationship between CBI and the Regional integration institutions 
(CO  MESA. EA C and SAD  C) in  Tanzania. 
1.4.1  Relationship between· Tanzania and COMESA 
Tanzania has shown intention of pulling out of CO  MESA. The reasons given to 
justify this decision are:-
t  Implications of  a Free Trade Area (FTA) on Government revenue and the existing 
industries. 
t  Costs and benefits ofbelonging to COMESAdo not justify Tanzania's continued 
presence. 
t  Duplication of  efforts among regional integration groupings, namely, CO MESA, 
SADC and EAC are pecuniarily too expensive. 
t  Uneven growth and balances that would ensue in a FTA are likely to be 
unfavourable for Tanzania. 
t  The geographical size of  CO  MESA. 
t  Tanzania geographical location. 
The intention is expected to come into force in September, 2000. However, efforts 
are being made by all those friendly to Tanzania to convince her to reconsider the intention. 
p.487 1.4.2  East African Cooperation 
The EAC Treaty was signed in October,  1999. The "Trade Liberalisation and 
Development" took a lot of time to negotiate. It was agreed at the EATWGs meeting 
held 71h  - 81h  December,  1999 at Nakuru, Kenya that although the target period for 
achievement of a Customs Union was four (4) years this should be hastened and the 
period reduced. The relationship between CBI and EAC is cordial and is regarded as 
complementing each other. 
1.4.3  Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Tanzania is a member of  SADC. The CBI has been developed in collaboration with 
the regional organisations i.e. CO  MESA, EAC, SADC and IOC. CBI, therefore, directly 
supports the integration agenda of the regional organisations.  SADC Secretariat has 
maintained contacts with the co-sponsors of CBI on how the initiative could serve to 
promote the SADC agenda. 
2.  ACTIVITIES OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP (TWG) 
2.1 Overview ofthe TWG meetings since beginning 
As mentioned elsewhere in this report TWG activities started in 1992. Due to various 
reasons TWG activities remained dormant until November, 1993 and the first meeting 
was held at the end of February, 1994. A summary of the meetings held since then is 
summarised below:-
1994  1 
1995  2 
1996  4 
1997  5 
1998  5 
1999  4 
2000  1 
Total  22 
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a)  Ministry of  Finance 
b) Planning Commission 
c)  Ministry of  Industry and Commerce 
d)  Ministry ofF  oreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation 
e)  Bank of  Tanzania 
f)  Tanzania Chamber of  Commerce 
Industry and Agriculture 
g)  Tanzania Exporters Association 
h) Confederation of  Tanzania Industries 
Chairman 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
Member 
i)  Tanzania Investment Centre  Has shown intention to join 
2.1.1  Summary of  the main issues discussed over the period 
a)  Letter ofCBI Policy 
This preoccupied members ofTWG until it was finally signed in 1996. 
b) CBI Trade Road Map 
TWG discussed the various items as presented in matrices. The aim was to review 
the extent to which various implementing agencies have done their work, constraints if 
any, and the measures that were in place. Issues pertaining to trade liberalisation, trade 
facilitation, payment regime, immigration and project development have been discussed 
and constraints dealt with. 
c)  East Africa Technical Working Groups (EATWGs) Meetings 
EATWGs meetings bring together the three TWGs of  Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
to  discuss issues pertaining to CBI Trade Road Map and which hinder smooth 
implementation among the three states. Issues pertaining to NTBs, comparing notes on 
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Road Map have been surmounted. 
2.1.2  Problems encountered 
At first, many institutions did not understand the role and benefits of CBI. As a 
result those institutions which were, in one way or the other involved in the implementation 
of  the CBI process were not cooperative. With the passage of  time and the sensitisation 
seminars the problem has been overcome. 
2.1.3  Other activities 
Evaluation ofthe CBI activities in Tanzania since inception (1992) to June, 1999 
was done by a consultant, Mr. Niel Dourmashkin who completed the work in Tanzania 
between l9
1
h July, 1999 and 22nd July, 1999. 
The conclusions drawn by the evaluation were: 
t  Most of  the trade-tariff objectives of  the CBI have been met by Tanzania. 
t  Most obvious NTBs have been eliminated or are in the process of  doing so. 
t  Trade facilitations measures targeted by CBI have generally been introduced with 
the exception of  the bond guarantee scheme. 
t  Financial aspects of  the CBI objectives have largely been achieved. 
t  Investment is an area where a great deal remains to be done. The establishment 
of the Tanzania Investment Centre as a ONE STOP CENTRE has not removed 
the multiplicity oflicences. 
t  Employment and residence permits to CBI participants are still restrictive and 
visa requirements still exist for some CBI countries. 
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2.2.1  Sensitisation Seminars/Workshops 
Sensitisation seminars/workshops on the activities of CBI and East African 
Cooperation Treaty started in 1998. 
By November,  1999, 7 sensitisation seminars/workshops had been held.  The 
seminars/workshops were organised and drew participants as shown below:-
7.  Moshi  24.11.1999  Arusha, Tanga and Kilimanjaro  31 
2.2.2  Other Sensitisation Activities 
The Secretariat, met on different occasions, officials of  the Prime Minister's Office, 
Tanzania Investment Centre, Customs Department and briefed them on the activities of 
CBI and their role in making it a success. Letters were written to institutions like Tanzania 
Federation of Trade Unions, Tanzania Bankers' Association. Association of Tanzania 
Employers and Tanzania Association of Women Enterpreneurs sensitising these 
institutions on the activities of  CBI. 
2.2.3  Main Results of  these Activities 
In these seminars/workshops/papers were presented by experts on fields which affect 
the business community. Awareness on various facets of trade with the neighbouring 
countries, tax regimes, and general facilitaiton of  trade was brought to the participants. 
Resolutions made in these seminars have been forwarded to the relevant authorities in 
the government. As for those resolutions which pertained to the regions, the respective 
branches ofthe Tanzania Chamber of  Commerce, Industry and Agriculture were charged 
with the responsibilities of  following them up. 
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2.3.1  Study to Identify Potential Areas of  Investmnet for Export by Tanzania 
to COMESA Countries: 
Areas of  Investment, Constraints, Promotional Strategy, Training, Sensitisation of 
Public and Private Sectors to Export 
The study was carried out to  identify areas of investment for Tanzania to the 
CO MESA sub-regions. Areas of  investment, constraints, promotional strategies, training 
and sensitisation of  the public and private sectors to export were to be explored by the 
study. 
With regard to investment, 10 areas of  potential investment were identified namely:-
ill 
thread 
Textile Industry; to produce quality fabrics, grey cloth, yam, garments and 
.(ill  Hides and Skins Industry; to produce quality hides and skins, shoes and 
leather products 
(iii)  Electrical Goods Industry; to  produce radios, cookers transformers, 
switchgears, radiators, batteries and cables. 
(iv)  Metal En::ineerin:: Industry; to produce billets, iron products, wire products, 
aluminium products, bicycles, industrial tanks and boilers 
.(y)  Chemical Industry; to produce medicines for both humans veterinary use, 
motor and bicycle tyres 
(vi)  Food and Bevera::e Industry; to produce for export, meat and meat products, 
wines, spirits and beer. 
(vii)  Natural Resource Industry; to produce fresh water fish and paper 
(viii)  Construction Industry; to produce cement, roofing tiles, bricks, ceramics 
and sheet glass 
(ix)  Minin:: Industry; to produce diamonds, gold, coppers, gas, limestone and 
mtca. 
U)  Service Industry; to produce services related to tourism, air, sea and land 
transport, banking and freight forwarding 
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and public business community lack appropriate training. Training gaps in the six sectors 
of agriculture, manufacturing, mining, trade, trade-in-services and natural resources, 
should be identified and tailor made training programmes made. Appropriate training 
programme should be both production and market oriented. Management and technical 
skill development is an integral part of  training. 
2.3.2  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Tanzania does not have a technology policy to guide the R & D Advisory Committees 
set up to steer development of  research programmes in each sector. In order to enhance 
the performance of  R & D institutions in their efforts to develop, promote and transfer 
appropriate technology the following conditions are critical:-
1)  An enabling environment sufficiently conducive for an enterprise to undertake 
manufacturing vesus trading. 
2)  Enterprises should be mandated to include the provision of  support toR  & D 
activities. 
3)  Industries need to have a quality control unit with at least one qualified quality 
controller. 
2.3.3  Tanzania Export Development Fund- Business Plan 
At a meeting ofTWGs held in April1996 in Mauritius, the co-sponsors of  CBI agreed 
to provide financial and technical assistance in support of  the private sector activities. The 
TWGs were required to prepare a programme equivalent to the Indian Ocean Community 
(IOC). The Tanzanian, Kenyan and Ugandan programmes were prepared by the respective 
TWG Secretaries and submitted to E.A.C. Secretariat for consolidation and sourcing for 
funds from European Union. The exercise is yet to be accomplished. 
MAIN FINDINGS 
The economic system created by Tanzania after independence did not pay sufficient 
attention to the need to expand export earnings in order to make real resources available 
to the government to finance its programmes. 
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difficult, if not impossible, to do so because they are not in a position to get facilities 
from the commercial banks. The reasons are:- high interest rates and stringent security 
requirements. 
The proposed fund will be in a form of  loan and grant. The loan component of  the 
scheme will be a revolving facility for financing pre-shipment and post shipment credit 
needs of  exporters. The grant component will be used to finance activities that directly 
or indirectly stimulate exports. Examples of such services which qualify for grant are 
prefeasibility and feasibility studies, advice on production techniques, technical assistance 
in machinery installation and quality improvement and personnel training. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
•  The study recommends that the loan and grant amount to be made available by 
EU be ECU 11  million. 
•  The Bank ofTanzania is to be the lead Bank in the implementation of  the project. 
Implementation should be in accordance to the terms and conditions to be agreed 
upon by EU and the Bank of  Tanzania. 
•  A Project Secretariat be established to implement the project. 
2.3.4  Tariff  Harmonisation in East Africa - Case of  Tanzania 
The study was initiated in 1997. The three studies (for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) 
which were all financed by the World Bank under CBI initiative were consolidated and 
experts of  the three East African states are working on the implementation. 
The Main Findings 
Among the objectives set out for the EAC was the possibility of  forming a regional 
trade arrangement (RTA) specifically, a customs union. 
•  A customs union would require 
a)  a common, harmonised external tariff to be adopted by the three members of 
RTA 
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•  The current status of  the trade regimes in the three countries offers a reasonable 
prospect of  achieving some important aspects of  the RTA objective. 
•  The prospects of  progress towards a customs union appear good. 
•  The existing trade imbalances within East Africa are significant and pose an 
important obstacle to successful integration. 
•  The proposed common external tariff (CET) of 0,7% and 15% will cause 
revenue losses in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
•  It is recommended that due regard be paid to the implications of the trade 
imbalances for costs of  tariff adjustments necessary for the normal creation of 
an East African RTA. 
•  The revenue consequences of tariff harmonisation need to be carefully 
considered from the prospective of  each member state 
•  Based on an assessment of a  number of alternative tariff structures 
recommendations have been given to achieve a single harmonised external 
tariff (HET) as a priority objective. 
•  After considering the various options for the choice of a common external 
tariff, the report concludes that a scheme broadly similar to the current Ugandan 
structure of0.7% and 15% should be adopted for East Africa 
•  The proposed tariff adjustments will cause revenue losses in Kenya and 
Tanzania and will require complementary policy measures to  safeguard 
revenue. 
•  All the three countries will need to tighten their exemptions regimes, strengthen 
customs cooperation, to prevent smuggling and diversion of  transit goods. 
•  Strengthen the existing commitments to avoid the use of  non-tariffbarriers to 
trade. 
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Proposal for an enabling Legal Framework in conformity with the agreed 
Concept Paper on Cross Border Initiative (CBI) 
Consultancy services study for review, consolidation and amendments oflegislation 
and or investment regulations and practices affecting Cross Border Trade and Investment 
within Eastern and Southern African countries was initiated and terms of reference 
prepared by the TWG. 
The Study which was financed by the World Bank examined the existing legal 
framework and proposed amendments/consolidations with the view of  creating a friendly 
climate for trade and investment. The amendments and recommendations were submitted 
to the Minister for Finance to be worked upon by relevant legislative machinery. 
MAIN FINDINGS 
The main finding was that there is lack of  transparency in the rules. Investors would 
usually prefer to have an authoritative set of  rules which govern business areas in which 
they are involved. The absence of  such rules exposes them to the discretionary behaviour 
of  bureaucracies. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Government agencies should maintain the up-to-date statutes, regulations 
and guidelines which govern their activities, and should also endeavour to disseminate 
them in a simplified form to interested parties within and out of  the country. 
2.  Consideration should be given to further liberalisation of  the capital account 
for transactions involving countries within the Cross Border Initiative. 
3.  Capital Markets and Securities Authority (CMSA) should relax, licensing 
criteria to all foreigners to participate in the sale and purchase of  securities at the Dar es 
Salaam Stock Exchange 
4.  Licenses for fishing activities by non-citizens require permit of  the Minister 
for Natural Resources and Tourism. The study recommends, that joint ventures with 
citizens of  CBI countries should be accommodated. 
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countries who are in the Cross Border Initiative should be relaxed as is the case for the 
eligible commonwealth countries. Secondly those nationals should also be allowed a 
maximum period of six months as is the case for East African nationals. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN  POLICY  REFORM  AREAS 
3.1 Foreign Trade 
3.1.1  Import/Export Licensing 
Import and export licensing were abolished since July, 1993. 
3.1.2  NTBs:  Have also been abolished. 
3.1.3  Intra- regional tariffs 
These have gradually been reduced and now stand at 80%. 
3.1.4  External Tariffs 
A number of  external tariffs have been harmonised. Tariff bands have been reduced 
to conform with other CBI member states. The 7 tariff bands which existed in 1996/97 
have now been reduced to 5 i.e. 0, 5, 10, 20, 25. The maximum being 25%. 
3.1.5  Trade Facilitation 
Harmonised transit charges. Tanzania continues to maintain road transit charges as 
approved by COMESA Council of Ministers Single Goods Customs Declaration 
Document (Bill of  Entry) was introduced and is being used. 
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3.2.1  Financial Sector Reform 
The financial sector reform programme is an on-going process, and to date, the 
following has been accomplished:-
t  the banking system has fully been liberalised, 
t  exchange control has been abolished, 
t  exchange rate of the Tanzania shilling is  determined in the Interbank Foreign 
Exchange Market and is flexible. 
t  the Dares Salaam Stock Exchange started operations in April, 1998. 
t  interest rates are determined in the financial market. 
3.2.2  Exchange System 
t  Current account of  the balance of  payment is fully liberalised 
t  Foreign investment in Tanzania is partially liberalised as the capital account is 
not fully liberalised. 
3.3 Investment 
3.3.1  Investment approval and licensing procedures 
Investment approval procedures have been simplified following the enactment of 
the new Investment Act in 1997 transforming the Tanzania Investment Centre into a 
ONE STOP CENTRE for investment information, advice, registration and certification. 
3.3.2  Investment Code 
An Investment Code and regulatory framework has been published by refinement is 
needed. 
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At East Africa level harmonisation of  the investment regimes are being done under 
the auspices of  the East African Cooperation. 
3.3.4  Movement of  persons and employment permits 
Visa requirements for nationals of  East Africa have been eliminated. The East African 
passport has been launched. Visa requirements for some members of COMESA and 
SADC have been removed. Visas for the remaining members of  CO  MESA and SADC 
will be eliminated on a reciprocal basis. 
With regard to employment permits, these are issued in respect of  employees under 
registered and certified investments provided that such employees meet the relevant 
criteria. 
3.3.5  Membership/participation in investment protection agencies 
Tanzania is a member of Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
International Centre for the Settlement oflndustrial Disputes (ICSID). 
3.4 CBI Status 
3.4.1 Status on Addendum to Letter of  CBI Policy 
The draft Addendum to the Letter of  CBI Policy was prepared and submitted to the 
TWG on CBI meeting held on 24th February, 2000. The TWG on CBI members went 
through the document and requested the Chairman to submit it to PIC Chairman for 
onward transmission to the CBI co-sponsors. The Addendum has not been forwarded to 
the co-sponsors. The TWG on CBI Secretary is following up. 
3.4.2  Status on preparation of  national Road Map on Investment Facilitation 
Preparations are underway. This may require assistance from the co-sponsors in 
which case a request for funds will have to be sought. 
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1.  OVERVIEW OF THE CBI IN UGANDA 
Uganda embarked on a detailed programme ofliberalizing the economy long before 
the CBI began. So, in effect the CBI helped to serve as a catalyst to the Government 
reform programme. Following the signing ofthe letter ofCBI Policy in 1995, most of 
the specific measures outlined therein were implemented in the period 1995 -1997. 
Following the adoption of the Country Programme of Action, the Uganda TWG 
began the process of sensitizing government departments about the need for,  and the 
benefits of, implementing measures contained in the CPA. The response to these initiatives 
was positive. Government accords regional integration as a high priority in its programmes. 
This statement has been repeatedly made at the highest levels of Government and the 
pace of compliance by Uganda to regional decisions governing integration bears this 
out. On the other hand, however, the CBI is not widely understood by the private sector. 
This may be attributed in part to its fragmented nature and the fact that it is still in its 
infancy. By and large, however, the CBI is seen, both in government and the private 
sector, as an important resource to mitigate the effects of  tariff reduction. 
One of the elements of the CBI that have been particularly useful Uganda, is its 
encouragement of  tariff  reduction and elimination ofnon-tariffbarriers. In this sense, the 
CBI is seen as a fast-track by which it has been possible to identify the non-tariffbarriers. 
On the other hand though, there is a feeling that the missing link has been the failure by 
some of  the stakeholders to participate effectively. For example, some of  the decisions in 
Tanzania could not be implemented and effectively exploited by the neighbouring 
countries because of  its decentralized system. 
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The Technical Working Group has been instrumental in keeping the CBI activities 
on the agenda. A lot of  work has been done by the TWG in collaboration with the Project 
Implementation Committee (PIC) to facilitate positive response to, and support for, actions 
and measures under the Initiative. There has been extensive collaboration with the co-
sponsors who provided technical and financial support in many areas under the CBI. 
2.1 Overview ofthe meetings since beginning 
The TWG is made up of members from different interest organisations from the 
public and private sectors. They meet regularly to discuss matters and issues that help to 
promote CBI activities in Uganda. These meetings have been held at least once a month. 
Between July and November 1998 alone, for instance, meetings were held on July 1st, 
July 21st, August 17th, October 22nd, and November 9th, 1998. 
The usual composition of  members attending is as follows: 
1)  Mr. Keith Muhakanizi  (Ministry ofFinance)  (UTWG Chairman) 
2)  Dr. Sam Katabaazi  (former UTWG Secretary/Consultant) 
3)  Dr. Evarist Mugisa  (new UTWG Secretary/Consultant) 
4)  Mrs. Ovia Matovu  (Uganda Export Promotion Board) 
5)  Ms. Daisy Owomugasho  (Uganda Investment Authority) 
6)  Mr. Barishaki C.  (Ministry of  Justice) 
7)  Prof. Sam Tulya-Muhika  (East Africa Forum) 
8)  Mr. Patrick Okilangole  (Ministry of  Tourism, Trade and Industry) 
9)  Mr. Barnabas M. Sekabembe  (Association of  Small Scale Industries) 
10)  Mr. Magala-Nyago  (Bank of  Uganda) 
11)  Ms. Sarah Kinene  (Uganda Manufacturers Association) 
12)  Ms. Estella Eryada  (Private Sector Foundation) 
13)  Mr. Anthony Ngororano  (Private Sector Foundation) 
14)  Mr. Dick Musisi Mpiima  (Private Sector Foundation) 
15)  Mr. Francis Batte  (Uganda Farmers Association) 
16)  Mrs. Irene Mutumba  (Uganda Women Entrepreneurs Ass.) 
17)  Mr. Luke Okumu  (Bank ofUganda) 
18)  Dr. Muhammad Serunjogi  (Bank ofUganda) 
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20) 
21) 
22) 
23) 
24) 
Mr. Robert Rutaagi 
Mrs. Beatrice Mukasa 
Mr. Patrick Nyaika 
Mr. Karemente Kyoratungye 
Mr. Santos Apire 
Mr. Marko Kayanja 
(Uganda Export Promotion Board) 
(Uganda Women Finance & Credit Trust) 
(Uganda Investment Authority) 
(Uganda Investment Authority) 
(Bank ofUganda) 
The members listed above have attended at different times. The usual size of the 
TWG at any one time is 12 members. 
The main issues discussed at these meetings have included: 
t  The East African Cooperation Treaty; 
t  CBI Activities and their Funding; 
t  Study on the "Impact oflnformal Cross-Border Trade on Revenue Collection in 
Uganda" 
t  Activities of  the Uganda Investment Authority; 
t  East African TWG meetings; 
t  The East African Passport; 
t  Foreign Exchange Study Review; 
t  Letter to the CBI Policy; 
t  Exchange Rates; 
t  Uganda Investment Authority and the promotion of  Export Processing Zones; 
t  Uganda's Investment Code; 
t  PRESTO activities; 
t  Consultative Group Report; 
t  Scholarships for trade associations; 
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g)_  Composition ofthe TWG:  There has been a feeling that the participation of  the 
private sector in the work of  the TWG has been less than adequate. This is not to 
suggest that private sector representatives have not been invited to participate; 
rather it is the lukewarm attitude toward the CBI that they have exhibited that has 
made their presence not noticeable. 
b)_  Rules o(Procedure:  Some members ofthe TWG have noted with concern the 
absence of  established rules of  procedure in the conduct of  the CBI TWG matters. 
For example, they point out the lack of rules regarding the meetings to  be 
convened, other activities of  the TWG, or the limits of  the TWG Secretariat, etc. 
In their opinion this leaves decisions to the discretion of  the Chairman and/or the 
Secretary/Consultant. 
£)_  Remuneration ofthe TWG:  Members of the TWG were not encouraged to 
participate in the work of the TWG, especially on account of poor or no 
remuneration in terms of  a sitting allowances. This matter has been discussed in 
some of  the meetings of  the TWG, but little or no progress was made to rectify 
the situation. It  was pointed out that, it is not correct to take their participation in 
the TWG work for granted. The members incur costs, like transport, telephone 
etc which need to be financed somehow. Besides, there is a cost to participating 
in the TWG activities. 
d)_  Poor Communication and Coordination:  It was observed that while the 
Secretariat was doing its best, communication and coordination ofTWG activities 
had been poor. There has been a change for the better, however, following the 
appointment of  a new Secretariat last year. 
f)_  Lack o(Activities for the Stakeholders: There is  s a  feeling that the range of 
activities for stakeholders has been limited. Most of  the activities mounted have 
focused largely on people who have no direct stake in the issues discussed. This 
problem is partly attributed to the limited resources. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN POLICY REFORM  AREAS 
Uganda embarked on a detailed programme ofliberalizing the economy long before 
the CBI began. So in effect the CBI helped to serve as  a catalyst to the Government 
reform programme. Following the signing of the letter of CBI Policy in 1995, most of 
the  specific measures outlined therein were implemented in the period 1995-1997. 
Significant progress was registered by Uganda in the four main reform areas, namely: 
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~  exchange and payments system; 
~  investment deregulation; and 
~cross-border movement of  persons. 
a)  Trade Re(orm and Facilitation 
Since 1987 Uganda made significant progress in liberalizing its external trade. The 
measures taken in this area have included elimination of all licensing or quantitative 
control of  trade. Their elimination has been gradual, subject to the structural adjustment 
programme or according to the timetable adopted for duties on regional trade among 
participating countries. 
Uganda has successfully completed most of  the decisions agreed under COMESA. 
Consistent with this, Uganda has fully eliminated all import bans, including those on 
beer, batteries and soft drinks. In line with Article 46 ( 1) of  the CO  MESA  Treaty, Uganda 
has worked towards eliminating tariff barriers. Up to  October 1998 a reduction of 90 
percent has been achieved and by October 2000 this will be 100 percent, thus achieving 
full elimination. Presently the maximum external tariff  rate is 15%, with a rate of  7% for 
immediate goods and 0% for plant and machinery, drugs and medicines. Progress towards 
a single rate is being pursued consistent with the provisions of  the CO  MESA Treaty and 
the EAC draft Treaty.  Improvements in the tax collection and tax compliance are on 
course. Notably, the Government has put in place a Tax Appeal Tribunal and strengthened 
the Anti Smuggling Force. This has enabled tax collection to increase to approximately 
12.5% of GDP,  but efforts are being made towards  19  percent of GDP.  To  this end, 
administrative reforms in the URA, which include capacity-building, have started with 
the support of  the donor community. 
b)  Exchange and Payment Systems 
Improvements particularly in the payments system have been an integral part of  the 
overall financial sector reforms. The reforms have focused, among other things, on: 
(i)  minimizing settlement risks arising from the high degree of  bank insolvency 
and liquidity problems, speeding up of  clearance of  cheques; 
(ii)  encouraging the use of  cheques; 
(iii)  establishment of real-time gross settlement system for the transfer of high 
value funds among banks; 
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(v)  setting up of the training and organisation needed for payment system 
development. 
Against this background, the GOU has liberalized interest rate policy and improved 
formulation and implementation of  monetary policy. The legal framework for deposit-
taking institutions and insurance companies has been strengthened. The Financial 
Institutions Statute is being reviewed and when a new one is enacted, it is expected that 
all financial intermediaries in Uganda will have to meet the prudential norms specified 
under the new law. More emphasis is now also being placed on improving the quality of 
supervision', and the revised Financial Institutions Statute will help the Bank ofUganda 
(BOU) to enforce compliance2 • 
Uganda formerly accepted the obligations of  Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of  the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF in April 1994. A unified interbank spot market has 
been in operation since  1994, and all restrictions on the current and capital accounts 
were removed. At the same time, there have been regular consultations between the 
BOU and the central banks of Kenya and Tanzania on policy issues and now all three 
currencies are accepted in cross-border trade.  Commercial banks have established 
correspondent relationships with the major trading partners, including Kenya. 
Uganda launched a stock exchange in January 1998-the Uganda Securities Exchange 
(USE). To-date the USE has listed three securities: the East African Development Bank 
Bond (January 1998), PTA Bond (February 1999) (the two high quality bonds managed 
to raise Shs.l8 billion on the local market) and Uganda Clays Ltd. whose trading starts 
in January 2000. It will be noted that the GOU decided to privatize some of  the public 
enterprises through the stock exchange, starting with Uganda Clays Ltd.3  This decision 
will make the GOU a major issuer on the USE following similar trends of  privatization 
in Kenya, Tanzania and other emerging markets. In addition, the USE has initiated the 
recording of Treasury Bills, discounting information for retail investors. Indeed with 
less than five listings the USE is still small. The main constraints to rapid growth of  the 
stock market are:  (i) many of the larger firms do not need to raise capital through the 
stock market, (ii) general lack of  awareness about the benefits of  listing and investing on 
the stock exchange, (iii) lack of public-company-based culture that requires financial 
reporting procedures, disclosure of  information, effective accounting policies and good 
management. 
1Since 1998, the Bank of  Uganda has implemented measures aimed at strengthening and expanding its supervisory role. It has increased the 
frequency of on-site inspections of  banks. It has also intervened in, and sometimes closed, banks which have failed to comply fully with the 
banking legislation. 
2The new Financial Institutions Act, expected to be in place by April2000, will raise the minimum capital and ongoing adequacy requirements, 
strengthen the restrictions on insider lending and large loan exposures, and introduce a requirement for mandatory corrective action to be 
applied by the regulators. 
'The initial offer on the local market was Shs. 1.3 billion, but this was over-subscribed by 20% (about Shs. 200 million). 
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education and strategic linkages both regionally and internationally. Indeed, the signing 
of  a Memorandum of  Understanding in 1997 by the East African Securities Regulatory 
Authorities (EASRA)
4
, presents a possibility of  cross listing by Kenyan and Tanzanian 
firms on the USE. There are plans to install a Central Depository System to replace the 
physical delivery and settlement system. The new system will be able to capture details 
of transactions, generate trading floor documentation and produce daily collection 
procedures. Beginning in year 2000 the USE IT infrastructure will be upgraded. 
c)  Investment Deregulation 
Uganda has made commendable progress in creating an attractive environment for 
foreign investment. The country is now a front-runner in Africa in inward FDI and a 
leading location for new FDI inflows in the emerging regional market of  the East African 
Community (for details, see Addendum to LCBIP). 
Uganda's success in attracting FDI has been largely due to a policy framework designed 
to exemplary standards. Since 1991 there has been much improvement in the legislative 
and policy climate for investment. The Investment Code has been amended several times 
but has now been completely overhauled. The new Investment Bill (1999) is  currently 
under discussion. If  approved, it will strengthen the role ofthe UIA as a "one-stop-centre" 
for co-ordination, encouragement, and promotion of investment. It will also establish its 
supremacy over all other laws relating to investment and introduce a more transparent 
framework for investors in Uganda. The Bill contains a protection clause. 
Uganda is a member of  the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
is  signatory to  the International Commission on Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). It has concluded double taxation agreements with UK, Kenya, Tanzania, South 
Africa, and negotiations with Egypt, Norway, the Seychelles, and Mauritius. Negotiations 
are under way with India, Italy and the Netherlands. In 1997 an investment protection 
agreement was signed with Italy. 
d)  Cross-border Movement o(Persons 
A lot of  progress has been registered by Uganda in the area of  cross-border movement 
of  persons within the context of  the East African Cooperation Treaty. For example, the 
introduction of  the Interstate Pass issued at border points to citizens of  the three countries 
wishing to cross the boarders, the Regional Passports now available in the three countries. 
Both of  these have been instrumental in promoting cross-border movement of  persons. 
Under the new measures, however, migration of labour and services has not yet been 
allowed. 
4The new body is intended to promote cooperation in the development and regulation of  securities in East Africa. 
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1.  OVERVIEW OF THE CROSS BORDER INITIATIVE IN 
ZAMBIA 
1.1 Overview ofthe Zambian Economv 
The Zambian economy, which has been heavily dependent on copper for its foreign 
exchange earnings started experiencing economic problems starting from the mid 1970's. 
This was due to a number of  reasons, among them, reduced copper prices on the world 
market and increased oil prices. Another contributing factor to  the poor economic 
performance was excessive government participation in the running of the economy 
through the creation of a large parastatal sector, which later was found to be inefficient 
and unproductive, in addition to increasing national debt. 
In response to the problems of  the rapidly declining fiscal and monetary positions, 
high inflation, low industrial productivity, high rates of  unemployment and urbanization, 
and the chronic shortage of  foreign exchange, the Zambian Government started to take 
steps towards restructuring of  the economy in the late 1980's and early 1990's. 
A number of measures were taken towards restructuring towards the end of the 
1980's, but much more has been achieved since the new Government come into power 
in October 1991. The Zambian Government is  committed to liberalization and 
privatization of economic enterprises, with Government playing a facilitation role, by 
putting in place conducive policies in all productive sectors of  the economy. It  is envisaged 
that the private sector will continue to play a leading role in economic activity. 
In order for meaningful economic growth to take place, there is a need for a good 
base of  capital formation which is expected to arise from both domestic savings as well 
as foreign inflows. The limited domestic savings, which are due to low levels of  marginal 
propensities to save, are expected to be supplemented by foreign inflows in the form of 
inward foreign investments. 
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institutional reform in the overall Structural Adjustment Programme initiated by the 
Zambian Government. Apart form the Investment Centre, other institutions that have 
been established by the Government of Zambia, in support of the development of the 
private sector, are, inter alia, the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA), and the Lusaka 
Stock Exchange (LuSE). 
Most of the former parastatals have been sold off and The Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM) has now also been privatized with major shareholdings of the 
mines taken up by Anglo American Corporation under a new company called Konkola 
Copper Mines (KCM). 
1.2 The CBI in Zambia 
The initiative to promote and facilitate cross-border trade, investment and payments 
(CBI) in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean island states was developed 
and launched in  1992 under the aegis of four co-sponsors: the African Development 
Bank (ADB), the commission of the European Union (EU), the IMF and the World 
Bank. The CBI is primarily aimed at creating the conditions for more meaningful and 
sustainable economic integration in the COMESA/SADC/IOC region by removing 
barriers to the cross-border flow of goods, persons and capital between the countries 
within the context of  country-specific programmes. 
It is an initiative which is now actively supported by 14  countries in the region 
including: Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and the Comoros Islands. All the 
participating countries agreed a Common Programme of  Action (CPA) in 1992 after two 
technical level workshops. The CPA identified four integrated areas of  reforms in trade 
liberalization, exchange and payment systems, investment and institutional development. 
At a further technical meeting held in Brussels, in June 1993, a Concept Paper outlining 
how the CPA should be implemented was agreed upon. The Concept Paper was approved 
at a ministerial meeting in Kampala in the same year. The approval of  the Concept Paper 
committed all the participating countries to a programme of  reform measures aimed at 
achieving closer regional economic integration. 
As part of  the steps for implementing the CPA Zambia successfully negotiated and 
agreed a package of  measures to be implemented under the CBI with the co-sponsors in 
1994. These measures were fully outlined in a Letter of  CBI Policy that was drafted by 
the Zambian government detailing the measures that would be implemented to address 
each of  the four core areas of  reform highlighted above. 
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Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising public and private sector representatives. 
It currently comprises the following institutions: 
•  Ministry of  Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI) 
•  Export Board of  Zambia (EBZ) 
•  Ministry of  Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) 
•  Zambia Association of  Manufacturers (ZAM) 
•  Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) 
•  Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC) 
•  German Technical Cooperation/ Zambia (GTZ) 
•  Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) 
•  World Bank Resident Mission 
•  Zambia Association of  Chambers of  Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) 
•  COMESA Secretariat 
•  Independent Management Consulting Services (IMCS) - Private Consultants 
providing 
•  Secretariat and Technical Support 
The TWG has carried out various studies and policy reviews to assess the likely 
implication of  adopting and implementing measures under the initiative. The TWG has 
also assisted the Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) and government as a whole 
preparing the package of measures under the CBI. In addition it has provided to the 
Ministry of  Commerce technical support in the formulation and implementation ofTrade 
and Industrial policy. 
p.511 1.3 Perceptions ofthe CBI 
The Cross-border Initiative (CBI) has, since its launch in 1994, been seen in Zambia 
as  having made significant contributions to the development of closer regional co-
operation and integration in Eastern and southern Africa and the Indian Ocean sub-region. 
It is appreciated that the CBI's primary aim was to create conditions for more beneficial 
regional integration by committing participating countries to various liberalisation and 
facilitating measures within specified timetables. These measures were to be taken in 
the areas of  foreign trade, domestic payments and settlements, foreign exchange systems, 
investment codes, immigration, institutional development and other areas.  Countries 
have undertaken these measures within the context of  country-specific programmes under 
an agreed Common Programme of  Action (CPA). Government has supported the CBI 
fully and the then Minister of  Finance, Mr Ronald Penza took a leading role by ensuring 
that Zambia implemented the tariff reduction programme as set out in the letter of  CBI 
policy. 
In terms of  its approach, the public sector in Zambia has seen the CBI as a programme 
that has been able to address some of  the weaknesses of  previous regional initiatives in 
Africa by emphasising, private sector involvement, variable geometry, and consistency 
with the  Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and collaboration with the donor 
community. 
The CBI is thus perceived as flexible and broad based, with an institutional framework 
that involves private sector participation and detailed country level work as well as regional 
level activities. It is noted that it focuses on basic pre-conditions that must be fulfilled 
and on which more elaborate integration policies and institutions can be built, if  Zambia 
as a participating country implements the measures. For instance, the EU has pledged 6 
million Euros if Zambia moves to the zero duty rate under the COMESA Free Trade 
Area programme. More importantly, and as highlighted above, (i.e. variable geometry) 
the CBI has used an approach that allows countries that are willing and able to implement 
regional integration to go ahead, encouraging other countries to follow when they are 
ready. 
Implementation of  the Common Programme of  Action by Zambia 
Zambia has made significant strides in the implementation of  the CBI programme 
of  action. In some cases, Zambia has gone beyond the requirements of  the CBI. To support 
and sustain the implementation of the CBI, participating countries, including, Zambia 
established a national Technical Working Group (TWG) to act as technical advisors to 
the Government through the Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) made up of 
Ministers responsible for key economic ministries under which the CBI policy measures 
fall. 
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has been reflected in the implementation of  the CPA as described in the Concept Paper 
and elaborated upon in the July 1994 Letter ofCBI Policy from the Minister ofFinance. 
Many of the policy objectives of the CBI, such as  the liberalisation of foreign 
exchange markets and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade have been realised in 
Zambia since  1991  through the implementation of the Structural Adjustment and 
Economic Reform Programmes by the Government. The CBI through the TWG adds an 
important regional dimension to government policy since its main aim is  to provide 
increased trade, investment and co-operation within the region. 
The TWG, consisting of private sector representatives, public officials and donor 
representatives has been instrumental in building a national consensus on the underlying 
approach to regional integration and trade and in lending a sense of urgency to the 
implementation of  the CBI and national economic structural reforms by the Government. 
An important externality is that the TWG in Zambia constitutes a forum for constructive 
debate on regional integration and national economic policies. The CBI has helped Zambia 
define more clearly its role in the COMESA and SADC regional integration process. 
Some of  the ways the CBI has been used effectively are highlighted below. 
(i)  Private/Public sector collaboration at the national level has already been 
established through the TWG. 
(ii)  The CBI has already addressed quite successfully the regional dimension of 
structural adjustment while supporting the efforts of  Zambia to achieve closer economic 
integration within the region. 
(iii)  It offers a flexible framework within which assistance can be provided to all 
the countries in the regional integration agenda that they define for themselves as members 
of  relevant regional organisations i.e. COMESA and SADC in Zambia's case. 
(iv)  Overall, the main result of the CBI process has been the increased local 
capacity to assist the governments and private sector with the tasks resulting from the 
new integration agenda. Economic and legal studies undertaken as part of  the CBI have 
provided information about the likely implications and consequences of  integration for 
our country. 
(v)  In addition, local CBI decision-making bodies (ie, the TWG members and 
government) have worked well together and have received secretarial and technical 
support which they are not always in a position to provide themselves. 
Overall, the role of  the CBI for Zambia has to be seen as part of  a continuous process 
of  economic reform and should therefore not be limited to the institution ofliberalisation 
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should be measured by their impact on a continuous basis. The TWG can therefore 
provide important inputs to  this process of continuous monitoring and assessment 
mechanism. 
2.  ACTIVITIES OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP (TWG) 
2.1 Overview ofTWG  Meetings Since 1992 
The Zambian National TWG was convened in 1992 by the then Minister of  Finance 
Hon. Emmanuel Kasonde after the Mauritius meeting in June 1992. The TWG held its 
first meeting in July 1992 in the Bank of  Zambia Boardroom with representatives from 
the public and private sectors, under the Chairmanship of the Central Bank's Deputy 
Governor. At this meeting, individual members of the TWG were assigned various 
assignments in line with the Terms ofReference as determined by the Mauritius Workshop 
.The TWG has held several meetings since with the last one being on Thursday 6th April 
2000 in the MCTI Conference Room. 
The TWG has continued to meet regularly and has been discharging its function in 
accordance with Zambia's letter of  CBI policy. Since its first meeting it has held a total 
of23 ordinary CBI meetings and one (1) special meeting to discuss the CBI Evaluation 
with the EU Consultants on the same. It is from these discussions that much of  its work 
is determined. 
On the other hand, the TWG was expected to interface with the Policy Implementation 
Committee (PIC) enabling the establishment of  a linkage for policy review and input to 
the meeting of  Economic Ministers namely from: 
•  Commerce, Trade & Industry 
• 
Finance & Economic Development 
•  Agriculture, Food and Fisheries 
•  Mines and Mineral Development 
•  Communications and Transport 
•  Home Affairs 
•  Labour & Social Security 
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following changes of  senior government officials including Ministers. This position meant 
that a number of  outstanding policy issues took longer to be addressed. In addition, the 
implementation of  the CBI has not been able to fully benefit from the government policy 
review. The TWG however has continued to ensure that respective Ministers are actively 
involved in policy reviews on matters relating to CBI, at individual Ministerial basis. 
A summary of  dates and key achievements/milestones for TWG meetings is outlined 
below: 
Dates and Key Notes of TWG Meetings 
1992  1  1st meeting- July 1992  Under The Chairmanship of  Bank of  Zambia Deputy Governor 
1993  2  - Details not available as Secretariat was managed by MCTI, whose 
files relating to that time were not easily available. 
To  3  - " 
1994  4  - 19'h October, 1994  JM Kasanga endorsed as TWG Secretariat 
1995  5  Tuesday, lOth January 1995  J M Kasanga took up position as Secretariat 
6  Friday, lO'h March 1995  TORs for TWG studies discussed including TESF, EPZs, Industry 
Commerce &  Trade Statistics as well as  Trade Liberalisation 
Impact study. 
7  Thursday, 20'h April 1995  TWG Chairmanship taken up by Permanent Secretary at MCTI. 
8  Tuesday, 12th September 1995  TWG Chair reverted to Director of  Trade & Commerce. 
1996  9  Thursday, 21" March 1996  Concerns expressed on lack of progress over the SADC Trade 
Protocol 
10  Thursday, 2nd May 1996  Call for resuscitating PIC made 
11  Tuesday, 18th June 1996  EBZ Director appointed TWG Vice Chairman 
12  Wednesday, 20'h November 1996  EPZ study draft results discussed at length 
13  Monday, 16'h December 1996  Draft document on the status of implementation of LCBIP 
presented 
1997  14  Tuesday, 21'' January 1997  Position paper & workshop agenda for EPZ study tabled. 
15  Tuesday, 15th April 1997  Funding for HET study approved 
16  Tuesday, 24'h June 1997  Zambia's 60% tariff preference as Opposed to 80% questioned 
17  Wednesday, 12'h November 1997  Progress on HET. 
1998  18  Monday, 16'h February 1998  Zambia synthesis paper for 3'd CBI Ministerial meeting adopted 
19  Friday, 28'h August 1998  Meeting informed that phase 2 of the CBI is  to emphasise on 
investment facilitation 
20  Wednesday, 4'h November 1998  Clarification sought on Zambia's continued position of 60% 
preference on COMESA tariff 
1999  21  Friday, 5'h February 1999  Walter Kennes from the EU in attendance 
22  Thursday, 15th July 1999  Special meeting for the EU CBI Evaluation Team-Messrs 
Hoestenberghe and Dourmashkin in attendance 
23  Thursday,  16th December 1999  Briefing made on the 4'h Ministerial meeting 
2000  24  Thursday, 6'h April 2000  Initial meeting date of  Tuesday 15th February 2000 adjourned as 
members could not form a quorum. 06/04/2000 was first meeting 
of  the year 2000. 
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The TWG has discussed a number of  issues significant to the CBI and the Zambia 
economy at large in its various meetings. Key to these meetings has been Zambia's position 
regarding the implementation of  the CBI letter of  policy and the various policy reform 
areas of  importance to foreign trade payment and investment facilitation. The following 
presents a summary of  the main issues discussed. 
Letter of  CBI Policy 
Generally, Zambia achieved a number of  the measures set out in its letter of  intent 
of 1994. The TWG was in agreement that Zambia stood far ahead of  most of  the other 
CBI participating countries in terms of  policy reforms as indicated in the LCBIP. 
However, there has been a deceleration of the reforms, over the last two years, 
particularly in terms of  further reductions in the CO  MESA preferential tariffs. 
A second update or Addendum to  the LCBIP is  currently been discussed for 
submission by the two Ministries ofFinance & Economic Development, and Commerce, 
Trade & Industry. 
Zambia's 60% COMESA TariffPreference 
Since 1996 when Zambia implemented the 60% COMESA tariff there has been no 
revision of  this rate. 
The TWG has continuously expressed concern over Zambia's adherence to the 
CO MESA tariff preference rates especially in view of  both the 1998 and 1999 Budget 
speeches not alluding to Zambia's position on the reduction programme. 
However, at a 1999 meeting, the Ministry of  Finance and Economic Development 
(MOFED) and the Ministry of  Commerce, Trade and Industry (MCTI) had resolved to 
initiate a study to assess the impact of  effecting further reductions. 
This study was carried out by the TWG Secretariat through Independent Management 
Consulting Services (IMCS) and the final report was submitted to the EU National 
Authorizing Office at MOFED in August 1999. The recommendations were accepted 
and if implemented by government, it would have resulted in the release of 6 million 
Euro in Balance of  Payment support (BOP). 
SADC Trade Protocol 
The TWG have been discussing the above issue quite extensively. The key points 
raised during these discussions was the need to harmonize policy to ensure that all the 
SADC countries comply to the provisions of  the protocol. 
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The TWG has studied the EU Green Paper with a view to  developing a position 
paper on the future of  the EU-ACP relationship. A COMESA discussion paper on the 
same was distributed to all the members for their comment and analysis. 
Future of  the CBI 
The issue of the future of the CBI has been extensively discussed by the TWG. 
Members generally agree that the CBI provides a flexible and broad bayed institutional 
framework that involves private sector participation and detailed country level work as 
well as regional level activities. Therefore, the TWG feels that it should broaden its role 
and be identified with government's "demand pool" on CBI related policy matters to 
give further impetus to the activities required at technical level. As a result the TWG 
Secretariat has prepared and circulated a draft position paper on the future of  the CBI. 
The proposed future structure of  the CBI has been accepted by the TWG in Zambia. 
Reconvening the PIC 
The reconvening of  the PIC has been set as one of  the major priorities for the coming 
year by the TWG. A brief  to the Minister of  Commerce, Trade and Industry was prepared 
and submitted. The TWG Chairman has been briefing the Minister on the TWG's activities 
on an ongoing basis to ensure he is kept well informed. 
Bilateral Trade Agreements with SADC Partners 
Despite on going negotiations between Zambia and other SADC members states on 
bilateral trade agreements, it was felt that little progress had been made in concluding 
the agreements with Zimbabwe which is one of  Zambia's major trading partner in SADC. 
Namibia on the other hand had expressed misgivings on the Agreement and was reluctant 
to ratify the draft as they were concerned that it had not taken their interest into account. 
On the Zambia-Malawi trade agreement, the Zambia Association of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) was happy with its contents and structure, and supported 
its conclusion. 
Zambia/SACU Trade Negotiations 
The Zambian government through the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry 
issued a statement that they would advise on the actual position during once matters 
were concluded. These negotiations are still on-going through the SADC Trade 
Negotiating Forums (TNFs). 
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The main points to be noted that would directly affect the TWG was that the proposed 
Road Map for Investment Function was now a core item of the CBI phase 2 reform 
agenda. The TWG would develop an agenda of  priority actions and would be expected 
to assist the government prepare an addendum to the Letter of  CBI Policy regarding the 
specific actions to be implemented on investment facilitation. Discussions are on going 
over this issue. 
Problems Encountered by the TWG in Zambia 
Policy Implementation Committee 
The Zambia TWG still does not have a functional Policy Implementation Committee 
(PIC) to provide the required link between the TWG and the policy making institutions. 
Both the EU Evaluation Team and Mr Walter Kennes had called for its revival if the 
TWG was to be more effective. The TWG had also made efforts to sensitise the Minister 
at MCTI but due to constant changes, it has been difficult to maintain dialogue. 
2.2  Overview Of  Sensitisation Activities By The TWG 
The TWG has undertaken a number ofSensitisation activities since its inception. It 
has organized and participated in a number of  programmes, and brief  details of  these are 
outlined below: 
a.  Seminar on The Initiative to Facilitate Cross Border Private Investment, Trade 
and Payments in Eastern and Southern Africa and The Indian Ocean Islands 
This seminar was held at Hotel Intercontinental in Lusaka on 171h February, 1995. It 
was officially opened by the then Minister of  Commerce, Trade & Industry, Hon. Dipak 
Patel and the following are the issues that were discussed at this meeting. 
t  Background to the CBI 
t  CBI measures already taken 
t  Trade issues that needed to be addressed in the context of  the CBI 
t  Payments and Exchange Systems 
t  Investment Issues 
Overall, the meeting looked at measures and policies implemented thus far  and 
areas that required further follow up. 
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This workshop was held on 24 January 1997 to discuss the EPZ feasibility study 
report. The workshop was organized by the TWG and financed by the EU through Imani. 
c.  Zambia -Namibia Trade Rendezvous 
The TWG Vice- Chairman and Secretariat attended the above trade and investment 
mission in April 1997 as part of  the Zambian Vice - President's delegation. 
d.  MCTI and Livingstone Chamber of  Commerce Meeting 
The TWG Secretariat accompanied the Minister to this meeting to present the CBI-
TWG EPZ Feasibility Study report recommendations and discuss the role of  the CBI in 
regional trade promotion. 
e.  President's Forum on Enhancing the Investment Climate in Zambia 
The TWG Secretariat presented a paper on Investment and the Establishment of 
EPZs in Zambia. The Secretariat took the opportunity of  explaining the role of  the CBI 
in improving Zambia's investment climate. 
f.  Participation in deliberations of the CO  MESA Trade and Customs Committee 
meeting, 19- 22 April, 1999; 
g.  Participation in the National Economic Conventions (1998 and 1999); 
h.  Organisation and facilitation of  a Stakeholders Workshop to discuss the findings 
of  the "Study to Assess the Impact of  the COME  SA Tariff Preferences on Zambia", 
held in August 1999. 
1.  Participation in the Zambia Institute of Marketing Seminar on the "Challenges 
of Marketing in the Millennium". Presented a paper on "Regional Trade and 
Integration within COMESA" 
J.  Participation in the Regional Consensus Building Workshop on the CO  MESA 
Rules of Origin held at the COMESA Centre in Lusaka (30
1h  August to  2nd 
September, 1999). Mr Simumba of the TWG Secretariat presented a paper on 
the Business Survey carried out to establish the constraints faced by business 
houses in the application of  the certificate of  origin. 
k.  Facilitation of  a Sensitisation Workshop on Cross Border Trade in the Free Trade 
Area. 
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which was held in Livingstone on 23rd November, 1999 at which there were 60 delegates 
from around the country.  Presenters at the workshop included the Zambia Revenue 
Authority, Immigration Department, Zambia Association of  Chambers of  Commerce & 
Industry, MCTI, the SADC/COMESA Cross-Border Traders Association and Consultants 
from IMCS. The meeting noted the importance of  informing traders on the opportunities 
under the FTA. 
1.  CBI Provincial Public Awareness Workshops 
One of  the key actions agreed at the Third Cross Border Initiative (CBI) Regional 
Ministerial meeting was for each country's Technical Working Group (TWG) to undertake 
public awareness campaigns to better explain and disseminate information about the 
objectives and work of  the CBI supported programme of action. This programme was 
part of  the agreed action plan to accelerate the implementation of  the evolving agenda 
and broaden CBI participation. 
In this regard, the Zambia TWG at its 21st meeting endorsed the awareness programme 
of  activities to include regional workshops in all the 9 provincial centres ofthe country. 
The Terms of  Reference were approved and these workshops were held between March 
and April2000 in Kabwe, Chipata, Livingstone, Mongu, Lusaka, Mansa, Kasama, Solwezi 
and Kitwe. 
The main objective of these regional workshops was to explain and disseminate 
information about the objectives and work ofthe CBI supported programme of  action, as 
well as the challenges and benefits of  the CO  MESA Free Trade Area (FTA) In addition, 
they provided an opportunity for the TWG to present the conclusive findings of  selected 
studies undertaken by the CBI-TWG. The TWG also provided information to exporters 
and importers on the various opportunities available on the regional and international 
markets, through Zambia's bilateral and multilateral trade agreements as well as market 
information held by the Export Board of  Zambia and the Zambia Investment Centre. 
In order to achieve full participation by the target group, that is, Small and Medium 
Enterprises, the TWG hosted the workshops in collaboration with the Zambia Association 
of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) through the newly formed affiliate, 
the Zambia Small Business Chamber for SMEs. 
The CBI Public Awareness Workshops were highly participative and considered 
successful by the small business chambers across the country. There have also been calls 
to have repeat workshops to benefit a greater segment of  the business community. It  was 
also resolved that the TWG conducts an audit of technical and financial  support 
programmes available to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) countrywide and compile 
a directory. 
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CBI and regional integration developments such as the CO  MESA free trade area. 
m.  Global Integration and the New Trade Agenda Training Programme 
This programme which ran from 5 - 16 April, 1999 by the World Bank Institute in 
Washington DC was attended by the following TWG members; 
i)  Mr Davison Mendamenda  - MCTI and Acting TWG Chairman (1st quarter 
of 1999) 
ii)  Mr Trevor Simumba  - IMCS/TWG Secretariat 
iii)  Mr Moses Simemba  - ZACCI 
iv)  Ms Joyce Chapuma  - Export Board of  Zambia 
The training programme brought out several important issues which will be of  great 
benefit to the TWG members in spearheading the focus and objectives of  the CBI. The 
course report was submitted to the Regional Secretariat in 1999. 
2.3 Overview OfStudies Conducted Under The TWG 
Trade and Enterprise Support Facility (TESF) 
The TWG drafted the outline and terms of  reference for a Consultant to investigate 
the feasibility and requirements of establishing a Trade and Enterprise Support Facility 
(TESF). The intention ofTESF was to give firms access to medium to long term finance 
to allow them to make adjustments necessary for them to operate more effectively in the 
newly liberalised environment. The study outline stated that the facility was not intended 
to subsidise firms relative to other producers in the region, as this would in tum distort 
the productive base of  the economy. 
Resulting from this effort, The Trade and Enterprise Support Facility was set up in 
1995 and is now fully operational and being managed by Zambia Capital Partners. 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
Manufacturers importing raw materials for export production may set up bonded 
facilities to avoid paying duty or may pay duty and later claim it under the drawback 
scheme. Both methods are costly as  manufacturers are required to raise costly bank 
guarantees and bonds on their bonded facilities or tie up their working capital in the 
drawback alternative. 
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on the  feasibility of establishing Export Processing Zones in Zambia as  a means of 
eliminating these costs. With the introduction of  the Value Added Tax (VAT) system in 
the second half of 1995, inputs for export production would not attract tax as exporters 
would be zero rated under this. Funding for the study was provided by the EU through 
Imani Consultants under the Framework Agreement for support to the CBI. 
The study was undertaken by Independent Management Consulting Services (IMCS), 
with counterparts drawn from MCTI, EBZ and ZIC. 
The EPZ schemes set up in Kenya and Mauritius were examined in detail to establish 
whether such schemes could be adapted for Zambia. Particular focus was given to 
achievements made, covering such aspects as:  enabling policies; legislative provisions; 
incentive regimes; and participation ofthe private sector in the operations and management. 
The study also reviewed the performance and constraints faced by the Non-Traditional 
Export (NTE) sector in order to establish whether EPZs offered further opportunities for 
increasing the contribution ofthis sector and required areas of  support, such as enabling 
policies, legislation and institutional arrangements. 
The study team's research work included visits to export producer companies in 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt, discussions with representatives of business associations, 
Investment Centre, the Zambia Revenue Authority and government officials including 
local authorities in Lusaka, Kabwe and Ndola. The local visits were supplemented by 
desktop work involving the review of  GRZ policy documents, analysis of  data on NTE 
sector performance and selected case studies of  Africa and East Asian economies that 
have established EPZs. 
This included a two-week study visit to both countries where meetings were held 
with private sector representatives and government officials supplemented by visits to a 
number of  EPZ sites. 
The study was completed in November 1996 and a  one-day workshop was 
successfully held on 24 January, 1997 for key private and public stakeholders to discuss 
the establishment ofEPZs in Zambia. 
The results of  the feasibility study indicated that there was high potential to improve 
Zambia's export competitiveness and accelerate growth of  non-traditional exports through 
the use of  EPZs as a policy instrument. These results were endorsed by the participants 
to the one-day workshop at which an EPZ implementation action plan and timetable was 
agreed. In order to facilitate the implementation of  agreed actions, the participants also 
endorsed the recommendation of the report for the establishment of a Task Force 
representatives from key government institutions and the private sector. 
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and Economic Development in his 1997 Budget Speech concerning the establishment of 
EPZs. In his statement, the Minister indicated that the government in 1997 would begin 
the process of developing the required enabling environment of a regulatory authority 
and provisions for private investors to develop export processing zones. More significantly, 
the President, Mr F J T Chiluba also made particular reference to the promotion of 
manufactured exports through EPZs in his presentation to the "President's Forum on 
Enhancing Zambia's Investment Climate for Sustainable Growth" held on 7 March 1997. 
In order to implement EPZs and fully interpret government intentions, technical 
inputs from various ministries and specialised agencies of  government working closely 
with the private sector were mobilised to ensure full participation. It  was in this regard, 
that a Task Force was constituted made up of representatives from the key economic 
public and private institutions and organisations. The TWG Secretariat was appointed to 
provide technical support to the Task Force. 
The Task Force developed specific recommendations and an implementation plan 
for the establishment of EPZs for governments consideration. They also reviewed the 
findings and recommendations of  the EPZ feasibility study final report and the proceedings 
and results ofthe one-day workshop. At the end of  this process, that Task force presented 
a  final  document to  government through MCTI for submission to Cabinet.  The 
implementation of  the EPZ scheme is pending Cabinet approval of  the legislation. 
Corpus Globe-Review of the Trade and Investment Acts (Harmonisation of 
Legislation for the Implementation of  the CBI in Zambia) 
Corpus Globe drew up modifications to all relevant trade and investment acts 
(including the Immigration and Labour Acts) to allow,  on the basis of reciprocating 
COMESA countries, the issuing of:-
t  five year multiple-entry visas to businessmen; 
t  short-term entry permits, on presentation of a valid identification document, to 
border residents of  neighbouring COMESA countries: and 
t  residence and employment permits to investors within four weeks of  the investor 
having obtained his or her certificate. 
The contracted lawyers, Corpus Globe drafted the administrative and legal changes 
required, while also specifying the steps and time required, to enable the Investment 
Centre to act as an agent for investors that wished it to do so. They have undertaken to 
ensure that requests arising from inward foreign investment are answered within a time 
frame that requires reactions from all relevant agencies within 45 days of  acceptance of 
the application. 
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changes in the relevant acts for investment facilitation. However, the government is yet 
to fully implement the recommendations. 
Study on Effects of  Distortions in Regional Tariffs 
In 1995, the TWG conducted the above study to look into the Domestic resource 
costs and the effects of  the distortions in regional tariff  structures on Zambia's industries' 
potential in regional trade. The study looked at the areas in which Zambia would have 
comparative regional trade advantage if  there was a common external tariff  and minimum 
tariff barriers between COME  SA countries and South Africa; and how the export sector 
in these areas could be supported in the transition period before the common external 
tariff was implemented. 
Harmonised External Tariffs (HET) 
At the second ministerial meeting on the CBI held in March 1995 in Mauritius, the 
participating countries endorsed an overall road map for tariff  reform that would remove 
all tariff barriers on intra-regional, eliminate immediately all NTB's and harmonize 
external tariffs. Further other duties and import charges including surcharges, were to be 
incorporated into the tariff structure to simplify and improve transparency in the trade 
regime. 
In April  1996 at the third meeting of the CBI-TWG the above principles of 
harmonization of  the external tariff  regimes were endorsed and two possible HET structure 
were also proposed i.e. (one with 3 rates of  5,15 and 25 percent and other with 0, 10 and 
20 percent). 
In this regard, it was decided that each country's TWG in collaboration with other 
country authorities should initiate preparatory work with a view to developing target 
HET classification, preparing revenue impact estimates and socio-economic evaluations 
of  the reforms and formulating any requests for technical assistance from the co-sponsors 
in any of  the above areas. As part ofthis work, a study was proposed whose main objective 
would be to assess the impact of  the proposed HET on government budget revenues, its 
effects on the pattern of  trade, and the structure of  agriculture and industry. 
Due to Zambia's current tariff structure which is consistent with the HET principles 
and the pattern of its trade, total revenue losses will be minimal. Preliminary analysis 
estimated that the government could lose immediate revenue of about K4.6 billion (or 
US $3.8 million) as a result of  zero tariffs on CO  MESA imports. However, this could be 
adequately compensated by an increase in the volume of  trade which will increase the 
amount of import VAT  collected. The study found that COMESA sourced imports 
represented only 5% of  total customs duty revenue collected in 1996. The growth in the 
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government revenue. In 1996, for instance, government collected about K11 0,000 million 
in VAT (or US $91.6 million) on imports and about K97,000 million (or US $80.8 million) 
in customs duties. 
Significantly, the HET's effect on Zambia's trade flows is likely to be positive as the 
regional market will be more open for Zambian exports which are already making an 
impact on levels ofNTE's from Zambia. Zambia has already demonstrated comparative 
advantage as an agricultural exporter of  both primary and processed products. 
Overall Conclusions 
The study found that for Zambia, the adjustment to an HET will require insignificant 
reductions in tariffs. Current tariff rates in Zambia are already very near the proposed 
HET and the country's trade patterns reflect this. Therefore under the HET, Zambia will 
require modest reductions in most tariffs. Although detailed calculations of the impact 
of  tariff changes on the governments have not been possible, general indications showed 
that Zambia will face a modest impact on revenues. 
However, if South Africa was to be part of an HET, then Zambia would suffer a 
huge revenue loss in a significant part of Zambia's trade.  The measurement of such 
budgetary effects requires substantial specific data. The next immediate task for the TW  G 
in Zambia will be to develop a plan of action in consultation with the IMF and World 
Bank to  calculate these budgetary effects. This study provided a strong base for any 
subsequent work and provided general indications of  the direction in which Zambia can 
go. Most importa'ltly, the success of  Zambia should be emulated by the other countries 
so as to speed up integration. 
Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) between Zambia and her neighbours 
Technoserve on behalf  ofUSAID  's Regional Economic Development Support Office 
(REDSO), in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) commissioned a longitudinal study to 
estimate the magnitude of  informal cross-border trade between Zambia and some of  her 
neighbours. 
The study was implemented by Independent Management Consulting Services 
(IMCS). The project involved field monitoring from September 1997 to August 1998 at 
selected border sites between Zambia and Congo DR, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia 
and Tanzania. The main objective of  the study was to generate quantitative and qualitative 
information about informal cross-border trade, and to  find out its  determinants and 
relevance to food security. The Zambian study is part of a series of  others, whose main 
focus has been to examine the performance of  informal cross border trade as an aspect of 
intra-Africa trade in the Eastern and Southern Africa region. 
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Field data was collected through observation (monitoring) at customs gates atselected 
border sites mostly for inland routes except on the lake route of Lake Tanganyika. By 
using a census technique trained resident research assistants (enumerators) recorded the 
values and quantities of  all major agricultural and industrial commodities passing through 
the border sites for fourteen days randomly selected from each month over a period of 
twelve months. The monthly estimates of  informal cross-border trade were then annualised 
to  indicate the magnitude of informal cross-border trade between Zambia and her 
neighbours during the review period. 
In addition to information derived from the border observation technique, one baseline 
survey was conducted midway through the monitoring period in order to provide additional 
information regarding the social structure of  informal cross-border trade and its operational 
facets such as product mix, marketing functions/strategies, information base, logistical 
parameters and financial requirements. 
Volume and Direction oflnformal Cross-border Trade: Implications for Food Security 
The study showed that there was significant informal cross-border trade between 
Zambia and her selected neighbours during the review period. The total estimated value 
of monitored trade (exports plus imports) was about US $45 million. This represents 
only about 40% of  actual informal trade. Thus, if  we include night time trade and trade 
that was not captured by the border monitoring, the total informal trade over the period 
would be close to US $100 million. 
On aggregate, exports from Zambia to the neighbours were 65% of  total informal 
cross-border trade during the period. At the same time, Zambia's net imports represented 
35% of  total informal cross-border trade. Zambia was therefore a significant net exporter 
to her neighbours during the review period. 
Conclusions and Prospects For Increased Regional Trade 
The study concluded that ICBT earnings represent huge trade values which have far 
reaching policy implications on GDP, government revenue and regional food security. 
The existence of unofficial trade on a significant scale, particularly in agricultural 
commodities, implies that governments are not reliably informed about their trade situation 
resulting in unreliable statistical estimates. The dominance of  agricultural commodities 
in ICBT underlines the key role played by this sector in stabilising food supplies by 
moving food from surplus to deficit areas quickly. 
It has been shown that even in the wake of  substantial market reforms, the region 
has seen increasing informal cross-border trade activities. The study has revealed that 
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currency instability, border harassment of traders, high transport costs, poor border 
infrastructure and lack of formal financial support for the traders. Further, it is evident 
that the on-going regional trade liberalisation initiatives have not been fully implemented 
leading to  distortions in trade relations between the countries and encouraging the 
proliferation of  the informal sector. 
The enhancement of  trade between Zambia and her neighbours is a key factor in the 
success of  the liberalisation policy and in securing food security both in Zambia and the 
region. However, in order to  tap the existing trade potential in the region, it requires 
major policy shifts that allows the free flow of  goods and services, including unrestricted 
cross-border investment in agriculture.  Free trade has a much greater potential for 
improving food  security and promoting economic development in the region. It is  a 
fallacy to hope that individual countries can all separately achieve food self-sufficiency. 
What is needed is the application of  the laws of  comparative advantage to optimise the 
use of  each country's scarce resource. 
The challenge for Zambia and its neighbours is - how can they formalise this trade 
for the mutual benefit of all, the countries? The key factor is the poor infrastructure 
particularly, road and rail. Therefore, it would be prudent to consider a regional initiative 
to improve the infrastructure in areas where ICBT is active, such as, Kipushi, Kasumbalesa, 
Mpulungu and Mokambo and designate these and other such areas as region free trade 
growth centres. 
Zambia and her neighbours could also benefit from creating uniform duty rates and 
pursuing similar external trade regulations to minimise trade imperfections among them. 
Regional integration bodies like SADC and COMESA should spearhead such efforts as 
co-ordinators. Institutions which seek to assist people in the informal sector must act 
with utmost speed because informal sector people are usually ahead of  the institutions. 
The key to successful regional integration and trade is to  ensure that countries 
implement policies that are consistent and in harmony with the objectives of  the region. 
These should be based on both competitive and comparative advantages so as to ensure 
balanced economic development and growth. 
Study on the Further Reduction of  Preferential Tariffs 
This study was commissioned by the Ministry ofFinance and Economic Development 
and funded by the EU through the CBIIEDF tranche for private sector development. 
Results of this study carried out by IMCS are highlighted below. The findings of the 
study led to a follow up study on the Competitiveness of  selected Zambian industries. 
It  found that the attainment of  the FTA is generally on course and the member States 
that are slightly behind schedule in tariff reduction have pledged to completely reduce 
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expected reduction of tariffs has been attributed to a number of reasons. The most 
frequently cited reasons are: 
t  the possible loss of government revenue as  a direct consequence of tariff 
reductions; 
t  the fear of  de-industrialisation arising from some member States' industries failure 
to compete with more technologically advanced or more efficient producers in 
other member States; and 
t  the need to offer some form of  protection to infant industries. 
Although, there have been notable increases in trade flows through intra-COMESA 
trade, this still represents a small proportion in comparison to trade between COMESA 
member States and third countries. For example, the proportion ofintra-COMESA trade 
in relation to total trade averaged at 5.9% over the period between 1992 and 1996. 
This also means that with the low level of  intra-COMESA trade, tariff reductions 
among member States may not significantly affect their revenue base. Coupled with the 
trade creation effects ofliberalisation and the attendant increased economic activity, it is 
anticipated that tariff  reductions will actually lead to higher levels of  disposable incomes 
and improved standards of  living amongst the populations of  the member States. 
Based on the current position, if  Zambia had to implement the full CO  MESA tariff 
reduction programme, the impact on customs revenues earned on COMESA imports 
would be minimal. According to the revenue impact study conducted in 1999, revenue 
losses are estimated at K7.3 billion. Further the 2000 budget estimates a loss of only 
K1.2 billion this year as a direct result of  FTA implementation in October. These losses 
should also be viewed against the benefits of  available BOP support, which is dependent 
on Zambia achieving visible progress with the tariff  reduction programme. For example, 
the European Union have pledged 6 million Euros which can be disbursed immediately 
the COMESA targets are adhered to in the reduction programme. 
The amount is approximately equivalent to three (3) year income streams of  customs 
revenue presently being earned on CO  MESA imports. The benefits of  implementing the 
CBI tariff  reduction programme can therefore be felt almost immediately. A reduction in 
the COMESA tariff would also improve prospects for Zambia to increase its exports to 
COMES  A and improve its balance of  trade position. According to government projections, 
the volume of total imports is estimated to grow by 13.2% in 1999, 7.2% in 2000 and 
6.5% in 2001. This translates to an average growth of  about 9% over the 3 year period. 
Thus, much of  the revenue losses due to COMESA tariff  reductions would be more than 
compensated for by increased collection of  import VAT on increased volumes of  trade. 
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This study aimed to establish Zambia's comparative position and identify the key 
factors that are presently hindering and/or facilitating her involvement in regional trade. 
Emanating from the study findings, CO  MESA is now considering implementing similar 
studies in all CO  MESA countries. The methodology of  the Zambia study has been adopted 
for the Tanzania study which is currently being conducted. 
Scope and Objectives of  the Competitiveness Study 
As the elimination of  tariffs is across-board, it is feared that final goods may end up 
being produced more cheaply in some countries than in others due to differences in 
factor costs. Whilst mechanisms for the protection of  genuine infant industries are provided 
for in the COMESA Treaty, the fears of  de-industrialisation need to be addressed. Most 
importantly, there is need to address the fears and concerns of  the member States on the 
effects of the FTA and its ability to result in the achievement of the objectives of the 
Common Market. Through this process, there has been consensus on the need to examine, 
more closely, the nature of difficulties faced by Zambian industries in competing with 
other producers in the region. 
Zambia Case Study-Problem Statement 
From 31st  October 2000, Zambia will be expected to  comply with the  Protocol 
established by the FTA and allow goods emanating from other COME  SA member States 
to enjoy zero tariffs, i.e. offer 100% Preference. Whilst Zambian industries have confirmed 
their support of tbe principle behind the establishment of the FTA, their concern has 
been on the factor costs that they face which render their products uncompetitive. 
Local industry consider that the "playing field"  is not level as  their regional 
competitors enjoy a much more favourable environment which enables them to produce 
and export to Zambia at a much lower cost. Zambian industries have therefore argued 
that the FTA will offer regional competitors an even much more favourable market in 
Zambia to the disadvantage of  local industries. 
This study was therefore commissioned to determine whether the FTA will harm 
Zambian industries by assessing two inter-related issues, namely: Firstly, the extent to 
which the FTA would affect the competitiveness of  Zambia's local industries. Secondly, 
establishing the impact of the FTA on the cost and flow of imports from COMESA 
member States that will land on Zambia's local markets. 
Representatives from ZAM and ZNFU also directly participated in the fieldwork 
data gathering exercise. As such, the execution of  this study was a joint effort of  IMCS 
and representatives of  the industrial associations indicated above. 
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Development alluded to the impending CO  MESA-FTA implicitly accepting that Zambia 
will implement the Protocol and offer zero tariffs on goods emanating from other 
COMESA member States but "on a strictly reciprocal basis". 
Zambia's External Trade Balance with COMESA 
Trade data for 1998 was analysed to establish the make up of  Zambia's main trading 
partners and sensitivity to the CO  MESA markets. CO  MESA markets accounted for only 
15% of the total value of Zambia's imports in that year.  On the other hand, Zambia's 
exports to other CO  MESA countries accounted for 22% of  the total. 
South Africa is by far the most dominant source of  imports for Zambia, i.e. accounting 
for 46% in 1998. Trade with overseas markets was also higher than that with COMESA. 
These results indicate that COMESA has remained a smaller market compared to 
traditional overseas partners and South Africa. 
Based on the above results, CO  MESA markets are presently not likely to influence 
significantly, Zambia's external trade balance, as is the case with South Africa. It can 
also be inferred that Zambia would be more affected if  South Africa was to be a member 
of  CO  MESA given the dominant position and skewed trade balances that presently exist. 
South Africa has been Zambia's main source of  raw materials for the manufacturing 
sector and finished consumer products. Trade with overseas markets has mainly 
concentrated on raw materials such as  base, metals (i.e. copper and cobalt), precious 
stones and agro- products (i.e. fresh flowers and vegetables). On the other hand, CO  MESA 
countries have been an important marh;t for Zambia's semi processed goods and 
manufactured products. 
A further analysis of  Zambia's trade with other COMESA countries was analysed 
over two years, i.e.  1997 and 1998. The results indicated that, Zimbabwe was the main 
source of  imports and provided the largest market for Zambia's exports. 
Overall Conclusions & Recommendations 
The study established that COMESA-FTA would generally expose local industries 
to increased competition from Zimbabwe, which has a stronger manufacturing sector. 
With regard to  other COMESA member states, Zambia already enjoys positive trade 
balances and should be able to increases its market share.  Overall, the FTA will not 
disadvantage Zambian industries that are efficient and use more of the local material 
resource base in their production activities. For such industries, the FTA should, in fact 
improve their competitiveness in regional markets. 
The findings  from this study and many others indicate that the liberalisation of 
Zambia's trade regime has put the country in a better position to compete, than at any 
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COMESA imports even under zero tariff rates.  However, some producers will be 
uncompetitive in the face  of free  trade.  The key factors  that would impact on their 
competitiveness relate to the following: 
(i)  domestic tax regime, including customs tariffs and VAT 
(ii)  inconsistent tax administration 
(iii)  inconsistent government policy on trade and industrial development 
(iv)  poor infrastructure 
(v)  lack of  a proactive or aggressive management at the firm level 
(vi)  inadequate marketing strategies 
(vii)  relatively higher costs of  energy and transport. 
It is  clear that the competitiveness of Zambian industry cannot be addressed by 
"laisez-faire" trade policy alone but through an integrated package of  industrial and trade 
policies. These policies must focus on mitigating the impact of  factors that inhibit Zambian 
industry from adjusting and improving productivity. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN POLICY REFORMS 
3.1 FOREIGN TRADE 
Import and Export licensing 
All import and export license requirements were abolished except for a small negative 
list. 
Non-Tariff Barriers 
Zambia has abolished all conventional NTBs. However, there may still be a few 
NTBs related to Phyto-Sanitary and Sanitary requirements and product standards. These 
are however negligible compared to what Zambian exporters face  in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa. 
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The government has undertaken to implement the COMESA zero duty in October 
2000 but strictly on a reciprocal basis. Zambia currently offers 60% preferential tariffs. 
External Tariffs and CBI Harmonisation 
Current tariffs are within the CBI proposed structure and a study on the Harmonised 
External Tariffs (HET) has already been done and submitted by the TWG, and now 
requires follow up. 
There is still need for some follow-up detailed analysis of  the implications particularly 
against Zambia's main trading partners. 
Trade Facilitation 
All the measures set out for trade facilitation have been implemented, such as the 
COMESAharmonised transit charges and the Single goods customs & excise declaration 
document. 
3.2 Pavments 
Financial Sector Reform 
The financial sector reforms have been done in conformity with the CBI and IMF 
Structural Adjustment Programme. 
Foreign Trade Instruments 
These have been partly implemented but with the demise of  the Export and Import 
(EXIM) Bank, government is yet to develop new foreign trade instruments. However, 
business houses are able to use the recently launched Export Financing Facility under 
the World Bank's Enterprise Development Project. 
Exchange Controls 
Exchange controls and restrictions in Zambia have been removed and the financial 
market is now fully liberalised. 
Exchange Rate 
The exchange rate is market determined but due to various economic factors, the 
Zambian Kwacha has depreciated from under KIOO in early 1992 to between K2,600 
and K2900 to US$1 as at April, 2000. 
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Investment Approval and Licensing Procedures 
Procedures have been simplified and done to CBI requirements. 
Investment Code 
The Zambia Investment Act was passed by Parliament and the Zambia Investment 
Centre was created to facilitate investments. However, the Investment code has been 
subjected to several adjustments and is still undergoing review. 
Harmonisation of  Investment Regime 
The process of  harmonisation is still on going and the Roadmap has already been 
developed. 
Movement of  Persons and Employment Permits 
Reforms on this issue have not yet been fully implemented. 
Membership/ Participation in Investment Protection Agencies 
Zambia is a member of the Multi-lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
and investments in Zambia are protected by an Act of  Parliament. 
3.4 CBI Status 
Status On Addendum To The Letter of  CBI Policy 
The Addendum to the letter of  CBI Policy has not yet been drawn up. However the 
two ministries ofFinance & Economic Development (MOFED) and; Commerce, Trade 
and Industry have already held initial talks to address this. 
The TWG Secretariat has already drafted and submitted a letter to MOFED outlining 
what is required and it is hoped that this matter will be completed soon. 
Status On The National Roadmap On Investment Facilitation 
The Investor Roadmap was completed in 1999 and transformation of the Zambia 
Investment Centre into a "one stop shop" is yet to be effected. 
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Transformation Of The Zambia Investment Centre Into A One-Stop-Shop For 
Investment Promotion And Facilitation 
It is recognised that the implementation of  the Cross Border Initiative will require 
fundamental changes and adjustments to internal structures and systems. It is suggested 
that more effort be placed in improving internal efficiencies of  Government and other 
national institutions, before legal provisions are prescribed to enforce decisions. The 
Investment Centre has, over the past several years; established good liaison arrangements 
with most of  the relevant Government ministries and Local Authorities in the facilitation 
of  investors. 
A number of  the tasks that the Investment Centre was required to do in the context 
ofCBI have been done, but more work is required. The Investment Centre is expected to 
assume a central role in the promotion and facilitation of  investment in Zambia, but the 
institution will require additional support, in addition to that from Government, to enable 
it carry out the tasks as envisaged in the CBI. There is the immediate need to provide: 
t  additional staff 
t  additional resources (computers and transport) to enable it provide efficient and 
timely services to investors that seek such services. 
t  transform the Investment Centre into a one-stop shop 
In August 1999, the Cabinet approved in principle that the Investment Act be revised 
and the Zambia Investment Centre should be restructured into a "One-Stop-Shop". 
Overall Conclusion 
The CBI has played a positive role in the East and Southern African economic sub 
region.  The capacity of the TWG Secretariat to conduct specific policy research and 
reviews has been enhanced and is now been utilized by government and regional bodies 
especially as COMESA approaches the Free Trade Area. It has therefore increased the 
capacity for both the public and private sectors in trade and investment. As the future 
CBI agenda evolves, the past eight years will now be translated into CO  MESA, SADC 
and the roc expanding local capacity to  implement deeper regional integration 
successfully. 
More importantly, the CBI has provided a forum and policy framework that can 
address at a regional level the structural difficulties that countries in the region face as 
they reform their economies and participate in the process of  globalisation. 
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1.  OVERVIEW  OF THE CBI IN  ZIMBABWE 
First involvement in CBI 
Zimbabwe was involved in the Cross-Border Initiative (then Regional Integration) 
from its inception in 1992. The CBI came at the inception of  Zimbabwe's own Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) whose objectives coincided, in large measure, 
with those of  the CBI. 
The Initiative was viewed as a non-bureaucratic channel for implementing measures 
agreed at the formal regional institutions levels COMESA (then PTA),  SADC (then 
SADCC) etc.  The most attractive aspect of the Initiative stemmed from the apparent 
flexible donor approach to funding the CBI programmes perceived as separate from the 
normal aid programmes. A specific expectation was compensation for revenue loss as a 
result of  reducing tariffs under CBI or a reward for implementing reform measures. This 
aspect was interpreted as being implicit in the donor's commitment to fund the Initiative. 
Ongoing perceptions of  the CBI  process within the country 
The Technical Working Group (TWG) is perceived by the public and private sector 
alike as  a useful non-partisan forum for discussing national and regional integration 
issues. However, being a non-formal organisation, achievements of  the CBI have proved 
difficult to measure. The feeling in some quarters is that the CBI should be formalised to 
enable more accurate assessment of  benefits. 
p.539 The government has acknowledged that work carried out by and through the TWG 
has contributed significantly to the policy formulation process. From this point of  view, 
a continuation of  the TWG would be beneficial. The private sector's appreciation of  the 
CBI, on the other hand has been waning over the last few years. This is partly because 
government's dominance in TWG meetings has reduced the Initiative to another 
bureaucratic process where decisions are never taken and partly because no direct benefits 
of  CBI to the business sector have been demonstrated. Both are agreed, however, that 
studies and other CBI initiatives are useful in highlighting issues of relevance to the 
integration and globalisation process. 
Specific elements of  the CBI that have been particularly useful 
Through the TWG, the Initiative has succeeded in bringing together public and 
private sector in a non-biased forum. This has had the effect of  facilitating freer debate. 
Although this cannot be measured in quantifiable terms, this process has had input into 
a variety of  national and regional issues. Particular examples include input into developing 
the Zimbabwe position vis-a-vis the SADC Trade Protocol and exercises by the Attorney 
General's Office to identify legislation that needs reviewing in order to comply with 
recommended regional integration measures and WTO requirements. 
The TWG initiated or facilitated a number of studies, seminars and workshops, 
outlined elsewhere in this report, which sensitised both the public and private sector 
about regional integration and globalisation issues. These events have impacted widely 
giving birth to other related developments. 
Relationship between CBJ and the ref:ional inte{tration institutions 
Zimbabwe is a member ofboth CO MESA and SADC. CBI has gradually developed 
a more amicable though non-formal relationship with both regional organisations although 
relations were generally perceived to be closer with COMESA than with SADC. 
Zimbabwe preferred to be guided by the COMESA time-table of  tariff  reductions rather 
than develop a separate CBI time-table. It  is acknowledged in some quarters that the CBI 
has helped in bringing understanding of regional integration issues which have given 
more focus to both COMESA and SADC. 
However, the new funding arrangement through COMESA has generally been 
perceived as  a "take-over". This perception may well bring division among regional 
integration organisations. The future relationship between the TWG and COMESA is 
p.540 uncertain at present. The feeling is that henceforth TWG programmes are likely to be 
viewed as belonging to CO  MESA and in this respect, the forum will lose its 'quiet' non-
partisan effectiveness. 
General conclusions and comments on the CBI and TWG 
The Zimbabwe TWG has debated at length on the usefulness ofCBI and the TWG. 
The general conclusions have been that the TWG should be retained because it is  a 
unique forum for articulating national, regional and global regional integration issues. 
However, the point of disagreement centres around the reporting structures that should 
be put in place now that the co-sponsors no longer have a pro-active role. The TWG has 
undertaken to  develop its view on a possible new structure in future  meetings. 
Unfortunately, only one meeting has been held so far this year. 
2.  ACTIVITIES OF THE TWG 
2.1 Overview ofTWG meetings since beginning o(the Initiative 
a.  Regularity of TWG meetings 
The aim at the start of  the Initiative was to hold meetings at least every six weeks. In 
practice 4 - 6 meetings were held each year although 1997 saw a total of 7 meetings 
held. The number of  meetings in 1999 were significantly reduced while 2000 has so far 
seen only one meeting held. 
b.  Usual composition of members attending 
At the outset, public sector representation (government ministries and departments 
and quasi-government organisations) dominated the Technical Working Group.  The 
private sector was represented by the Confederation oflndustries, Chamber of  Commerce 
and the banking sector. Private sector representation gradually diminished to one, the 
Chamber of Commerce. At the start of  the Initiative, the public sector was represented 
by the Ministry of Industry &  Commerce (who were also the first TWG Chair), the 
Reserve Bank, Ministry of  Transport, the Department of  Customs & Excise, the Attorney 
General's Office. The Ministry of  Finance (who became the Chair in 1994), joined the 
group later. 
p.541 c.  Summary of main issues discussed over the period 
1993 
Discussion in what was, in effect, the TWG's first year of  operation centred around 
the following issues:-
•  Promotional activities needed in order to publicise the Initiative. 
•  Efforts to gather consensus around the Common Programme of  Action (CPA) 
•  Discussion and clarification of Terms of Reference for the TWG. The main 
business of the meetings involved allocation of responsibilities to  TWG 
members as guided by the Terms of  Reference. 
1994 
•  Letter of Policy (LOP). Discussion to facilitate the drafting of  the Letter of 
Policy dominated several meetings. Many versions of  the proposed document 
were discussed before finalisation. There was some reluctance on the part of 
the authorities to make firm commitments in terms of  overall liberalisation. 
This delayed the finalisation ofthe Letter ofPolicy. This reluctance was evident 
throughout the life of  the Initiative and discussions to up-date the LOP were a 
recurrent phenomenon. 
•  Project Implementation Committee (PIC). Discussions to develop the (PIC) 
also took centre stage not just in the identification of appropriate ministries 
but in the planning of  the first meeting. 
•  Tariff Study. A suggestion to conduct a study to assess revenue loss as  a 
result of tariff reductions was discussed and approved. Terms of Reference 
for the study were developed and possible consultants to undertake the study 
were identified 
1995 
•  Tariff Reductions Under CBI. There was extensive discussion on tariff 
reductions under CBI where emphasis was made that this would be done on a 
reciprocal basis. An indicative framework for doing this was provided. 
•  Export Processing Zones. The need to monitor this development was emphasised 
and from that point, the TWG actively monitored developments. 
p.542 •  Immigration. A senior immigration officer attended one of the meetings by 
special invitation to clarify the criteria for granting work permits and residents' 
permits to investors. 
1996 
Meetings during this year were dominated by suggestions to carry out studies and 
related workshops and by discussions of  draft reports arising out of  the various studies. 
Recommendations were made to carry out the following studies and workshops:-
•  Study to Determine the Competitiveness of Zimbabwe Industry in the 
Region. 
•  WTO Study and workshop. 
•  Study to Draft an Investment Code for Zimbabwe. Consensus to undertake 
this study was reached after several suggestions had been considered.· 
Other issues to dominate discussions included:-
•  Common External Tariff Study and Workshop. This was being carried out 
byCOMESA. 
•  Tariff Commission. Discussions also zeroed in on the  impending Tariff 
Commission and its expected role. 
1997 
Discussion on follow-up action required on various studies carried out during 1996 
dominated a number of  the 1997 meetings. 
· Study to Determine the Competitiveness of the Zimbabwe Industry in the 
Region 
There was considerable debate on how best to follow-up recommendations of  this 
study including the possibility of  setting up a productivity centre. 
· Study to Draft an Investment Code for Zimbabwe 
There was no consensus on the best way to 'construct' the Code following the study. 
Differing views (including those of  the authors) were often over-ridden by the prevailing 
economic conditions. 
p.543 · WTO Notifications. 
This study was suggested to answer some of the issues raised in the study on the 
Impact of  the Uruguay Round on Zimbabwe. It was noted that officials involved in the 
Notifications exercise need in-depth knowledge of  the issues and the procedures involved. 
It  was eventually resolved to hold one workshop to discuss findings of  all3 completed 
studies in order to assist the TWG formulate follow-up action. (The workshop was duly 
held in June of  the same year.) 
· WTO - Study to Assess Impact on Zimbabwe. 
There was also detailed feed-back on the WTO negotiating meeting held in Singapore. 
It  became apparent that a variety of  other WTO aspects need to be further clarified, one 
issue of  note being the procedures and criteria for WTO Notifications. 
· Letter of Policy was discussed again and the concern that co-sponsors appear to 
be shifting funding conditions was expressed. The EU confirmed that funding was linked 
to Balance of Payments support and that funds would be released provided the tariff 
rationalisation programme is moving towards the reform "road map". 
· SADC Trade Protocol. There was discussion on the compatibility in relationship 
to CBI arrangements. Fears of  possible operational problems were expressed given the 
existence of  different regional groupings with varying time-tables for achieving a Common 
Market. This discussion gave rise to the suggestion that a study be carried out aimed at 
assisting the Zimbabwe government formulate its position vis-a-vis the SADC Trade 
Protocol. (This study was eventually carried out under the umbrella of the Ministry of 
Industry & Commerce and GTZ funding. Its findings have been used by the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce as a basis for negotiations. 
· Harmonised External Tariff Study. The Terms of  Reference for this study were 
discussed and finalised and selection of  consultants commenced. 
·Third Ministerial Meeting. The TWG was involved in the preparation for this 
event which took place in Harare. 
· TWG Membership. Suggestions were made to expand TWG membership to 
include more private sector members as well as other key departments. The desirability 
of  appointing a Deputy TWG Chairperson was also mentioned. The first suggestion was 
followed up with limited success. The latter suggestion yielded no results. 
· CBI Strategic Planning meeting. There was a report-back from this meeting which 
took place from 20 - 21 November. The meeting had reviewed the achievements of  CBI 
to-date and concluded with 3 possible options for the Iniative:-
p.544 •  Close down Initiative and consider CBI objectives achieved 
•  Continue with present agenda 
•  Continue with expanded agenda 
The TWG was challenged to consider the future of  the CBI under those suggestions 
and come up with ideas. 
1998 
The meetings discussed and oversaw the production of the Harmonised External 
Tariff Study. Findings were discussed at a special meeting with government who undertook 
to take into account findings of  the study in future tariff reviews. 
Key findings of the WTO Notifications Study were presented to the TWG and 
possible way forward plotted which included suggestions for a workshop. 
Discussions to up-date the Letter of  Policy featured again triggered by concern over 
the suspension of  Foreign Currency Accounts (FCA's). The government representatives 
were non-committal about possible reversals. 
The Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) detailed plans to conduct a study to identify 
the various steps undergone by potential investors in search of  approval for investment 
projects with a view to streamlining some operations. It  was noted that this development 
was in keeping with the recently suggested Road Map for Investment Facilitation. The 
TWG discussed Terms of Reference and suggested that local consultants work with 
FIAS consultants. 
The TWG were also given a presentation on the changing role of the CO MESA 
Clearing House and its proposed replacement. 
1999 
The Road Map for Investment Facilitation and Addendum to the Letter of Policy 
and the SADC Trade Protocol dominated the 1999 meetings. The meeting also committed 
some time to discussing the CBI Evaluation. 
2000 
The one meeting so far this year, dwelt on the production of  the Addendum to the 
Letter of Policy,  considered recommendations of the 4th  Ministerial meeting and its 
implications for the future of CBI and the TWG. The meeting considered the pros and 
cons of the new funding arrangement through COME  SA and concluded that was not 
p.545 ideal, as it could divide regional groups and detract from the hitherto non-aligned status 
of  the CBI. 
d.  Problems encountered 
Voluntary membership to the TWG sometimes hampered commitment particularly 
at higher levels within organisations. After the first few years, it became obvious that the 
CBI was not considered a priority by most high ranking officials and TWG meetings 
would be delegated to junior members of  staff, often at short notice and without adequate 
briefing. However, at times, high ranking officials could not attend due to genuine prior 
business commitments. 
In the latter years, government dominance of TWG meetings increased. This had 
the effect ofthwarting discussions as meetings degenerated into platforms for explaining 
and, at times, outright defending government policy. 
2.2 Overview o(sensitisation activities 
Sensitisation activities undertaken by the TWG had two objectives: 
a.  Activities to sensitise various stakeholders on the objectives of  the Cross Border 
Initiative. 
b.  Activities which stemmed from work undertaken by the Technical Working Group 
and aimed at sensitising the business community and government officials on 
various issues relevant to the economy. These studies were mostly later followed 
by seminars or workshops. 
c.  In terms of  the first category, four seminars were held as follows:-
1993 
Two seminars were held one each in Bulawayo and Harare. Both were designed to 
sensitise the government and private sector on the objectives of  the Initiative. The event 
also aimed to,  on the one hand, solicit high level commitment particularly from 
government and on the other, to generate interest within the private sector. The seminar 
was also used as a forum for obtaining information on the potential volume of  regional 
trade and investment and questionnaires were used for this purpose. This information 
was meant to assist the TWG in its deliberations and to convince the government on the 
need to liberalise in order to realise the potential for trade and investment in the region. 
p.546 Both seminars were well attended and the objectives met, to a significant extent. 
Momentum for the Initiative was maintained at a high level for a long time after these 
two events. 
1996 
The second set of seminars were again held in Harare and Bulawayo and were 
organised along similar lines as the first two. The aim, on this occasion, was to provide 
an up-date on the CBI and re-kindle interest in both government and the private sector. 
These events, although well attended showed signs of  wariness to the of  Cross Border 
Initiative. It became obvious that the CBI was, at best being mis-understood and,  at 
worst not being viewed seriously, largely because of  its informal status. 
c)  Sensitisation activities under this category took 2 forms: 
111.  Studies 
111.  Follow-up workshops or seminars 
1.  Studies 
The TWG initiated studies outlined below which aimed at clarifying and analysing 
issues as they affect both Zimbabwe and the region. 
· Study of  the Impact of  Removing Tariffs in Terms ofthe Cross Border Initiative 
- the Zimbabwean Case. 
The study was commissioned to assess potential revenue loss to Zimbabwe as  a 
result of  removing tariffs in accordance with CBI objectives. The study carried out an in-
depth analysis of Zimbabwe's imports from the CBI member countries with a view to 
assessing the potential for trade on one hand, and the likely costs to be incurred by 
Zimbabwe when tariffs are reduced under the CBI programme. 
The study carried out an assessment of  Zimbabwe's imports from CBI participating 
countries and other COMESA members states, which indicated the higher levels of 
Zimbabwe's imports from these countries, had been growing at a faster rate than from 
the rest of the world and South Africa. The study demonstrated that the structure of 
import duty revealed that the bulk of  Zimbabwe's imports from other CO  MESA countries 
are raw materials and/or intermediate goods-imports that are likely to promote industrial 
growth in Zimbabwe rather than decrease it. 
p.547 Conclusions 
The study concluded as follows:-
t  Zimbabwe stood to have significant gains from competitive imports from the 
region. It argued that the expected trade creation benefits from the countries in 
the region, which will cease the opportunities to export to Zimbabwe as result of 
the removal of customs duties, will equally benefit Zimbabwean exporters as 
they will also be targeting these markets. The domestic manufacturing sector in 
particular stood to  gain from the competitive industrial raw materials and 
intermediate goods needed by its sub-sectors. 
t  There would be minim the findings of  this was cautious particularly on the part 
of government who felt  it painted a "glowing picture" which is  difficult to 
substantiate. However, they undertook to take the findings into account in their 
tariff review exercises. 
· WTO: Implications of  the Uruguay Round on Zimbabwe 
The  study examined the possible consequences of the Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation for the  agricultural, manufacturing 
(including clothing and textiles) and services sectors of the Zimbabwean economy. A 
particular aim was to establish whether Zimbabwe, as a developing country stood to lose 
or gain by membership to the WTO. The study also sought to:-
t  recommend action needed to  implement an internationally acceptable anti-
dumping mechanism for Zimbabwe 
t  lobby for the establishment of an institutional framework for the dissemination 
ofWTO related information and regulations within Zimbabwe and 
t  to  ensure that Zimbabwe presents a united national position in its future 
negotiations under the WTO as well as provide inputs for preparations of the 
negotiating meetings. 
Conclusions 
The study highlighted commitments made by Zimbabwe at the Uruguay Round, 
e.g.  binding of its  duty rates on various agricultural and manufactured imports and 
commitments made with respect to various services. It  clarified Zimbabwe's position on 
the issue of agricultural subsidies. With respect to manufactured goods, the study said 
that the country's own reform programme had done more to open up the economy than 
p.548 will result under the WTO expectations. The study finally concluded that the Uruguay 
Round will have limited impact on Zimbabwe's domestic market in terms of  opening it 
up to international competition because, as a developing country, Zimbabwe was only 
required to make limited commitments due to the GATT principle of non-reciprocity 
between developed and developing countries. On the regional export market front, the 
study claimed that reforms in those countries would be the determining factor rather 
than the WTO regulations, whilst conceding that some preferential treatment would be 
lost in developed markets. 
Results 
This study was instrumental in clarifying the WTO, its objectives and implications. 
It  also triggered discussion on what Zimbabwe needs to do to position itself in the WTO 
context. The study was closely followed by a seminar to explain the requirements under 
the WTO and a workshop to discuss sector specific issues as outlined above. The standing 
committee on WTO chaired by the Ministry oflndustry and Commerce was consolidated 
and expanded following this development. It is felt that national debate on WTO has 
been enhanced albeit much needs to be done to equip those involved in both negotiations 
and implementation. 
·Study on World Trade Organisation (WTO) Notifications 
A direct off-shoot of  the above study, this study was conducted to identify various 
legislation with regards to WTO Notifications and the procedures for  doing so.  The 
study led to a workshop later in the year targeting personnel in key departments. This 
was immediately followed by a week-long technical training programme for the same 
key officials. 
The study and subsequent workshop and training programme contributed to greater 
understanding of subsidies and countervailing measures. The exercises also enabled 
Zimbabwe to "take stock" of  its position with regards to Notifications obligations. 
· Study to Determine the Competitiveness of  Zimbabwe Industry in the Region. 
The study examined technical factors of  competitiveness, examined the Zimbabwean 
case both prior and within the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). It 
highlighted Zimbabwean industries short-comings in terms of competitiveness and 
outlined what needs to be done by both government and industry in order to  achieve 
optimum competitiveness. These included:-
t  Putting in place fiscal policies (without resorting to tax increases which effectively 
punish the producers). The study called for a policy regime that is sensitive to 
discipline. 
p.549 t  Promoting the existence of domestice competition so that the local market can 
be a testing ground for potential exports. The argument was extended to the 
provision of  utilities. 
The report also suggested the setting up of  productivity centre in order to enhance 
skills training. 
It touched on competitiveness of  Zimbabwean industry in overseas markets. 
Results 
The study gave industry and its line ministry (Industry & Commerce) benchmarks 
with which to measure its competitiveness. This was followed by a workshop to facilitate 
discussion and clarify issues.  The Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the 
Confederation of  Zimbabwe Industries were challenged to follow-up on specific issues 
raised. The possibility of  setting up a productivity centre was monitored by the TWG for 
a while but no progress was noted. There are current plans of  introducing a Competition 
Commission. 
· Study to Draft An Investment Code for Zimbabwe 
The study was intended to chart the course for the drafting of  an Investment Code 
the country. Currently, Zimbabwe is governed by Investment Regulations rather than a 
Code which is more binding. 
The study reviewed and up-dated the ~xisting investment regulations in Zimbabwe 
having regard to  current domestic, regional and international developments. It 
recommended that purely administrative rules be superseded by appropriate legislation 
which spells out the specific rights of foreign investors and legal safeguards for their 
investments rather than drawing new legislation in order to put into effect an investment 
Code. The Code would be published in two sections, one section dealing with the relevant 
legislation (which is permanent) and the 2nd section dealing the macro-economic issues 
(which are subject to change). 
The report was submitted to the Cabinet's Committee on Legislation for approval 
before it can become law. However, the authorities have not made a decision regarding 
how to treat pre-1993 investors. Under the current regulations, pre-1993 investors cannot 
fully remit funds when dis-investing. This issue is likely to remain unresolved until clear 
policy has been developed. 
p.550 ·Study on Harmonising External Tariffs (HET) 
This study was commissioned in response to the recommendation that CBI 
implementing countries examine the feasibility of implementing harmonised external 
tariffs againstthird countries. The study, completed in April 1998, was working within a 
time-frame that envisaged total removal of tariffs by the end of 1998. The following 
were expectations of  the CBI road map for tariff reform:-
•  The removal of  all tariff barriers on intra-regional trade by 1998 
•  Immediate elimination ofnon-tariffbarriers on all trade; and 
•  Harmonisation of  external tariffs by having not more than three non-zero rates, 
weighted average of  not more than 15 percent and maximum rate ofbetween 20 
and 25 percent by 1998. 
The study:-
a)  Reclassified products in CBI categories, namely; raw materials, capital goods, 
intermediate goods and final goods; 
b) Analysed revenue consequences ofharmonising external tariffs and eliminating 
tariffs on intra-regional trade; 
c)  Assessed the effect on revenue of  implementing the proposed HET under various 
scenarios; and 
d)  Established revenue loss due to existing official duty exemptions. 
The study concluded that introducing CBI HET rates will lead to a reduction in 
venue by an average 10. ?percent. However, it argued that the lower tariff levels proposed 
under the CBI/HET system can be a powerful economic tool and must not be viewed as 
a means of  revenue collection only but should target wider objectives. A tariff cut which 
might appear to reduce revenue may well increase it if  it leads to expansion of  economic 
activity. 
The study, however, recommended a tariff reduction path that would incur the least 
revenue loss in the first stage, one which would also give industry an opportunity to 
grow. The study, however, also recommended further studies in the following areas were 
needed, as these fell outside the scope of  the consultants' Terms of  Reference:-
•  Study the magnitude of  revenue leakages arising from false declaration of  value 
and incorrect classification; 
p.551 t  Detailed study on the impact ofHET on revenue collection and industrialisation; 
t  Study to synchronise various CBI countries' HET study in order to determine the 
way forward. 
Result 
This report was cautiously received, particularly by the finance ministry. They have, 
however, indicated from time to time that they are taking its findings into account in the 
tariff then taking place. 
111.  Seminars 
Three Seminars took place under this category and all followed the larifying many 
Issues. 
1997 
WTO Notifications Workshop 
This workshop was a direct result of the 1996 event and was also preceded by a 
study to identify requirements and procedures for notifying under WTO. This was a 
targeted event and brought together key government ministries and other departments. 
Departments which attended included:-
t  The Ministry oflndustry & Commerce (Committee involved in WTO matters) 
t  The Attorney General's Office 
t  The Standards Association of  Zimbabwe 
t  The Ministry of  Finance 
t  The Ministry ofF  oreign Affairs 
t  Industry's representatives 
t  Sector Representatives 
t  The Commercial Farmers' Union 
t  The Ministry of  Agriculture 
p.552 An expert from the EU facilitated the workshop and clarified issues related to 
Notifications including clarification on subsidies, countervailing measures and related 
1ssues. 
Training ofKey Officials in Notifications 
The workshop was followed by a week-long technical training of  key officials on 
notifications requirement. It  was recommended that this type of  training should continue 
to include other departments not reached on that occasion. Apart from the directly TWG 
initiated studies and events, the TWG has had input into other regional integration 
processes and investment issues. The more outstanding cases include assistance to the 
Zimbabwe government to clarify its position vis-a-vis the SADC Trade Protocol and the 
ZIC Study to identify the administrative barriers to investment. 
3.  ACHIEVEMENTS OF CBI IN POLICY  REFORM AREAS 
3.1 Foreign Trade 
At the start of the Initiative Zimbabwe was in its  2nd year of implementing an 
Economic Adjustment Programme (ESAP) whose objectives coincided in, a number of 
areas, with some of  the objectives under the CBI. Any benefits accrued cannot, therefore 
be wholly attributed to the CBI. 
a.  Import/export licensing 
Import licences were completely liberalised in 1994 and an open import system 
introduced. Import licences are required for products on a very short negative list which 
has been retained for health and security reasons. Generally, there have been no controls 
on exports. Export permits are issued on a few items related to food and minerals in 
order to ensure that the stock levels are monitored and to ensure compliance with health 
and sanitary requirements of  the export markets. Zimbabwe is not expected to review 
this position. 
b.  NTBs 
It  is difficult to claim measurable success on this but Zimbabwe has made efforts to 
reduce NTB's. For instance Zimbabwe has ensured that there are no quantitative 
restrictions on imports. In addition, specific efforts are being made under the auspices of 
the SADC Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology (SQAM) 
Programme to reduce technical barriers to trade. 
p.553 c.  Intra-regional tariffs 
As outlined elsewhere in this report, Zimbabwe has followed the COMESA time-
table of  tariff  reductions in its trade with COMESAand CBI countries and has generally 
been on target. The country has committed itself  to the implementation of  zero tariffs by 
October 2000. 
d.  External Tariffs - and CBI harmonisation 
An HET Study was conducted in 1998, however, the government have stated they 
are not yet in a position to implement its recommendations. 
e.  Trade facilitation 
A variety of  measures outlined in the Common Programme of  Action to facilitate 
smoother trade largely stem from measures put in place by COMESA. These include:-
Implement COMESA 
Harmonised Transit Charges 
Zimbabwe has operated, based on these for a number of  years .Introduce single goods 
declaration document- Zimbabwe has introduced one customs bill of entry - the 
ASYCUDA system is in use. 
3.2 Pavments: 
Financial sector reform 
Reform in this sector has been tackled in the following areas:-Monetary Policy 
Reform which has facilitated a shift from direct to indirect methods of control where 
open market forces interventions prevail. 
Interest Rates have been deregulated and are now market determined. Interest rates 
of the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) (government owned) and of the Building 
Societies have also been partially deregulated. 
New Instruments have widened the scope of Building Societies' operations, for 
instance NCD's. 
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There are now five Commercial Banks, six Finance Houses, ten Merchant Banks, five 
Savings Banks (POSB), and several insurance companies' pension funds. 
b.  Foreign trade instruments(Some of  the reforms outlined below have been 
reversed due to economic conditions prevailing in the country.) Prior to the commencement 
of  the Reform Programme in 1990, exporters had to surrender all their foreign exchange 
to the Reserve Bank of  Zimbabwe. Foreign exchange requirements would then be met 
from  allocations. At the onset of the Reform Programme in 1990, the government 
introduced an Export Retention Scheme (ERS) which allowed exporters to rein in some 
of  the export proceeds for their own use. The retention rate started from as low as 5% in 
1990 and progressively increased to 100% in July 1994. The ERS was discontinued and 
replaced by the system ofForeign Currency Accounts (FCA's) 
The introduction of(FCA's) led to the development of  an inter-bank market which 
allowed for a system of  payment and exchange without the involvement of  the authorities. 
Up until 1994, two exchange rates were quoted, the Reserve Bank quoted rate and the 
market determined rate.Since then market determined rates are quoted in Zimbabwe. 
(However, the exchange rate has been artificially held at its  current levels since the 
Zimbabwe Dollar crushed in 1997). Zimbabwe accepted Article VIII of  the IMF Articles 
of  Agreement in 1995. The current account was fully liberalised for transaction purposes 
and dividend remittability is  now 100% for new investment. The capital account 
liberalisation commenced on a cautious and phased basis. 
3.3 Investment: 
a.  Investment approval and licensing procedures 
The Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) was set up in the early stages of ESAP 
(1991) as  a one-stop investment facilitator.  However, the one-stop facility is  only in 
terms of providing information and approval of investment projects. The Centre does 
not have the authority to grant the necessary permits and licences following approval. 
This process remains fragmented. ZIC has made efforts to influence granting oflicences 
by developing closer links with the relevant authorities who are represented on the 
investment projects approval committee. The authorities include the  department of 
immigration, utility authorities etc. The project approval process has, however, improved 
significantly from an open-ended time-frame to a maximum of 10 days. 
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The Investment Code still has to be developed. Currently Zimbabwe is guided by 
Investment Regulations which came into effect at the same time as ZIC. A study to draft 
an investment code was completed in 1996 and its recommendations are being considered 
for legislation. Among the key issues being considered is the remissibility of  funds for 
pre-1993 investors. Post-1993 investors have full remissibility. 
c.  Harmonisation of  investment regime 
This is expected to be tackled under the Road Map for Investment Facilitation once 
approved. 
d.  Movement of  persons and employment permits 
Residents' permits are granted automatically for individuals investing over US$1 m. 
Individuals investing over US$300 000 are given 3-year permits. In terms of  other business 
persons, Zimbabwe ratified the first phase of the COMESA protocol albeit it is 
implementing this on a selective basis. Bona fide business persons can obtain visas at 
major entry points. 
Membership/participation in investment protection agencies 
In addition to being a member ofMIGA and OPIC, Zimbabwe has signed bilateral 
investment agreements with one more country since the inception of CBI bringing the 
number of  such agreements to 10. 
3.4 CBI StatusStatus on Addendum to Letter of  CBI Policv 
A draft Addendum to the Letter of  CBI Policy is currently under consideration by 
the Minister of  Finance. No substantive progress can be expected until after the elections 
as the finalisation of  the document hinges on clear policy issues. 
b.  Status on preparation of  national Road Map on Investment Facilitation 
Initial discussions have been held on the possible way forward. However, no formal 
work has been commissioned. As is the case with the Addendum to the Letter of  Policy, 
progress hinges on clear policy issues which is unobtainable at present 
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STUDIES AND ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CBI 
YEAR  COUNTRY/  TITLE  CONSULTANT 
REGION 
1991  CBI region  Constraints to intra-regional trade, investment and payments in Eastern and  Imani Development 
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region 
1992  CBI region  First workshop ofTWGs, Mauritius
1  Imani Development 
1992  Burundi  Constraints to intra-regional trade, investment and payments in Eastern and  DrPNyamoya 
Comoros  Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean region at the national level  Wilton Consultants 
Ethiopia  DrS Yemenu 
Kenya  DrNNg'eno 
Madagascar  Wilton Consultants 
Malawi  Business Development Africa 
Mauritius  Wilton Consultants 
Namibia  NEPRU 
Rwanda  Mr J M Mbaguta 
Seychelles  Wilton Consultants 
South Africa  Mrs N Hill/Prof. G Maasdorp 
Swaziland  DrXGuma 
Tanzania  Prof. R Mabele 
Uganda  Dr S Katabaazi 
Zambia  DrG Mudenda 
Zimbabwe  Imani Development 
1992  CBI region  Second workshop of  TWGs, Mauritius  Imani Development 
1993  Burundi  Follow-up studies at the national level, covering, inter alia, listing laws and  DrPNyamoya 
Kenya  DrNNg'eno ":=' 
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1993 
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1994 
1994 
COUNTRY/ 
REGION 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Namibia 
Rwanda 
South Africa 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
CBI region 
CBI region 
Kenya 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Seychelles 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Comoros 
Madagascar 
Seychelles 
Seychelles 
Seychelles 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 
Indian Ocean 
region 
TITLE  CONSULTANT 
regulations needing amendment in terms of  the CBI; estimating levels of  intra- Wilton Consultants 
regional trade and investment flows; reviewing regulations on private  Business Development Africa 
investment, identifying actions required for implementation of  CBI measures,  Wilton Consultants 
identifying institutional requirements in the context of  implementation of  the  NEPRU 
CBI measures.  Mr J M Mbaguta 
Mrs N Hill/Prof. G Maasdorp 
Dr S Katabaazi 
DrG Mudenda 
Imani Development 
Meeting of senior officials, Brussels 
First CBI Ministerial Meeting, Kampala 
Amendments to national laws and regulations to give effect to CBI measures  MrDAmeyo 
Mr E Singini 
Mr N Beekarry 
MrGDodin 
Mr L Tibaruha 
Mr E Chipimo 
Mr B Patel 
Assistance with preparation of  letter of  CBI policy  DrP Ramsamy 
Assistance with preparation of  letter of  CBI policy  DrP Ramsamy 
Assistance with preparation of  letter of  CBI policy  Dr A Lennblad 
Study on net transitional costs of  implementation of  the CBI  Mr B Rassool/Dr A Lennblad 
Study on tax reform implications of  implementing CBI measures  Ms D Tirant/ Mr J Rankin 
Study to assess the impact of  regional market development on the economy of  Dr S Katabaazi 
Uganda with special emphasis on the manufacturing sector 
Study to determine the impact of  removing tariffs in terms of  the CBI  Dr D Ndlela 
Assistance with preparation of  letter of  CBI policy  Imani Development 
Meeting of  Indian Ocean TWGs  Indian Ocean Commission YEAR  COUNTRY/  TITLE  CONSULTANT 
REGION 
1995  Burundi  Technical assistance to TWG and PIC  MrPNyamoya 
Madagascar  Technical assistance to TWG and PIC  BAPIM 
1995  Burundi  Amendments to national laws and regulations to give effect to CBI measures  Mr M Nibitanga 
Madagascar  Mr Y Ratrimoarivony 
Malawi  Mr J McGrath 
Seychelles  Mr B Rassool 
Tanzania  MrLMmasi 
Zimbabwe  Imani Development 
1995  CBI region  Second CBI Ministerial meeting, Mauritius
1  Imani Development 
1995  Indian Ocean  Meeting oflndian Ocean TWGs  Indian Ocean Commission 
region 
1995  East Africa  Meeting of  the East African TWGs, Arusha  MrLMmasi 
regwn 
1995  Comoros  Assistance with preparation of letter of  CBI policy  DrPRamsamy 
Kenya  Preparation of  paper for Ministerial meeting  DrNNg'eno 
Madagascar  Assistance with preparation of letter of  CBI policy  DrPRamsamy 
Namibia  Assistance with preparation of  letter of  CBI policy  Mr P Morawetz 
Swaziland  Assistance with preparation of  letter of CBI policy  Mr P Morawetz 
Tanzania  Assistance with preparation of  letter of  CBI policy  DrPRamsamy 
1996  Kenya  Technical assistance to TWGs and PICs  MrMMunyaka 
Namibia  Dr E van der Linden/Gaoses 
Seychelles  Mr B Rassool 
Swaziland  MrM Hall 
Tanzania  MrLMmasi 
Uganda  Dr S Katabaazi 
Zimbabwe  Imani Development 
1996  CBI region  Third workshop of all TWGs  Mauritius  Imani Development 
1996  East Africa  Meeting of  East African TWGs, Nakuru  MrMMunyaka 
regwn YEAR  COUNTRY/  TITLE  CONSULTANT 
REGION 
1996  Indian Ocean  Assistance with preparation of  letters of  CBI policy and implementation of  MrJ P Duvert 
region  CBI measures 
1996  Indian Ocean  Meeting of  Customs officials and other officials to discuss tariff liberalisation  Imani Consultants (Mauritius) 
region  and harmonisation 
1996  CBI region  Meeting to discuss ESARIM proposals, Brussels  Imani Development 
1996  Kenya  Business Plan for proposed Regional fund for Trade Development  MrMMunyaka 
1996  Kenya  Commercial Paper Programme  MrMMunyaka 
1996  Madagascar  Follow-up activities related to implementation ofCBI measures  Mr J P Duvert 
1996  Madagascar  Study on air transport policy  Mr R Sithanen 
1996  Namibia  Assistance with renegotiations of SACU  Dr E van der Linden/Gaoses 
1996  Seychelles  Study on identification of  projects for possible funding under CBI  Mr B Rassool 
1996  Seychelles  Study on substitution of  trades taxes by import tariffs and sales taxes  Mr B Rassool 
1996  Zambia  Feasibility study on establishing export processing zones in Zambia  Independent Management 
Consulting Services 
1996  Zimbabwe  Study on the implications of  the Uruguay round agreements on the Zimbabwe  Mr M Humphrey, Mr A Hofisi, 
economy  Dr R Mabeza-Chimedza 
1996  SACU region  Bfudy on the impact of  the proposed EU-SA Free Trade Agreement on the  Imani Development 
1997  Kenya  BLNS Technical assistance to TWGs and PICs  MrB Kagira 
Namibia  Dr E van der Linden/Gaoses 
Seychelles  Mr B Rassool 
Swaziland  MrMHall 
Tanzania  MrLMmasi 
Uganda  Dr S Katabaazi 
Zambia  Mr JKasanga 
Zimbabwe  Imani Development 
1997  SADC region  Facilitation of  meeting of  representatives from SADC region  SADC Secretariat 
1997  East Africa  Study on harmonisation of  External Tariffs in East Africa  1  Mr G Mwau, Prof. 
S.Tulyamuhika, Economic and 
Social Research Foundation YEAR  COUNTRY/  TITLE  CONSULTANT 
REGION 
1997  East Africa  Meeting of  TWGs  Dr S Katabaazi 
1997  Indian Ocean  Meeting of  Indian Ocean TWGs  Indian Ocean Commission 
region 
1997  Indian Ocean  Study on harmonisation of  External Tariffs in the IOC countries  Imani Consultants (Mauritius) 
regwn  Ltd 
1997  COMES  A  Assessment needs of  Private Sector Organisations in the Indian ocean region2  DrPRamsamy 
1997  CO  MESA  Participation in study on the future role of  the Clearing House.  Dr D Hudson, Mr M Mansoor, 
Mr M Bennett and Mr R Hess 
1997  Kenya  Development of  Business Plan for Kenya Export Development Fund  MrB Kagira 
1997  Kenya  Various papers for national workshop  various 
1997  Kenya  Review of  investment laws  MrB Kagira 
1997  Namibia  Consultative Forum on Competition Policy  TWG 
1997  Seychelles  Study on promoting cross-border investment  MrB Soundy 
1997  Seychelles  Study on harmonisation of  External Tariffs  Mr C Morrin, Mr B Rassool 
1997  Uganda  Study on impact of  foreign exchange liberalisation  Dr S Katabaazi 
1997  Uganda  Local regional seminars in 8 locations  Dr S Katabaazi 
1997  Zambia  Workshop on EPZ feasibility  Independent Management 
Consulting Services 
1997  Zambia  Study on harmonisation of  External Tariffs  Independent Management 
Consulting Services 
1997  Zimbabwe  Workshop on results of studies undertaken by TWG  TWG 
1997  Zimbabwe  Study to draft an investment code  Ms R Mazula I Mr N Nyaguse 
1997  Zimbabwe  Study on WTO notifications  MrD Ruhukwa 
1997  CBI region  Meeting for TWG Chairpersons and resource people to review draft synthesis  Imani Development 
paper 
1997  Zimbabwe  Study on harmonisation of external tariffs  FETA Services/Techfin 
1998  Comoros  Technical assistance to TWGs and PICs  Ms Z Dahalane 
Kenya  MrB Kagira 
Malawi  Mr J McGrath 
Mauritius  De Chazal du Mee YEAR  COUNTRY/  TITLE  CONSULTANT 
REGION 
Namibia  Dr E van der Linden/Gaoses 
Seychelles  Mr B Rassool 
Swaziland  MrM Hall 
Tanzania  MrLMmasi 
Uganda  Dr S Katabaazi 
Zambia  Mr JKasanga 
Zimbabwe  Imani Development 
1998  CBI region  Third Ministerial Meeting  Imani Development 
1998  CBI region  Fourth Regional TWG meeting  Imani Development 
1998  CO  MESA  Needs assessment study for future role of  the COMESA Clearing House  Mr F Read, Mr M Mansoor, 
Mr T Rajaona 
1998  CO  MESA  Follow-up work on development of  AGF and RESA  various 
1998  SACU region  Further study on the impact of  the proposed EU-SA Free Trade Agreement  IDS 
on the BLNS 
1998  SADC  Financial assistance to SITCD for funding a workshop on regional industrial  SIT  CD 
policy 
1998  Kenya  Various papers for national workshop  vanous 
1998  Kenya  Revisions to paper on Kenya Export Development Fund proposal  MrB Kagira 
1998  Namibia  Business-to-business meetings  Trend Line 
1998  Seychelles  Study on implementation of  CO  MESA Tariff reductions and alternative  REPIM 
revenue sources 
1998  Tanzania  National seminar on regional integration  IMAIS 
1998  Tanzania  Local regional seminars in 6 locations  IMAIS 
1998  Tanzania  Business plan for Tanzania Export Development Fund  IMAIS 
1998  East Africa  Meeting of  East African TWGs  IMAIS 
1998  Uganda  Local regional seminars in 8 locations  DMCI 
1998  Zimbabwe  Study and workshop on notification requirements under WTO  MrDRuhukwa 
1998  Zimbabwe  Regional workshop and technical assistance re WTO notifications  Mr G Platton YEAR  COUNTRY/  TITLE  CONSULTANT 
REGION 
1999  Comoros  Technical assistance to TWGs and PICs  Ms Z Dahalane 
Kenya  MrB Kagira 
Malawi  Mr J McGrath 
Mauritius  De Chazal du Mee 
Namibia  Dr E van der Linden 
Seychelles  Mr B Rassool 
Swaziland  MrMHall 
Tanzania  MrLMmasi 
Zambia  Mr JKasanga 
Zimbabwe  Imani Development 
1999  Regional  Study on the impact of trade liberalisation under the CBI on domestic  Prof. C. McCarthy 
industries 
1999  East Africa  Meeting of East African TWGs  MrB Kagira 
1999  CBI region  Fourth Ministerial Meeting  Imani Development 
1999  Kenya  Study on Private Sector Business Associations  Integrated Development 
Consultants 
1999  Kenya  Study on decline of specific Kenyan export products to regional markets  Integrated Development 
Consultants 
1999  Tanzania  Local regional seminars in 2 locations  IMAIS 
1999  SACU region  Assistance with seminar on impact of EU-SA FTA  BIDPA 
2000  Rwanda  Assistance with preparation of  Letter of  CBI Policy  Mr J Musonda 
2000  Zambia  Regional Integration awareness seminars in 9 locations  IMCS 
2000  Kenya  Preparation of  National Investment Facilitation Programme  Integrated Development 
Consultants 
2000  Kenya  Background paper on the Implications of  the East African Customs Union on  Integrated Development 
the Kenyan Economy  Consultants 
Notes: 
1Funded by World Bank  2 Framework contract only funded expenses, not fees APPENDIX II 
TWG AND PIC CONTACT DETAILS 
COUNTRY  NAME  TEL NO.  FAX NO.  E-MAIL 
Burundi: 
- PIC Chairman  Dr M. Sinamenye  257-222744  257-223128 
Governor, Bank of  Burundi 
- TWG Chairman  Mr Cyprien Sakubu,  257-2133447/8  257-213446  sakubu@cbinf.com 
Ministry of  Commerce and 
Industry 
- Secretariat  Mr Prime Nyamoya  257-222096  257-221341  ogi@cni.cbinf.com 
257-225531  221391 
Comoros: 
- PIC Chairman  M. Assoumany Aboudou  269-74 41  75  269-74 41  40 
Minister of  Finance 
- TWG Chairman  Mr Ibrahin Mohamed Soule  269-732140  269-744140 
744140 
- Secretariat  Mme Zalihata Dahalane  269-736076  269-732222  zal.daha@snpt.km 
744163 
Kenya: 
-PIC Chairman  Ron. K N K Biwot  254-2-227411  254-2-252777 
Minister of  East African and 
Regional Co-operation 
- TWG Chairman  Mr Z N Mwaura,  254-2-338111  254-2-219365 
Deputy Chief Economist 
Ministry of  East African and 
Regional Co-operation 
- Secretariat  Mr Bernard Kagira  254-2-543351  254-2-211701  aedc@users.africaonline~ 
co.ke 
Madagascar: 
- PIC Chairman  Vice-Premier Ministre charge  261-2022-35374  261-2022-
des Finance et de l'Economie  23040 
- TWG Chairman  Mr A. Rajaobelison,  261-2022- 261-2022-
Secretariat d'Etat a  20284/5  28508 
l'Economie et au Plan 
- Secretariat  n/a 
Malawi: 
-PIC  Ron. Cassim Chilumpha  265-782199  265-781679 
Minister of  Finance  265-782533  781521 
- TWG Chairman  Mr Patrick Kamwendo,  265-782199  265-781679 
Deputy Chief Economist  784824 
Ministry of  Finance  826209 
- Secretariat  Mr. J.C. McGrath  265-630612/584  265-622992  johnmcgrath@malawi.net 
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Mauritius: 
- PIC Chairman  Hon. R. Bheenick  230-2013575  230-2113095  medrc@intnet.mu 
Minister of  Economic  230-2012673 
Development, Productivity 
and Regional Development 
- TWG Chairman  Mr D. Dusoruth,  230-201-1633  230-2115363  medrc@intnet.mu 
Officer in Charge, Regional 
Co-operation, Ministry of 
Economic Development, 
Productivity and Regional 
Development 
- Secretariat  Mr Pierre Dinan  230-202-3000  230-208-0086  multico@intnet. mu 
Namibia: 
- PIC Chairman  Hon. Bernard Esau  264-61-2837329  264-61-253866 
Deputy Minister of  Trade 
and Industry 
- TWG Chairman  Ms Paulina Elago,  264-61-2837331  264-61-253865  pelago@iwwn.com.na 
Director, International Trade 
Ministry of  Trade and 
Industry 
- Secretariat  Mrs E van der Linden  264-61-259060  264-61-233629  trendline@mweb.com.na 
Seychelles: 
-PIC Chairman  Hon. J. Michel  248-382000  248-225265 
Vice President and Minister 
of  Finance and 
Communications 
- TWG Chairman  MrT. Jones,  248-224688  248-224845  mfapesey@seychelles.net 
Director General, 
International Relations, 
Ministry ofF  oreign Affairs 
- Secretariat  Mr M Nalletamby  248-225131  248-225414  nalletamby@hotmail.com 
Swaziland: 
- PIC Chairman  Hon. Lufto Dlamini  268-40-43201  268-40-44  711 
Minister of  Enterprise and 
Employment 
- TWG Chairman  Mr Myekeni Vilakati  268-40-43201  268-40-44711 
Principal Secretary 
Ministry of  Enterprise and 
Employment 
- Secretariat  MrMHall  268-42-20080  268-42-20080  raddon@realnet.co.sz 
Tanzania: 
-PIC Chairman  Hon. Daniel Yona  255-51-111174/6  255-51-117790 
Minister of  Finance  112854  110326 
- TWG Chairman  MrGMgonja  255-51-113334  255-51-110326 
Deputy Permanent Secretary  117790 
Ministry of  Finance 
- Secretariat  MrL. Mmasi  255-51-114469  255-51-114099  imais@cats-net.com 
MrTMworia  111903 
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Uganda: 
- PIC Chairman  Hon J. Mayanja-Nkangi  256-41-230290  256-41-250005 
Minister of  Finance  232370 
- TWG Chairman  Mr K. Muhakanizi  256-41-230290  256-41-250005  finance@imul.com 
Commissioner  232370 
Ministry of  Finance,  234700/9 
Planning and Economic 
Development 
- Secretariat  Dr Evarist Mugisa  256-41-232657  256-41-232657  equamgt@infocom.co.ug 
256-75-717140 
Zambia: 
-PIC Chairman  Minister of  Finance  260-1-250544  260-1-251078  finance@zamintnet.com 
250593 
- TWG Chairman  Mrs Irene Tembo  260-1-221475  260-1-226673 
Acting Director of  Trade 
- Secretariat  Mr JKasanga  260-1-227889/90  260-1-227891  imcs@zamnet.zm 
Zimbabwe: 
-PIC Chairman  Hon. H Murerwa  263-4-794571  263-4-792750 
Minister of  Finance 
- TWG Chairman  Ms R. Faranisi,  263-4-734  780/8  263-4-793998  rfaranisi@gta.govt.zw 
Director, Ministry of  Finance  263-4-774232 
- Secretariat  Mr K. Atkinson  263-4-774233/5  imani@ecoweb.co.zw 
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Chairman 's Summation: Third CBI 
Ministerial Meeting 
Harare, Zimbabwe, February 19-20, 1998 
1.  Discussions during the two days affirmed the considerable progress in 
the implementation of  the CBI Agenda, the contribution it has made in promoting 
sound economic management and the creation of  a policy and institutional 
environment conducive to the promotion of private investment and trade among 
the participating countries. 
2.  There was a concern about the lack of  participation by South Africa in 
the CBI process. It was noted that South Africa's current trade policy restricts 
access of CBI countries to South African market, thereby creating unsustainable 
bilateral trade deficits with South Africa. The slow pace of  SA CU renegotiations 
is also a concern for Namibia and Swaziland. It was hoped that an expeditious 
ratification of  the SADC Trade Protocol would ease the current situation. The 
meeting resolved to continue the dialogue with South Africa on its trade 
liberalization. 
p.567 3.  Some CBI countries felt that the CBI Agenda on trade liberalization 
should be flexibly interpreted taking into account specific country 
circumstances. 
4.  The discussion particularly noted the contributions made by the 
TWGs in the formulation and implementation of the country-specific actions. 
Experience suggests that the TWGs have facilitated broader policy dialogue 
between the private sector and the concerned governments. There was a 
consensus that the TWGs should be sustained and further strengthened. The 
proposed CBJ website could facilitate interaction between the TWGs.  This 
could provide a valuable neighborhood effect in the form of exchange of 
technical expertise among the CBI participants. This could further enhance 
homegrown competence.  It was also suggested that TWGs should be broadened 
to include organized labor so as to facilitate labor market reform as an essential 
step in promoting investment. 
5.  The discussions have also confirmed the need to stay the course with 
the evolving agenda.  The meeting recognized that despite obvious progress, 
trade liberalization is not complete and tariff  reform needs to encompass other 
duties and charges. Failure to do so has the potential to negate the progress so 
far.  The discussions indicated a concern about the potential revenue impact of 
such reforms. However, there is evidence from the experience of  the CBI trail 
blazers that such reforms are fiscally sustainable even in the short term in the 
context of overall taxation reform and elimination of exemptions. This is also 
desirable over the medium term for efficient investment and acceleration in 
growth. 
6.  The same would be true of investment deregulation and related 
issues such as residence and work permits. These are all within our reach. All it 
requires us is to shed our fear of  the unknown, and a resolute will to view the 
private sector as the engine for vigorous growth.  The discussions reflected a 
consensus in favor of completing actions on investment deregulation by end-
1998. We propose that the same should be held also for residence and work 
permits. 
p.568 7.  The issue of adequate regional networks for communication and 
transportation was raised by several delegations. The partners would address this 
issue in the context of  their bilateral lending programs. 
8.  The volume and timeliness of donor support was raised as an issue. 
Clarifications were offered that balance of  payments needs of  the CBI participants 
which have undertaken the relevant reforms, have been met by the co-sponsors as 
a group. In addition, there has been a substantive flow of  grant-funded technical 
assistance.  It was further clarified that preparation of  LCBJP alone is not enough 
to receive bop support. The LCBIP has to be anchored in an appropriate 
macroeconomic framework 
9.  Because of  extended discussion on other matters, the issue of  financial 
sector reform, as proposed in the Synthesis Paper, did not come up for discussion. 
I believe this will be a very worthwhile effort for non-SADC countries, in parallel 
with a similar effort already underway for SADC countries. 
10.  There was a desire on the part of  the regional institutions who have 
all endorsed CBI process for a greater role in existing CBI countries to implement 
the CBI Agenda. The participating countries, in cooperation with the regional 
institutions, need to promote CBI Agenda in their periodic discussions. Exchange 
of information was emphasized by several delegations today. As we indicated 
yesterday the proposed Web site will help the process. We will seek the 
cooperation of  Regional Institutions in this regard. 
11.  In the light of our discussion yesterday, I perceive a clear consensus 
that CBI has taken roots. There is also a long way to go and the evolving agenda 
as identified in the Synthesis Paper, needs to be pursued. It is thus premature to 
call a closure on this very worthwhile venture. We, therefore, resolve to 
continue. 
p.569 12.  Due consideration should also be given to further broaden the 
participation within the region (e.g., Mozambique) as a way forward to facilitate 
the much-avowed objective of economic integration. The principle of  self 
selection will ensure that countries of  their own volition and state of economic 
management will decide on such participation. The co-sponsors will facilitate 
this. 
13.  In conclusion, I express my deep satisfaction at the substantive and 
very encouraging deliberations of  these two days and express my support and 
confidence in the path ahead.  We have resolved to implement the Action Plan 
adopted at this meeting. We also resolve that the next ministerial meeting be 
held in a year's time and a meeting of the TWGs in six months to consider the 
Road Map for investment facilitation. Finally, I would like to thank the 
secretariat and the interpreters for helping make our deliberations a success. 
Thank you. 
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Country  Names Participants  Position  Address  Telephone/Fax  e-mail address 
Burundi  Mr. M.  Sinamenye  Governor, Bank of Burundi  P.O. BOX 705, BUJUMBURA  257-222-744/ 257-223-128 
Mr.  Sigejeje  Secretary General, Chamber of  P.O.  BOX 313  257-222280 I 257-227895 
Commerce and Industry 
Mr.  C.  Sakubu  Director. Private Sector  P.O. BOX 6138, BUJUMBURA  257-213-447/257-213-446  PPSD@WorldBank.org 
Development 
Mr. P. Nyamoya  Consultant, TWG Secretary  B.P 2085, BUJUMBURA  257-222-096/257-221-391 
Comores  Mr.  Issihaka Mahamoud  Secretary General, Ministry of  BP 324, MORONI, COMORES  269-744141 
Finance, Chairman TWG 
Mr Mohamed S. Ibrahim  Chief Inspector of  Customs  BP 1048 MORONI, COMORES  269-732140 
Mr Mogne Said Mugni  Private sector  AV. DE LA LIGNE DES ETATS ARABS  269-732971 
Kenya  Hon. C.P.K. Arap Kirui  Ass. Minister of  Finance  P.O BOX 70928, NAIROBI  254-2-338111/219303 
Hon. S.Ole Ntutu  Ass. Minister of East African and  BOX 30510, NAIROBI  254-2-227411 
Regional Co-operation 
Mr S. Wa Sanja  Under Secretary, Ministry of  P.O. BOX 30007, NAIROBI  254-2-338111 
Finance 
Mr.  J.G. Tuamwari (SP)  Dep. Chief Economist, Ministry of  P.O. BOX 30510, NAIROBI  254-2-227411/252777 
East African and Regional Co-
operation 
Mr R.N. Omusi  Sen. Trade Officer, Kenya National  P.O BOX 47024, NAIROBI  254-2-220866/7- 340664 
Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 
Madagascar  Mr A.R. Randrianarivony  Secretary General, Ministry of  101-ANTANANARIVO  261-202-220-423/234-530 
Finance and Economic Planning 
Mr A. Rajaobelison  Director General, Economic  B.P674ANTANANARIVO 101  261-202-220-284/228-508 
Planning 
Mr R.  Ramanana  Director, Technical and Research,  DIRECTION DES DOUANES (PTE)  261-202-227637 
Customs Department 
MrLeonnel  Dir. of  External Trade, Ministry of  P.O.BOX 593 ANTANANARIVO 101  261-202-229-872/231-280 
Commerce and Consumption Country  Names Participants  Position  Address  Telephone/Fax  e-mail address 
Malawi  Hon. J. Malewezi (SP)  Vice President & Minister of  P.O. BOX 30049, LILONGWE  265-782777/781521 
Finance 
Dr Maxwell Mkwezalamba  Chief Economist,Malawi Chamber  BOX 258 BLANTYRE  671-988/671147  MCCI@EO.WN.APC.ORG 
of Commerce and Industry 
Mr P.  Zimpita  Senior Treasury Economist  BOX 30049, LILONGWE  265-782199/781679 
Mr G. Kabango  Divisional Chief, Reserve Bank  BOX 30063, LILONGWE  780 600 
Mr B. Sambakunsi  Economist, National Economic  P.O. BOX 30136, LILONGWE 3  265-782-300/782233/ 
Council  782224 
Mr.  J.C. McGrath  Consultant, TWG Secretary  BOX 2598, BLANTYRE, MALAWI  265-630612/584/622992  johnmcgrath@malawinet 
Mauritius  Ron. R. Bheenick  Minister of  Economic Development  PORT-LOUIS  230-201-3575 
& Regional Co-operation 
Mr N. Boodhoo  Trade Officer, Ministry of  Foreign  5th FLOOR CNT HOUSE  2011319/2126368  MOTAS@bowiNT.MV 
Affairs and International Trade 
Mr D. Dusoruth  Officer in Charge, Regional Co- MINISTRY OF EC DEV  &REGIONAL  201-1633/230-212-4124 
operation, Ministty of Economic  COOP 
Development and Regional Co-
operation 
MrMCheeroo  Deputy Secretary General,  3 ROYAL ST. PORT-LOUIS  230-208-33011208-0076  mccipl@intnet.mg 
Mauritius Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry 
Namibia  Hon. W. Emvula  Deputy Minister of Trade and  P.B.  13340 WINDHOEK  264-61-283-7329/253866 
Industry 
Ron. R. Kukuri  Deputy Minister of  Finance  P.B.  12395, WINDHOEK  264-61-229-127/230179 
MsP. Elago  Director International Trade,  P.B.  13340 Mil, WINDHOEK  264-61-2837291/253865  pelago@iwwn.com.na 
Ministry of  Trade and Industry 
MrS. Geiseb  Head of  Corporate Services,  BOX 9355, WINDHOEK  264-61-228809/228009  nnccihq@iwwn.com.na 
Namibia National Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 
Rwanda  Mr E.M. Ndahimana  Secretary of  State Finance &  P.O. BOX 1881 KIGALI  250-74785 
Economic Planning 
MrE. Torero  Deputy Controller of  Customs  P.O. BOX 718 KIGALI  250-78088 Country  Names Participants  Position  Address  Telephone/Fax  e-mail address 
Seychelles  Hon. J. Bonnelame  Minister ofF  oreign Affairs, Planning  P.O. BOX 656 VICTORIA  248-224866/224845  mfapesey@seychelles.net 
and Environment 
MrT. Jones  Director, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs,  MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  248-224688/224845  mfapesey@seychelles.net 
Planning and Environment 
Mr J. D'Offay  Director General, Trade and  VICTORIA, MAHE  248-550158 
Commerce, Ministry of  Finance and 
Communications 
Mr Joe Chung Faye  Representative of  Seychelles  BEL OMBRE, MAHE  248-22454  7/224065 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Swaziland  Hon. A.M.C. Dlamini  Minister of  Enterprise and  Box 451, Swaziland  0268 43201/8/44711 
Employment 
Hon. A.H.N. Shabangu  Minister of  Finance  BOX 602, MBABANE, SWAZILAND  42296/42157 
MR S. T.  Motsa  Senior  Planning Officer, Ministry of  Box 451, Swaziland  43201-6/44  711 
Enterprise and Employment 
MrM. Hall  Consultant, TWG Secretary  P 0  BOX 4567, Mbabane, SWAZILAND  268 20080 
Tanzania  Hon. M. Mbega  Deputy  Minister of  Finance  P 0  BOX 9111, DARES SALAAM  255-51-113334/117790 
Mr G.S. Mgonja  Deputy  Principal Secretary, Ministry  P 0  BOX 9111, DARES SALAAM  255-51-113334/110326 
of  Finance 
Mr M.M. Kalanje  Tanzania Chamber of Commerce,  P 0  BOX 9713, DARES SALAAM  255-51-11943  7 
Industry and Agriculture 
Zambia  Rev. D. Pule  Deputy Minister Finance  ZAMBIA 
Mrs S. Chibanda  Director, Ministry of  Finance  P 0  BOX 50062,LUSAKA,ZAMBIA  260-1-250501/250115 
MrL. Mwale  Assistant to Minister of  Finance  BOX 50062, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  260-1-254263/253494  finance@zamintnet.com 
Mr A.S. Kalambata  Acting Principal Economist, Ministry  P 0  BOX 50062, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  260-1-250501/250115 
of  Finance 
Mr J. Kasanga (SP)  Consultant, TWG Secretary  BOX 30997, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  260-1-227889/227890  imcs@zamnet.zm 
Mr 0  Sikufweba  Director of  Commerce & Trade,  P 0  BOX 31968, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  260-1-221475 
Ministry of  Commece, Trade and 
Industry 
Zimbabwe  Hon. Dr.  H. Murerwa  Minister of Finance  P 0  BOX 7705 CAUSEWAY, HARARE  263-4-723363/792750 
Mr C.T. Kuwaza  Senior Secretary for Finance  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263 -4 722101/792750 
Mrs R. Faranisi  Director, Ministry of  Finance  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-734  780/793998 
Mr M. Dzinotizei  Deputy Director, Ministry of  Finance  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-734  780/793998 
Mr 0. Matshalaga  Director of  Finance, Ministry of  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-725542/792750 
Finance Country  Names Participants  Position  Address  Telephone/Fax  e-mail address 
Miss C.  Mhini  Chief Economist, Ministry of  Finance  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-734  780/793998 
Mr F Chawasarira  Chief Executive Officer, ZimTrade  4th FLOOR KURIMA HSE, HARARE, ZIM  263-4-706887/708630 
MRFChihwai  Principal Economist, International  BOX 1283, HARARE  263-4-703000/705978  psyeharare.iafrica.com 
Relations, Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe 
Mrs J.C Blanchfield  President, Confederation of  P.O. BOX 3794, HARARE  263-4 77226726-7/750953  CZI@PRIMENETZW.COM 
Zimbabwe Industries 
Mr T.  Dhliwayo  Chief Economist, Minisrtry of  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-794029/793998 
Finance 
Dr. L. Tshumba  Governor,  Reserve Bank of  RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE  263-4705311/705890 
Zimbabwe 
Mr G.D. Nyaguse  Chief Economist, Ministry of  Finance  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-734  788/793998 
MrS Malaba  Advisor to the Governor  P 0  BOX 1283, HARARE, ZIMBABWE  263-4-703000 
Mr G C Magwenzi  Snr. Admin Officer  P 0  BOX 4240, HARARE, ZIMBABWE  263-4-707005/794681 
MrsEKarwi  Ass. Dir. Marketing & Research,  109 ROTTEN ROW, HARARE,  263-4-780140-5/759917  karwi@zic.samara.co.zw 
Zimbabwe Investment Centre  ZIMBABWE 
MrD Ruhukwa  Snr. Law Officer, Attorney General's  P BAG 7714, CAUSEWAY, HARARE  263-4-772997/87/79090 I 
Office 
Mrs J Kateera  Economist  BOX 7705, CAUSEWAY, HARARE  263-4-722101/706853 
Mrs S Mugoni  Ministry of  Information  BOX CY 825, CAUSEWAY, HARARE  263-4-736910/705914 
Mr W Chidakwa  General Manager, EPZA  9th FLOOR LIVINGSTONE HSE, S  263-4-736565/736486 
MACHEL 
Mr L Masilela  Customs & Excise Dept  PO BOX 7715, CAUSEWAY, HARARE  263-4-739598/790255 
Mrs CNcube  Senior Economist, Ministry of  P BAG 7705, CAUSEWAY  263-4-734780 
Finance 
Mozambique  Mr.  C.C. Jessen  Dep. Minister for Planning & Finance  MOZAMBIQUE  491-762/491-460 
Regional 
Organisations 
SADC  Dr P. Ramsamy  Chief Economist  PB 0095,Gaborone, Botswana  267-351-863  ramsamyp@sadc.int 
Mr L.B. Monyake  Dep. Executive Secretary  P B 0095, GABORONE, BOTSWANA  267-351863/372848  monyake@sadc.int 
COMES  A  Dr J.E.O. Mwencha  Acting Secretary General  COMES  A  263-4-229727/32/227318  secgena@comesa.int 
MrM Pearson  Advisor  P 0  Box 30051, Lusaka  260-1-221009/225107  mpearson@comesa.int 
Mr L Nitereka  Operations Officer, COMESA  CO MESA BANKERS ASS.  263-4-72624  7/730819  niterek@id.com 
Bankers Association 
Mri Lukwago  Director  P 0  Box 7120, Uganda  256-41-230978/255983 
MrS. Karangizi  BOX 30051, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA  260-1-229726/225107  skarangizi@comesa.int Country  Names Participants  Position  Address  Telephone/Fax  e-mail address 
C. CLEARING  Mr A. Mansoor  Executive Secretary  101 UNION AVENUE, HARARE, ZIM  263-4-790954  amnsoor@worldbank.org 
HOUSE 
IOC  Mr E.M. Caabi  Secretary General  BP 7, MAURITIUS  230-425-1652/ 425-1209  co17@bow.intnet.mu 
EAC  Dr S.G. Nahamya  Dep. Executive Secretary  P.O. BOX 1096, ARUSHA  (057) 4254/(057) 4255  N/A 
ECA  Dr C.T. Mwalwanda  Sen. Economist Affairs  BOX 3005  251-1-515391/  Cornelius-Mwalwanda-at-
251-1-510389  uneca@un.org 
OAU  MrD. Luke  Chief of  Trade  BOX 3243, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA  251-1-510458/512622  david.luke@telecom.net.et 
Dr I M Mah'moud  Monetary Policy Expert  OAU/PASUAddis Ababa, Ethiopia  251-1-517700/512622 
GCA  MrT. Dinka  Senior Advisor  1750 PENNSLVANIAAV, NW SUITE 1204,  202-458-4043/522-3259  TDINKA@WORLDBANK.ORG 
WASHINGTON DC 20006 
Co-Sponsors 
EU  MrW. Kennes  Head of  Sector Regional  RUE DE LA LOI, 200-1049, BRUSSELS  32-2-2992729/2992896  N/A 
Integration 
Mr J da Silva Domingos  Director, Eastern &  Southern  RUE DE LA LOI, 200-1049, BRUSSELS  32-2-2993259/2992902  N/A 
Africa 
Ms G. Nkhata  Economist  200 RUE DE LA LOI, G-12-8/10  32-2-2992863/ 32-2- N/A 
2992896 
Mr P.  Christiansen  Ambassador, Head of  P.O. BOX 9514  255-51-117473/ 113277  eudeltza@twiga.com 
Delegation, Tanzania 
MrK Sibanda  National Project Officer  Box 4252, EU, Harare  263-4-707139 
Mr J.E. Leandro  Economic Adviser  110 TAKAWIRA STREET, HARARE  707120/ 734084  eucomzim@harare.iafrica.com 
IMF  MrG. Gondwe  Deputy Director  700 19TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON DC  202-623-6957/202-623- N/A 
6987 
Mr H. De Zoysa  Sen. Economist  700 19TH STREET, NW WASHINGTON DC  202-623-8688/202-623- HdeZoysa@IMF.org 
5315 
MrR. Franco  Resident Representative  65 SAMORA MACHEL, HARARE  737074/75/737076  N/A 
World Bank  Mr N. Gorjestani  Lead Advisor  1818 H.ST, NW, WASHINGTON, DC.  202-4  73-3343/202-4  77- ngorjestani@worldbank.org 
2977 
MrH. Imam  Senior Economist  181 H. ST, WASHINGTON. DC  202-4  73-4419/202-4  73- kimim@worldbank.org 
8179 
Mr. A.  Rajaram  Economist  P.O. BOX 30577 NAIROBI, KENYA  254-2-260446/260382  ARAJARAM@WORLDBANK.ORG 
MrD. Cook  Representative  BOX 2960, ZIMBABWE  263-4-729611/708659  N/A 
ADB  Mr.A.R.Awl  Director  BP 1387, COTE DIVOIRE  225-20.40.4  7/225-20.49.02  A. A  WL@AIDB.org 
MrF. Ndukwe  Economist  ADB, BPV 316, COTE DIVOIRE  225-20-4  792/225.20.42.20  F.Ndukwe@Afdb.org 
Mr S M Malleck Amode  Principal Economist  P 0 BOX V316, ABIDJAN, COTE D'IVOIRE  225-20-44 96/49 86 
Imani Dev  Mr R. Hess  Managing Director  P 0  BOX  4990, HARARE, ZIMBABWE  263-4  77  4233/5/77  4 23 3  imani@harare.iafrica.com APPENDIX IV 
CBI Fourth Ministerial Meeting 
Grand Baie, Mauritius, October 18-19, 1999 
CHAIRMAN'S SUMMATION 
The discussions have confirmed the considerable progress that has been made by 
participating countries since the CBI's inception in all four policy areas: exchange 
systems;trade liberalization and facilitation; strengthening of  domestic banking and 
payment systems; and investment regulation. These measures have contributed to 
improved performance in trade and growth and have laid many of  the conditions 
necessary to increase investment flows and sustain high performance over a longer 
period. 
However, much remains to be done.  There are many elements of  the reform 
agenda which still have to be completed. 
We have focused specifically during these two days on measures to stimulate 
investment. By enthusiastically endorsing the Road Map for Investment Facilitation 
we have committed ourselves to a series of  actions to improve the environment for 
both foreign and domestic investors. The emphasis has been on attracting foreign 
direct investment, but it has been clear from interventions that this will only result if 
our own nationals are satisfied with domestic conditions for investment and take the 
lead. 
p.576 As representatives of  both public and private sectors, we  have all: 
• Recognised that essential conditions for attracting investment must be met 
including : peace, political stability; good political and corporate governance; 
macroeconomic reform and stability; trade liberalization; market integration; 
exchange system liberalization ;investment deregulation ;and policy consistency. 
The sustained implementation of  these policies and measures will go some way to 
create an environment in which flight capital will return. 
• Identified areas in which actions are needed to increase investment that may take 
time to be formulated or bear fruit, including: tax reform; legal and judicial and 
institutional reform; capital market development; human capital development; credible 
privatisation;improved infrastructure; and investment promotion; and 
• Agreed to establish programmes for Immediate Actions to increase investment 
involving: accelerated implementation of  CBI trade reform agenda; investment 
promotion; selective legal and judicial reform; selective tax reforms and an Africa 
Achievement Award scheme. 
It has been clear from our discussions that precise measures will differ from 
country to country but, in all, there is a need for actions in all these areas. 
Time and again, the question of  the image of  the region was raised. Press comment 
is often felt to be unfair; investors often held outdated perceptions which did not 
differentiate between countries or recognize recent improvements. The best way to 
address such concerns is through improved performance. But the regional dimension is 
important. Just as countries can be badly labeled by the errors of  their neighbours, so can 
they gain credibility from their successes. Such measures as the proposed African 
Achievement Award scheme can also help correct misperceptions.  Private sector 
participants have also again emphasised the importance of  political stability and social 
peace. 
While recognising the substantial support that the co-sponsors have provided for 
the reform process, many participants stressed the need for continued assistance to 
implement the measures and to help address any fiscal consequences. The co-sponsors 
have also indicated a willingness to extend their support for such measures. They 
detailed several new initiatives such as the AIG-African Infrastructure Fund, the 
proposed African Guarantee Facility, the enhanced HIPC Initiative, the EU SADC 
Investment Programme, PRIDE, the new EU support programmes for COMESA and 
EAC and the ADB Multinational Projects Fund. 
p.577 We also discussed the way ahead.  In particular: 
• We agreed to explore ways to establish a high-level forum of countries in the 
region that will promote broader  regional cooperation and development. As a first 
step we agreed to form a working group chaired by Mauritius, comprising Kenya, 
Namibia, Mauritius, Uganda Zambia, Zimbabwe, and if  possible another country, to 
develop the concept further.  The  working group will report by the end of  February 
2000.  We also agreed on some guiding principles.  The forum should be a think-
tank rather than a new institution, providing a neutral space which would transcend 
the boundaries of  existing regional arrangements.  It should also build on existing 
institutions like regional business groups and the Technical Working Groups. 
• Participating countries will in future take  a larger stake in the direction and 
organisation of  the CBI with the cosponsors in a supporting role. 
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PARTICIPANTS LIST 
Country  Name  Address  Tel  Fax  e-mail 
Burundi  Mr J.B. Habonimana  Economic Advisor in President's Office  257 24 1382 
lind Vice-President 
Mr Cyprien Sakubu  Ministry of  Trade Industry & Tourism  257 21  3447/8  257 21  3446  sakubu @cbinf.com 
P.O.Box 6138, Bujumbura 
Mr Prime Nyamoya  Consultant  257 222096  257 22 1341  ogi@cni.cbinf.com 
Mr F. Karangura  Tembo Burundi, P.O.Box 2891  257 211034  257 211413  tembobdi@cbinf.com 
Comores  Mr Maoulana Charif  Secretaire General du Ministere des  269 744144  261  74 4140  smpt.km 
Finance  269 733756 (res) 
P.O Box 324, Moroni 
Mrs Zalihata Dahalane  Consultant du GTT, BP 1923 Moroni  269 736076  269 732222  zal.daha@smpt.rm 
Mr Ahamada Mbapandza  Association pour la promotion du  269 730338  269 730313 
secteur privee, Moroni RFI 
P.O. Box 1347 
Kenya  Hon. K. N.K. Biwot  Minister of  Tourism, Trade & Industry  254 2 227411  254 2 252777 
P.Box 30510, Nairobi 
Mr Samuel Zadock Ambuka  Ministry of  Tourism, Trade & Industry  254 2 250240  254 2 252777 
P.Box 30510, Nairobi 
Mr Z. N. Mwaura  M/Tourism, Trade & Industry  254 2 227411  254 2 252777 
P.Box 30510, Nairobi 
Mr Kefa Lando Muga  Senior Economist  254 2 240109  254 2 250125 
Fiscal and Monetary Affairs 
Ministry of  Finance 
P.O.Box 30007, Nairobi 
Mr Bernard Kagira  Consultant/Secretary  254 2 543351  254 2 537 713  aedc@africaonline.co.ke 
Kenya TWG P.O.Box 45507, Nairobi '? 
Vl 
00 
0 
Country 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Name 
Mr A. Randrianarivony 
Mr A. Rajaobelison 
Mr C. Ramanana-Rahary 
Mr Paul Gerard Ravelomanantsoa 
Mr Jaona Randrianarisoa 
Mr Kinord Mkwinda 
Mr C. Kaferapanjira 
Mr John Richard Me Grath 
Hon R. Bheenick 
Mr D Dusoruth 
Mr Navin Beekarry 
Address 
Secretaire General et du Ministere des 
Finances et de L'Economie, 
Antaninarenina.l 0 I 
President du GTT 
Min des finances et de L'economie 
Antaninarenina.I 0 I 
Direction Generale des Douanes 
Antaninarenina I 0 I Antatanarivo 
9, Rue Rainitovo, Antsahavola, 
Antananarivo 
Comite de reflexion sur la competitivite 
Immeuble Marbour-Antsahavola 
Antananarivo 
Ministry oflndustry & Commerce 
30366, Lilongwe 3 
Malawi Investment Promotion agency 
P/Bag 302, Lilongwe 3 
Imani Development Malawi 
P.O. Box 2598  Blantyre 
Minister of  Economic Development 
Productivity and Regional Development 
9th Floor Emmanuel Anquetil Building, 
SSR Street Port Louis 
Officer in Charge Regional Development 
Division 
9th Floor Emmanuel Anquetil Building, 
SSR Street Port Louis 
Assistant - Solicitor General 
Attorney General's  Office 
Grannum Road, Vacoas 
Tel  Fax  e-mail 
26I 2 02220423  261 20 34530  a.r.randria@lycosmail.com 
26I 20 22202 84  26I 20 28508  dgep@dts.mg 
26I 20 22 276 37  26I 20 22 21307 
26I 20 22 2I628 
26I 202262I-I2  26I 20 2264354  ccc@compro.mg 
265 78024  265 7806 80  minci@malawi.net 
265 780800  265 78I78I  ckaferapanjira@eo.  wn.apc.org 
265  632 I86  265 6306I2  johnrncgrath@malawi.net 
230 20I 35 75  230 211  3095  medrc@bow.intnet.mu 
230 20I 35 75  230 2II 5363  medrc@bow.intnet.mu 
230 2I2 3964  nbeeka@intnet.mu Country  Name  Address  Tel  Fax  e-mail 
Mr Narainduth Boodhoo  Trade Analyst  230 2011319  230 212 6368  motas@bow.intnet.mu 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs & International 
Trade 
5th Floor Government Centre, Port Louis 
Mr Marcel Lan Pin Wing  Senior Industrial Analy~t  230 210 7100  230 211  0855 
Ministry oflndustry, Commerce corporate 
Affairs and Financial Services 
Dr A. K. Aubeeluck  Director Economic Affairs, Ministry ofF  inance  230 201  2336  230 212 9385 
Mr Pierre Dinan  Consultant TWG  230 202 3000  230 212 5265  pierre.dinan@dcdm.intnet.mu 
DCDM 10, Rue Frere Felix de Valois, Port 
Louis 
Namibia  Hon. Bernhardt Esau  Ministry of  Trade & Industry  264 61  2837329  264 61  253866 
P/BAG 13340, Windhoek 
Mr A  N dishishi  Ministry of  Trade & Industry  264 61  2837111  264 61  220227  ndishishi@mti.gov.na 
P/BAG 13340, Windhoek 
Ms E. Van der Linden  Trendline Economic & Mgt Services  264 61  259060  264 61  233629  trendline@iwwn.com.na 
P.O.Box 80822 
Mr Penda Kiiyala  Deputy Director National Planning  264 61  2834081  264 61  236794  pkiiyala@npc.gov.na 
Commission 
P.O Box 4523, Windhoek 
Mr !Gaoseb U. F.  Namibia Investment Centre  264 61  283 7348  264 61  254600  gaoseb@mti.gov.na 
P. Bag 13340, Windhoek 
MrS. Geiseb  Namibia Chamber of  Commerce &  264 61  228809  264 61228009  nnccihq@iwwn.com.na 
Industry P.O.Box 9355, Windhoek 
Seychelles  MrTerry Jones  Ministry ofForeignAffairs, PO Box 656,  (248) 225528  (248)224845  terryj@seychelles.net 
Victoria 
MrChung-Faye  Chamber of  Commerce, Private Sector,  (248) 224547  (248)323888  jmsa@Seychelles.net 
PO Box 933 Victoria 
Swaziland  Hon. Nicolas Matsebula  Box 3009 Mbabane  268 4829080  268 404 4711 
MrS. Motsa  Ministry Delegate of  Enterprise and  268 404 3201-6 
employment 
Government, Box 451  Mbabane Country  Name  Address  Tel  Fax  e-mail 
Mr Z. W. Lukhele  Corporate Planner  268 404 2486  268 404 5009  sifiso@iafrica.sz 
Swaziland, Railway 
P.O.Box 475, Mbabane 
Tanzania  Mr S.R. Madata  Ministry of  Finance,  116597 
P.O Box 9111, 
Dar es Salaam 
Mr T.M. Mworia  Iramba Management & Industrial Services  264 61  114469  114099  imais@cats.net.com 
P.O.Box 21856 DarEs Salaam 
Uganda  Hon. Gabriel Opio  Ministry of  Finance  256 041  342367  256 041  342370 
Mr A. D. Ngororano  Private Sector Foundation  256 041  344920/1  256 041  259109  prisf@starcom.co.ug 
P.O.Box 7683, Kampala 
> 
MrR. Mugabi  Ministry of  Finance  256 041  342367  256 041  342370 
Dr Evarist Mugisa  Equator Management Services Ltd  256 041  232657  256 041  232657  equamqt@infocom.co.ug 
P.O.Box 9444, Kampala 
Zambia  Hon. G.  Simasiku  Government ofthe Republic of  Zambia  260 1 253388  260 I 250012 
PO Box 50062  Lusaka 
Mr Oliver Sikuf\veba  Ministry of  Commerce Trade & Industry  206 1 221475  260 1 221475  comtrade@zarnnet.zn 
P.O.Box 31958, Lusaka 
Mr John Kasanga  IMCS, Box 30997 Lusaka,  260 1 227889  206 1 227891  imcs@zarnnet.zm 
Mr Moses Simemba  Zambia Association of  Chambers of  260 1 252369  260 1 252483  zacci@zarnnet.zm 
Commerce and Industry 
Box 30844 Lusaka 
Mr W. Aka:pelwa  Finance & Economic Development  260 1 252143  260 1 250115 
P.O.Box 50062, Lusaka 
Zimbabwe  Hon. M. Chinamasa  Ministry of  Finance, P.O.Box 7705  263 4 727472 
Mr F. Chimphondha  ZNCC P.O.Box St 234 Southerton, Harare  263 4 663561-3  263 4 661661 
Mr S. Mutanhaurwa  Ministry oflndustry & Commerce  263 4 791823  263 4 723765  minind02@samara.co.zw 
P.Bag 7708, Causeway, Harare 
Ms R. Chota  Imani Development  263 4774233  263 4 774232  imani@harare.africa.com 
P.O Box 4990, Harare 
Ms Ma-Lord Makaya  ZimTrade, P.O. Box 2738, Harare  263 4 706676  263 4 706930  mmakaya@zimtrade.co.zw Country  Name  Address  Tel  Fax  e-mail 
Regional Organisations 
CO  MESA  Mr. Erastus J. 0. Mwencha  Comesa  260 1 22 9725  260 1 22 7318  secgen@comesa.int 
Box 30051, Lusaka, Zambia  260 1 22 5107 
Dr C. Chanthunya  Come  sa  260 1 22 9726  cchanthunya@comesa.int 
Box 30051, Lusaka, Zambia  260 1 221009 
Mr Mark Pearson  Comesa  260 1 22 1009  mpearson@comesa.int 
Box 30051, Lusaka, Zambia 
Mr Isa Lukwago  Comesa Clearing House  263 4793 911  lukwago@id.co.zw 
101 Union Avenue, Harare  263 472 793.911 
Mr Mahmood Mansoor  Economic Consultant Comesa  263 4 72 6246-8  mmansoor@fumail.com 
Clearing House 
101 Union Avenue, Harare, 
Zimbabwe  230 425 2709 
IOC  Mr Caabi Elyachroutu Mohamed  Indian Ocean Commision  230 425 1652  coi7@bow.intnet.mu 
Q4 Avenue Guy Forget, Quatre 
Bomes, Mauritius  230 425 2709 
Mr 0. Magnaval  Indian Ocean Commision  230 425 1652  magnaval@intnet.mu 
Q4 Avenue Guy Forget, Quatre 
Bomes, Mauritius  230 425 2709 
Mr E. Van Overstraeten  Indian Ocean Commision  230 425 1652 
Q4 Avenue Guy Forget, Quatre 
Bomes, Mauritius  27 12 315 5108 
SADCIFISCU  MrL. Wort  Private Bag X115 Pretoria,  27  12 315 5395  lwort@finance.pwv.gov.za 
South Africa  27 12 315 5108 
Mr B. T. Mamba  Private Bag X 115 Pretoria,  27  12 315 5927  mambab@finance.pwv.gov.za 
RSA 001 
OAU/AEC  MrE.Akpan  PO Box 32 43 Addis Ababa  25  11  519385  25  11  512622  e.b.akpan@telecome.ef.net 
Ethiopia Country  Name  Address  Tel  Fax  e-mail 
Co-Sponsors 
EU  MrB. Savage  Delegation EC, Maseru  266 313 726  bemards@iso.eudel.com 
Mr R. Baldwin  Box 1253, Gaborone Botswana, EC  267 314455  267 313626  eudelbwa@info.bw 
Mr J. Silva Domingos  R. de geneve 12-(4-61) B-1140 Brussels  322 2993259  322 299 2902  jose.silva-Domingos@dgs.cec.  be 
MrW. Kennes  Rue de la Loi 200  322 2992724  322 2992896  walter.kennespdg8.cec.be 
1049 Brussels Belgium 
Mr G. Jarchow  European Commision  230 207 1515  230 211  6624  gerd@intnet.mu 
Delegate, European Commision Port 
Louis 
Mrs Amanda Sunassee  European Commision  230 207 1515  230 2116624  amsun@intnet.mu 
Economic Assistant, 
8th Floor St James Court Port Louis 
Mr A. Schafer  European Commision, Councellor  230 207 1515  230 211  6624  schaear@intnet.mu 
8th Floor StJames Court Port Louis 
IMF  Mr Jose Fajgenbaum  700, 19th St NW, Washington DC20431  202 623 8637  202 6234131  jfajgenbaum@imf.org 
Mr Jon Shields  700, 19th St NW, Washington DC20431  202 623 6254  202 623 4131  jshields@imf.org 
ADB  MrF. Ndukwe  African Development Bank (OCOD)  225 20 4792  225 20 5991  f.ndukwe@afdb.org 
BPV 316 Abidjan Cote D'ivoire 
MrM. Traore  African Development Bank, (OCOD)  225 205 933  225 204053  m.k.  traore@atbd.org 
BV 316 Abidjan 01  Cote D'Ivoire 
World Bank  Mr 0. Campbell-White  1818 H.St. Washington D.C.  202 473 7952  202 522 1198  camwhite@worldbank.org 
Mr N. Gorjestani  1818 H. Street, Washington D.C.  202 473 3343  202 477 2977  ngorjestani@worldbank.org 
Others 
GCA  MrT. Dinka  1750 Pennsylvania Ave, Suite 1204  (202)458 4043  (202)522 3259  tdinka@worldbank.org 
Washington, DC, 20006 
Imani Development  Mr & Mrs R. Hess  PO Box 4490 Harare Zimbabwe  263 4 774 233  263 4 774 232  rhess@id.co.zw 
Mr Veepin Bhowon  D'Epinay Quatre Bomes, Mauritius  230 465 6557  230 464 9884  imani9@bow.intnet.mu '? 
Ul 
00 
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APPENDIXV 
REGIONAL MATRIX ON IMPLEMENTATION OF CBI MEASURES 
Summary of  Country Matrices as at April 2000 
Codes: 
1 =  Fully implemented 
2 =  partially implemented 
3 = arrangements for implementation in preparation 
4 = arrangements for implementation not yet identified 
S~CTORI  AREA  MEASURE 
TRADE 
Foreign Trade  Abolish import licensing 
Liberalisation  Abolish NTBs 
Eliminate tariffs on intra-regional trade 
Abolish export licensing 
Open up trade in services 
Harmonise external tariffs 
Trade Facilitation  Implement harmonised transit charges 
Introduce single goods customs 
declaration document 
Introduce bond guarantee scheme 
PAYMENTS 
Domestic  Complete financial sector reform 
Payments and  Introduce foreign trade financing 
Settlements  instruments 
Remove impediments to entry by 
foreign financial institutions 
Exchange  Remove restrictions on current account 
Systems 
Bur  Com  Ken  Mad 
2  1  1  1 
1  2  1  2 
2  2  1  3 
1  1  1  2 
1  2  1  2 
2  2  3  2 
1  n/a  1  n/a 
3  n/a  1  n/a 
4  n/a  3  n/a 
2  1  1  1 
1  4  1  2 
1  1  1  1 
1  1  1  1 
Mal  Mao  Nam  Sey  Swa  Tan  Uga  Zam  Zim 
1  1  3  2  2  1  1  1  1 
2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  2 
2  2  2  3  3  2  2  2  2 
1  1  3  1  1  1  1  1  2 
2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  3 
2  3  3  3  4  2  1  2  2 
1  n/a  3  n/a  3  2  1  1  1 
1  1  1  4  3  1  1  1  1 
4  n/a  4  n/a  3  3  3  3  3 
2  1  4  2  2  2  1  1  2 
2  1  4  1  1  1  1  2  2 
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2 
1  1  2  4  2  1  1  1  2 SECTOR/AREA  MEASURE  Bur  Com  Ken  Mad  Mal  Mau  Nam  Sey  Swa  Tan  Uga  Zam  Zim 
Remove capital account restrictions  4  3  2  4  2  I  2  2  2  2  I  1  2 
Establish unified, inter-bank, spot  4  4  I  I  2  1  1  4  2  1  1  1  1 
exchange markets 
INVESTMENT 
Investment  Simplify investment approval  3  2  I  I  2  2  I  I  3  2  2  2  1 
regtme  procedures 
Remove investment licensing  4  2  I  1  4  4  I  2  1  2  4  4  3 
requirements 
Publish investment code and  1  I  3  1  1  2  I  2  3  I  I  I  2 
regulations 
Harmonise investment regimes  4  4  3  4  3  2  1  4  3  3  3  2  4 
Immigration  Remove visa requirements at regional  2  2  2  3  2  2  2  1  2  2  I  2  2 
level 
Improve processing of  residence and  I  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  2  I  I  2  2 
employment permits 
Other  Join MIGA and similar bodies  I  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Conclude double taxation agreements  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Develop cross-listings on regional  4  4  2  4  3  2  2  3  2  3  2  2  2 
stock exchanges 
INSTITUTIONS 
Continue TWG activities  4  1  I  2  2  1  2  I  1  1  1  I  I 
Strengthen business organisations  3  2  3  2  2  I  2  2  4  2  2  2  2 
Give greater involvement to private  2  1  1  4  2  1  1  2  3  2  1  2  1 
sector in regional integration activities 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
AgreeLCBIP  2  1  I  1  1  I  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Draft Addendum to LCBIP  3  2  1  3  3  2  3  3  4  1  1  2  2 